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Foreword
This is the second set of collected papers from the Ford Foundation sponsored seminar on the global 
society This volume gathers together the research papers of fourteen advanced graduate students from 
four disciplines who completed the Ford Foundation Interdisciplinary Research Seminar on Global 
Markets and the Emerging World Society during the spring semester of 1995 at the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Each of the seminar papers is the product of the joint efforts of the graduate student listed and her or 
his major principal advisor Each of the papers attempts to address a disciplinary question in a way that 
can illuminate a problem or issue confronting the development and impact of global markets through 
the specialized knowledge and methods of the student s discipline
This approach had several advantages First students in different disciplines were encouraged to 
examine global problems in light of their knowledge and skills The Ford Seminar had the effect of 
sensitizing these students to the research agenda posed by a worldwide market economy and the need to 
apply the specialized knowledge and know how of the social science disciplines including history to 
learn how these markets work and what problems need attention to make them work better
Second students were exposed to different social science perspectives and methodologies Many of 
the papers subtly reflect the fruits of these exchanges and students were challenged to address the 
criticisms of other disciplinary perspectives and insights in developing their papers
Third students and faculty gradually developed a deeper understanding of the growing interdependence 
of peoples and states and the contribution that their particular discipline might have to an understanding 
of the major political economic and technological forces shaping the future of the emerging world 
society There clearly crystallized among the participants a heightened sense of consciousness of the 
revolutionary conditions under which we now live
None of these positive outcomes including the papers presented in this volume would have been 
possible without the encouragement and incentives provided by the Ford Foundation grant and we are 
grateful for this opportunity to make an impact on this campus and to contribute more generally to the 
development of interdisciplinary studies and their utility in solving global problems
Edward A Kolodziej
Research Professor of Political Science and
Coordinator Ford Foundation Seminar
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Chapter 1
Capitalism in Post Mao China Problem or Solution
Tom Altpeter
Since the ascendance of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 China has embarked on a series of economic reforms 
unprecedented in its history Deng and his fellow reformers are attempting and actually carrying out a 
major transformation and restructuring of the Chinese economy from a system in which social equality 
is given primacy toward a system in which free enterprise is not only condoned but actively aided and 
encouraged to effervesce And yet the economic ramifications and influences relating to the old policy 
of trying to achieve pure social egalitarianism still remain These policies are still very much 
trumpeted about by the leadership cadre de jure even if de facto more and more moves toward freer 
enterprise are devolving
In the course of this paper I will examine the major roadblocks which contemporary scholars believe 
are hindering the Chinese economy from achieving further salutary increases in economic efficiency 
After briefly reviewing the theme of China s efforts at retorm since 1978 I examine four areas in 
which it is critical to achieve clarity if any economy hopes to achieve maximum efficiency 
Specifically I will try to demonstrate that a lack of clarity concerning China s legal system central 
banking system price reforms and attitudes toward private property rights will unless clarified in the 
near future most likely lead to economic stagnation
Under the leadership of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) China moved far afield from any free enterprise 
model Since Mao was the a unmitigated Marxist he gave absolute primacy to the class struggle and 
to making sure egalitarian principles predominated After he and his cohorts achieved power in 1949 
they made sure that all private businesses were reduced to mere joint state capitalist organizations by 
1956 Says Riskm The role of the market was completely eliminated by 1956 and the previously 
for profit businessman was reduced to accepting a fixed interest payment from the state in return for 
his services 1 Mao did not favor the Soviet command type of system (because it fostered an elite set of 
bureaucratic planners within the Socialist strata) nor the market socialist system (first proffered by 
Oskar Lange in the 1930s reaching China through such spokesmen as Sun Yefang and Liu Shaoqi) 
Mao s ideal system was a kind of half way house sitting between both of these models The 
government was to control the major macroeconomic variables (decisions regarding investment versus 
consumption foreign trade allocation of material inputs and the labor supply prices of various 
commodities) while allowing room for more local initiative than the Soviet type 2
Deng Xiaoping became first Vice Premier of the State Council in January 1975 leaving him 3rd in 
line in political hierarchy behind Chou En Lai and Mao himself In the name of achieving greater 
economic efficiency he began broaching ideas which were previously held to be unspeakable for 
example the possible need for layoffs If our production is not well no revolutionary fervor will 
possibly make up for this lack I need to separate the Party from work and economic issues 3 He 
really laid the foundation for a free enterprise system to burgeon He started dismantling the Commune 
system in 1978 because it deprived farmers of incentives 4 He also broached the possibility of 
enticing foreign investment into China a move which raised eyebrows among the more conservative 
faction 5 The more conservative faction was dumbfounded that Mao s philosophy of self reliance in 
practice from 1966-1976 could be or should be abandoned so easily 6
I can contrast China s evolving incrementalism with the situation in Eastern Europe and Russia 
where efforts were made to switch much more suddenly toward a market economy (after 1989) China s 
economy has moved toward a middle ground which is neither capitalism nor socialism an institutional 
framework which perpetuated bureaucratic interferences in the economy so called market socialism
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Market socialism was the overarching philosophy of the economic system in the 1980s 7 The 
overall framework strongly resembled that of NEP (New Economic Policy) m the USSR in the 1920s 
and in China itself in the early 1950s 8 The old system of direct administrative planning was rejected 
decisively in favor of one in which markets and their related incentives were viewed as necessary to the 
effective functioning of the economy In the 1980s public enterprises were given greatly increased 
independence in production marketing and the disposal of their income However since then 
leadership has consistently spoken of the economy as one in which public ownership planning and 
socialist values are central to socio economic life 9 Throughout the reform period there has been a 
continual preference for the need to combine the market and plan Again I are reminded of the contrast 
with the economic ideology of post communist countries in Eastern Europe and in Russia in which 
the economic functions of the state were looked upon with the greatest suspicion from the moment that 
the communist parties were toppled
Agriculture
The mam focus of the economic reforms of the 1980s was the system of agricultural production and 
distribution 10 Rural households were given much more freedom to make their own decisions about 
production and were also encouraged to diversify their activities into sideline production A 
consequence of these early reforms was the growth in number size and diversity of the free markets for 
food in and around the urban areas This in turn gave urban households much more choice in their food 
purchasing 11
In approaching the reform of agriculture after 1976 planners recognized that rural management had 
been faulty first of all in the motivation of the farmer A principal move therefore was to encourage 
by product or sideline production on farms in addition to gram production 12 The farmer s by products 
could be sold on free markets locally which would raise his income Another change m management 
was the production responsibility system This term really included six or more variations but they 
were all significantly based on contracts After various stages of experimentation the contracts were 
generally made between the production team (part of a village) and the individual household The team 
managers (cadres) made an overall plan and then contracted with households for them to use certain 
plots of land Contracts set the output targets and compensation to be paid to the household The result 
was to take the bookkeeping out of the bigger organizations like brigades and bring it back to the 
production teams of say between 25 and 40 families 13
To move responsibility down to the individual farm family provided a great incentive because it 
meant the more they worked the more they could produce for themselves and not see it pooled into the 
local pot Land could not actually be purchased but it could be used on this basis 14 Instead of meeting 
grain payments of a landlord state the farm families now farmed certain parcels of land and returned 
certain quantities of crops to the team This was the full responsibility to the household system 
which became almost universal 15 The earlier Maoist system had used moral exhortation as an 
incentive had demanded grain production only and had banned all sideline production as incipient 
capitalism —a triumph of centralized blueprint ideology over reality
Industrial Investment
Mao et al after 1949 had embarked on a policy of building up heavy industry with tremendous 
amounts of GNP being devoted to capital accumulation (upwards of 40 percent in the peak year) 16 It 
wasn t until 1979 after Deng ascended that the planning strategy made a basic shift to emphasize 
agriculture and consumer goods for sale at home and abroad
The about face in CCP policy from the class struggle to economic reform was a huge change in the 
means if not the ends of the Chinese revolution In the 1970s China was plodding along in the 
centralized fashion of the former Soviet Union Bureaucratic controls stifled initiative but some 
progresses still occurred The motive of Premier Deng and others therefore can be seen as very similar 
to Mao s in the Great Leap Forward of 1958-1960 which was to speed up China s growth to wealth
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and power17 Mao and Deng with him had been averse to centralization which produced this 
stultifying bureaucratism The difference after 1978 was that Deng was now trying to advance by a new 
route of fostering initiative but at the same time rebuilding the party and government He realized that 
China s growth had to be engineered through and with a trained bureaucracy—not by trying to go 
around i t 18
Before 1978 all State Operating Enterprises (SOE) were subject to strict planning all output was 
prescribed for the SOE all pnces were set by state all circulation details (from producer to destination 
end user) were very carefully delineated and all profits were remitted to the state while enterprises 
incurring losses were subsidized 19 After 1978 major changes included the following First the SOE 
was given much more autonomy The system corresponding to agriculture s Household Responsibility 
System was the SOE Contract Responsibility System This system gave the SOE the freedom to set 
its own investment plans direct some of its own excess output (after mandatory state quotas were 
filled) and help create its own budget in exchange for the right to retain some of the profits and to 
distribute bonuses to individual workers who performed superlatively The new system also forced the 
SOE to get its working capital via interest bearing loans instead of gratis from the state as it enjoyed 
before I must also mention how the new system made employment with the SOE a contractual affair 
for a new hire That is he did not have a job for a lifetime with all the attendant benefits as he did 
under the old system rather he was subject to dismissal if he did not perform up to par 70
But a major problem soon became evident For although the state declared to the SOEs Be free1 
yet there was no hard and fast distinction made between a poorly run and between a badly run 
enterprise—bankruptcy was a virtual impossibility This was because the commercial and central banks 
were all pressured to subsidized losing enterprises 21 The state put this pressure on the banks because of 
the social welfare ramifications which would be associated with a bankruptcy of any SOE For in 
China the SOEs were not only places to work but they were also dispensers of all sorts of benefits 
and social welfare such as kindergartens healthcare daycare etc 72 In the eyes of the state to have an 
enterprise go bankrupt would be tantamount to causing social upheaval And with memories of the 
mayhem and tumult of the 1960s Cultural Revolution fresh in mind this was the very last thing any 
of the reformers wanted to see Thus no real competition was introduced into the SOE sector (industry 
sector) and the incentive system hence remained more ambiguous within the industrial sector than it 
was in the agricultural sector
Perhaps Deng s most spectacular reversal of economic policy was his open door to foreign trade 
technology and investment In the 1970s and accelerating after Deng came to power in 1978 Chinas 
turned outward Normalization of Sino-American relations begun in 1972 was completed in January 
1979 when Deng toured the United States Deng s open door policy was really an acknowledgment that 
the Chinese economy could progress only with a greater infusion of technology and capital both of 
which could be obtained abroad Therefore technology transfer became a major objective 23 Contracts 
with foreign firms for the installation of new machinery factories production processes tourist hotels 
and the extraction of coal and oil to name but a few would simultaneously bring in both capital and 
technology
This foreign infusion is not without its problems however By examining the four roadblocks to 
greater efficiency as it were we can see that relations with foreign investors are cause for concern
Roadblock One China s Primitive Legal System
Foreign trade and joint ventures inevitably created an urgent need for lawyers to handle contracts and 
litigation of commercial disputes To be sure Chinese administration had always had law codes— 
administrative for the bureaucracy criminal for the populace The Nationalist Government in the 1930s 
had tried to create a more comprehensive modem legal code 94 At the same time constitutionalism 
which had seemed like a veritable panacea to supplant imperial despotism was given formal 
acknowledgment in a lengthy senes of documents published by the governments and the parties 25 The 
law as such still played little role in the life of the common people however Litigation before a
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magistrate remained something to avoid Local disputes were usually settled by mediation among all 
the interested parties including a public interested in moral justice and proper obedient behavior26 The 
People s Republic after its inception in 1949 had continued to put forward constitutions and a few 
laws and decrees but a supremacy of law was hard to find because the supreme power rested in the 
Party and its policies would naturally fluctuate For a time under Mao law and morality were virtually 
amalgamated 27 Moral behavior according to party standards was promoted by the government and 
immoral behavior was penalized as much as under imperial Confucianism As a result law and policy 
tended to coincide anything contrary to party policy was ipso facto illegal78
By 1981 a new policy was m place that a genuine legal system completely separate from the party 
should be set up By this time legal skills were needed not only for foreign trade but also for domestic 
management State enterprises having been converted more into independent accounting entities their 
managers were more responsible for profits and losses as well as the handling of contracts and 
investments One estimate is that these enterprises could use 400 000 legal counsel79
Thus the new state constitution that was adopted in 1982 specified that the National People s 
Congress should be the legislative body in which laws should be initiated and by which these laws 
enforcement should be pursued In general the Congress was given much greater authority and prestige 
at least on paper The Ministry of Justice which had been abolished m 1959 was reinstated in 1979 
and People s Courts were set up at four levels—supreme higher intermediate and basic By 1984 
there were about 15 000 courts and tribunals and 70 000 judges At the same levels were reestablished 
the People s Procuracies as well as the profession of lawyer A problem was that these lawyers were 
all government employees and when assigned to defend an accused party they for the mam tried to 
mitigate his sentence 30 That is no presumption of innocence was established
In addition to being limited in scope the new legal system had to start from scratch m personnel In 
1985 a score of higher education institutions had law departments enrolling some 13 000 students 
There were now 15 legal research institutions and knowledge of law was being spread through the 
Ministry of Justice and the media However since judicial personnel were appointed to the National 
People s Congress there was little separation between legislative and judicial functions and meantime 
both were overridden by the party dictatorship of which the whole government was a creation In effect 
the legal system was still not independent from the party and its policies party control is sacrosanct 
and law is one of its tools 31
The lack of a solid legitimate and trustworthy legal system has driven many multinationals close to 
the edge of despair For China seems to have little understanding of the basic capitalist concept that 
business can be a win win game to enlarge an economic pie China does not presently have and needs 
to develop minds that have been permitted to be open inquisitive and creative and who are willing to 
stay in China Investors increasingly are discovering they have no reliable legal recourse when their 
businesses are blackmailed or their revenues extorted 32 While Beijing claims authority over its 
provinces it conveniently ducks when called upon to shoulder unpleasant responsibilities like 
enforcing international copyright laws against Chinese piracy Further complicating matters senior 
politicians military men and their families are often involved in the pirating industries Says Howard 
Lincoln chairman of Nintendo of America I have evidence that government officials have ownership 
stakes in companies doing the counterfeiting 33
But many multinationals are willing to put up with the headaches nevertheless For example last 
year Motorola s China revenues seemed to justify the hassle its cellular telephone and pager sales 
topped $1 5 billion But now changing tax rules inflation and competition from Motorola products 
being smuggled into China are causing losses to mount Executives say the Tianjin factory loses 
money on every cellular phone it makes and sells in China
And yet the company plans to invest another $1 billion in China I believe the country will 
continue to open up says P Y Lai president of Motorola China Electronics division Ltd For 
many foreign investors that prospect outweighs a growing ambivalence provoked by the broken 
promises shattered contracts and political and economic turmoil34
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Thus perseverance has replaced exuberance at companies in China for the long haul It should be 
noted that in the 1980s there were also a couple ot mass exoduses by multinationals beginning with 
what some humorously called The Great Adjustment of 1981 n that retrenchment then Premier 
Zhao Ziyang canceled a dozen major projects including an expansion of the Baosha steel m ill15 
Companies such as Bethlehem Corp Caterpillar Inc and Bechtel Group Inc closed offices or pulled 
out its employees Foreign companies retreated again m 1987 when some reform minded leaders were 
purged and again in 1989 when Beijing crushed democracy protesters 36
But the cost of such retreats was high AT&T abandoned efforts to sell sophisticated telephone 
switching equipment to China in the mid 1980s But it has now fallen behind rivals Siemans AG of 
Germany and Alcatel of France
In the past two years U S corporations have poured nearly $4 3 billion into China What could well 
slow the flow of that investment are the prominence of the companies running into legal hassles the 
size of the potential losses and growing awareness of just how deeply rooted China s problems are 
McDonald s for instance is being evicted from its prime site in Beijing despite a 20 year lease that has 
17 more years to run Lehman Brothers is suing two state corporations for failing to pay nearly $100 
million of losses in foreign exchange trading And a group of Japanese German and Italian banks has 
been reduced to begging Beijing to make good on some $600 million of defaulted loans they made to 
state enterprises 37
Of great importance is China s seeming ignorance of basic contract law The intellectual property of 
corporations with manufacturing plants in China is at risk along with showbiz products To get into 
PRC companies must disclose to authorities details of their products and processes Says Kenneth 
DeWoskin a University of Michigan business school professor and China specialist Chinese research 
and design institutes look for the best technology in the country and spread it around They also 
examine plans and specifications of new ventures so there s bound to be some leakage 38
Indeed after DuPont introduced into China its Londax herbicide which curbs weeds in nee fields it 
decided in 1992 to open a $25 million plant in Shanghai to make the product By then state owned 
Chinese competitors had jumped into the market with cheaper knockoffs of DuPont s own weed killer 
And shortly after Pilkington opened a plant in China to make architectural glass a state glass factory 
sent an order for production equipment to Germany—complete with detailed and obviously filched plans 
emblazoned with Pilkington s name'19
Currently protecting a brand name in the China market is almost impossible For example a 
Chinese breakfast cereal product called Kongalu Comstrips has a trademark and packaging identical to 
that of Kellog s cornflakes A small Chinese computer manufacturer Mr Sun has appropriated the 
trademark of Sun Microsystems for its machines And mineral-water drinkers in China can even enjoy 
Pabst Blue Ribbon Water 40 According to a report issued by the U S Trade Representative s office 
Anyone can walk into a store in Beijing and buy a pirated copy of Microsoft s popular Windows 
software package The store simply copies it for you onto a few blank floppy disks while you wait 41
Optimists hope that what occurred in Taiwan will also occur in China Only 12 years ago this nation 
also harbored a vigorous underground pirating network But the counterfeiting subsided once Taiwanese 
companies developed their own intellectual property and thus a deeper appreciation of its value 42
Roadblock Two China Does Not Condone 
Ownership of Private Property
Instead of moving rapidly toward a system in which private property became the dominant form of 
ownership China in the 1980s was committed only to experimentalism and gradualism in ownership 
reform In all important areas of the economy legally protected property rights were actually the 
exception not the rule Public ownership with confused property rights was the norm 43
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For example in agriculture the decollectivization of farmland was not followed by the establishment 
of private property rights m land The new system resembled Western medieval feudalism with the 
village and state as landlords and the individual households as more or less bound tenants The reason 
for this is that the CCP did not wish to allow for a landlord class to develop and therefore decreed that 
land could not be bought or sold 44 The village community controlled the terms on which the land was 
operated by individual households endeavored to ensure that farm households had equal access to 
farmland and retained part of the household income as a rent
Thus the rural reforms of the late 1970s and early 1980s left property rights unclear In the words of 
one scholar Every member of a village community has a share in the property rights to the land of 
his/her community but the share is not embodied in any tangible form such as a deed or stock so it 
seems that no one is the real owner of the land 45 And even the way the land was used still remained 
heavily influenced by state instruction the state s compulsory deliveries remained in force for some key 
products (notably gram) so that providing grain for self consumption and compulsive delivery pre 
empted about 70 percent of farmland
Regarding industry even if the new laws allowed for individuals to begin setting up their own 
businesses there was still a strong preference for the publicly owned sectors in state policies (e g the 
allocation of credit power supplies public transport and foreign exchange) Public ownership of 
industrial assets took both the state per se and well as the collective (community) form By the end of 
the 1980s around 55 percent of industrial output still came from the state sector and about 36 percent 
from the collective sector 46 The genuinely privately owned sector occupied only a tiny fraction of total 
output
Here is what the 1990 World Bank report has to say about the property rights confusion in the state 
owned sector
The ownership of Chinese state owned enterprises is becoming increasingly ill defined 
Ten years ago all industrial assets in the state run economy were clearly controlled and 
effectively owned by various levels of the governments which exercised both ultimate 
management power and final claim on residual income Today managerial authority and 
claims on income are split between government and enterprise itself as well as to a 
lesser extent the banking system The uncertainty attending on the ownership system is 
putting serious obstacles in the way o f improved performance 47
The situation is not much better in the rural sector It still is the case that the vast bulk of assets 
were owned by the local community with the community s asset management board arranging on the 
community s behalf the key aspects of the use of the property under their control According the same 
World Bank report
This is an environment in which ownership and property nghts with respect to industrial 
assets are not clear and pure private property is rare except in the smallest 
concerns Thus the most powerful reward for small scale entrepreneurs in other 
countries—the ability to reap large gains from a capitalization of entrepreneurial success 
in other firms—is absent or at least sharply circumscribed 48
Roadblock Three Problems with Price Reform
As early as 1980 the Chinese government had become convinced of the necessity for comprehensive 
pnce reform
There is much confusion m our present system of pricing This irrational price 
system has to be reformed otherwise it will be impossible to correctly assess the 
performance of enterprises As the reform of the price system affects every household
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and the national economy as a whole I must be extremely prudent formulate a well 
conceived feasible program based on the growth of production and capability of the 
state s finances and on the premise that the people s real incomes will gradually be 
increased and then carry it out in a planned and systematic way 49
The unique Chinese dual price system was implemented because it fit in well with the reformers 
goal of gradualism What is gradualism and how does the dual price system relate to this policy7
In essence because of the previously mentioned memories of the social nightmare which the 
Cultural Revolution occasioned Chinese policy makers have opted for a reform process in which social 
stability is given highest priority 50 So everything must proceed slowly Thus since 1978 
notwithstanding the intentions referred to m the last sentence of the reformer s quote above the reforms 
have not proceeded according to any real overall master plan or blueprint Rather progress is largely 
achieved on a trial and error basis sometimes reforms are planned in advance by the state sometimes 
reforms begin spontaneously m one province and then snowball to all others for example the 
Household Responsibility System started out as an experiment m Sichuan province then spread 
elsewhere after its overwhelming success The obvious advantages of such a gradualist reform approach 
include the lack of severe shocks to the economy the possibility that mid course fine tuning and 
alterations can take place and that individual Chinese can become acclimated to the new changes 
gradually
The dual pnce system fit in well with this gradualist policy This policy refers to the existence of 
centrally determined administrative pnces alongside market determined prices 51 Before the reform era 
all products were priced according to the cost plus mark up system Post reform the state now allows 
industrial products to circulate more freely—as long as the SOE or agricultural family paid its share of 
direct and indirect taxes it was free to sell excess production at the market Thus marginal resource 
allocation decisions were made on the basis of the market52 By allowing SOEs and working families 
to sell their excess at the market the Chinese government hopes to gradually acclimate their people to 
free enterprise In general price reform is seen to provide a system in which a few strategic and 
important products and services are still to be priced by the government while the rest will be freed 
subject only to market forces The plan for the reform in the 1990s is to reduce further the scope of 
government pricing However no schedule is set for the abolition of the two tier system nor for 
removing the partial planning control over pnces of these products 53
Thus pnces are set outputs disposed of and inputs procured in the Chinese economy through a 
complicated combination of three different mechanisms administrative directives (referred to as the 
plan ) market forces and negotiation It is not easy to quantify the relative importance of these 
mechanisms54 This is partly for lack of data partly because the situation vanes among provinces 
partly because specific outcomes are sometimes shaped by more than one of the mechanisms and 
partly because in many cases reality diverges from what is supposed to happen For example 
administrative directives usually reflect pnor negotiation goods that are supposed to be 
administratively allocated are frequently diverted to the market and fixed pnces are often negotiated or 
covertly altered or supplemented by additional charges to guarantee timely delivery and the like 55 On 
the other hand I read of how many pnces and quantities which are supposed to be market determined are 
influenced also by formal or informal administrative directives or (in the absence of a proper market) 
are actually negotiated directly between buyer and seller 56
Stnct and detailed administrative control now applies only to a small minority of economic 
transactions most notably those associated with key investment projects which are generally 
provided with the allocated quantities of inputs of the right quality and specification on time and at 
controlled pnces 57 Pure market regulation of prices and quantities applies to an enormous number of 
less important goods and services but their aggregate value is sill a fairly small minonty of 
transactions m China 58 The majority of goods and services in terms of value are thus subject to some 
mixture of plan market and negotiation and the pnce setting process is thus very confused and leads to 
much inefficiency
8 Tom Altpeter
In the late 1970s virtually all prices were set by the government By the mid 1980s there had been a 
large growth in the role of free markets but even by 1990 it was still the case that no more than 
around 50 percent of marketed goods was sold at free market prices 59 And not much more that 33 
percent of industnal means of production were sold at free market prices The government thus 
continues to hinder the development of a purer free enterprise system
Roadblock Four The Need for Efficient Organization 
of State Owned Enterprises
I have touched on this problem before and wish to expand further on this important problem at this 
time To do so I might liken state owned enterprises (the foundation of the planned economic system) 
to gears in the national economic machine In relation to the totality of a particular industry any 
individual enterprise is only one component of the whole mechanism In the framework of a planned 
economy each enterprise is expected to modulate its activities so as to mesh with other gears in the 
system That is independent initiative is neither expected nor welcomed and is in any event made 
virtually impossible
In the case of state owned industries raw materials are allocated through the Ministry of Materials 
and Equipment under State Council All products are bought by the Ministry of Commerce (in the case 
of consumer goods) or the Ministry of Materials and Equipment (in the case of goods used in 
production) 60 It follows that management effort has not been required in state owned enterprises and 
there is little appreciation of competition among enterprises
The Chinese economic model was nurtured in the liberated areas (guerrilla bases) during wartime 
and as a consequence self reliance came to assume a high priority Thus the emphasis in enterprises 
has been on production from parts to final assembly—what is known as one unit ism (producing the 
entire production in one place)61 The slogan small and complete large and complete means that each 
enterprise regardless of size would produce all parts on site so that production could be earned on 
independently
Theoretical support for one unit ism has been provided by the one unit approach on the battlefield 
and by the reality that enterprises and society are closely knit When a large enterpnse is established it 
often forms subsidiaries to provide nurseries schools (kindergartens through universities) hospitals 
and stores for its workers The reason has been to give employees adnft in a society of deprivation a 
secure environment in which to work This approach to solving social problems bears a close 
resemblance to the self reliant supply of products 62
The battlefield mentality of assuming full responsibility for workers basic societal needs has made 
modernization difficult if not impossible Enterprises have begun the need to cut back or spin off these 
service departments in order to reduce the cost of administration However such a move is not feasible 
unless local governments are prepared to take the services over Thus China s one unit ism 
ultimately has served as a shackle on the move toward modernization and freer enterpnse
In this context I would do well to mention that the presence of the Communist Party organs within 
enterpnses also was and is an impediment to improvement Under the planned economy system the 
party secretary within the enterprises had ultimate authonty to manage production personnel and 
finances However after enterprise reform the factory manager was accorded responsibilities and the 
role of the party secretary was dramatically reduced 63
After the Tiananmen incident in June of 1989 a tendency to enhance the role of the party secretary 
was again observable The position of the factory manager was substantially eroded in the ensuing 
Enterprise Law to such an extent that the secretary was even given authority to dismiss him There 
were cases of party secretaries impeding reforms being pushed by enthusiastic reform minded factory 
managers However since Deng Xiapeng s talks in the spring of 1992 enterprise reform has once 
again come to the forefront
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Roadblock Five China s Poorly Structured 
Central Banking System
Of course the function of the Chinese central bank of executing macroeconomic control is shared by 
every central bank in the world What is peculiar to China is the central bank s unique role as a fund 
supplier This is different from the usual function of central banks as lenders of last resort because it 
not only means tiding over banks in difficulties but also that the central bank must guarantee the 
funding of certain investment projects state enterprises and some items of top state priority such as 
the purchasing funds for agricultural and foreign trade goods 64 It may seem impossible to most 
Western trained economists that these two functions could be combined but this is the reality in 
China Thus the behavior of the central bank is torn between these two irreconcilable functions 
Because of various pressures the second function often predominates over the first making inflation 
inevitable
This unique tradition in China of the Central Bank as fund supplier can be traced back to even before 
the reforms started when a single bank supplied extra working capital which was taken as the same as 
budget funds But even in the contemporary 1990s though the basic concept that loans must be repaid 
has been gradually established that fact that what the budget cannot cover should be satisfied by bank 
credit cannot be changed The major difference is now that firms borrow to supplement their working 
capital needs whereas before reform they depended mainly on the budget funds 65
Thus despite the increasing reliance on monetary instruments by the Chinese central government in 
recent years the performance of monetary operations in the context of macroeconomic control has been 
rather poor This sub par performance is reflected in several aspects First monetary policy has been 
rather loose in recent years leading to cost push inflation 66 It must be stressed that this is not what 
the central bank intended to have because adequate credit and inflation control has always been one of 
its top priorities Second monetary policy can go from one extreme (very loose) to the other (very 
tight) in a very short time causing prevailing funds position problems and sharp fluctuations m the 
economy 67 Fine tuning operations are not effective Third the financial sector has low efficiency in 
distributing (rationing) the loanable funds with good enterprises often facing fund shortages and poorly 
run enterprises still receiving credit support 68 This policy makes tight monetary policy even more 
difficult and more costly to pursue because good enterprises will also be heavily affected
It is important to examine some of the major problems of Chinese central banking in greater detail 
Unlike other free enterprise countries the central bank has little independence Officially it ranks as a 
ministry subordinated to the State Council and acts on behalf of the State Council to execute monetary 
control and administration 69 Therefore it is part of the central government and behaves in accordance 
with government policies especially it must obey orders from the State Council and coordinate its 
action with the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance The branches of the central 
bank are required to follow the policies dictated by their headquarters but they should also listen to the 
local government of which they are regarded as a part70
Significantly the central bank has very few effective monetary instruments and the introduction of 
new instruments has been greatly restricted not only by financial development but also by the current 
system Under the centralized system compulsory plans along with other plans such as the material 
plans were enough for effective control71 But now since the credit plans have been turned into 
guidelines in most years except that for fixed asset investment new instruments have to be introduced 
However open market operations are still not possible due to the limited transactions in treasury bills 
The legal reserve requirement which has indeed been established is not yet operational for two reasons 
One is that the major banks specialize in some industries and areas and indiscriminate operations could 
affect some high priority industries such as agriculture and foreign trade The other reason is that the 
specialized banks are still in a strong bargaining position with the central bank because they are huge 
powerful and state owned and because of the historical relations between them Thus a higher reserve 
ratio will directly reduce the loanable funds of the banks and thus their profits which proves to be an 
important practical obstacle under the current system 77 Thus the central bank is left only with plans
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central bank loans administrative orders and sometimes compulsory deposits with the central bank 
When the central bank loans are not effective either (as will be explained later) the use of orders and 
plan quotas are inevitable should the central bank want to execute tight control as was the case in late 
1985 1988 and 1989 |
Setting interest rates has also been problematic There are in fact negative real rates The central 
bank does set the interest rate at a very low level and thus the rate cannot adequately reflect the 
conditions in the demand and supply of capital The central bank must therefore estimate the gap 
between the demand and supply by reference to the pressures on commercial banks from the enterprises 
and the pressure on itself from the commercial banks 71 Similarly the central bank cannot judge the 
goods market conditions by simply looking at the prices because the price system as discussed above 
is distorted and chaotic Since the prices of some vital matenals and products are still controlled strictly 
by the government and they have significant potential influence over the general price level the central 
bank must also judge the demand and supply gap of them All these along1 with the soft budget 
constraint on the enterprises and the prevailing investment hunger make the central bank operate in 
a shortage environment which for macro monetary management means persistent unbalanced 
markets subjective judgment over demand and supply conditions rationing and demand for continuous 
control74
The Relationship Between the Commercial Bank 
and the Central Bank
The four largest commercial banks in China are known as the specialized (banks because each of 
them specializes in one of the following sectors industry and commerce agriculture construction 
foreign trade and international capital flow They possess absolute dominance over the financial sector 
The several other banks are small mainly regional and newly established and need not be discussed 
here ,
It is important to analyze the many restrictions imposed on the specialized banks and enterprises 
First the banks must operate only in their assigned business area For example foreign trade and other 
foreign exchange related businesses can only be operated by the Bank of China the single foreign 
exchange bank Another example is that the biggest bank the Industrial and Commercial bank cannot 
make agricultural loans which is the business of the Agricultural Bank Thus there is very little 
competition among these banks i
Second any Chinese enterprise can only open the same type of account with one bank and usually 
this bank is specified according to the business nature of the enterprises 73 Multiple account holdings 
are prohibited Third it has been mandated that all banks must obey the rulings set by the central 
government and the central bank such as cash regulation (i e they cannot retain much cash outside the 
banks) and wage fund regulation (i e enterprises must withdraw wage anci bonus from this account and 
under approved level) Fourth these banks are supposed to follow the priorities and entena set by the 
government and central bank in making the loans Bnefly these pnonties in order of importance 
seem to be working capital credit prior to fixed asset credit within the working capital credit area 
purchasing credit for agncultural and foreign trade goods should be at the (top and goods m short supply 
should be supported first m general state key projects major enterpnses and good performance 
enterpnses should have priorities 76 1
I can see from restriction one and two that the banks willy mlly have become monopolistic Because 
of the division of jurisdictions there is little competition among the banlcs they cannot expand into 
another s business area and they do not have to worry about expansion from other banks 77 During the 
reforming process a reduction of these jurisdiction barriers was attempted but was then suspended in 
1989 when tight controls were re imposed 78 The attempted expansion into other business areas by the 
banks was said to have caused lots of chaos and meaningless competition and costs 79 The overall effect 
of this monopolistic state is an important one for our discussion the banks have shown little 
enthusiasm in improving their facilities or services This monopolistic power along with the cash
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regulations imposed on enterprises means that the banks can always count on the automatic deposits 
from the enterprises to which very low interest rates are paid
Enterprises cannot choose their own banks and thus deposits will not flow away even if services are 
very poor Except when money is really tight the banks have little incentive to expand savings 
businesses because savings deposits are small in amount more costly to operate and attract a much 
higher interest rate In fact compared to the low interest rates charged on loans the interest rates paid 
to savers are so high as to really deprive the bank of any profit As a result of all these factors savings 
facilities in China are very much underdeveloped 80 There are shortages in institutions in asset 
varieties m technology and in staff Few checking accounts are made to individuals leading to a large 
currency flow in consumer goods trading Check account facilities for the millions of new small 
businesses are also poor forcing many of them to cash in trading
Another insight I can gain from examining the aforementioned restrictions is that the fixed 
relationship between banks and enterprises makes banks in a position of fund supplier and are thus 
made responsible for the survival of the enterprises holding accounts with them enterprises have to 
depend and are used to depending on their banks When an enterprise is in trouble either its bank 
supports it or it collapses—or it will accumulate debts the payment of which has to be supported by 
its bank sooner or later 81 It is very easy for the government the enterprise and the public to hold the 
bank responsible for any consequences In such cases with few exceptions the banks will concede and 
support the survival of the enterprises ignoring any danger of bad loans 89 This is the basic reason why 
banks do not take much responsibility for their loans and can hardly be required to do so They are 
often forced to make loans to unsound enterprises and other designated uses This practice has really 
accustomed banks to ignoring the recovery of the loans and has provided excuses when bad loans 
happen 83
Therefore I can see that if the Chinese government is serious about improving its economic 
efficiency the behavior of the commercial banks must change Without a reform of the monopolistic 
state of these banks and their relationship with the enterprises it is pointless to talk about competition 
in the financial sector and improvement m its efficiency 84 Many scholars have written of this need to 
devise a good interest rate structure a self responsibility system and provide adequate competitive 
pressure so as to force even the big banks to get deposits by providing good facilities and services and 
to be more responsive to financial conditions Jurisdictions and fixed relationships with the enterprises 
should be gradually eliminated
Moreover these frequent changes in the reform measures together with the absence of a coherent and 
comprehensive reform plan have made it difficult for the government to establish credibility for 
imposing financial discipline upon enterprises which is essential for the hardening of budget 
constraint85 These difficulties are further compounded by the fact that the reform measures so far have 
focused on the structure of incentives but have largely ignored the creation of an equal and competitive 
environment m which enterprises operate The existence of a large number of distortions in both the 
product and factor markets provides state operated enterprises legitimate excuses for demanding 
government subsidies tax concessions and preferential treatment and makes the enforcement of the 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law exceedingly difficult86
I
Conclusion
China has heretofore grown in spite of the roadblocks but faces a precarious future without remedying 
the situation
In most of the key aspects regarding institutional arrangements and policy China s post reform 
economy in the late 1980s to the early 1990s appeared to be the kind of incrementalist half way house 
that most economists would probably predict would perform very badly 87 Throughout the decade 
individual property rights existed in only a minor part of the economy the government continued to
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intervene in price setting the economy remained substantially isolated from the impact of world prices 
and the Communist Party continued to rule in sometimes brutal and authoritarian fashion 88
And yet despite these vanous roadblocks to free enterprise China s economic performance was much 
better than under Maoist policies China has had some success in the direction of incrementalism and 
gradualism the rate of net national output has accelerated sharply since 197889 and China seems 
content on moving slowly toward free enterprise By using the gradualist approach and by not 
subjecting the state sector to major shocks China has succeeded in avoiding severe social costs during 
its transaction
The Chinese effort has focused much less on changing old enterprises and more on generating new 
opportunities Indeed the emphasis m China has been on marketization instead of privatization and on 
the role of growth of the non state enterprise sector in diversifying ownership patterns This spectacular 
growth of non state enterprise has served two key functions 1) it created economic growth and 
generated employment opportunities thus bringing out significant gains from reform 2) it generated 
competitive pressure on state owned enterprises forcing changes in their behavior even though this 
process remains far from complete This process is one that can be regarded as a sort of privatization 
from below in that within just 15 years 45 percent of industrial output is now from non state 
industries Moreover by postponing social reforms to the end of the reform process China has been 
given the opportunity to develop the institutional framework for a new social security system over 
time What remains to be tested is whether China can now move beyond this approach to address the 
more fundamental issues of the state enterprise sector and the dismantling of this huge social system— 
and indeed the issue of whether the state wishes to carry out these aspect of reform Nevertheless it is 
clear that this approach has avoided some of the serious social consequences that could have undermined 
the case for further reform |
An analogy comparing the enervating Communistic economic system to! a man who is carrying a 
heavy burden of stones with him in a satchel may be appropriate In this analogy I might say that the 
Russian economy has tried the route of dropping the entire satchel of stones all at once—very free but 
also very dizzy and unsure of what to do with this new found freedom But China has opted to try and 
remove one stone at a time very slowly trying to acclimate everyone to the new incremental change 
before moving on to drop yet another stone In this way leadership hopes ¿o reach a higher stage of 
free enterprise but without all the chaos and dizziness that Russia and some of Eastern Europe has 
experienced It remains to be seen how successful such an incremental attitude will be in the long run
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Chapter 2
Human Needs and the Foundations of the Social Order
Omar Anas
Introduction and Motivation
On which basis are to be set the limits between the freedom of individuals to pursue their best 
interests and the coercive power of the State9 This is perhaps the crucial question to be answered in the 
construction of a particular social political and economic system It will not only prescribe how to 
organize resources for production and consumption but also the values and norms that constitute the 
normative basis for the interactions of individuals within the social order
In a free market system the answer advanced mainly but not exclusively by liberals is powerfully 
embodied in assertions like No one is a better judge of his best interest than the individual himself 
though with some openly recognized exceptions Thus the promotion and enhancement of individual 
choice based on preferences is the ultimate guiding principle for the construction of the social political 
and economic order Moreover many see the history of human kind as an incessant quest for realizing 
the potential of individual freedom Liberal democracy is seen as the ultimate expression of freedom in 
human government and as Fukuyama puts it the end point of mankind s ideological evolution 1
Two problems anse with this liberal glamonzation of individual choice and freedom First it seems 
that the exceptions for a freedom to choose rule seem to be far too many In all classical economists 
one can find a list of the particular situations in which state intervention is justified but one can hardly 
find anything really exceptional or particular in those In modern stream economics some of these 
exceptions are associated with the problem of externalities which leads to the widely recognized 
proliferation of today s collective action problems The reason lies on the conflict between the claims 
for freedom based on individual preferences and the so called pre conditions for the effective operation 
of free markets While smooth markets efficiently use the information conveyed by individuals 
choices the provision of the order welfare and legitimacy required for the support of markets entails 
some restriction to those choices
Second the notion of freedom based solely on the doctrine of individual preferences is a view of 
human nature that s too restricted In their attempts to set normatively driven foundations for the 
operation of markets Dasgupta and Wilson try to go beyond the treatment of individual preferences and 
freedom as the ultimate defining characteristics of human nature 2 But they do not question directly the 
issue of the legitimacy of those preferences This confines their discussion to deal with the classic 
tension between individual and collective preferences even though in spint their work points at a 
broader perspective of the human expenence
In this paper I argue that establishing normative foundations for the legitimacy and efficacy of social 
economic and political institutions demand the exploration of aspects of the commonality of human 
expenence In particular it requires a holistic approach to the multiple dimensions of an individual s 
nature where the role of both environmental and innate factors in shaping behavior is recognized
Along these lines I advance a notion of fundamental human needs as a building block to discuss 
the typically emphasized conflicts between individual freedom and the moral welfare order and 
legitimacy foundations of markets The satisfaction of ¿hese needs ought to be arguably the ultimate 
objective of individual and social action and therefore offers a guidance for the construction of the 
normative foundations of a social order
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Surprisingly (and mysteriously) despite the sacred role ascribed to preferences very little has been 
said about their nature They are exogenous or given by the obscure psyjcho biological and social 
factors associated with individual action and motivation But the role of learning clearly points at the 
importance of exploring the nature of the factors that determine individual preferences and motivation
This in turn involves an inquiry into the factors that determine human mitivation and behavior In 
my discussion I try to depart from the dilemma between individual interests] and collective strivings 
while I highlight the extent to which the reinforcement of these types of dilemmas is a product of 
socially induced self fulfilling selfish expectations
Because of the high normative content in human needs proposals some of the theoretical and
methodological problems involved in the construction of a system of universal human needs are
discussed On this basis a concrete proposal is presented to illustrate the potential usefulness of a 
human needs approach to development3 In particular I discuss the benefits lof this approach in dealing 
with the issues of well being and destitution the moral foundations of markets and collective action 
problems 4
Free Choice Morality and Collective Failure
The central conflict faced by liberalism lies on the increasing claims of freedom based on the exercise of 
individual preferences and the restrictions to choice entailed by the provision of the order welfare and 
legitimacy foundations on which markets based their effective operation Tins conflict can be identified 
m the discussions of well being and destitution 5 collective action problems; and the moral foundations 
of markets 6
Well Being and Destitution
In his inquiry into destitution Dasgupta tries to broaden the concept of well being by including two 
main components welfare and liberties 7 The welfare component is related to the basic commodity 
needs requirements which are necessary to live a well lived life This follows the standard view of 
human needs as person specific and regulated by a hierarchical (lexicographic) structure 8
Based on Isaiah Berlin s concept ofj liberty he distinguishes negative freedoms from positive 
freedoms The former gives rise to rights claims of absence of coercion while the latter relates to the 
satisfaction of the material needs which entitle the individual with the ability for self determination
The lack of any of these two freedoms are the sources of destitution He argues that markets are not 
expected to guarantee a provision for claims of both negative and positive rights and in fact base their 
operation on their existence Thus the role of the state is to guarantee and protect basic needs as well 
as social and political liberties (i e to promote well being)
Based on a contractual view of the state he asserts that not all individual Lesires but legitimate 
claims of rights (on goods and liberties to pursue the person s own conception of the good ) should be 
the basis to design carefully the limits of state intervention He argues that trade offs between positive 
and negative freedoms are not necessary since empirical evidence shows that welfare achievements do 
not need to be based on restrictions of civil and political liberties
Nevertheless in this concept of well being the determination of the legitimate rights embodies the 
conflict between the limits to individual s freedom and the scope of state actions aimed to enhance 
welfare If the legitimacy of rights is based on individual preferences provision of the means to satisfy 
commodity needs will entail some restriction on the claims for negative freedom As long as 
preferences embodied in individual s utility appear as a source of well being the claims for commodity
needs and absence of coercion may be m conflict9
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Collective Action Problems
The tensions between the claims for individual freedom and state coercion are central to the discussion 
of collective action problems as suggested by Olson and Sandler 10
The institutional support for markets effective operation (rules and norms) entails restrictions of 
personal freedom in order to face the free rider behavior of rational and selfish maximizer individuals 
Because of the free rider dilemma adequate provision of some collective goods essential for the 
individual s well being and sustainable development (such as environmental protection health etc ) 
requires exertion of the coercive power of the state (through taxation or regulations) Again the free 
rider dilemma lies at the heart of the conflicting forces of claims of freedom of choice based on personal 
preferences and the need to draw the limits to this claims
Morality
Moral codes are part of the institutional framework that markets require for their effective operation As 
embodied in the role of ideology in North 11 they account for the investment in legitimacy that 
societies make to avoid the huge costs of enforcing norms and legal regulations They restrain the 
natural maximizing behavior of individuals which let alone would lead to a Hobbesian jungle
The notion of cultural relativism as Wilson points out 12 entirely neglects the existence of an innate 
moral sense common to every human being It questions the idea of a moral human dimension 
independent of a concrete cultural and social context If rational selfish behavior is thus the only 
common feature of human behavior morality does not entail any universal restriction to the exercise of 
an individual s freedom other than dictated by his or her personal tastes Thus the extension of the 
claims for individual freedom of choice to the free choice of moral values based on personal tastes 
threatens the instrumental value of the moral foundations of markets
The Needs Approach Conceptual and Theoretical Issues
A close reading of the discussions of Dasgupta and Wilson11 reveal a recurrent reference to the 
commonality of human experience to justify normative foundations for markets and the social order I 
suggest that it is within such a broader framework that their central arguments gain full strength In 
particular a notion of fundamental needs allows to properly place the moral and liberty dimensions of 
human beings within a broader concept of well being It also allows for a better understanding of the 
factors driving individuals actions and thus the potential for collective efforts
Aspects of Human Motivation Needs and Wants
Perhaps the main problem in the study of the concept of needs is the confusion in terminology 
Specifically the terms wants and needs are usually used alternatively The concept of wants has 
been mainly adopted by economists while the concept of needs underlies most of the psychological 
literature on human motivation
Early economists recognized needs and wants as the most powerful factors determining human 
actions levons Walras and Bentham among others established the foundations for a subjective theory 
of value connected to an utilitarian conception of individual s well being the latter was seen as 
determined by the pam or pleasure derived from the satisfaction or lack of satisfaction of individual 
wants 14
Away from this hedonistic conception Marshall has a more extensive and comprehensive discussion 
of wants In stressing the connection between human activities and the wants derived from them he 
acknowledged the social dimension of wants For Marshall wants were influenced by social customs 
and were also unbounded since the rise of new wants come together with the progressive development 
of human character and activities 11 Nevertheless the largely subjective nature of wants made 
economists turn into the concept of utility as an indicator of a preference ordering of individual wants
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Utility was seen as derived from the purchases (actions) that met these individual wants The latter 
development of utility maximization theory has led to a focus on the most efficient means of allocating 
goods neglecting the role of goods injthe satisfaction of human needs and the underlying motives for 
the acquisition of those goods Subsequently the influence of the social and natural environment on 
wants clearly acknowledged by classical economists is being ignored m die assumption of 
exogenous individual preferences of neoclassical economics
On the other hand psychologists have studied the factors that determine motivation and human 
actions For some scholars these factors are innate to the individual and arej located in an unconscious 
level such as in Freud s theory of instincts 16 Yet these theories were not capable to explain all 
behavior since the existence of an unconscious driving force do not alwaysUctivate behavior 17 thus 
encouraging a second explanation in which motivation lies on the conscious level of the individual and 
is driven by factors of the natural and social environment Examples are thé goals setting theories that 
view goals as the immediate dynamic regulators of human actions 18
The problem with both views is that human behavior appears to be a mixture of both behaviors 
programmed into the organism as well as behaviors learned or dependent on social environmental and 
cultural interactions 19
At this point it may be useful to advance a distinction between needs anJ wants Needs are connected 
to the concept of necessity which means we have an image of what is necessary to be human 70 
People are not presumed to be conscious of their needs Needs that are not satisfied lead to 
malfunctions of the person while the non satisfaction of wants that are Jot the expression of needs at 
most leads to frustrations 21 Wants |on the other hand are subjective (but^  conscious) expressions and 
articulations of wishes and/or desires of the individual They may or may not express needs while 
some needs may not be usually expressed m wants
Since the satisfaction of wants create additional wants they are potentially insatiable and unbounded 
Despite being clearly influenced by social and cultural factors wants are individual specific Is this true 
also for needs or does it make sense to talk about finite and universal human needs9 This is the central 
question I address next i
Needs and Satisfiers
One can distinguish two different views of the concept of needs The historical subjective view 
regards human needs as culturally and socially determined and even person specific based on the 
observable existence of different levels of requirement for needs satisfaction across cultures and 
individuals
For the objective universal view if properly defined human needs are the same irrespective of 
culture race and place and as such has a universal sense which Galtung22 refers to needs in one way 
or the other human being everywhere and at all times have tried and will try to come to grips with 
something of that kind in very different ways (p 59) |
Lederer points out the usefulness of the concept of needs on social sciences m terms of the concept s 
potential as a constant remainder of a if not the most important goal on any individual and social 
activity this potential derives from the affinity to human motivation ank self fulfillment 74 But as 
far as anything needing human satisfaction depends on culture a dilemma ¡s well posed by arguments 
such as Heller s all needs felt by humans to be real must be considered as real to which Ríst replies 
if everything is a need then needs mean nothing 24 Therefore to be of any use the postulation of 
universal needs should be combined with conceptions that take into account the natural and social 
context of the individual Such an approach is based on a distinction between needs and satisfiers 75 
Though human needs are universal and objective each culture devises different means satisfiers to 
satisfy each of these needs Thus satisfiers are context and culture specific I
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Mailman and Solomon devised a mathematical model based on set theory through which they derive 
the logical and semiotic congruities that are implied by the theoretical distinction of needs and 
satisfiers 76 They point out the general features that any system based on this distinction will have in 
particular the overlapping of needs and satisfiers needs may be satisfied with various alternative 
satisfiers and satisfiers may simultaneously satisfy several needs From this fact interesting 
implications can be derived as we shall see latter
Some of the benefits of the universal approach to needs will emerge in later in this discussion In 
general it opens the possibility of referring to general principles of human existence to common 
elements of human nature without rejecting cultural differences in the satisfaction of human needs
In sum human needs can be theoretically examined and it is possible to work out a system of 
universal needs without a priori definition of granted individual wants or desires But this is only a first 
step In the following section I consider some theoretical problems faced by a formulation of this type
Universal Needs Theoretical Problems
Level o f Abstraction
In practical terms the relevant question is how to build a list of human needs7 This implies deciding 
both the criteria used to classify needs and the level of aggregation at which they are formulated 
Regarding the latter in his study of the effects of culture in personality the anthropologist Ralph 
Linton distinguishes four level of analysis universal (apply to all individuals) specialties (apply to 
groups) alternatives (categories of individuals) and variants (individual level) 77 An analogous scheme 
could be helpful for needs But in general there is not definite answer to this question
The construction could be based on its usefulness for sensitizing to the problems in connection with 
satisfiers and need satisfaction or it could be based on emphasizing the commonality of human 
experience (or some combination of both) The first strategy carries the risk of missing the 
commonality of human experience in the mass of detail of cultural variation in needs satisfaction On 
the other hand clearly the more abstract the classes of needs the less interesting the statements that 
can be made As Galtung points out such categories may be good for classifying origins or roots of 
needs but not so good for analysis of the politics of needs 28
Hierarchy o f Needs
In analogy with the theories of stages of growth some of the proposed systems of human needs are 
characterized by a hierarchical order Among these the most well known is Maslow s theory of needs 
He proposed five fundamental human needs which are satisfied progressively (both at an unconscious 
and conscious level) going from lower order needs (physiological safety needs) to higher order needs 
(belongingness and love esteem and self actualization) 29
The hierarchy hypothesis is not a valid general rule about human behavior This is a hypothesis to 
be verified or rejected empirically Priorities among human needs exist in concrete cases but this does 
not prove their universality In any case hierarchical arguments are dangerous since they can be 
misused to justify the current socio economic status quo and ongoing processes of destitution It seems 
to support the distinction between basic and non basic needs that is so common on development plans 
As we shall see if well being is understood in a broad sense needs are by definition all basic
This is not to neglect that within certain levels of deprivation the satisfaction of needs such as 
subsistence becomes imperative But people have died for freedom claims and many others are known 
to go on hunger strikes It seems more sensible to suppose the existence of threshold levels of 
satisfaction for every fundamental human need under which the levels of deprivation ascribe a higher 
priority to a need In any case these threshold levels are not necessarily the same for every individual or 
culture or at all points in time
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It shall prove to be more fruitful to think of a ranking of satisfiers according to their potential of 
satisfaction or inhibition of human needs i
Westernization o f Needs
This problem discussed in great detail by Galtung 30 has several dimensior s The relevant points for 
this discussion are a western centered list of needs a linear and mechanistic approach to the process of 
satisfaction of needs and an emphasis on needs whose satisfaction carries conflicts of scarcity
Galtung argues that a list of human|needs with universal validity may be western centered 31 The 
West may try to impose its model of historical progress posing not only tne danger of 
overemphasizing (western) aspects of humanity which are not universally  ^ suitable but possibly 
hindenng the possibility of assimilating other important (eastern) developed aspects of human nature 37 
This problem simultaneously embodijes the potential usefulness as well as the political dimension of a 
discussion of a system of universal human needs As Galtung asserts (thlis is) perhaps the major 
utility each group challenges the others an indispensable tool against tlie flatness of cultural
relativism A Western group postulating a need to dominate other peoples 
postulating a need for suttee (widow (burning)
and an Indian group
The second point claims for a more dialectical approach to human needs and their satisfaction as a 
process with no beginning or end Strictly speaking a need is not satisfied or dissatisfied It 
simultaneously entails a lack o f and a potential for something Galtung asserts there is probably a 
rhythm or many rhythms (depending on the need on the person on where and when) to need 
satisfaction a dialectic that should be|permitted to unfold itself freely 34
Finally the list can put emphasis ojn aspects of needs that foster competition that will entail winners 
and losers (zero sum games) rather than solidarity and cooperation and a distorted emphasis on being 
and having i
Needs satisfaction could also be ultra individualized neglecting the role of the social context The 
recognition of this problem is in Wilson s remark The real problem with prolonged television 
viewing is the same as the problem with any form of human isolation it cuts the person off from 
those social relationships on which our moral nature in large depends 15
Epistemological Errors j j
According to Galtung 36 the central problem in the analysis of human needs is that while the person 
perceives his experiences of well being as a whole 37 in analyzing needs one is led to decompose the 
wholeness of human beings into its constituent elements 38 That is to say people in general do not 
perceive their situation in terms of needs or need lists Doing so one ignores the systemic nature of the 
person
Nudler points out some epistemological errors that are commonly present in the needs approaches 
and formulations (and perhaps often in social sciences in general)39 They are related to the treatment of 
the internal structuring of the person system (biological affective dimensions etc ) and its 
relationship with the bigger system to which it belongs (e g natural and social environment)
The first approach is naive holism1 which aims to identify a unique simple principle as the basis 
of the person The proposals of a single unified universal need to describe human nature (such as self 
actualization) fall in this category The second is fragmentalism which leads to consider the parts of
a person system independently of the 
the lists of compartmentalized human
person that is in separate compartments Among these we have 
needs without any explicit interconnection such as some of the
well known basic needs proposals for the development of the third world
The third is reductiomsm which though recognizes the person systemic nature overemphasizes the 
role of one of the person s subsystems to which the rest of the subsystems áre subordinated Example
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of these formulations are the topologies that put emphasis on material needs against non material 
needs
The fourth individualism assumes that the nature of the person system is essentially independent 
of its environment to which it relates only when it is imperative to satisfy the person s needs To 
these we can ascribe instincts or biological deterministic theories that try to explain human actions 
solely on the basis of the individual s biological or psychical characteristics without any reference to its 
environment
Finally for supraindividuahsm the nature and behavior of the person is entirely explainable in 
terms of the bigger systems to which she belongs This is clearly the error incurred by most ascnbers 
of cultural relativism when they argue that needs are entirely determined by cultural variations
A Holistic Approach to Needs
What are then the basis for a right approach9 As Klineberg points out different empirical studies 
support both biological determinism and cultural relativism 40 In particular anthropological work have 
shed light on cultural variations m human behavior and organization and parallel findings of 
similarities and regularities in human behavior have been traced back to biological origins
This gives rise to the so called biosocial approach which aims to study the interrelation between 
hereditary factors and learning in determining and shaping human behavior In favor of this view 
Klineberg asserts All human activities are due 100% to environment and 100% to 
heredity everything human beings do is determined by the nature of the underlying biosocial 
integration 41
The bio component can be viewed as conferring the capacity or potential for some activity which 
can or cannot be explicitly expressed in behavior depending on the social component that is the 
learning experiences of the individual This approach is consistent with what Nudler proposes as a 
sophisticated holistic approach for the study of human needs that does not loose sight of the unity of 
the person system 42 Human needs should be seen as interconnected elements of a larger unity the 
individual and this in turns as being part of a system of interconnected social and natural structures
The human needs system that is suggested in the next section ascribes to this approach It 
circumvents the implications of the criticisms underlying Lederer s assertion (As) the results of 
unidisciphnary considerations of the human being we have homo sapiens homo economicus 
homo sociologies and leisure and time research and industry discovered homo ludens Somewhere 
among these the human being must have gotten lost 43
These are the main problems that should be kept in mind in the formulation or the assessment of a 
system of universal human needs I now present the system proposed by Max neef 44 which seems to 
score better in addressing most of these theoretical issues but more crucially offers a rich framework 
for my discussion of well being freedom and the moral foundations of markets and the social order
A Fundamental Human Needs System
Because the criteria as well as the level of abstraction in which one can classify human needs are 
arbitrary all the systems of human needs that have been advanced have a suggestive nature Since the 
purpose of my discussion is not to develop a theory of needs an assessment of the reliability and 
usefulness of needs proposals is based on their theoretical consistency and their intuitive appealing to 
provide a neh understanding of the commonality of human nature and a broad normative framework to 
undertake a policy of needs
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Unsatisfactory Needs Proposals '
To illustrate this case let s consider some unsatisfactory proposals Clearly all theories derived from 
principles of biological determinism or cultural relativism collapse because of their epistemologically 
biased nature Maslow s theory of needs though it does not suggest any one way causal determinism 
will not do because of its implied hierarchy and unilinear approach 45 1
Galtung proposed four fundamental human needs—security welfare identity and freedom—within a 
holistic perspective and with no implied hierarchy Nevertheless it appearslthat more disaggregation of 
these four needs is still possible particularly with regard to the need of welfare Furthermore Galtung s 
proposal does not capture well the dynamic characteristic ot the process of needs satisfaction which he 
himself acknowledged46 I ,
I
Nudler advanced a very interesting classification which seems to provide a very general framework for 
other concrete topologies He argues that the human being as a living organism whom shows the 
characteristic of an open system 47 has three fundamental needs Identity Growth and transcendence of 
which only the latter is unique to humans The first need is constructed through the incorporation and 
elaboration of elements from the natural and social environment the seconci is rooted in the internal and 
external dynamic forces which leads|to an ongoing creation of a new individual identity48 the third 
refers to the need to transcend as overcoming the imbalance of man with (nature not submitting to it it 
means returning to nature giving up|to it an ego that has realized its potential 49 From these three 
fundamental needs derive the needs of survival affection security as well as the needs to explore 
know create participate love etc yhose satisfaction depends on the specific cultural and social 
environment of the individual I
A System of Fundamental Needs
Max neef proposed a system of fundamental needs that can be viewed as a sensible classification of 
Nudler s derived needs 50 He proposes a system of fundamental needs organized according with two 
categories existential and axiological which allows to illustrate the interaction of the needs of Being 
Having Doing and Interacting with the needs of Subsistence Protection Affection Understanding 
Participation Creation Leisure Identity and Freedom |
These are combined on a matnx (see Table 1) which shows suggested satisfiers for each combination 
of needs For instance food and shelter are satisfiers of the need of (Having) Subsistence communities 
and the family are satisfiers of (Interacting) participation and sharing and caring are satisfiers of the 
need for (Doing) affection As Max neef asserts This matrix is neither normative nor conclusive if 
completed by individuals or groups from diverse cultures and m different liistoncal moments it might 
vary considerably 51 I will now summarize the mam features he ascnbed to human needs and 
specifically to this system i
Human needs are not something to be satisfied but to be potencialized íjleeds satisfaction is a process 
that simultaneously embodies a lack of something and a potential for something since they bring 
out the constant tension between deprivation and potential always present in individuals (say through 
the dimensions of Doing and Interacting)52 To the degree that human motivation and human actions 
are driven by needs they may eventually become a resource
Human needs do not respond to any linear hierarchy they conform a system with no fixed order of 
precedence and an internal dynamic of simultaneities complementarities and trade offs Thus an 
individual may face conflictive tensions in the satisfaction of these needs Nevertheless the nature of 
this tensions will mostly depend on the type of satisfiers used for needs satisfaction as Max neef s 
classification of satisfiers suggests These needs can be satisfied within three contexts with regard to 
oneself with regard to the social group and with regard to the environment In this sense this system 
is holistic Max neef also acknowledges the existence of pre systemic thresholds below which the 
sense of deprivation may urge to satisfy a given need over others 1
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Along with the universalist subjective view needs are finite and invariant across cultures 
(universal)^ what changes is the way and/or the means (both the quantity and quality) used to satisfy 
them While satisfiers express the way needs are satisfied in a culture economic goods are the ultimate 
means used by an individual to empowered the different satisfiers Max neef points out that each 
economic social and political system adopts different styles for the satisfaction of the same 
fundamental human needs 54 Satisfiers are related to everything which by virtue of representing forms 
of Being Having Doing and Interacting contributes to the actualization of human needs 55 They may 
include forms of organization political structures social practices values and norms56
Economic goods are the objects that empowered satisfiers (in a negative or positive direction) with 
the potential to actualize human needs Clearly the type of goods and quantity associated with needs 
satisfaction varies across cultures and individuals (though minimum standards for nutritional and health 
requirements exist)
As advanced by Mailman and Solomon there is not one to one relationship between needs and 
satisfiers From this fact Max neef classified satisfiers into five categories
1 violators or destroyers which inhibit the satisfaction of several needs simultaneously
including the one they are aimed to satisfy
2 pseudo satisfiers which induce a false sense of satisfaction of a given need
3 inhibiting satisfiers which despite satisfying a particular need inhibit the satisfaction of
other needs
4 singular satisfiers which aimed at the satisfaction of only one need and are neutral
respect to the others and
5 synergic satisfiers 57 which simultaneously satisfied several needs 
Examples of each of these type are shown in Table 1
TABLE 1 Human Needs and Type of Satisfiers
Violators and Destructors Need to be Supposedly Satisfied Needs whose Satisfaction is Impaired
Arms Race Protection Subsistence Atfection 
Participation Freedom
Bureaucracy Protection Understanding Affection 
Participation Creation Identity 
Freedom
Inhibiting Satisfers Needs whose Satisfaction is Inhibited
Obsessive competitiveness Freedom Leisure Protection Affection 
Participation
Commercial television Leisure Understanding Creation Identity 
Freedom
Pseudo Satisfiers Need which is Seemingly Satisfied
Over exploitation of Natural 
resources
Subsistence
Charity Subsistence
Singular satisfiers Need which is Satisfied
Food programs Subsistence
Insurance systems Protection
Synergic Satisfiers Needs whose Satisfaction is Stimulated
Popular education Understanding Protection Participation Creation 
Identity Freedom
Preventive medicine Protection Understanding Participation 
Subsistence
Educational television Leisure Understanding
Source Based on M Max neef A Elizalde and M Hopenhayn Human Scale Development An Option for  
the Future (in English) Development Dialogue (Uppsala Sweden Daj Hammarskjöld Foundation 1986)
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These distinctions are perhaps the main contribution of Max neef to a theory of fundamental human 
needs The dialectic relationship between needs satisfiers and economic gojods is part of the definition 
of a culture and crucial on the configuration of styles of development I
The immediate implication is that an evaluation of how the social or cultural environment represses 
tolerates or encourages the satisfaction of human needs is essential for a comprehensive understanding 
of the problems of destitution and deprivation It also has key implications for my discussion of 
morality and collective action problems I
Needs Well being Markets and Morality 
A New Conception of Well Being
Within this broader framework one can advance a more comprehensive notion of well being as a state 
of well balanced satisfaction of each and all fundamental human needs Ás Max neef acknowledges 
we should not speak of poverty but of poverties any fundamental human need that is not
adequately satisfied reveals a human poverty 58 ^
i I
And in a holistic sense each poverty generates pathologies that is induces perturbation in the 
entire system of fundamental needs The problem of unemployment illustrates this argument since 
subsistence disturbs the sense of protection consequent family crises may destroy affective relations 
and the lack of participation gives rise to feelings of isolation and a crisis of identity
This conceptualization also offers a richer set of options for the promotion of well being Because 
not all wants express human needs and needs satisfaction could take place at an unconscious level there
is not presumption that individual preferences are the ultimate sensors of well being
A closer look at the satisfiers and their relation with economic goods might suggest fundamental 
revisions of the way and means a culture empowered needs satisfaction Ás it is explicit in Galtung s 
critique of cultural relativism there is nothing sacred about needs nor atjout cultures they are subject 
to tests of whether they serve self realization without doing damage to others 59
Needs and the Progressive Market
Because needs generally may not be satisfied at a conscious level does this necessarily imply the need 
for state planning of the lives of the individuals9 No because this would clearly perturb their whole 
system of needs satisfaction and thus their general perception of well being 60 As Galtung clearly 
points out the purpose of need theory would be to inspire people into awareness not to steer and 
direct them into well structured needs sets 61 Indeed as Max neef suggests the matrix of needs and 
satisfiers may serve as a participative exercise of self diagnosis for groups located within a local 
space 62 Thus the alleged universal nature of needs cannot lead to loose sight of the local dimension 
m which satisfaction takes place for the individual A vertical policy of needs will not do because of 
the variety of satisfiers not only across cultures but also across and within social groups
This procedure has been allegedly successfully applied in many communities in South America in 
which group dynamics take place on the presence of a moderator Individuals are asked to identify both 
negative and synergic satisfiers associated with the matrix of needs which would then allow changes in
the process of satisfaction of needs This enable the individuals within a 
sources of both his deprivations and potentialities and unravel the veil
ascribed to the potential of his own actions to undergo changes in the environment
group to become aware of the 
of insignificance that is
I should point out that there is not any presumption that Max neef s list of needs (or any other) is 
conclusive it may well be subject to the western bias I previously discussed But the main benefits of 
the approach should be clear Individual are empowered with the possibility to actively and 
simultaneously shape themselves and their environment We are not only the product of learning but 
we can also change the structures that affect and determine our behavior In a holistic framework the
Foundations of the Social Older 27
veil of insignificance ascribed to individual action in the atomistic market cannot play a role Thus 
within the context ot market exchange this process of awareness is consistent with the idea of a 
progressive market
Social scientists in marketing and business has long recognized and exploit the potential to shape 
individual tastes In fact people themselves show a systematic inclination to invest resources and 
efforts to change their preferences The more informed consumers are about the wider implications of 
their consumption patterns the best they can guide their buying habits Therefore initiatives 
promoting synergic processes can be supported through market exchange As Abolafia and Biggart 
suggest the view of competition as an asocial process cannot account for the role of social networks as 
well as social and cultural factors that frame competitive systems
Ekins observes that membership associations are rapidly growing in importance 64 For instance the 
International Organization of Consumer Unions (IOCU) encompasses 170 groups in 65 countries 
whose aim is the promotion of issues of social concern such as drugs women s rights and 
environmental protection through the promotion of alternative trading which is to enhance the 
commitment of firms with the problems of local communities and the natural environment In short 
as Ekins suggests the steps toward a progressive market aims to remove the schizophrenic anomaly 
whereby people in the market place are presumed to be selfish actors while in the family 
community are widely acknowledged to have powerful moral and social commitments 65 In 
particular the construction of synergic satisfiers constitutes a way of recreating the holistic dimension 
of the process of needs satisfaction
Moral Universals
Within this system of human needs we can properly place the fundamental dispositions to which 
Wilson ascribed the existence of a universal moral sense True moral universal rules cannot be found 
because all rules reflect the indeterminate intersection of sentiment and circumstance 66
But a universal moral sense can be referred to principles that facilitate the actualization of 
fundamental needs (i e the enhancement of well being) Values and norms can then be viewed as 
satisfiers with special connection with the needs of affection participation and identity And as such 
are subject to revision and change by individuals within a culture as long as they serve a destructive or 
inhibiting role in the process of needs actualization Here s where the flatness of cultural relativism 
lies
As Wilson observes the need for affiliation is so powerful that it reaches as far as one can find a 
historically plausible and emotionally satisfying principle of similarity 67 Psychological studies of the 
role of reference groups and social comparisons reveal that individual goals are set and expectations 
are formed by reference to others This is connected with Wilson s observation of the need people feel 
to justify acts that are considered immoral by others
The details of moral constructions are then context and culture specific as Wilson asserts moral 
senses are natural to some important degree innate since these senses are to a degree indeterminate 
culture will affect how they are converted into maxims customs and rules 68 But there s nothing 
sacred about them except for their role of enhancing needs satisfaction (ì e of promoting well being)
Needs Freedom and the Social Order
As Dasgupta acknowledges m any justification of rights both the commonality of the human 
condition and the distinctiveness of every two humans make their impact 69 Because of the 
simultaneities complementarities and trade offs that characterize the system of fundamental human 
needs freedom is the exercise of constrained choice As Wilson points out it cannot be the single 
principle describing human nature we have a nature that is a set of traits and predispositions that set 
the limits to what we may do and suggest guides to what we must do 70
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In equating freedom with claims of rights and individual autonomy its interactions with the needs of 
Doing and Interacting are not acknowledged As Wilson rightly points out I the notion of commitment 
is substituted by the liberal s notion of free choice But the true potential of individual freedom cannot 
be fully unraveled without responsibility and commitment with oneself others and the environment 71
Since individual preferences define a ranking of wants and desires which in turn does not 
necessarily express needs the relevant potential conflict is much more complex than a conflict between 
coercion and freedom of choice based on individual preferences Our limited exploration of human needs 
suggests that it is a systemic conflict between equally important needs Though part of it may be in 
our genes much of this conflict is socially determined by our learning experiences The relationship 
between satisfiers economic goods and needs in a society may increase or ameliorate this conflict
Etzioni refers to several studies confirming the role of moral values and self fulfilling expectations in 
shaping behavior11 Wilson found that both values that people internalize (i moral uplift ) and the level 
of punishment and opportunities for crime significantly affect crime rates 7|3 He found people s 
predisposition to engage in criminal activities was low when people lived in small integrated rural 
communities in which moral commitment was high Song and Yarbrough found evidence that moral 
commitment and suspicion ( others cheat ) is a strong factor determining tax compliance 74
It is necessary to acknowledge the extent to which we are products of our own social construction 
The well acknowledged role of expectations and beliefs (such as m game theory analysis oí sequential 
equilibriums) in determining equilibrium outcomes reinforces the significance of learning and 
environmental factors in the social construction 75 I
In fact the affirmation of dilemmas such as the choice between individual utility and 
commitment to social goals to a great extent may be supporting the freej rider behavior and no the 
other way around Economists serve best to illustrate the case Experiments earned out by both 
economists and psychologists have identified the deep influence of the neoclassical wisdom among both 
students and scholars in economics In pnsoner s dilemma type games economic students are less 
likely to behave cooperatively compared to non economists Even the notion of fairness seems to be 
alien for the former 76
As Sandler has noted no general conclusions about the possibility of collective action can be made 
The free rider dilemma is not a generally valid dilemma Nature imposed sanctions attached to the 
status quo can assist groups to a paretto optimal outcome 77
As Uusitalo78 has clearly posed it the dilemmas rational economic man versus socially 
committed man and self interest versus social commitment lie behind our choice of the social 
order we may end up constructing as Table 2 illustrates
An emphasis on a natural propensity of humans to pursue self interest gains at any cost gives rise 
to a Hobbesian social order in which the viability of society requires the enforcement of rules and 
conventions If it is additionally supported on a moral vacuum this social order is more likely to 
promote a conflictive process of needs actualization in particular with respect to the need for freedom 
On the other hand in a more normative communal society a system of ¿eliefs and sentiments is
TABLE 2 Preferences Individual Behavior and Social Constructions |
Pieferences Primarih I
Concerned with Types of Social Actors Tipes of Social Order
Actions Primarih Commitment to Commitment to
Concerned with Individuality Utilm Social Goals Individual Utility Social Goals 
Individal Utility Economic man As it moral man Atomistic efficiencyCoercive imposed
based society law society
Commitment to Free rider Moral Man Alternated society Cooperative Self
Social Goals___________________________________ __ ______________ j____________ reflexive society
Source Based on Lisa Uusitalo Economic Man or Social Man Exploring Free Riding in the Production ot 
Collective Goods in Olander Grunert ed Understanding Economic Behavior (Ì993)
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central to the viability of the social order and may promote more synergic processes of need 
actualization
It is necessary to recognize the truth embodied in Linton s assertion every person is in certain 
respects a) like all other person b) like some other persons c) like no other person 79 It seems that 
orthodox liberalism has confined the image of the individual to the last two dimensions
The veil of lack of commitment and responsibility on the exercise of freedom and the veils of 
amorality and insignificance that are ascribed to an individual s actions set the path toward the 
atomistic or the coercive imposed law societies In these type of social orders the introductory 
question of this paper clearly poses (and in this sense justifies) the dilemma between individual 
preferences and collective preferences Constructing a cooperative self reflexive society involves 
the rescue of the commonality of human nature and more emphasis on the moral person rather than on 
free riders
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Chapter 3
Social Authoritarianism Mexico’s Path to Neoliberal Reform
Paul L Clark
Introduction1
Democratization and neoliberal reform have become the two dominant concerns of comparative political 
science and political practice in the last decade or so Several Latin American authontanan regimes were 
replaced by democratically elected political leaders during the 1980s The final year ofthat decade 
brought an unprecedented and unexpected demise of several authontanan regimes m Eastern Europe 
culminating in the dissolution of the USSR and beginnings of democracy in Russia Since that 
dramatic decade authoritarianism has been on the decline ideologically and has seen some tentatively 
decline as an empirical manifestation
Neoliberal reform moved onto the intellectual and practical stage in 1973 with the Chilean coup and 
drastic economic reorientation wrought by the new military regime With the debt crisis beginning in 
1982 many developing countries found themselves both unable to continue servicing foreign debt and 
obliged to relinquish a measure of national pride if not sovereignty to deal with this problem The 
debtors were urged by international financial institutions foreign governments (the U S primarily) and 
their own technocratic classes to accept and implement neoliberal economic policies that have been 
informally codified as the Washington Consensus fiscal restraint trade liberalization and export 
promotion 2
Neoliberal reform has been implemented in many countries attempted m others and the subject of 
debate in still others Much has been made of the various costs and benefits of reform and its 
differential impact on groups and individuals in those countries attempting to follow the Washington 
Consensus While domestic opposition has existed in every country where neoliberal reform has been 
attempted this opposition has only slowed or reversed the process of reform in some instances Often 
this reform reversal is only temporary lasting until economic crisis heightens and oppositional forces 
are weakened or abandoned by their former supporters In a few countries reform minded political elites 
have managed to ignore domestic opposition and consolidate reform Unexpectedly there seems to be 
little correlation between regime type and consolidation of neoliberal reform Freely elected 
governments authoritarian governments and governments in the grey area between have been able to 
carry out drastic economic restructuring m some cases and failed to reform m others
While regime type does not necessarily determine the success of economic reform nor does neoliberal 
economic restructuring determine regime type 3 there seems to be roughly three paths that lead to 
consolidated neoliberal economic restructuring An authoritarian path in which economic change is 
introduced regardless of popular will A democratic path m which popular will is taken into account in 
the economic restructuring process due to institutionalized mechanisms of participation contestation 
and accountability And the social authoritarian path which counter intuitively combines an 
unaccountable regime in which participation and contestation are limited but which institutes 
ameliorative social welfare policies that would be expected to result from democratic politics The 
authoritarian and democratic paths are easily explained within existing conceptualizations Authontanan 
governments can inflict costs on their citizens without their consent Democratic governments due to 
the accountability imposed by the electoral imperative cannot long ignore interests of the electorate 
and remain in office The social authontanan path to neoliberal reform is counter intuitive 
governments that are not subject to the electoral imperative implement policies as if they were It is 
this third path that seems to charactenze the Mexican experience
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This paper s purpose is primarily to explain the existence of ameliorative social welfare programs 
implemented in the context of an authoritarian regime unaccountable to the beneficiaries of these 
programs It will be argued that Mexico implements these social welfare programs due to the nature of 
state-society relations and it is these relations that help explain the longevity of the regime in spite of 
periodic drastic policy reorientations like the shift to a neoliberal export led growth model The 
Mexican case suggests that there may be a stable equilibrium far short of liberal democracy in which 
capitalist markets are able to function but liberal democracy is not realized Mexico may not be 
experiencing a slow transition to democracy Secondarily this paper will argume against the 
complacency found in some predictions that liberal democracy and liberal capitalism are the stable 
equilibrium that all societies are converging to 4 Mexico s experience may not be sui generis but an 
alternative path into a future in which history has not ended
Characterizing the Three Paths
The three paths to economic reform are identified here as commonalities in existing policy making 
processes not as prescriptions for a particular policy making regime An extensive literature is devoted 
to valuative questions of the relative benefits of the authoritarian or democratic path to economic 
reform and the related issue of the political determinants of economic growth generally 5 Rather than 
argue the benefits of one path over another this paper advocates recognition that a third path should be 
recognized as distinct from the authoritarian or democratic Identifying the social authoritarian path as 
distinct from the other two paths is important given the reduction of political and economic options 
seemingly available to nation states With the demise of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact global communism has vanished from the world stage as a proposed alternative to 
Liberal Democracy and free market capitalism as practiced in the U S and other OECD countries The 
mere existence of a Washington Consensus —a comprehensive policy prescription that is being 
advocated not only in the traditional third world of Asia Africa and Latin America but also in the 
former second world of Eastern Europe and the former USSR—indicates an unprecedented narrowing of 
policy options
While global communism as embodied in the Marxist-Leninist and Maoist countries of the former 
eastern block has fewer committed adherents now than ever it does not necessarily follow that no 
viable alternative to the duo of democratic politics and liberal economics exists The debate has changed 
from one between competing systems to one about variations in a single system From central 
planning versus markets the debate has been reduced to markets with social welfare safety nets versus 
markets without a safety net6 and parliamentary democracy versus presidential democracy 7 Some have 
argued that democracy and capitalism were the end state toward which human society in general and 
nation states in particular were converging 8 This point of view denies the long term stability and 
viability of any other combination of political and economic system While normatively this may be a 
desirable outcome it ignores empirical evidence that may indicate multiple end states This paper m 
contrast argues that Mexico is an example of the possibility of long term stability and a degree of 
legitimacy both domestically and internationally in a regime which falls short of the minimum 
requirements for liberal democracy but coexists with a capitalistic economy
The Authoritarian Path to Neoliberal Reform
The argument must first start on a more limited base whether neoliberal economic reform can only be 
accomplished either by an authoritarian or democratic regime The authoritarian path to economic 
reform is characterized by a regime that derives its authority from force A group of political elites 
determine the nature and pace of economic reform and implement this plan without the necessity of 
reaching consensus with or seeking approval from those affected The costs and benefits of reform are 
distributed by a logic developed by the ruling group in order to further goals set independently of those 
advocated or preferred by groups or individuals in society While these goals may correspond to those of 
groups or individuals in society this correspondence is due to shared interests not to institutional
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structures like elections separation of powers or checks and balances which oblige leaders to adopt 
policy positions more close to their constituents in order to remain in office
Authoritarian neoliberal reformers are commonly technocrats individuals trained in a technical field 
like economics who apply this technical training in decision making roles in the regime 9 O Donnell 
in elaborating the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian (B-A) variety of the authoritarian path to economic 
reform described a technocratic approach to policy making
Their [technocrats] training stresses a technical problem-solving approach Emotional 
issues are nonsense the ambiguities of bargaining and politics are hindrances to rational 
solutions and conflict is by definition dysfunctional That which is efficient is 
good and efficient outcomes are those that can be straightforwardly measured the rest is 
noise that a rational decision-maker should strive to eliminate from his decision 
premises 10
This technocratic approach to governing was also identified as characterizing recent regimes in 
Mexico with the addition of the trait of inability to accept criticism of the efficient solution as viewed 
by the technocrat 11
The B—A model was developed in an effort to link particular stages of economic development (e g 
exhaustion of the easy phase of import substitution industrialization) with a turn to authoritarian 
politics A B-A regime is an alliance between military and civilian technocrats who favor orthodox 
economic policy and the political exclusion of the popular sectors 12 Chile under Pinochet was a 
particularly brutal example of a B-A regime implementing neoliberal economic policies South Korea 
also restructured under military rule Taiwan is an example of the authoritarian path to economic reform 
under a civilian government
The essence of the authoritarian path is autonomous policy making within the state unaccountable to 
non-state groups or individuals Jose Pinera Minister of Labor in Chile under Pinochet described the 
process by which Chile s neoliberal restructuring was undertaken Generals in the ruling junta enlisted 
the services of a group of U S educated economists who implemented reforms Pinera argued that 
strong leaders not democratic institutions were necessary for successful reform
One final crucial ingredient m the political economy of any country making the difficult 
transition to a free open economy is the presence at the top of people who are real leaders 
rather than politicians The individuals who make the ultimate decisions must base 
them on what is best for the country not on what will win them the next elections or 
help them survive the next coup d e ta t13
The Democratic Path to Neoliberal Reform
In contrast the democratic path to neoliberal reform is characterized by a government elected freely and 
fairly and held accountable by the electorate In this path the costs and benefits of the economic reform 
are distributed according to the logic of the electoral imperative This imperative leads to either a strong 
democracy that implements ameliorative social welfare programs to cushion those most adversely 
affected by the reforms or a weak democracy that sacrifices aspects of democratic rule (although short of 
becoming authoritarian) in order to insulate policy makers from much of the popular pressure for 
counter reform
The strong democracy variant usually consists of continued state spending in the areas of health and 
education and consumption subsidies targeted at those whose subsistence is threatened This is the 
social democratic approach to economic reform advocated by Bresser Pereira Maravall and 
Przeworski 14 They argue that the optimal neoliberal reform strategy is one implemented by a 
pragmatic left-wing government which will orient reforms toward growth protect material welfare and 
fully utilize democracy in formulating and implementing the reforms 15 Originally there was thought to
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be a tension or incompatibility between neoliberal reform and democratic governance Neoliberal reform 
brought high costs consumption for some fell whether through the elimination of government 
subsidies contraction of state agencies and enterprises unemployment due to the cost cutting 
accompanying the new competition in a liberalized market or through the elimination of illicit 
revenues possible through corruption that inevitably developed m highly regulated markets in which 
the state controlled import licenses and a good deal of production The inevitable costs of economic 
reform requiring some groups in society to reduce consumption were believed to elicit pressure for 
redistribution that would not be resisted in a democratic context
Either the reform would be sidetracked or democracy would be sacrificed for economic orthodoxy 
While economic reform does imply costs several cases of economic reform by democratic regimes now 
cast doubt on the former fears Przeworski has argued that while those whose subsistence is threatened 
by neoliberal reform have no choice but to oppose the reform those who will suffer reductions in 
income and consumption will not necessarily oppose the reform Their support is conditioned on their 
confidence in the soundness of the policy and competence of the policy makers and likelihood that the 
short term hardships will be replaced by long term benefits 16 The depth of the pre reform crisis or 
brutality of the previous non-democratic regime are also strong incentives for citizens in democratic 
regimes to support neoliberal reforms in spite of their considerable cost There is no automatic 
oppositional response by those adversely affected by the reform and therefore democratic politicians do 
not necessarily need to tear lor their jobs while implementing neoliberal reform Neoliberal reform 
under a strong democracy is possible—and may be optimal
Neoliberal economic restructuring can also be implemented under what I have termed weak 
democracy O Donnell has identified a new species of democracy delegative democracy which 
combines authoritarian policy making methods with free elections and the periodic change of political 
leaders 17
Delegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency 
is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit constrained only by the hard facts of 
existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office 18
Delegative democracy enables relatively rapid policy making without the constraints of the separation 
of powers and legislative-executive impasse frequent m representative democracies In this way the 
pressures for modification of the economic reform program m order to shield those bearing its costs are 
more easily resisted without having to resort to the repression of an authoritarian regime
The essence of the democratic path whether the strong or weak variety is a measure of 
accountability of political leaders to the citizenry This accountability is usually institutionalized 
through structures of representation like legislatures and elections Leaders who behave in a way 
inconsistent with their mandate or inconsistent with the interests and preferences of the electorate can 
be removed in the next election and replaced with individuals more willing to serve the public will The 
authoritarian and democratic paths to economic reform can be characterized as differing along this 
dimension of accountability Authoritarian regimes are less accountable to their societies than are 
democratic regimes (The inflection point at which one regime can become another will not be 
determined here ) This accountability is the mechanism through which those bearing the costs of 
economic reform can voice their opposition In a democratic regime some effort to ameliorate those 
costs must be implemented In an authoritarian regime these costs can more easily be ignored
This discussion creates an interesting puzzle when applied to the empirical case of Mexico What is 
it about the Mexican regime—being authoritarian and largely unaccountable to a voting electorate— 
that has produced the unexpected result of a comprehensive social welfare program intended to ease the 
hardship of those hurt by the neoliberal reform9 The remainder of this paper will present an explanation 
of this puzzle
Social Aiithontarianism 37
The basic argument is that the nature of the links established between the Mexican state and society 
when confronted with the dilemmas of economic reform produced a policy response that would be 
expected in a democracy in spite of the lack of democracy in Mexico The Mexican regime 
characterized by a dominant but ideologically heterogenous and fragmented Institutional Revolution 
Party (PRI) a relatively mild civilian authoritarian tradition relying more on cooptation than coercion 
and the corporatist structures of political control that at times imperfectly mimic democratic 
interchange has produced policy responses from an authoritarian context that would be expected from a 
democratic context in which politicians and policy makers were held accountable by the electorate 
These characteristics of the Mexican regime suggest a third path to neoliberal economic restructuring a 
social authoritarian path The rather impressive record of regime longevity held by Mexico relative to 
other Latin American regimes in spite of several significant economic crises and drastic policy 
reorientation can also be explained in this way Longevity of an authoritarian regime may depend on 
state-society relations as found in Mexico The success of Mexico m following this path indicates that 
liberal democracy may not be in the near future for Mexico
Mexico s Social Authoritarian Path to Neoliberal Reform
Before examining the state-society relations that seem to have produced the social authoritarian path in 
Mexico I must first establish two preliminary points 1) that Mexico is in fact an authoritarian regime 
unaccountable to its citizens and 2) that it has in tact instituted social welfare programs to ameliorate 
the adverse affects of economic restructuring
Mexico s Authoritarianism
In a 1990 televised forum on the demise of communism and triumph of democracy organized by 
Octavio Paz Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa proclaimed Mexico a perfect dictatorship and 
was promptly asked to leave the country What made it perfect he claimed was that while having all 
the characteristics of dictatorship it did not seem like one 19 While the citizenry is not free to elect a 
government of its choice there are significant opportunities for political participation a degree of 
pluralism in policy making and an institutionalized and time honored mechanism by which every six 
years the dictator-president voluntarily leaves office to be replaced by another who for six years will 
enjoy the exercise of broad discretionary powers free to chart a divergent course from his or her 
predecessor
To substantiate the authoritarian nature of the Mexican political system I will present information 
from an objective external source which attempts to quantify the degree of political freedom and civil 
liberties in individual countries I will also offer information on the Mexican electoral system which 
demonstrates that elections while performing a political function are not the primary method for 
choosing political leaders
Freedom House ratings of Mexico for the last fifteen years have consistently placed Mexico in the 
category of Partly Free nation states 20 For example m the 1980 ratings Mexico scored three for 
political rights (i e government selected outside of public view in spite of periodic elections) and four 
for civil liberties (i e holding of political prisoners some censorship torture by state security 
services)71 The 1991-1992 and 1993-1994 ratings were four for both categories respectively during 
both periods 27 In the commentary explaining the rating it was stated that civil liberties had been 
restricted further since the last rating due to more sophisticated forms of repression 73
Overall in 1993 there was a general tightening of control over politics and civic activity 
as the state—party system geared up for the electoral transition to the next PRI president 
in 1994 The government hardened its position against protests over electoral fraud Its 
use of tougher measures—including tear gas mass arrests beatings by security forces and 
torture during confinement—was evident during a number of state elections
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Targets of rights violations include political and labor figures journalists human rights 
activists criminal detainees and with regard to extortion the general public Over the last 
decade nearly 500 people have disappeared There is credible evidence that since 1989 more 
than 200 activists of the opposition PRD [Democratic Revolution Party] have been killed 
tor political reasons During one week in November 1993 alone five PRD activists were 
killed in three southern states Since 1991 there has been compelling evidence of 
electronic surveillance of government critics opposition parties and the official human 
rights commission itself74
While Mexican citizens enjoy greater freedom than many around the world the Freedom House 
ratings indicate that Mexico is not a democracy in spite of many ostensibly democratic structures
Much of the authoritarianism m Mexico is manifest through electoral manipulation and fraud In 
1976 no opposition candidate ran but the PRI candidate received 94 percent of the vote an 
embarrassingly high percentage which diminished the significance and credibility of the electoral 
process 25 During the 1988 presidential election the new computer tabulation system crashed 
as early returns put the left of center opposition candidate Cuauhtemoc Cardenas in the lead in Mexico 
City (Smith 1989) Official results were released days later giving Carlos Salinas de Gortan the victory 
with less than fifty one percent of the vote Electoral manipulation and fraud in Mexico takes place in 
two distinct phases during the campaign and on election day The PRI as ruling party has access to 
vast state resources to fortify its electoral campaigns In the 1994 presidential elections the PRI spent 
the maximum legally allowed $41 million compared to the PRD candidates $2 million Much PRI 
spending is illicit and therefore not officially recorded but estimates put it at many times what is 
admitted 76 Apart from spending imbalances the PRI enjoys significantly asymmetric media coverage 
Principal opposition demands for electoral reform include equal media access for all parties 27 Ross 
describes one example of media bias
On a day in early June when [Cuauhtemoc] Cardenas drew 30 000 at the Autonomous 
University in southern Mexico City the country s top newscaster Televisa s Jacobo 
Zabludovsky glossed over the huge rally and featured a twenty five minute interview with 
Zedillo [PRI candidate]78
Another pre-election tactic is to truck people in to PRI rallies 29 or to insinuate or threaten that 
certain state benefits will not be forthcoming without attendance In April 1994 PRI operatives worked 
to insure a sizeable turnout to a Salinas rally celebrating the anniversary of the assassination of Peasant 
Revolutionary Emiliano Zapata and simultaneously reduce the turnout to a Cardenas campaign rally 
the same day in a nearby municipality Peasants were told that deeds to their land promised under 
legislation ending land reform would only be distributed to those attending the Salinas rally 30
Election day tactics range from brigadas volantes ([flying brigades] of policemen soldiers and party 
activists that cast votes in one place and then are transported to other polling places to vote again) to 
fraude cibernetico or computer manipulation of voter registration rolls 31 The voter registration rolls 
have been criticized for having been purged of opposition voters and augmented with PRI voters 
Barberan and Cardenas by comparing census data with voter registration data found the unlikely fact 
that ninety eight percent of women between twenty two and fifty three years of age were registered to 
vote in 1994 37 Thirty four electoral districts in the 1988 presidential elections had more than 105 
percent of the voting age population registered to vote 33 The rather circumspect authors of an election 
study commented on the phenomenon of over registration
Nevertheless there exist some rural zones in which the relation [registered voters/votmg 
population] exceeds 100 percent which is really strange and could implicate genuine 
adulteration of the Election rolls The correction of these anomalies should be a priority 
activity for the new government and a demand of the political parties and society m 
general34
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In Chiapas location January 1994 of an armed revolutionary movement that has yet to be pacified 
reported 88 8 percent voting for the PRI in 1988 the highest percentage of any state giving significant 
help to the Salinas electoral effort1,5 The village of Oxchuc Chiapas supposedly was unanimously in 
favor of the PRI in 1991 elections giving it 100 percent of their votes In 1994 Oxchuc residents 
welcomed the Zapatista rebels
Elections in Mexico are usually more fair and clean in urban rather than rural areas due to the greater 
ease of election monitoring for opposition parties as well as decreased influence of local political 
caciques or strongmen who wield significant political and economic influence in the countryside 
Repeated electoral reforms since the 1960s have allowed greater access to the electoral process to 
opposition parties and candidates In 1988 the conservative opposition was allowed to win a 
governorship—unprecedented since the revolution Since then other governors have been removed from 
office by the president in the face of opposition protest of fraudulent elections The nature of these 
forced resignations by presidential fiat indicate that elections still are not the primary method of 
designating political office holders v  Candidate selection within the PRI is by and large by designation 
of party leaders Party primaries were proposed but aborted in 1964 and have not been instituted to the 
present18 There is some effort to provide a non partisan forum for dealing with claims of electoral 
fraud Eisenstadt (1995) argues that while still weak the Federal Electoral Tribunal is slowly 
increasing its autonomy from the PRI and its ability to adjudicate electoral irregularities 19 Overall 
Mexican elections remain politically important but are not the principal mechanism of political 
leadership selection thus failing a primary test for democratic government40
Mexico s Social Welfare Efforts
Having been bom from the first great social revolution of the twentieth century the Mexican regime 
has long shown at least a superficial concern for social welfare The 1917 Constitution that 
encapsulated the revolutionary aspirations provided for an eight hour work day prohibited child labor 
and required equal pay for equal work regardless of gender as well as other generous protections and 
benefits to labor (Article 123) The Constitution also provided for public education (Article 3) Land 
redistribution to the landless and a prohibition of large landholdings is perhaps the best know provision 
in the Constitution (Article 27) 41 Finally Article 25 gives the state the responsibility of directing the 
economy for national development sovereignty a just distribution of national wealth and promotion of 
the general welfare While the Constitution calls for many social initiatives and a state active in 
fulfilling the economic and social needs of its citizens the record of implementation is rather limited 
Land reform for example languished as a mere idea for years after ratification of the Constitution until 
President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-40) used its implementation to reward the mobilization of the rural 
poor in support of his consolidation of power away from former president Plutarco Elias Calles who 
had pretensions of ruling from behind the throne 42 After this initial period of land redistribution land 
reform was slowed by subsequent administrations s granting considerable legal protection to land 
owners who were potential targets of redistribution By 1977 after a final yet dramatic expropriation of 
irrigated and fertile land in Sonora land reform came to a defacto end made de jure in 1992 Forms of 
mediation between the state and society were recast after the Revolution when strongmen political 
bosses caciques became the new intermediaries who helped a centralizing and ambitious state meet 
the needs of local communities in order to integrate the country State patronage (in the form of roads 
schools land irrigation) was essential to this integration
Many of the modem social welfare programs created by the state originated in the 1970s By and 
large these programs avoided structural change and instead concentrated on infrastructure production and 
distribution Listing these programs creates a typical bureaucratic alphabet soup CONASUPO 
(agricultural price support system and food marketing agency) PIDER (integral rural development 
program) COPLAMAR (yet another rural development program) SAM (Mexican Food System aimed 
at self sufficiency) IMSS (social security agency) ISSSTE (state worker social security program) 
FOVISSSTE (state worker housing program) INFONAVIT (national workers housing fund) etc
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In 1988 with the neoliberal restructuring of Mexico firmly in place and poised for a dramatic 
deepening and state participation in the economy declining and domestic spending contracting a new 
social welfare program was introduced simultaneously with the inauguration of Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari as president This program the National Program of Solidarity (Pronasol or Solidarity) was 
targeted at those most hurt by the economic restructuring It was introduced as a departure from the 
long tradition of PRI as party machine dispensing paternalistic patronage to subordinate clients who 
became fodder for electoral cannons 44 Instead Pronasol emphasizes co- responsibility between state 
and citizen requires committees to form at the community level to design projects and then petition 
funds and depends on local provision of part of the necessary resources usually through volunteer 
labor by the beneficiaries 45 In an era of budget contraction social spending in Mexico has increased 
seven percent each year between 1989 and 1990 In 1990 it was equal to 37 64 percent of total non­
interest government spending 46 Some suggest that Solidarity will serve to integrate the urban poor 
until now not members of any official sector of the PRI into the party with predictable negative effects 
on the chances for democratization 47
Interestingly the Solidarity program has drawn many of its top officials trom former leftist militants 
(e g former guerrillas excommunist party leaders etc ) 48 This pattern of integration into the official 
fold of former opposition leaders is not new in Mexico but as will be argued later is one important 
factor in the ability of the regime to maintain itself
In general social welfare policy has been used to shore up support for the regime or to coopt and 
neutralize those who opposed it This is not to deny a genuine desire on the part of political leaders to 
alleviate poverty and other social ills nevertheless the political role of social welfare policy has been 
the guarantee of social peace and at least acquiescence to continued PRI rule or at most active support 
for the regime Now we are poised to answer the all important question of why would a regime not 
dependent on electoral support expend so many resources and effort legitimating itself through social 
welfare programs9 The answers lie m the nature of the state-society links that have developed in 
Mexico
State-Society links in Mexico Leading to Social Authoritarianism
Social authoritarianism seems to result from three characteristics of state-society links m Mexico 
The violence of the Revolution and post-Revolutionary power struggles were finally halted by the 
creation of a political party within which competition for power and influence could be earned out non- 
violently The Mexican military by 1946 was subordinated to civilian politicians and violent 
repression while not uncommon has never been pervasive there has been a marked preference for 
coopting opposition groups or drawing them into the regime through limited concessions and divide 
and conquer techniques rather than forceful exclusion of those not in agreement with the political 
direction of the country The corporatist system which institutionalizes direct ties between important 
sectors of society has mimicked democracy to a certain extent allowing some groups limited 
representation within the state while allowing unaccountable political leaders to maintain a degree of 
control over and autonomy from these groups These three factors—party cooptation before repression 
and corporatist state-society ties—have developed into a political system that combines authoritarian 
unaccountability with social welfare programs which seems to provide long term stability and a degree 
of legitimacy without democracy
Fragmented and Ideologically Heterogenous Party
The PRI is the present manifestation of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) organized in 1929 
President Calles after the pre-inauguration assassination of Obregon his successor proposed the 
creation of a party in order to make Mexico a country of institutions and laws instead of a country of 
one man 49 The PNR almost immediately began to develop the traits that characterize the official party 
to this day almost absolute domination of elective positions a lack of internal democratic decision 
making and financial support from the government In 1938 after the dramatic expropriation of foreign
Social Authoritarianism 41
oil holdings and acceleration oí land distribution the PNR was reorganized and renamed the Party of the 
Mexican Revolution (PRM) The PRM unlike its predecessor which was based on individual member 
affiliation was a coalition ot peasant labor popular (bureaucracy) and military sectors with indirect 
member affiliation through the sectors 50 The PRM was restructured in 1946 eliminating the military 
sector and renamed the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) The PRI has been the dominant 
political force not withstanding a vocal and active opposition since that time
In fact partisan opposition in spite of having its own life and strength has been able to 
act only to the extent that it is permitted to do so by the group in power It could not 
have had even the modest position it has in the electoral panorama if it had been openly 
rejected by those who exert power in contemporary Mexico A traditional method of 
lessening tensions m the Mexican political system had been precisely not to close the 
doors to expressions of dissidence 51
The PRI organization is rather centralized with most decision making taking place within the 
National Executive Committee (CEN) The CEN s twenty one members make party policy determine 
the ideological positions of the party and through the party bureaucracy run party affairs 57 The 
President of the Republic determines the composition of the CEN and in this way the party itself has 
remained subordinate to the executive Beside the CEN the party is composed of various national state 
and regional committees and councils as well as the Institute tor Political Economic and Social 
Studies (IEPES) an in house think tank that has been instrumental in writing the party platforms 
during presidential campaigns Representatives of the three official sectors of the party are present in all 
levels of the party organization
The PRI is perhaps the quintessential party machine on a national scale Its ideological 
underpinnings are vague and pragmatic enough to allow a wide range of views within the party 
Automatic party membership based on membership in one of the sectoral organizations a official 
union or peasant league creates links between the citizens and the state but more importantly open 
channels of influence the state frequently manipulates
A myriad of jobs are available only through the Party Thus it can be an abundant source 
of the most essential ingredient to maintaining even a subsistence standard of living The 
Party itself employs tens of thousands of people m its offices and affiliates nationwide It 
can also be a necessary and sufficient means for achieving employment in the 
governmental sector And finally through its unions it controls many jobs in private- 
sector as well as state-owned industnes 53
The party due to its history as the integrating force of disparate political groups after the revolution 
and emphasis on institutions rather than personalities has remained ideologically heterogenous and 
relatively adaptable and pragmatic Historians have chronicled the pendulum swings of presidential 
terms a conservative president being followed by a more populist or leftist one all professing loyalty 
to and strengthening the party in the process 54 Cardenas with his attacks on large land owners foreign 
corporations and mobilization of labor and peasants was followed by Manuel Avila Camacho and 
Miguel Aleman who courted business and started a drive to industrialization Gustavo Diaz Ordaz who 
ordered the 1968 massacre of student demonstrators in the Plaza of the Three Cultures was succeeded by 
Luis Echeverría who used populist rhetoric and policies to mend fences When Echeverría s gestures 
proved too little to convince the opposition political forces that real competition was possible his 
successor Jose Lopez Portillo inaugurated political reforms that legalized the Communist Party made 
political party registration easier and guaranteed 100 seats to opposition parties in an expanded 
Chamber of Deputies
In addition to swings m Presidential orientation the PRI formally includes peasant labor and 
popular sectors and informally business and military groups To keep such a heterogenous coalition 
together (and hide most intra party conflict and competition from outside observers) indicates a 
considerable ability to accommodate
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When faced by opposition the Mexican regime s most frequent response was to bring its 
critics into the system—by offering a voice a job or a policy concession As one 
observer neatly summarized the government s approach two carrots maybe even three or 
four then a stick if necessary By embracing (and defusing) the opposition the Mexican 
state managed to strengthen its supportS5
Gonzalez Casanova argues that the PRI not only recruits talented or capable individuals but also
captures (coopts) individuals that are dangerous for the hegemony of the apparatus 
inviting them independent of their antecedent affiliations to form part of the government 
or of the PRI itself where they are given benefits that contrast with the difficulties of 
making any type of public career from outside 56
Evidence of this ability to coopt the opposition forces was already provided above in the discussion 
of militant leftists (some of them former political prisoners) occupying important policy making 
positions in the Salinas s neoliberal administration Within the PRI there are different currents and 
factions In the mid 1980s the Democratic Current (CD) became a vociferous critic of the lack of 
democracy within the PRI When Salinas was chosen as PRI candidate for the 1988 election many in 
the CD formally left the party and formed an opposition group that would later become the PRD This 
split and on going tension in the party is attributed to the ascendence of técnicos [technocrats who 
have no experience in elective office] over politicos [traditional politicians having held elective office] 
This shift has been called a revolution due to its magnitude 57
Shift of influence away from politicos has meant a significant internal restructuring of the PRI and 
its political support base but seems to have been successful While the técnicos have become 
dominant within the party and have succeeded m implementing their neoliberal economic reform there 
remain within the party significant factions that are not enamored with the economic program The 
PRI as a heterogenous organization has nevertheless managed to maintain the coherence of the party 
keeping the factions together 58 This ability to resist fissiparous forces can be explained by the 
fragmented nature of the PRI-State Federalism creates many sub-national power centers and allows the 
executive to deal differentially with regions The principle of no reelection an almost sacred tenet of 
the Constitution also provides dissatisfied party members the hope that next time around they will 
have another chance to influence the direction of the party by the ascendence of their faction 59
This discussion of the PRI may imply greater coherence of strategy and levels of intent to PRI 
leaders than is warranted The PRI and the regime it supports have been successful at maintaining their 
dominant positions in Mexican society but not because they are all powerful or all knowing and 
therefore able to perfectly anticipate opposition demands and offer prophylactic reforms to head off 
destabilization Historian Alan Knight offers some perspective on the PRI s ability to remain intact 
through economic crisis and restructuring while under going significant internal power shifts Stability 
and longevity of regime and party may not be due to superior foresight or political acumen but to the 
ability to make the best of imperfect political tools
It is worth developing this line of argument further considering whether on the basis of 
history since about 1940 the PRI should not be seen as a more ramshackle institution 
than often supposed albeit one that having survived in ramshackle form for half a 
century may continue to do so 60
While economic restructuring would hurt some factions of the party there is significant incentive on 
the part of party leaders to negotiate with these factions and offer at least limited amelioration in order 
to secure continued party unity 61 It has also been argued that party factions often ally with like minded 
groups in society in order to gain influence within the party The short lived SAM program was one 
incidence when reformist and populist party members in the bureaucracy were able to influence state 
policy by demonstrating a significant following among peasant organizations As they gained influence
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over state policy they were able to transfer state resources to their clients When the political balance of 
power shifted within the bureaucracy and the program was ended the peasant beneficiarles were able to 
retain significant resources in this case several program trucks with which they could further their 
organizational and production goals independent of the state while waiting for another opportunity to 
ally with a patron 67
Thus the dilemmas posed by economic restructuring initiated by a party which was so broad as to 
contain many who would be hurt by the policy who had significant ties to societal groups created 
significant incentives to provide social welfare benefits to those adversely affected (within the party and 
through channels of patronage to society) m spite of the lack of avenues of democratic influence for 
groups in civil society Social welfare policy benefiting societal groups js  a type of by product of 
efforts to maintain the unity and coherence of the PRI
Tradition of Military Subordination and Limited Repression
The Mexican military is one of the most apolitical armed forces in Latin America Its subordination to 
civilian authority was complete by 1946 when the military sector of the PRI was disbanded Story 
identified several tactics that maintain the military subordination frequent rotation of assignment of 
military officers to prevent the establishment of personal followings promotions based on loyalty to 
political leaders encouragement of graft and profiteering through private channels rather than public 
institutions lessening the incentive to enter politics for financial gain 61 In spite of the apolitical stance 
of the military it has become increasingly important to the regime It has been used to repress 
opposition movements when they seem to threaten the regime itself as m the 1968 student massacre 
and 1970s counterinsurgency against rural guerrillas
The military has also been used to put down strikes The importance both within Mexico and 
internationally of the illicit drug trade has also given the military a significant role as well as 
opportunity for corruption The 1994 uprising in Chiapas offers an example of the continuing 
subordination of the military in spite of its growing importance to the regime The armed movement of 
indigenous people m Southern Mexico was met immediately with military force After several days of 
armed clashes a unilateral cease fire was called by the government A second governmental offensive 
was briefly launched then aborted in February 1995 This pattern of significant restraint in the use of 
military force in the face of an armed revolutionary movement is anomalous in the regional context of 
ambitious and tremendously brutal counterinsurgency efforts What is also significant is the complete 
absence of military personnel in the government negotiation teams sent to Chiapas to resolve the 
conflict With no tradition of military intervention in politics for over fifty years it is easier for the 
regime to use the two carrots before the stick tactics of accommodating opposition movements and 
offers a less polarized atmosphere within which social welfare programs can be created
As previously mentioned in the discussion of the authoritarian nature of the Mexican regime 
repression is a reality in Mexico Clearly the level of repression is relatively low compared to other 
Latin American authoritarian governments of the right and left During the Salinas administration 
efforts were made to deal with the human rights abuses and state violence by the creation of a National 
Human Rights Commission (CNDH) While some have argued that this is merely window dressing to 
divert attention from the abuses 64 The act of creating a Commission however limited its authority 
indicates that a policy of general repression is not likely With no tradition of widespread repression it 
is easier for the regime to address social needs and grant benefits and concessions to petitioning groups 
than it would be in the polarized context created by pervasive state violence
Corporatist System of Political Control Mimicking Democracy
As mentioned the PRI is organized around the popular labor and peasant sectors This corporatist 
arrangement flaws and contradictions notwithstanding has mimicked democratic state-society linkages 
to a certain extent which is a third factor in the explanation of social welfare policies in the absence of 
democracy
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The corporatist system in Mexico has been labeled populist corporatism
Populist corporatism implies political mobilization m order ironically to demobilize 
the class groups that can formulate demands Populism activates strategic class groups 
and incorporates them into the state apparatus controlling and de radicalizing their 
demands Depoliticization m the Mexican political system has allowed a sophisticated use 
of the bargaining process within the limits prescribed by the state It is an alternative to 
the indiscriminate use of repressive measures 65
In a study of the CNC and its political role Hardy argues that the corporatist system has divided the 
peasants making it harder to act collectively This division allows their demands to be resolved partially 
and selectively by the state through the conduit of the CNC 66 In the years immediately after the 
creation of the corporatist sectors the peasant and labor groups had significant influence within the 
regime As time went on the popular sector gained more influence due to the implicit alliance of the 
state with private capital during the years of the economic miracle 67 In spite of this progressive 
weakening of peasant and labor sectors the corporatist system remained flexible enough to 
accommodate peasant demands
In 1975 peasant mobilization m Northwest Mexico independent of the state had reached high levels 
Land invasions were becoming more frequent stimulated in part by populist rhetoric from President 
Echeverría CNC leaders had to radicalize their discourse in order to regain some control over the 
mobilization When land was finally redistributed over the adamant opposition of the large landholders 
the CNC was the agent of distribution in spite of its relatively limited role in the mobilizations 68 In 
this way the state was able to regain control of peasant mobilization while not having to resort to 
force This game of catch-up played by CNC leaders mimics to a degree what democratic accountability 
would also accomplish—keeping leaders aligned with the interests of their constituency
During the period of economic restructuring the corporatist system has remained flexible and partially 
responsive to peasant interests With approximately one quarter of the Mexican population living in 
rural areas and economically dependent on agriculture the liberalization of trade was a significant threat 
to the livelihood of millions of smallholding peasants who were unable for a variety of reasons to 
compete with U S farmers Trade liberalization and the accompanying commodification of formerly 
inalienable ejido land would mean that millions of peasants would either migrate to the already crowded 
cities (a significant area of opposition party electoral strength) or to the U S (a source of growing 
tension in bilateral relations) At the same time independent peasant organizing (outside of the CNC) 
had gained ground during the 1980s The regime was faced with a dilemma
As it had dealt with similar situations in the past the independent peasant movement was split 
those with potential to compete in the international market were offered a degree of pluralism and some 
voice m agricultural policy making while those with no productive potential were placated with limited 
social welfare programs to prevent mass migration or starvation 69 Thus by drawing some of the 
independent organizations into the regime through limited expansion of representation and offering at 
least some economic benefits however insufficient to other segments of the peasant movement the 
regime was able to greatly reduce the level of pressure from the rural poor on the regime while not 
altering its economic program The corporatist system offered institutional mechanisms for this result
These examples demonstrate how the corporatist system by bringing certain sectors of society into 
the regime m an institutionalized but flexible relationship creates the possibility for some authentic 
representation or at least reactive responsiveness to the interests of society without the mechanisms of 
democracy
The Rural Poor as Test Case
A brief look at state-rural poor relations lends more credence to the argument The peasantry m Mexico 
is the least likely group to evoke a democracy like response from the state yet they have been the
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subject of numerous social welfare programs Social authoritarianism m Mexico is open enough or 
has enough democratic traits so that some groups can periodically exert influence over policy But the 
rural poor experience less democracy than any other group in Mexico
The peasantry is the source of the biggest voting blocks for PRI candidates due to manipulation and 
coercion and the difficulties of opposition parties to penetrate the countryside While it theoretically is 
possible that the rural poor actually prefer the PRI to other parties the rebellion in Chiapas in 1994 as 
well as past incidences of rural unrest of violent and non violent forms seem to indicate that a sizeable 
proportion of the rural poor are not voluntarily voting for the PRI
Mexican peasants especially indigenous peasants are also the poorest of all groups in Mexico It 
was reported in April of 1994 that in the states of Chiapas Guerrero and Oaxaca where 75 percent of 
the population is indigenous and peasant (and these three states account for over 10 percent of national 
population) that 29 percent were illiterate with only 25 8 percent receiving more than primary 
education In spite of the fact that these states are the location for the principal hydroelectric projects m 
Mexico they have the lowest levels of electrification in the country At least 50 percent of the 
households in these states use wood or charcoal daily for cooking 70 Clearly the rural poor have little 
economic clout As participants in an area of the economy which is by and large uncompetitive in 
international markets the peasants are to a certain extent economically expendable state officials have 
said so much in slightly different terms 71
Notwithstanding these characteristics making the rural poor the least likely to elicit a democracy like 
response they have received considerable benefits during the period of economic restructuring For 
example Pronasol funds have been provided in the form of debt relief and new credit administered 
through no collateral loans A new program PROCAMPO was initiated to provide smallholding 
peasant producers with a cash payment per acre of land with no conditions as to type of crop or 
agricultural activity it was used for
While social welfare programs have benefited the rural poor even though they have the least ability 
to pressure the state for such programs the statistics given above illustrating the extreme poverty 
experienced by many peasants seem to discredit this argument Why are they so poor if they are 
benefiting from social welfare programs7 The principle reason is that the primary objective of social 
welfare programs in Mexico is not to eliminate poverty—Lustig estimates that this could be done with 
as little as 2 24 percent of GDP—but to ensure political and social stability 72 Those peasants that are 
able to threaten stability to a greater extent receive proportionately more resources than those who are 
so marginalized they can have little impact These marginal peasants are not completely neglected 
however The neoliberal program for rural areas specifically addresses their situation of extreme 
poverty PROCAMPO was one effort to increase their disposable income PROCAMPO benefits 
would be greater if the primary goal was to reduce poverty 73 Nevertheless the Mexican state 
unaccountable to these poorest of the poor has implemented programs to ameliorate not eliminate the 
negative effects of neoliberal reform
Implications
A pause for review may be helpful I have argued that the nature of the Mexican political system m 
spite of its authoritarian regime and resultant lack of accountability of political leaders has provided 
social welfare programs to its citizens to cushion the negative effects of neoliberal economic 
restructuring This social welfare response would be expected in a democratic regime in which the 
electoral imperative keeps policy roughly in line with societal interests This social authoritarian path 
to neoliberal restructuring is distinct from the authoritarian or democratic paths discussed previously 
This path is explained by three aspects of the Mexican political system a heterogenous dominant 
political party a tradition of military subordination and limited repression and a corporatist system 
that mimics democratic representation allowing demands to be passed up to the state although there is 
no method of democratically choosing state personnel
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It seems that these three factors also help explain the impressive staying power of the Mexican 
political system in the face of repeated external shocks (e g falling oil prices and rising interest rates 
in the early 1980s) and internal shocks and policy reorientations (e g massive land redistribution and 
state subsidization of large scale commercial agriculture import substitution industrialization to 
neoliberal export led growth) Mexico seems to fit Evans s description of embedded autonomy the state 
maintains significant ties to many groups in society but retains enough autonomy from those groups 
to periodically act against their particular interests 74
In 1989 several scholars opined about the effects of the political earthquake of the 1988 presidential 
election and its seeming contribution to a potential transition to democracy 75 Like the seismic 
disturbance that shook buildings m Mexico City in 1985 the effects of political earthquake of 1988 are 
hardly visible in 1995 Salinas the president with the weakest claim to legitimate ascension to the 
presidency managed to implement the Solidarity program that has received praise and emulation 
throughout the world 76 In spite of an armed uprising assassinations of his handpicked successor and 
the party president he managed to hand over the presidential sash to a second hand picked successor after 
an election which had been pronounced relatively clean by foreign and domestic observers 77 While 
Salinas may have exercised considerable political skill during his tenure the political system itself 
based on the PRI traditions of inclusion over exclusion and a corporatist system that provided 
representation while controlling dissent seems to have made Salinas s political comeback possible 
Mexico seems to have weathered the political earthquake well as past earthquakes have been weathered
The social authoritarian path to economic change seems likely to be a long one What then can be 
said for Fukuyama s hypothesis of an eventual convergence to liberal democracy and capitalist markets9 
It seems that Mexico may be an example of another possibility for long term stability Fukuyama 
argues that a human struggle for recognition and inherent lack of legitimacy of authoritarianism made 
liberal democracy the only stable regime But perhaps he has made his thresholds too high It seems 
that Mexico is a political system which—assuming Fukuyama is correct—allows enough recognition 
to human beings and generates enough legitimacy to stave off perhaps indefinitely the forces that he 
argues inexorably lead countries down the road to democracy Will the Mexican citizenry in spite of 
the continuing calls for democracy and political reform from a sizeable group be willing to accept the 
lower levels of recognition and legitimacy available in Mexico s social authoritarianism instead of 
paying the high pnce of pushing for the greater levels of these psychic goods available in democratic 
regimes9
While I am not enamored with Fukuyama s thesis nor with the social authoritarianism in Mexico I 
am not optimistic that there will be a qualitative change in the Mexican political system in the near 
future What can be hoped for is a decrease in the level of repression and expansion of the levels of 
limited pluralism offered to some groups While far short of democracy these changes would serve to 
lessen the social costs of authontananism while giving more people an opportunity to influence the 
political decisions that affect their own lives
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Chapter 4
The International Monetary System States and Stability
MarkJ Crescenzi
The more open an economy and the greater degree of capital mobility the harder it is 
for monetary authorities to exert control over monetary conditions that are described in 
textbooks 1
The benefits from the movement toward a single economic space come at a price For 
governments the price is a limitation o f autonomy in the conduct o f policies smaller 
margin for errors and an increased vulnerability to external shocks 9
Richard Nixon s 1971 decision to suspend indefinitely the dollar s convertibility into gold marked the 
end of the Bretton Woods international monetary system 1 The stable system of fixed exchange rates 
collapsed and for the first time since 1945 the world returned to a more anarchical system of floating 
exchange rates Since then the international monetary system has experienced an increasing trend 
towards deregulation and globalization drastically changing the economic structure and processes 
around the world These changes have had political consequences specifically regarding the political 
autonomy of states
As states compete for foreign investment in order to stimulate domestic growth or maintain national 
debt the process of creating and maintaining domestic markets such that they are attractive to foreign 
investors is rising up the priority ladders of policy makers When this priority of maintaining accessible 
and attractive markets clashes with domestic agendas (l e welfare programs that burden domestic 
economic performance but satisfy domestic political goals) often one policy goal must be sacrificed in 
favor of the other The continued growth and importance of the international economic system 
significantly impacts the policy maker s ability to sacrifice international concerns in pursuit of 
domestic goals (l e reelection) thereby impairing the state s ability to function unilaterally and with 
the political autonomy that has been a long cherished product of sovereignty Therefore this paper 
argues that the global finance market has emerged as a highly salient dimension of international 
interaction that impacts both state and non state actors The conflicting agendas of the various actors in 
the global financial system can lead to a structural tension between political and economic goals This 
structural tension is particularly relevant to states and their ability to coordinate domestic political 
goals with the maintenance of their position in the global financial markets Failures to successfully 
coordinate this tension can lead to serious consequences at both the domestic political and the global 
financial levels These consequences must be recognized to include (but not be limited to) regime 
change and global financial instability
This paper seeks to address the growing trends in international finance and their potential impact on 
the state as a non market actor In order to appreciate the potential problems argued above regarding 
present economic conditions we must first explore the past and hopefully trace the path of 
development for the international economic system Thus this paper begins with an examination of the 
origin success and eventual decline of the Bretton Woods system The post Bretton Woods era is then 
discussed in terms of both the structure of the system and the emergence of new actors in a 
technologically advancing world This history will not only provide insight as to where we are and how 
we got there but also how our present international financial system is becoming highly 
interdependent with state behavior as well as non state actors
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What is found is that finance has become decoupled from production to become an independent 
power an autocrat over the real economy 4 The global finance market has evolved into a highly 
volatile system characterized by little regulation Regulation that is in place results from tired 
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) left over from the now 
defunct Bretton Woods system interstate agreements of cooperation regarding financial goals such as 
the Louvre Agreement15 and from new and nebulous non state regulating organizations such as the 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS)
Previously controlled by a fixed system with stability as a near singular goal international Finance 
markets have flourished in a flexible system in search of a compromise between financial stability for 
the maintenance of the goods markets and flexibility that reflects a more efficient market that can be 
speculated against for the pursuit of profit This represents a structural departure from the original 
concept of the international financial system This departure is in both the underlying purpose of a 
financial system and m the actors who participate m and manipulate financial markets
The global finance market has emerged as a playing field tor two very different types of actors The 
first actor type is the state or firm who needs to attract investment in the pursuit of growth and 
production The second actor type is the business entity that is in pursuit of the short term goal of profit 
making via manipulation of the finance markets This second actor type can be found m the form of 
banks investment firms and organizations and even individual investors Short term profit maximizers 
have little concern for political goals or long term production goals Further these second actor types 
have exploded in number and influence As these actors continue to impact market behavior their 
short term goals increasingly clash with the wants and needs of states In short the power relationship 
in these markets is changing and the changes do not favor states and their desire to remain sovereign 
and politically autonomous
In order to maintain influence in the global financial market states must overcome the collective 
action problem of cooperation in the face of almost certain free ndership and with few paths of 
recourse for those who do free ride 6 Near perfect cooperation is required to produce effective 
regulation of the financial markets that benefits state actors as a whole The political challenge for 
states in this arena of political economy is to find a way to successfully cooperate in their pursuit of 
market access while maintaining as much political independence as possible To fail this challenge is to 
relegate the state to the role of janitor in times of market failure and to otherwise emasculate the state 
not only in its influence over financial markets but also in its pursuit of essential domestic and 
international political goals
The Origins of the International Monetary System
At the core of the Bretton Woods system was the idea of a stable world monetary system This system 
was designed to provide and maintain ample opportunities for nations to engage in the practice of free 
trade Embracing the philosophy of John Maynard Keynes the framers of the Bretton Woods system 
argued that financial stability was the only way to provide for an open goods market and free trade 
was a mission of peace Why was this stability so attractive to the survivors of the Second World War9 
The answer lies in the instability of fiduciary money and the volatile anarchical monetary system of 
the pre World War Two years Financial innovation had drastically changed the economic way of life 
by introducing a radical new concept credit 7
Fiduciary (or credit) money revolutionized economic transactions While goods for barter and even 
gold and other commodity moneys were difficult to transport and often held mystical value 8 paper 
currency and letters of credit were fast and efficient The proliferation of credit money mobilized 
capital and democratized status based on wealth Wealth was no longer tied exclusively to land and 
entrepreneurs could build businesses with fresh ideas and borrowed money Credit changed the 
fundamental nature of the economic transaction and the use of credit exploded
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When industrialization created a new rich that brought with it tremendous growth inflation was not 
far behind Despite protests from the old rich —the land owning class for whom growth and inflation 
were only leading to increased devaluation and taxation of their wealth—the use of credit and 
increased technological innovations in transportation led to an emerging anarchical monetary system 
This system soon linked the industrialized countries in a way that they had never foreseen by money 
Credit brought liquidity and the exchange of capital became frequent 9
By the twentieth century international monetary exchange was rampant As Britain s hold as the 
world s economic leader waned so did the reliance on the British pound sterling (silver) as the world s 
currency The United States had replaced Britain as the leading economic producer 10 Capital no longer 
served merely as the grease for the exchange of goods Short term capital exchanges and bank lending 
were reaching record levels Money lending was standard practice for the banks and when financial 
disaster struck in the 1930s it was the banks inability to cope as the masses made their run for their 
savings that pushed the national economies deeper into depression
In the aftermath of World War II as the Anglo American collaboration labored to engineer a 
phoenix to rise from the ashes both countries harbored sour memories of the open financial markets 
before the Great Depression The British delegation headed by Keynes felt that volatile short term 
capital flows had contributed substantially to the interwar period of economic disaster 11 The U S was 
in full agreement and Henry Morgenthau then U S Treasury Secretary declared the goal was drive 
the usurious money lenders from the temple of international finance 12 Short term profit seeking 
wasn t the only concern The floating exchange rates also came under fire Nurske argued If there is 
anything that inter war experience has clearly demonstrated it is that paper currency exchanges cannot 
be left free to fluctuate from day to day under the influence of market supply and demand If 
currencies are left free to fluctuate speculation in the widest sense is likely to play havoc with 
exchange rates speculation not only in foreign exchanges but also as a result in commodities entering 
into foreign trade 13 Thus fear of returning to the tumultuous days of the interwar period had a strong 
influence on these framers as they set out to establish an international monetary system
Fear wasn t the only motive driving these policy makers The ideological force behind Bretton 
Woods was strong and came mostly from Keynes The liberalization of trade was embraced as a 
peaceful and prosperous goal Trade would link economies increase efficiency and provide 
disincentives for conflict or isolationism It was also clear that Europe would need American assistance 
in order to get back on its feet because domestic markets were harshly crippled by the war For Keynes 
however liberalization of trade meant a more efficient and adaptive division of labor The Keynesian 
ideal of the welfare state relied in part on open trade and more importantly balanced trade Stability 
was seen as a necessary precondition for open and balanced trade Keynes argued that a liberal trading 
system and the adaptive division of labor he envisioned with it could not be maintained in the 
presence of volatile short term capital flows that could skew the exchange rate and adjustment process 
and undermine the aspirations of domestic populations 14 Thus stability was considered a primary 
goal despite any intrusion it may impose on the independence of nations
Essentially Bretton Woods was the Anglo American solution to the collective action problem of 
establishing a productive and peaceful international economy 15 A strong and open international 
economy meant sustained growth and benefit for most or all of the nations involved Open trading 
markets also meant greater efficiency and peaceful interactions between states One can envision the 
international economic system is in the nature of a public good It represents a set of rules that are 
implicitly or explicitly accepted and followed and this in return creates a presumption of stability on 
trade and payments relations 16 (Thus a system that facilitated free trade was a collective good in that 
it could not be obtained by any individual nation The benefits of this system were Pareto optimal 
despite the fact that the U S would have probably benefited more in the short term by engaging in 
isolationism The political goals of European peace and stability as well as the long term development 
of European markets that eventually could sustain balanced trade with the U S figured prominently 
into the American stance Both the U S and Britain felt an ideological pull to create a stable 
international economy that would promote peace and democracy 17 In addition American industry
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needed the overseas customers to maintain the levels of economic activity wartime production had 
hitherto provided 18 Recognizing the long term benefits of the Bretton Woods system the U S 
accepted its role as the cornerstone economy of the system
As the only remaining fully functional economy and clearly the dominant economic and military 
force in the western world the U S promised to uphold the value of the dollar anchored to gold at $35 
an ounce 19 The gold standard emerged in the inter war period as the British pound sterling 
deteriorated and the world embraced gold as the hard currency Currency was to be easily convertible 
into dollars based on its hard connection to gold reserves The world however underestimated the 
difficulties of recharging war torn economies Europe and the Far East needed capital to import 
American goods in order to rebuild their domestic economies While American business interests 
pushed for faster liberalization and access to foreign markets Europeans increasingly resisted U S 
manipulation Despite European suspicions however it was clear that more liquid capital was needed 
in the system in order to establish a cycle of international trade and payments Fearful of their 
dependence on the U S Europe struggled to go their own way and the dream of a relatively open 
monetary payments and financial order dominated by the Bretton Woods institutions appeared 
dead 70 The solution to the collective action problem it appeared had fallen apart The key problem 
remained the inconvertibility of domestic currencies into dollars due to the dollar shortage and the 
inability to access enough capital to make structural improvements domestically
In response to a waning system and increased dissatisfaction from the Europeans the U S flooded 
Europe with $18 billion of capital via the Marshall Plan 21 This capital was in turn used as fuel for the 
recovering European economies and was essentially sufficient to purchase the capital and agricultural 
goods necessary for the reconstruction of domestic economies This unilateral response by the 
Americans was motivated by political and economic goals Politically the Marshall Plan was designed 
to strengthen U S -European ties in a time when the Cold War was just heating up The need to 
preserve a free and strong Western Europe was becoming increasingly important Economically the 
aid was designed to give Europeans the capital they needed to buy American exports These exports 
would serve to stimulate a waning post war American economy Similar aid was provided in Asia 
under the Korean War rearmament process Given these economic and political goals Marshall aid 
become America s first Cold War policy the Korean War the second 77 These policies proved 
successful revitalizing the European economies and strengthening Cold War alliances By 1958 
Britain and the other European economies possessed enough capital to convert their currencies into 
dollars thus ending the preconvertible phase of the Bretton Woods era 71 As the European phoenix got 
off the ground it appeared that Bretton Woods was reborn as well
Bretton Woods 1959-1971
The Bretton Woods system based on a dollar fixed to gold (at $35 an ounce) was set up
for self destruction It was only a matter o f time 24
During this period the Bretton Woods agreement enjoyed its greatest stability Economic growth was 
solid as Europe continued its recovery Each currency in the system was anchored to the dollar and 
thus anchored to gold Capital controls existed to some extent in most of the countries manipulating 
surpluses and deficits to stay within two percent of either side of panty with the dollar 75 Despite this 
stability and success however there remained a flaw in the way the Bretton Woods system was 
working What had been envisioned as an equal currencies system was in stead a gold dollar 
system 76 This dollar standard 77 meant that the whole system relied on the fixed price convertibility 
of dollars into gold It was the growing pool of dollars in foreign hands that kept the system of 
commerce and payments up and running
The international organizations set up by Bretton Woods—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank—were designed to handle the short term and long term exchange imbalances in 
the system but instead the payments system was regulated essentially by the American Treasury and
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the Federal Reserve Herein lies the dilemma that would eventually mark the downfall of the fixed rate 
system
The world economy needed an ample supply of dollar liquidity to ensure growth and 
trade yet the more dollars there were the more shaky would be the ability of the U S to 
honor its pledge to convert unlimited amounts of gold on demand at the fixed price of $35 
an ounce This meant that the U S government had to run an economic policy aimed 
at some combination of maintaining the international trade competitiveness of American 
industry and service sectors and controlling the capital outflows linked to private overseas 
investment and government expenditure 28
The U S was charged with maintaining the international monetary system with plenty of liquidity 
dollars that would be used to buy its exports but increasingly domestic European and Japanese 
products were earning market share Dollars that could have been invested domestically were flowing 
out to foreign governments This money flow was still a key part of Cold War economic policy 
Meanwhile these governments were padding and protecting domestic firms and products making the 
U S goods less competitive and breaking down the cycle of the flow of capital
As the system locked into the fixed exchange rate gold dollar standard three key problems from the 
inter war era reemerged adjustment liquidity and confidence 29 Balance of payment adjustments were 
dampened and manipulated due to the Keynesian concerns with unemployment which led to more 
rigid wages Under Bretton Woods automatic adjustment was supposed to take place partially via 
changing income and expenditures in the international economy and partially by manipulating the 
supply of capital through changes in reserves Full adjustment however required the cooperation of 
domestic policy makers and failure to adjust fully was often ironed out or overlooked by the United 
States
Liquidity was essential to the machinery of the Bretton Woods system The essential function of 
liquidity is to maintain reserves which in turn facilitate adjustments As dollars were increasingly 
acquired by foreign governments and emerging private sectors the need for further liquidity increased 
The essential problem here involves the fixed nature of the dollar to gold Unable to devalue the dollar 
issuing more dollars meant threatening market confidence in the viability of the economic system 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) were designed during this period to facilitate a new world currency 
available only to states 10 Quotas were established by the IMF and all participants were required to 
build reserves in SDRs instead of dollars Each SDR was valued at one dollar SDRs were fully 
convertible into any currency and were to be used to serve as adjustment mechanisms and to ease up 
on the liquidity demands on the dollar
Confidence in the Bretton Woods system was perhaps never strong While the dollar easily filled in 
as a world currency in the late 1940s and early 1950s by the time Europe was convertible the dollar 
was already running out of time Fears over U S gold convertibility emerged as early as 1960 when 
speculators pushed the price of gold on the London market up to $40 00 per ounce Stabilizing the gold 
markets and thus the dollar was a cooperative goal that had to be met in order to maintain confidence 
in the system By 1965 France was actively campaigning against the dollar and the dollar gold 
standard was again in jeopardy 31
The classic hegemonic problem of maintaining an international system was growing increasingly 
strenuous on the U S and the dollar 39 European and Asian economies were becoming competitive 
with the American economy Dollar based capital markets emerged unregulated through the use of 
offshore banks channeled through London This allowed the private sector to regain market share in the 
finance markets as offshore banks expanded the supply of dollars By the mid 1960s the problem was 
becoming critical Eventually a lack of trade competitiveness and accelerating financial outflows 
meant that the foreign holdings of dollar I O U s severely overshadowed gold stocks 33 Speculation 
on the dollar was inevitable
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The 1960s were characterized by the consistent and unwavering growth oí the dollar Federal 
Reserve credit surged forward from 1961 to 1971 The sizable excess of Federal Reserve credit over 
the growth of the base is in part reflected in the decline in international reserves 34 The decline in 
reserves meant adjustments were hindered liquidity was down and confidence was wavering in the 
United States ability to convert dollars into gold Budget deficits and a costly Vietnam War were 
crippling the American money base
The final blow to Bretton Woods however came from the rapid and hungry growth of the private 
sector s manipulation of dollars via oftshore banks With no one willing to restrain the multinational 
firms and financial institutions eventually short term capital flows overwhelmed the system 
precipitating its collapse 35 Facing further runs on the dollar and no way to prevent them the U S 
acted unilaterally once again when in 1971 Richard Nixon cut the dollar free from its fixed value of 
gold and allowed the U S currency to float As the anchor floats so does the ship and the Bretton 
Woods fixed exchange rate system was defunct
Attempts at restructuring the fixed exchange rate system were made but with the first oil shock of 
1973 it had become clear that the international monetary system was overwhelmingly characterized by 
floating exchange rates
The Post Bretton Woods Era Liberalization and Globalization
Since the collapse of Bretton Woods private international financial activity has outpaced international 
trade of goods at a phenomenal rate By the late 1980s the volume of foreign exchange trading had 
come to total $650 billion per day exceeding that of international trade by nearly forty times 36 Gross 
financial exchanges were estimated between $60 and $70 trillion a year in the mid 1980s with trade 
being estimated at $4 trillion during the same time period Gross capital exchanges between the U S 
Europe and Japan grew at an average annual rate of 54 percent per year between 1980 and 1986 while 
trading grew at an average of only eight percent per year over the same period The amount continues 
to grow at an alarming rate with the world stock of derivatives recently estimated at $12 trillion 37 
This extraordinary growth was made possible by the dramatic liberalization and globalization of the 
international monetary system Given this runaway growth of finance markets one must question the 
stability of the liberal monetary system and the impact it is having on states and firms in the 
international economy
Financial liberalism was highly touted by many as the world settled into a new monetary system 
This section examines the ideological push for liberalization of finances as well as how market 
pressures and technological innovations changed the nature of the international monetary system 
These three pushes for liberalization of finances have led to a dramatic and sustained deregulation of 
markets and market actors As discussed above the result has been unprecedented manipulation of 
capital and the emergence of the global finance market as the dominant economic market in the 
international economy
The U S was instrumental in the liberalization of the monetary system By the early 1970s there 
was a shift away from the Keynesian framework Neo liberal positions were staked out by such 
powerful figures as Milton Friedman and Fredench Hayek 38 This neo liberal stance held that 
liberalization of the financial markets would lead to a more efficient global distribution of capital It 
called for the removal of state barriers and regulations of capital exchange Instead they advocated 
freedom of movement and involvement for both state and non state actors The neo liberal stance 
represented a departure from the Bretton Woods system on two dimensions
First they rejected the post war concern that speculative financial flows would disrupt 
stable exchange rate arrangements by arguing strongly in favor of a floating exchange 
rate system Second they did not sympathize with the Bretton Woods architects 
commitment to national Keynesianism and the autonomy of the welfare state 39
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Instead neo liberals favored the autonomy of the international financial markets which would in turn 
discipline state economic behavior
Not all the participants in the international monetary system favored such a drastic ideological shift 
away from Bretton Woods and Keynesianism Neo liberalism was centered in the United States and 
America used its hegemonic power to push for liberalization This involved freeing currencies from 
exchange controls and pushing for domestic liberalization Those who were opposed to this 
liberalization found their ability to resist the changes seriously limited Britain in 1976 and France m 
1983 attempted to opt for tight exchange controls in order to preserve their autonomy as welfare states 
in an increasingly powerful and global monetary system In both instances the governments found
their national Keynesian strategies thwarted by speculative capital flight 40
Ultimately both France and Britain were forced to bow to the discipline of the markets What they 
found was that political manipulation of the public domain of markets required cooperation at every 
node of activity As with many collective action problems cooperation is essential to overcome the 
overwhelming temptation to defect and enjoy differential gains When Britain and France attempted to 
impose controls on their domestic capital they found the U S and the private sector all too eager to 
accept fleeing capital and speculate on their fixation of currency Without cooperation from all the 
major players unilateral action regarding financial markets was becoming increasingly difficet 
practices are difficult to overcome
Andrew Crockett argues that ideological forces were only one factor in the liberalization of the 
global monetary system 41 In addition he argues that technological innovation market growth and 
volatile inflation contributed to deregulation Together with the ideological movement towards neo 
lberahsm the shift towards liberalization was unavoidable
Technological innovations have revolutionized the process of economic transactions No dimension 
of economic activity has been impacted by technology as much as the finance markets since 
industrialization Technological advances have prqvided global finance markets with a virtually 
unregulated and electronically connected twenty four hour a day network 47 This incredibly efficient 
system has facilitated the emergence of finance as an independent and increasingly dominant 
dimension of the international economic system Thus communications technology has increase the 
ability to abstract currency from the goods exchange process and regard it as a commodity of its own
Market growth has also fueled the fire of liberalization 43 Growth in trade and investment has 
highlighted the importance of the global economy Along the dimension of trade GATT continued to 
provide the international system with successful steps toward open trading practices across the board 
Technology and policy agreement facilitated easy access to international goods thereby expanding 
goods markets Financial markets have enjoyed a boom in growth that dwarfs the progress of the goods 
markets As finance markets grow in activity and significance the private sector has increased its 
pressures for further deregulation In 1969 the Bundesbank grew in excess of $4 billion in the span of 
seven business days 44 Such growth was not uncommon among U S banks as well and indeed the 
majority of the private sector sunk its teeth into the finance markets and then pressured states to release 
the exchange controls and liberalize the markets
Inflation was the fourth factor in liberalizing the finance markets High inflation during the 1970s 
and the subsequent low inflation of the 1980s highlighted the fact that currencies were volatile and that 
keeping a firm fixed set of controls on them would be disastrous Currencies needed the freedom to 
breathe during these growing pains of inflation Market imperfections imposed by state exchange 
controls would only exacerbate the natural market cycles Inflation also highlighted the risks involved 
in future contracts 45 and signaled to all that promises of long term convertibility could not be 
guaranteed even by the hegemonic Americans
Together these four factors—ideology technology market growth and inflation—combined to push 
for rapid and decisive liberalization of the finance markets Capital became an important commodity to 
be traded and speculated on By the mid 1980s capital exchanges dominated the international
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economy This represents a functional departure from what the architects of the Bretton Woods 
agreement envisioned as the purpose of capital The Bretton Woods system reflected a decision to 
sacrifice financial liberalism in the interests of creating a stable exchange rate system and liberal 
trading order 46 Capital was subordinate to political interests and free trade The current system of 
financial interaction bears little resemblance to its defunct predecessor and its changes have significant 
effects on both state and non state actors
The Liberal International Monetary System Characteristics and Implications
The liberalization of capital flows has removed many o f the last vestiges o f domestic 
policy making autonomy completing the transformation o f the post war global order 47
The current international monetary system is structurally and functionally different from its 
predecessor This section focuses on the characteristics of the new monetary system and what it means 
for state and non state actors who participate and are affected by the trend towards a single economic 
space 48 What is found is that stability is still a primary goal of the system but for different reasons 
Further the costs of maintaining stability will be felt at the margin in terms of unemployment and 
other consequences ojf economic cycles These costs will be harsh and abrupt and states political 
goals are no longer exempt Neo liberal ideology now serves as the paradigm but fringe criticisms 
abound and call for aj return to the Keynesian philosophies of the Bretton Woods system
The motivating factor behind the modern monetary system is to provide for the continued 
liberalization of trade in addition to increased globalization and liberalization of capital flows 
Regulation is sparse but emerging amongst very powerful non state actors These characteristics 
represent a precarious position for states as actors in the money game as power shifts towards the 
private sector have decreased the states abilities to shape and mold the international monetary system
in pursuit of political stability
Structurally the global monetary system has evolved m three ways since the collapse of Bretton 
Woods in 1971 These structural changes include technology integrated (not just liberalized) capital 
and the broad acceptance of the private sector Together these changes create a new monetary system 
that is a distant relative to the Bretton Woods system with functional as well as structural differences
The financial markets of today enjoy cutting edge technology Not only are transactions completed 
within seconds and encompassing massive amounts of capital computer programming has emerged as 
a common method ofjexecution Complex computer systems are established to exchange capital faster 
that is humanly possible thus maximizing the efficiency of the economic transaction This innovation 
has allowed for even further speculation and comprehensive approaches to financial investment
Financial investment has turned towards integration of capital in this global monetary system Most 
importantly investment has shifted towards securitization of assets This securitization of assets is 
characterized by mobilization of funds through the issue of marketable instruments rather than non 
marketable debt 49 Thus instead of investing money in a bank account which is then pooled and lent 
as debt by the financial institution financial investments are increasingly taking the form of capital 
integration This integration includes the issuance of stocks and bonds thus linking the ownership of 
the private sector to global actors via securities Securitization allows for more liquid and productive 
investments as well als creating a deeper link between investors in the global market thus bringing the 
global financial markets back into contact with goods markets and furthering the trend towards a single 
economic space 50
Related to both technology and securitization is the emergence of the private sector as a significant 
force m the global financial market One of the goals of the Bretton Woods system was to remove the 
private sector from the manipulation of capital Many blamed the central banks and their faulty loans 
as instigators of financial crises m the interwar period In sharp contrast to the Bretton Woods system 
today the global financial markets are once again dominated by non state actors Central banks such as
I
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the Bundesbank and the Nederlansche Bank are major players in financial investment In addition to 
the central banks securities commissions have emerged as significant actors in the financial system 
Pension funds and mutual funds are rapidly gaining market share in the global market and they show 
no signs of letting up thus furthering securitization The reemergence of the banks and the emergence 
of securities commissions has drastically changed the structure and function of the global monetary 
system States are largely outnumbered and outfinanced a harsh reality that has been a bitter pill for 
states who envisioned their ability to manipulate domestic and international capital markets as part of 
their political autonomy Private sector actors have begun calling for a broad reappraisal of the role of 
government in modern society 51 revealing the increased confidence of non state actors regarding 
their positions m the global economy
The private sector has changed the function of the global finance market as well as its structure 
Whereas the Bretton Woods system expressly created the international monetary system to serve the 
goods markets the modern monetary system has emerged as autonomous The abstraction of capital 
due to technology and the speculation of capital due to private sector actors has created a market for 
capital Capital has become an abstract good something which can be bought and sold for profit or for 
loss States strove to control the exchange of capital under Bretton Woods with the fear being the very 
reality of the modem system Further it is not clear how states can benefit from this added function of 
capital and it appears that domestic currencies are becoming more vulnerable to drastic fluctuations 
based on speculation Thus one of the most significant developments of the modern monetary system 
both structurally and functionally is this strong emergence of the private sector
The changes associated with the modem monetary system have serious implications for states and 
their political autonomy The private sector appears to favor relegating the states to the role of last 
resort lenders 52 or janitors to clean up market messes In addition to the fact that states most likely are 
not pleased with this assignment their ability to fulfill it may be deceptive Black Tuesday in 1987 was 
feared to be the same prelude to depression that Black Friday was in 1929 but state cooperation in the 
G 10 preserved market confidence as states absorbed the blow In the U S example of the Savings and 
Loan crash it was the government who stepped in and cleaned up the mess at the high expense of 
taxpayers If market failures are inevitable if not likely and they will logically grow more devastating 
and expensive as the financial markets continue to grow then the ability of states to play this role of 
janitor may be waning Political costs (e g angry taxpayers) as well as the need for tremendous 
liquidity may prove unbearable for states
Regardless of the acute instances of financial crises states face other losses in the financial arena 
Helleiner argues the globalization of finance has increased the opportunities for tax evasion and 
considerably eroded the revenue base required to fund the welfare state 53 A more immediate problem 
involves the ability of states to be politically sovereign Helleiner writes
the political autonomy of the welfare state has become compromised by the threat of 
capital flight This threat has given those who control internationally mobile funds— 
wealthy asset holders transitional corporations and key private financial bodies such as 
banks and fund managers— an increasingly powerful tool of exit with which to 
encourage changes indirectly in government policy toward their preferences 54
The threat of capital flight thwarted both Britain and France in their attempts to regain control over 
capital mobility and thus their political autonomy Thus the important question is whether or not 
states can cooperate and work collectively to regain market control It appears that the nature of the 
collective action problem that has faced states since the mterwar period has fundamentally changed 
The liberalization of the finance markets has brought the private sector in as a firmly rooted member 
Private investment has so dominated the global finance market in recent years that states can now only 
hope to work together not only amongst themselves but also in cooperation with the central banks and 
soon even the fund managers Recalling Olson s advice on achieving and maintaining public goods
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through collective action <55 one must note the need for small membership size accountability and the 
ability to dissuade free riders None of these factors are present in an anarchic global monetary system
The pendulum of ideological opinion is swinging back towards structural controls with political 
goals 56 but whether states will be able to reestablish dominance without experiencing tremendous 
costs is unlikely Bretton Woods was formed in part because the Great Depression and World War II 
created a clean slate for the Anglo Americans to work with Bamng similar disasters no such clean 
slate exists for states to work with today
Instead states appear to be working with the private sector through the use of international 
organizations in pursuit of the joint goal of stability Coleman and Porter argue that recent 
developments in international financial markets have led nation states working through several key 
international organizations to construct international regimes for international banking and for 
international securities markets 57 Two such organizations—the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)—represent the most 
productive avenues of influence for states m today s markets The states first organize alone through 
international agreements such as the currently active Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 58 Once 
organized as one cooperative voice the states are better able to influence the norms and processes of 
the BIS and IOSCO I
What may be the ace in the hole for states seeking active participation in the global monetary system 
is its extreme interdependence among both state and non state actors Despite losing power in the 
global finance market states still maintain the ability to act unilaterally despite the tremendous costs 
that may result The private sector is wise to be weary of drastic political actions taken by policy 
makers who either fail to appreciate ensuing costs or are faced with a domestic political crisis that 
takes precedence Such actions could devastate financial markets and set off chain reactions via 
computer investment across the globe In an interdependent world political actions are becoming 
increasingly tied to economic behavior and vice versa
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Chapter 5
The New Authoritarianism
How Capitalism Shortchanged America’s Marketplace of Ideas
N Vincent Duffy III
Former radio journalist Mumia Abu Jamal sits on death row in Pennsylvania A former 
president of the Philadelphia Association of Black Journalists he was convicted of killing 
a police officer in 1982 Jamal maintains his innocence and much attention was given in 
court to his former writings as a member of the Black Panthers
Last year Ellen Weiss executive producer of National Public Radio s All Things 
Considered asked Jamal to write a monthly series of radio commentaries discussing life 
inside prison Before the first piece was aired the entire project was cancelled by NPR 
managing news editor Bruce Drake after protests by local and national police 
organizations and a call to withhold listener and government support to NPR No other 
media outlet has expressed interest in discussing the project with Jamal
Despite the press usual resistance to infringements on any of its freedoms the Gannett 
owned Free Press in Burlington Vermont asked Judge Matthew Katz last year to impose 
a gag order in connection with a lawsuit against itself Gannett executives were concerned 
about policy profit and personnel information being reported in the press 1
The Federal Communications Commission is now selling pieces of the broadcast 
spectrum in order to speed development of the so called information superhighway 
FCC Chairman Reed Hundt is committed to allowing private companies determine what 
goes on the highway The government is selling segments of the spectrum to help trim 
the federal budget deficit2
These three examples are diverse illustrations concerning access to the public sphere The first involves 
an individual being closed out of the public forum and effectively silenced The second concerns specific 
information being denied public exposure and withheld from possible future debates The third 
demonstrates how individuals or organizations lacking sufficient capital are denied use of the spectrum
There is however some similarity All three items portray a situation in which powerful monied 
interests control the general public s ability to acquire or disseminate information a control permitted 
with varying degrees of governmental assistance
This paper examines the ability of corporations to dominate public discourse in modem United States 
capitalist society Specifically I establish how First Amendment decisions concerning freedom of 
speech have created a situation which places commercial and corporate speech on the same level of 
legal protection as political stump speeches and protests I further argue that it is now irrelevant 
whether First Amendment laws protect dissent or detergent because the content and delivery of both are 
controlled by capital The paradox is that it is precisely because the government tnes not to abridge 
freedom of speech that a vacuum is created which some other equally powerful entity then fills
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I do not offer a definitive solution to the problems created by corporate dominance of the public 
sphere Although some of the solutions suggested by others are presented and discussed many of the 
proposed legal reforms dealing with these issues fit the cliche of the cure being worse than the 
disease The intent of this paper is to show how today s situation came to exist the possible 
consequences of allowing it to continue and why it is unlikely to go away
The Inclusion of the Individual
The foundation of the body of laws concerning freedom of the speech and press is the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution which reads in part Congress shall make no law abridging the 
freedom of speech or of the press or of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances 3
The traditional First Amendment scholarship concentrates almost exclusively on governmental
constraints that interfere 
organizations In theory 
ideas among individuals
with the freedom of speech and expression of individuals and press 
democracy in the United States is best served by an energetic marketplace of 
and their free press and the First Amendment provides protection against
governmental limitations on the process
According to classical) liberal theory the freedom of the press (and its cousins speech and expression) 
has its foundation in the freedom of everyone to publish a newspaper magazine pamphlet etc 
without being subject toj prior restraint by the government The belief is that this will ensure a press 
reflecting a wide range of viewpoints in society If a particular position is absent it is only because it 
lacks sufficient support to sustain it in the marketplace of ideas 4 The important point is that every 
individual should have the opportunity to sell their belief or idea within this conceptualized 
marketplace If an expressed position does not have public support m theory it is because it has been 
heard and is rejected |
Emerson asserts that the freedoms provided by the First Amendment are much more complex in our 
modem democratic society 5 In his view (framed in terms of freedom of expression) the First 
Amendment provides four functions
First freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self 
fulfillment Second freedom of expression is an essential process for advancing 
knowledge and discovering truth Third freedom of expression is essential to provide 
for participation in decision making by all members of society Finally freedom of 
expression is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence more stable community 
of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus 6
Similar functions (or values) have been cited by Stone7 who says the First Amendment allows the 
search for truth meaningful participation in self government and individual self fulfillment 
and Chaffee8 who refers to both individual interest and a social interest in the attainment of truth 
so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way
For Bollinger 9 the dominant function of the First Amendment is getting at the truth or the 
advancement of knowledge Following in the historical tradition of Milton 10 Bollinger believes it is 
through speech that we convey information and ideas and test them against each other The end result 
of the debate process is a close approximation of the truth 11 This function of free speech is supported 
by Meiklejohn as well who felt free speech plays a practical role for a self governing society by 
protecting discussion among citizens so they can decide the best course of action concerning political 
issues p
Like the philosophers jthe courts have also expanded the scope of activities protected under the rights 
granted in the First Amendment This expansionist tendency 13 has created a situation m which free 
speech law has become extremely complicated both in terms of its purposes and protection
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Whether one chooses to work with the basic structure of the classical liberal theory of free speech or 
today s more modem and complex legal readings and tree speech tests citizen participation is still 
central to any theory of the First Amendment Without the active involvement of the governed in the 
debate and decision making process over issues and policies the full spirit of the First Amendment is 
not being realized
Libertarian Theory versus Authoritarian Theory
One of the most influential texts concerning theoretical outlooks on the freedom of the press is Four 
Theories o f the Press 14 The four theories are actually made by redefining an extension of two 
Libertarian and Authoritarian The Social Responsibility Theory describes a less anarchic libertarianism 
to account for the lowered confidence in the rationality of man and the Soviet Communist Theory is 
an extension of the Authoritarian Theory where the media are state owned rather than state controlled 
The book has been called a work of Cold War scholarship 15 and much of the text is devoted to 
justifying the superiority of Western Liberal press theory over that of the Authoritarian Communists
Sieben writes that the significant contribution of liberalism is the importance of the individual 
Building on the traditions of Milton Thomas Jefferson and John Stuart Mill as other First 
Amendment scholars have done Sieben asserts that under the libertarian concept the purpose of the 
media is to help discover truth to assist in the process of solving political and social problems by 
presenting all manner of evidence and opinion as the basis for decisions This discovery of truth is 
possible through the self righting process created by a multiplicity of voices where theoretically 
all have the same opportunity or the same means of access Under a Libertarian Theory of the 
press truth is not conceived as the property of power but emerges when all ideas get a fair hearing 
As the authors explain
Minorities as well as majorities the weak as well as the strong must have access to the 
press This is the theory of the press which was written into our Bill of Rights 16
For Siebert the theoretical antithesis of libertarianism is authoritarianism where the press as an 
institution is controlled in its functions and operation by organized society through another 
institution government Citing Machiavelli Mussolini and Hitler as the evil examples of those who 
desired governmental control of the press authoritarianism is presented as a press theory whose basic 
purpose is the control of attitudes toward culture and politics This control is accomplished by a system 
that determines who has a right to use the media or access to media outlets in order to express their 
beliefs and opinions In the Authoritarian Theory of the press truth is not debated among the people 
but presented to them Truth is thought to be located near the center of power and the press functions 
from the top down
While I accept the above definition of Libertarian Press theory I believe the description of 
Authoritarian Press theory is incomplete Sieben adequately describes the conditions of authoritarian 
press controls but by his definition the controlling agent of the media in an authoritarian system 
must be the government The system we find ourselves with today is one in which capital is the 
controlling agent of the media
What difference does it make to the voiceless masses who controls the monopoly of opinion 
expressed by the media and denies them access9 As an example of early authoritarianism Siebert offers 
the publishing monopolies granted by the Tudors and Stuarts This example fits his definition because 
the government controlled who had the monopoly and it could be taken away But would it make any 
difference to the populace if the king or queen decided they should not be involved in publishing yet left 
the monopoly in place7 The people would still be subjected to one message from their media 
monopoly and there would still be no access for them to express their ideas or beliefs in the public 
sphere
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When the libertarian philosophy on which our First Amendment is founded was formulated it was 
in a century in which the only concentrations of power were the government and the Church (itself a 
government at that timel) As Smythe points out in his criticism of libertarian press theory 17 It 
existed in a society where no large concentrations of power existed in the business community and 
where therefore restraints from such sources were not possible
The Authoritarian Press Theory should be expanded to include any concentration of power 
(governmental or not) that can effectively silence other voices from participation in the public sphere 
As Smythe writes I
To demonstrate the inadequacy of this legalistic authoritarian theory one would only 
have to show that substantial control over the press could come from a third institution 
while in face the government maintained detachment from interference with the press 18
Today that concentration of power does exist Ironically the controlling agent of the press is the 
capital controlling the press corporations themselves With the First Amendment making governmental 
control (for the most part)19 of the mass media illegal the marketplace of ideas has become a 
monopoly on its own as Schumpeter asserts all unregulated markets will have a tendency to do 20 This 
omission on Siebert s part is bemoaned by Guback who complains that the book ignored the media s 
roles in a market driven system 71
* Are the Media One Voice9
Capitalism is the dominant force behind the modern American press just as it is the dominant force 
behind the automobile industry and any other business Whatever journalism s intellectual origins it 
is now a creature of commerce as much as it is a creature of politics 22 Sinclair wrote m 1920 that 
there is no daily newspaper in America which does not represent and serve vested wealth For the 
ruling class 71 journalism is simply a means of serving up day by day between elections propaganda 
whereby the minds of the people are kept in a state of acquiescence
O J Simpson Tonya and Nancy the Menendez brothers Lorena Bobbitt Amy 
Fisher etc These are|the news stones and issues of public debate presented to the American voting 
public Without having done the research to support the claim I suspect most Americans can describe 
in detail the developments of these issues while being dumbstruck if asked to describe health care 
reform welfare reform jWhitewater or NAFTA Even less is known among the general public about 
issues concerning corporate America This is not because it is complicated it is by design
A recent survey by the Amencan Society of Newspaper Editors found that one third of all editors 
working for newspaper chains do not feel free to run a news item damaging to their parent firm 24 
Dreier has long noted that America s predominant media are heavily linked to its (their) business 
establishment In 1982 j  he documented 24 news organizations with 447 ties to business 
organizations the majority being outside directors sitting on media company boards 75
Adding to this concern over corporate supervision of the news and information which reaches the 
public is the propensity towards media conglomeration (what Marx would call the inevitable 
monopolization of capital in a media structure allowed to operate by market terms) Through a process 
of mergers acquisitions | and takeovers the majority of newspapers magazines broadcasting systems 
books and motion pictures are controlled by a handful of huge multinational corporations Dreier and 
Weinberg called attention to the trend of interlocking directorates among news media owners and the 
organizations they cover in 1979 76 and Bagdikian has made an academic career out of tracking media 
ownership trends He notes as an example that at the end of World War II 80 percent of the U S daily 
newspapers were independently owned but by 1989 80 percent were owned by corporate chains 77 
Furthermore almost all of these newspapers are monopolies in their individual markets Only 2 percent 
of American cities with news dailies have competitive newspapers 78
i
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Not only are there lewer owners of the media but the media are increasingly owned by parent 
corporations with economic interests in other areas of the economy including defense spending health 
care education and other issues of national political importance NBC is owned by General Electric 
ABC is owned by Capital Cities and Time/Warner it seems owns a bit of everything
In the United States today only the richest groups and companies can afford to own media or 
informational outlets and guarantee themselves access to the public sphere insuring their voice is 
heard on matters of public debate Our marketplace of ideas is one m which the ideas for sale are offered 
by an extremely small propertied class m both our informational and entertainment spheres
With fewer owners of news organizations the range of opinions to which the public has access is 
limited The danger of corporate group ownership of almost all media outlets lies in the concentration 
of financial political and social power in relatively few people 29 With news organizations and other 
media continually owned and controlled by a smaller richer group of people the multiplicity of voices 
is diminished the marketplace is shut down and the hegemonic voice of capital is the only voice 
heard It becomes extremely difficult for political democracy and the diversity it requires to exist when 
the marketplace of ideas is controlled by a handful of individuals and corporations Under our 
Libertarian Theory the press is not an instrument of the government but it is an instrument of 
business We do not have a free marketplace of ideas but a marketplace with a cover charge a fee 
much too expensive for the minorities and the weak Siebert describes 30
From Marketplace to Corporate Dole
While the American courts for the most part have protected and reinforced private property from the 
beginning 11 the great industrial growth which sparked the increasing concentration of capital began 
after the Civil W ar32 In 1886 the Supreme Court voted unanimously that corporations had the same 
legal protection as persons and were therefore entitled to the same equal protection under the law 
provided by the Fourteenth Amendment33 While not directly related to free speech this ruling was an 
important precedent to the 1936 ruling in Grosjean v American Press Co that corporations engaged in 
publishing enjoy the same freedom of the press as do natural persons
Once corporations had the same free speech rights as persons they too were free to participate in the 
marketplace of ideas Most corporate speech historically has been commercial speech with the 
intention of persuading the public to purchase a commodity rather than persuade them about any 
particular political issue 34 In 1942 the Supreme Court held in Valentine v Chrestenson that such 
speech with a primarily commercial purpose had no protection at all under the First Amendment The 
Court overruled Valentine in 1976 in its ruling of Virginia Board of Pharmacists v Virginia Consumer 
Council The Court however declined to state explicitly that commercial speech stemming from 
corporations deserved the exact same protection under the First Amendment as the expression of 
attitudes and beliefs in other contexts such as political debate 35
The most important case for corporate speech in the political sphere came in 1978 with First 
National Bank of Boston v Bellotti In this case the Supreme Court extended First Amendment 
protection to include corporate political speech as well After Bellotti a corporation could spend money 
through contributions expenditures media campaigns etc to influence political issues such as state 
referenda regardless of whether or not the issue being decided had any monetary effect on the company s 
property or business interests Herbert Schmertz Director of Mobil Oil at the time of the ruling 
celebrated the decision saying it boiled down to the following logic
Individuals have the right of free speech so do groups of individuals If these individuals 
are banded together in a membership corporation and find that they can be more effectively 
heard when they speak through the corporate voice then this too is their constitutional 
right And when it comes to a stock corporation the corporate identity of the speaker 
does not deprive the speaker of First Amendment rights that would otherwise be clearly 
protected 36
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Bellotti also erased any distinctions between corporations that own newspapers or broadcasting 
facilities and those engaged in the sale of other commodities This type of distinction was easier to 
make in 1978 before General Electric acquired NBC and other such corporate takeovers took place
Bellota allows corporations to use their immense wealth to flood the public sphere which they 
control with their own messages This allows corporate America to define what the issues are and 
how those issues are presented and what the permissible debate will be An extension to this is that 
the rich have better access to information and complete control over the information flows of business 
government and public sector channels 37 As Patton and Bartlett describe 38 even if another voice or 
point of view manages to enter the debate it is a foregone conclusion that the corporate speaker will 
be the loudest voice in town
One of the other interesting points made by the majority in the Bellotti decision was the argument 
that not only do speakers have a First Amendment right to speak but the public also has a First 
Amendment right to hear what is being said regardless of who the speaker may be 39 This fits within 
the market place of ideas framework because the public is entitled to hear all sides of an issue in order 
to make well considered judgements
The Clear Voice
The court decisions allowing corporate capital to control the public sphere should come as no surprise 
to critics of capitalism The tension between capitalism and democracy as described by Lindblom 
suggests that politics is not an autonomous sphere of activity as classical democratic theory argues 
but has always been shaped and controlled by economic interests 40 Fiss adds that the First Amendment 
cases presented to the Supreme Court are often difficult41 and we should expect some false turns but 
he claims to be startled by his own analysis showing a decisive pattern in which capitalism almost 
always won
Through a senes of judicial interpretations over the last three decades we have a new First 
Amendment As a result of Bellota and the other Supreme Court decisions outlined above the First 
Amendment now protects the privileged more than the due process clause ever did The marketplace of 
ideas just like the marketplace of commerce is biased in favor of those with enough resources to speak 
money is speech This creates a situation descnbed by Smolla42 as one where the ideas of the wealthy 
and powerful will have greater access to the market than the ideas of the poor and disenfranchised
Tushnet writes that after Bellota 43 the First Amendment stands as a general obstruction to all 
progressive legislative efforts Under Buckley v Valeo44 (which placed ceilings on independent 
expenditures in election campaigns) and Bellota the neh can invest in politicians or political debates 
which can prevent effective regulation of capital
Under an authontanan press structure controlled by corporate capital those controlling public debate 
have two goals The first is to maximize profits and the second is to maintain the status quo which 
keeps them in profitable power This is done by excluding progressive ideas that might otherwise be 
produced in a competitive arena The greater the power of corporate capital in the public sphere the less 
power is afforded to other potential speakers 45
In recent years corporate capital has tned to expand their free speech nghts and control of the public 
sphere even further Numerous corporate lawyers are now arguing that the First Amendment should 
invalidate a wide range of Federal regulations including Securities and Exchange Commission 
disclosure requirements that govern corporate takeovers or the rules affecting stock offerings 46
The extension of free speech rights to corporations is akin to a zero sum game that steals the rights 
and powers of actual individuals When this is the case the Miltonian process does not work properly 
and ideas that are not the truth can dominate the intellectual and political marketplace as a result of the 
systematic exclusion of messages that do not suit the economic or political interests of those who 
control access to the media of transmission 47
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This singularity of corporate voice is not immediately recognizable to the media consuming public 
Ever increasing outlets give the appearance of variety and diversity How could we have a media 
monopoly when we re about to get 500 channels on cable7 But if the 500 channels were replaced by a 
list of the companies that own them there would be very little to watch It is the same appearance of 
diversity one senses at Marketplace Mall in Champaign only to find out that most of the smaller 
clothing stores are owned by Limited Inc
The warning of the Hutchins Commission m 1947 is unfortunately even more true today
Protection against government is now not enough to guarantee that a (person) who has 
something to say shall have a chance to say it The owners and the managers of the press 
determine which persons which facts which versions of the facts and which ideas shall 
reach the public 48
The question now is what can be done7 Is there any solution to the economics of the marketplace 
that puts individuals who wish to speak to fellow citizens and the individual who wishes to hear 
alternative viewpoints at the mercy of corporate capitalism7
Proposed Solutions
The problem of corporate domination of the public sphere is not a new concern but it is a dilemma 
that continues to get worse as media monopolization endures The challenge is that few developed 
theories of free speech offer adequate solutions to the problem Some philosophies like Absolutism 
virtually overlook the crisis or do not recognize it as being problematic Other proposals such as 
Access have strong arguments against them and are not likely to be politically accepted The 
remainder of this paper reviews the more prevalent theories and suggestions offered as possible 
conceptual approaches in addressing corporate control of the public sphere
Absolutism
Absolute theory regards freedom of speech as an utterly inalienable right and regards government as the 
enemy of free speech 49 America s most famous absolutists are former Supreme Court Justice Hugo 
Black and to a lesser degree his colleague Justice William O Dougla 50 For absolutists like Black51 the 
First Amendment commands that Congress shall make no law means literally no law In the 
strictest sense absolutism provides unconditional protection for all speech under any circumstance
Smolla provides a distinction between what he redundantly calls absolute absolutism and qualified 
absolutism an absolute view towards free speech which nevertheless allows for some safety valves 57 
While absolute absolutism never permits under any circumstances any conditions restraints or 
penalties on speech qualified absolutists provide absolute protection for freedom of speech but define 
speech narrowly in order to give the government some regulating ability Those who would separate 
speech and conduct (such as blocking abortion clinics or wearing Fuck the Draft buttons) and 
then provide absolute protection for speech but place regulations on conduct would be qualified 
absolutists
Because any effort to regulate speech would be anathema to absolutists it is unlikely they could be 
convinced of the problems of corporate control of the public sphere and any proposed regulations 
would be resisted Furthermore an absolute theory of free speech includes a strong conception of 
neutrality Government may not promote the speech it likes and attempt to quell the speech it finds 
distasteful all speech is provided the same protection
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Access Rights
With the communications media controlled by corporate capital and the public sphere closed off to the 
public some scholars have called for an affirmative dimension to the First Amendment Among the 
legal reforms proposed is constitutionally mandated access to force open the marketplace of ideas51 
Barron a strong supporter of this idea 54 realized the difficulty of getting an idea accepted in the 
competition of the marketplace While we protect expression once it has come to the fore writes 
Barron our law is indifferent to creating opportunities for expression The Darwinian concept of the 
truth winning out cannot take place if the truth is not exposed According to Barron
In this struggle the continuing menace has been seen to be government That private 
power might so control the struggle of ideas as to predetermine the victor had not been 
considered But increasingly private censorship serves to suppress ideas as thoroughly and 
as rigidly as the worst government censor55
Ladenson disagrees with Barron 56 claiming that private communications companies could never be 
as potentially strong as the government m their ability to suppress ideas Ladenson points to 
governmental ability to enact sedition obscenity and censorship laws impose prior restraints punish 
those with improper views mandate the avowal of beliefs and control speech through vague or 
overbroad laws While admitting corporate capital possess great power in controlling speech he argues 
it is no where near the potential power of even a moderately strong government
Blasi summarizes the two sides by claiming those who wish for access regulations call for a 
Keynesian approach involving selective government intervention in the process of information 
dissemination while those who oppose access regulations (especially those who now control the media 
channels) claim the First Amendment protects them against any legal doctrine requiring media to 
disseminate material they deem unnewsworthy or inappropriate 57 Certainly access rights should not 
include free access because there would be no way to meet the demand and the audience would be so 
small as to be irrelevant
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutional issues raised by access regulation claims in 
1969 58 (The case challenged the closest thing to access regulation in American law the longstanding 
but rarely enforced Fairness Doctrine of the FCC ) This regulatory rule required a reasonable right to 
respond for individuals or groups attacked on the air during a presentation of issues and a right to reply 
for political candidates who are explicitly opposed or whose opponent is endorsed on the air At that 
time the Supreme Court unanimously upheld both access regulations writing that the broadcast 
license holders were proxies for all the different viewpoints in the community As Justice White wrote 
It is the right of the viewers and listeners not the right of broadcasters which is paramount 59
In the 1970s however the Supreme Court twice rejected the idea of a First Amendment right to 
access to the public sphere In the first case 60 the Supreme Court ruled that CBS could refuse to air 
editorial advertisements including one from an anti Vietnam war group Chief Justice Burger wrote for 
the majority that a robust and wide open [debate] does not mean that we should exchange public 
trustee broadcasting with all it s limitations for a system of self appointed editorial commentators
A later case61 overruled a Florida state law giving political candidates a right to reply to criticisms 
and attacks by a newspaper In this case Burger wrote that because the government must stay out of 
public debate it cannot force a newspaper to print anything Here we see a clear example of the 
government s hands off position contributing in some way towards a closing down of the 
marketplace of ideas
These court rulings foreshadowed the 1980s when public policy toward broadcasting changed 
dramatically Rather than regulate broadcasting in anyway the dominant trend was to virtually 
eliminate government regulation and to rely upon an enlarged vigorously competitive economic 
market to protect and expand the marketplace of ideas 67 Striking a major blow to adherents of access
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regulations the FCC in 1987 abolished the Fairness Doctrine assuming that rising competition would 
provided a better marketplace As shown above this competition has been illusory with the reality 
creating just the opposite
The FCC gave two main reasons for its decision to overrule the Fairness Doctrine At the 
Constitutional level the Commission believed broadcasting should be afforded the same First 
Amendment protection from government interference that the printed press enjoys At the policy level 
it was felt the Fairness Doctrine created a chilling effect on the broadcasting of diverse and controversial 
subject matter It was believed that stations avoided Fairness Doctrine rules by simply not airing 
controversial material to begin with 61 The debate over the Fairness Doctrine is not over Majorities in 
Congress have voted to reinstate the doctrine and final resolution may be up to the Supreme Court
With the overruling of Red Lion the deregulatory mood established by the Reagan Administration 
throughout the 1980s created a very different voice from the FCC regarding any need for control over 
broadcasting FCC Commissioner Mark Fowler said
It was time to move away from thinking about broadcasters as trustees It was time to
treat them the way almost everyone else in society does that is as
business Television is just another appliance It s a toaster with pictures 64
There is some credibility to the argument that the Fairness Doctrine discouraged broadcasters from 
covering diverse and controversial issues but the economic marketplace does not provide any incentives 
for the media to change course The goal of the media is to gather the largest audience possible and 
difficult or controversial programming does not serve that purpose Neither traditional forms of access 
regulation nor laissez faire economics are likely to produce the divers marketplace of ideas
However as Hedblom argues 65 the Fairness Doctrine or its equivalent remains a legitimate policy 
goal Minimally it is a reminder that broadcasters (and other media) should serve the public interest as 
well as their own The problems addressed by the Fairness Doctrine are created by the unequal 
relationship between the corporate capital which controls the media and the citizenry who do not 
Greater equity is required in this relationship and access rights are a step forward towards that goal
Government Supported Media
One way to expand journalism from the control of corporate capital is to create media outlets which 
operate independently of economic pressure Smythe argues that the augmentation of the existing 
public broadcasting structure or the creation of a publicly subsidized private media are two 
possibilities 66 The Public Broadcasting Service and National Public Radio both offer excellent daily 
public affairs programs by focussing on the quality of the content and disregarding concern for 
maximizing the size of the audience As Entman points out however their biggest weakness is 
precisely their small audience and meager impact on public opinion 67 Another weakness for public 
broadcasting is that they take a financial risk should they upset any of the politicians foundations 
corporations businesses and listeners they rely on for financial support
One solution although politically impossible under the current Congress would be the creation of 
guaranteed irrevocable and large tax subsidies for public broadcasting With a budget similar to those 
of the major networks PBS and NPR could offer more frequent documentaries investigative projects 
larger staff etc Tax revenue could be raised by a tax on advertising a tax on spectrum use (which has 
been suggested for the creation of a CPB trust fund) or from the general revenue A danger to the status 
quo this proposal is facing serious criticism especially from the National Association of Broadcasters 
who represent commercial interests
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Conclusion
This generation has witnessed a broad based deregulation of the media and as Guback asserts the 
public interest standard is today little more than a reminder of an earlier time when there was some 
control over uninhibited corporate greed in media corporations 68Sunstein follows by pointing out that 
there is a major difference between the marketplace of ideas (a deregulated economic market) and a 
system of democratic deliberation 69 This paper raises difficult questions about the need to create a mass 
marketplace of ideas that transcends the economic market so that we can genuinely develop a free press 
serving an informed citizenry in the true spirit of the First Amendment
As Schiller points out with uncharacteristic resignation the answers are not simple and provide a 
wrenching set of alternatives to the status quo 70 either accept the continued growth of corporate 
control of expression or insist on governmental restraint and forced access and the First Amendment 
dangers such solutions bring with them The difficulty arises any time a suggestion is made outside of 
the absolutist arena Even the hint that the government might be required to help the press do its job 
returns us to the specter of governmental control which the First Amendment prohibits But Emerson 
warns that we have no alternative but to turn to government for solutions and the difficult First 
Amendment questions have never been adequately answered by invoking simplistic solutions 71 We 
should not allow corporate capital to shout freedom of speech every time their profits are threatened 
by reforms
Just because the solution is not simple to find does not mean the academic community should not 
continue to call attention to the present failure of the marketplace of ideas and press for answers It is 
possible that some government controls over the press in an effort to assist diversity and increased 
attention to public affairs can actually help free speech The dangers of the status quo are so profound 
that doing nothing is the most dangerous course
The New Authoritarianism 75
References Not Cited
Armor John C Substance and Shadows The Original Meaning o f Freedom o f the Press 
Washington DC Freedom of Expression Foundation 1984
Bollier David Electronic Media Regulation and the First Amendment A Perspective for the Future 
Washington D C The Aspen Institute 1991
Cooper Gloria Darts and Laurels Columbia Journalism Review (July/August 1994) 17-18
Curran James and Jean Seaton Communications Power and Social Order In Culture Society and 
the Media edited by Michael Gurevitch Tony Bennett James Curran and Janet Woollacott 
London Methuen 1982
Demers David Pearce Structural Pluralism Intermedia Competition and the Growth of the Corporate 
Newspaper in the United States Journalism Monographs 145 (June 1994)
Elman Philip The New Constitutional Right to Advertise 64 A B  A Journal 206 (1978) 206-210
Emerson Robert M Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment New York Random House 
1966
Gräber Mark A Transforming Free Speech The Ambiguous Legacy o f Civil Libertarianism 
Berkeley University of California Press 1991
Hentoff Nat Free Speech for Me But Not for Thee How the American Left and Right Relentlessly 
Censor Each Other New York Harper Collins Publishers 1992
Key V O Jr Public Opinion and American Democracy New York Alfred A Knopf 1964
Levy Leonard Legacy o f Suppression Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History 
Cambridge Harvard University Press 1960
Oilman Berteli and Jonathan Birnbaum The United States Constitution 200 Years o f Antifederalist 
Abolitionist Feminist Muckraking Progressive and Especially Socialist Criticism New 
York New York University Press 1960
Nossiter Bernard D The FCC s Big Giveaway Show The Nation 402 (20 October 1985) 402^104
Rosenberg Norman L Another History of Free Speech The 1920s and the 1940s Law and 
Inequality 3 (7) (July 1989) 333-366
Schiller Herbert I Mass Communications and American Empire 2nd ed Boulder Westview Press 
1992
Shnffrin Steven The First Amendment and Economic Regulation Away From A General Theory of 
the First Amendment 78 Northwestern University L Rev (1984) 1212 1271
Steinberg Charles S The Information Establishment Our Government and Media New York 
Hastings House 1980
Stevens John D Shaping the First Amendment The Developmentof Free Expression Beverly Hills 
Sage Communications 1982
Tushnet Mark An Essay on Rights 62 Texas L Rev (1984) 1363
Wright R George The Future o f Free Speech Law New York Quorum Books 1990
76 N Vincent Duffy III
Additional Legal Citations
First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti 435 U S (1978)
Grosjean V American Press Company 297 U S 233 (1936)
Valentine v Chrestenson 316 U S 52 (1942)
Virginia Board of Pharmacists v Virginia Consumer Council 425 U S 748 (1976)
The New Authontariamsm 77
Notes
I Cooper Gloria Darts and Laurels Columbia Journalism Review (July 1994) 17-18
9 FCC to Auction Airwaves This Year Reuter News Wire 9 May 1994
3 For a comprehensive examination of the legal and philosophical background of the First Amendment see Leonard 
Levy Legacy of Suppression Freedom of Speech and Press m Early American History (Cambridge Harvard University 
Press I960) See also Thomas 1 Emerson Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment (New York Random House 
1966)
4 James Curran and Jean Seaton Power Without Responsibility The Press and Bri adcastmg in Britain (London 
Routledge 1988)
5 Robert M Emerson The System of Freedom of Expression (New York Vintage Books 1970)
6  Ibid 6 -7
7 Dean Stone Content Regulation and the First Amendment William & Mary L Rev 25 (1983) 189 193
8 Z Chaffee Free Speech in the United States 4th ed (Cambridge Harvard University Press 1948)
9 Lee C Bollinger The Tolerant Society Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America (New York Oxford 
University Press 1986)
10 John Milton Areopagitica in Steven R Knowlton and Patrick R Parsons eds The Journalist s Moral Compass 
Basic Principles (Westport Conn Praeger 1994)
II Bollinger 45
12 Alexander Meiklejohn Free Speech and Its Relation to Self Government (New York Harper 1948)
13 This phrase is taken from R George Wright The Future < f Free Speech La (New York Quorum Books 1990)
14 FredS Sieben Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm F< ur Thei ríes i /  the Piess (Urbana University of Illinois 
Press 1948)
15 Thomas Guback ed C< unterclockwtse Perspectives on Communication (Boulder Colo Westview Press 1994)
16 Sieben Peterson and Schramm 4
17 Guback 1994
18 Ibid 104
19 The government does control a majority o f the postal business and still regulates broadcasting to a continually 
smaller degree through the Federal Communications Commission However the philosophical framework of a free and 
independent press still exists
20 Joseph A Schumpeter Capitalism Socialism and Democracy 3rd ed (New York Harper and Row 1950)
21 Guback 1994
22 Steven R Knowlton and Patnck R Parsons The Journalist s Moral Compass Basic Principles (Westport Conn 
Praeger 1994)
23 Upton Sinclair The Brass Check in Steven R Knowlton and Patnck R Parsons eds The Journalist s Moral 
Compass Basic Principles (Westport CT Praeger 1994)
24 Ben H Bagdikian The Media Monopoly 3rd ed (Boston Beacon Press 1990)
95 Peter Dreier Capitalists vs the Media An Analysis of an Ideological Mobilization Among Business Leaders 
Media Culture and Society (1982) 4 Peter Dreier The Position of the Press in the U S Power Structure Social 
Problems (1982) 29
26 Peter Dreier and Steve Weinberg Interlocking Directorates Columbia Journalism Review (November/December 
1979) 51-53 67-68
27 Bagdikian 1990
9 8 It should be added that in this example newspapers operating under a Joint Operating Agreement such as takes 
place in Detroit are not considered competitive
29 Benjamin M Compaine Christopher H Sterling Thomas Guback and J Kendrick Noble Jr Who Owns the 
Media Concentration of Ownership in the Mass Communication Industry (White Plains NY Knowledge Industry 
Publishing 1982)
30 Sieben Peterson and Schramm 1963
31 Morton Horowitz The Transformation of American Law (Cambridge Harvard University Press 1977)
32 Herbert I Schiller Culture Inc Corporate Takeover of Public Expression (Oxford Oxford University Press 1989)
33 Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad 118 U S 394 (1886)
34 For an overview concerning Supreme Court cases related to commercial speech see Philip Elman The New 
Constitutional Right to Advertise in 64 A B A  Journal 906 (February 1978)
35 Robert F Ladenson A Philosophy of Free Expression and Its Constitutional Applications (Totowa NJ Rowman 
and Littlefield 1983)
36 Herbert Schmertz Corporations and the First Amendment (New York AMACOM 1978)
37 Schiller 1989
38 William Patton and Randall Bartlett Corporate Persons and Freedom of Speech The Political Impact of Legal 
Mythology Northwestern L Rev 78 (December 1983) 1 " 4
39 Ibid
78 N Vincent Duffy III
40 Charles E Lindblom Pt litics and Markets The Wt rld s Pt litical-Ect nonut Systems (New York Basic Books 
1977)
41 Owen M Fiss Free Speech and Social Structure in Jules Lobel ed A Less Than Perfect Union Alternarne 
Perspectives on the Constitution (New York Monthly Review Press 1988)
47 Rodney A Smolla Free Speech in an Open Society (New York Vintage Books 1992)
43 Mark Tushnet The Constitution from a Progressive Point of View in Jules Lobel ed A Less Than Perfect Union 
Alternative Perspectives on the U S Constitution (New York Monthly Review Press 1988)
44 Buckley V Valeao 435 U S 765 785 (1978)
45 Bruce M Owen Economics and Freedom of Expression Media Structure and the First Amendment (Cambridge 
Ballinger Publishing Co 1975)
46 Ralph Nader and Carl J Mayer Corporations Are Not Persons in Berteli Dillman and Jonathan Birbaum eds The 
United States Constitution 200 Years of Anti Federalist Ab< htionist Muckraking Progressive and Especially Socialist 
Criticism (New York New York University Press 1990)
47 Owen 5
48 Robert M Hutchins A Free and Responsible Press in Steven R Knowlton and Patrick R Parsons eds The 
Journalist s Moral Compass Basic Principles (Westport Conn Praeger 1994) ">16
49 Cass R Sunstein Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York The Free Press 1993)
50 Smolla 1992
51 See Beauharnais v Illinois 343 U S "MO 775 (1952)
57 Smolla 1992
53 Benno C Schmidt Jr Freedom < f the Press vs Public Access (New York Praeger 1975)
54 Jerome A Barron Access to the Press A New First Amendment Rie ht in Kent Middleton and Roy M Mersky 
eds Freedom of Expression A Collection of Best Writing (Buttalo William S Hein & Co 1982)
55 Jerome A Barron Freedom of the Press for Whom The Right of Access to Mass Media (Bloomington Indiana 
University Press 1973) 321
56 Ladenson 1983
57 Vincent A Blasi Checking Value in First Amendment Theory in Kent Middleton and Roy M Mersky eds 
Freedom of Expression A Collection of Best Writings (Buffalo William S Hein & Co 1981)
58 Red Lion Broadcasting Co v FCC 395 U S 367 (1969)
59 Ibid
60 Columbia Broadcasting System v Democratic National Committee 412 U S 94 (1973)
61 Miami Herald Publishing Co v Tourmllo 418 U S 241 7 5 g ( 1 9 7 4 )
62 Robert M Entman Democracy Without Citizens Media and the Decay of American Politics (New York Oxford 
University Press 1989) 102
63 Ibid
64 Mark Fowler quoted in Bernard D Nossiter The FCC s Big Giveaway Show The Nation 402 (26 Oct 1985)
65 Milda K Hedblom Returning Fairness to the Broadcast Media Law and Inequality {1 Flow 1988)
6 6  Smythe 1994
67 Entman 1989
6 8  Guback 1994
69 Sunstein 1993
70 Schiller 64
71 Emerson 1970
Chapter 6
The Re organization of the Japanese Economy 
A Response to the Emerging Global System
Greg Esdale
An economy can be described as a web of institutional arrangements necessary in order to produce 
an increasingly wide variety of commodities Inputs such as labor raw materials investment and 
organization are necessary to maximize output However the extent to which this output raises 
human welfare is largely determined by the organization of distribution Markets have become 
widely accepted as most efficient means by which to distribute goods and transfer information 
throughout society
As North suggests prior to the formation of markets there had to exist a sufficient level of 
population urbanization and technological change among other factors in order to bring about an 
economic revolution Further
The resultant increasing market size induced greater specialization and division of 
labor which increased transaction costs Organizational changes were devised to 
reduce these transaction costs and had the consequence of radically lowering the cost 
of innovation at the same time that the increasing market size and better specified 
property rights over inventions were raising the rate of return of innovating 1
For Jones these organizational changes require a synergy between the government and private 
interests 2 If the government provides certain public goods3 and avoids excessive rent seeking 
activities impediments to the natural accumulation of wealth will be insufficient to impede 
growth During the long run up to the emergence of capitalism in Europe a convergence of 
interests among western European monarchs and nascent capitalistic entrepreneurs in the towns 
created the essential synergy Today this relationship has become many times more complex 
Somewhere between the argument for laissez faire policies and a welfare state lies the proper 
organization of a society s people within its institutions
Continuing as the premier institution nations have exerted coercion to affect this process to 
varying degrees Debate over the phenomenal rise of the Japanese economy after WWII has largely 
been centered on the role of the government in fostering industrial development Theorists have 
suggested that the bureaucracy has been unusually efficient in coordinating this economic 
transformation 4 However many of these approaches have assumed that the existence of 
bureaucratic organizations with specified goals translates clearly into a high degree of effectiveness 
While there exists some supporting empirical evidence especially in the two decades following 
WWII Japan has benefitted from less government intrusion in industrial policy than is popularly 
believed In fact the industrial groupings5 autonomy has historically been quite strong Moreover 
industry has possessed sufficient autonomy to pursue independent action often in direct 
contradiction to bureaucratic guidelines
It is my intention to show that Japanese economic success has been the result of moderation 
between the direction proposed by the state in the form of political and bureaucratic policy 
making and the private allocation of credit and resources in order to maximize specific corporate 
goals Surely the individuals within the MNCs have kept an eye on the national interest They 
have not forgotten that they are members of a relatively homogenous people separated from other 
cultures geographically and culturally for thousands of years However the Japanese are also
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compelled by a strong sense of group loyalty which comes into conflict with the neo Confucian 
dedication to the people the state and the emperor As self perpetuating organizations which 
function as wholes apart from the control of its constituent individuals Japanese MNCs have 
struggled to organize around their private interests while maintaining specific relationships with 
the state I seek to specify these relationships as well as the domestic and international macro 
changes that have further influenced the development of this synergetic relationship
Some Theoretical Considerations
Of central importance to this study is the need to establish the level of analysis There have been 
three primary approaches to this question The first a neo classical approach places individuals 
and firms at the center of analysis Each satisfies their range of wants through the market in which 
information is conveyed through the price mechanism Market failure occurs when externalities or 
the need to provide public goods arise While Coase suggests that affected parties might bargain 
amongst themselves 6 the typical outcome is the creation of institutions to settle these conflicts 
either among private interests or between private interests and the overall public good These 
institutions often come under the purview of government authority which alone among the actors 
in society can marshall sufficient coercive power to enforce decisions
In its support of actors below the level of the state who can best moderate the overall societal 
wealth the neo classical approach can partially help explain the Japanese political economy At its 
core lies the suggestion that international trade assumes perfect competition which in reality has 
not been the case 7 Strategic trade theory sought to address this deficiency by asserting that to 
overcome imperfect competition oligopolistic market structures and externalities states often 
pursue industrial and sectoral policies in support of the strategies of its domestic firms 8 Such a 
project however requires the state agencies which become involved in making market decisions to 
be aware of entry and exit costs market structure learning effects research and development costs 
as well as the domestic and foreign reactions of firms and governments to their actions Whether 
such politicians or bureaucrats possess such skills is questionable especially as the world s 
developed economies reach post industrial complexity
The recent history of development offers further problems for neo classical theory The East 
Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) have mirrored earlier Japanese success by rapidly 
developing their economies via a central role for the state While many other less developed 
countries (LDCs) maintained a strategy of state directed import substitution industrialization (ISI) 
the NICs began to reformulate this approach once the limits of production for limited home 
markets had been reached Alam suggests that the states of Taiwan and South Korea were quite 
successful in grafting export orientated industrialization (EOI) strategies onto previous ISI 
production and today continue to expand sectors in the economy geared towards exports 9 Further 
these states have utilized tight control of the economy through public enterprises scrutiny of 
technology imports restrictions on firm entry and exit plant size minimums sponsored mergers 
domestic content minimums export targets and industry rationalization
Having no significant rivals to state power within civil society South Korea was able to 
establish the Economic Planning Board (EPB) as a highly influential agency with vital control 
over the credit required by Korean industry Without such a strong developmentalist state South 
Korea may not have been able to advance from an impoverished country after the Korean War Its 
integration into the global world economy has conferred upon it rising incomes and a relatively fair 
distribution of wealth 10
Alam continues with the factors that compel firms within developing economies to seek 
government assistance 11 Previous contact with the global economy is often low which requires 
the state to subsidize initial information and start up costs Large fixed capital costs necessary for 
entry into many industries may be too excessive for private firms to shoulder Banks and other 
credit allocation institutions may need guidance themselves in directing where resources ought to
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be distributed as well as support in bearing the risk of investment society as a whole can bear 
larger amounts of risk Often the state can facilitate economies of scale for exporters by 
overcoming political obstacles At early stages of development the state is often more capable of 
organizing the technological benefits associated with exporting Without state guidance firms may 
futilely compete with each other for technology abroad and raise learning costs by repeating 
research and development The state is usually in the sole position to establish the preconditions 
necessary for development These include investments in infrastructure a legal system and 
investment in human resources While education and health are usually essential to firms the 
NICs have benefitted from state controls of wages and unionization Development ultimately 
depends on the value of leadership As long as the politicians and the bureaucrats of the state 
maintain their positions as legitimate efficient and incorruptible agents of rapid economic growth 
industry and the public will acquiesce to their further direction of economic development
Shafer suggests an economy s sectoral make up is essential for determining the outcome of state 
intervention 12 The state neutrally positioned above the firms in their drive for production are 
more equipped to assess whether economic resources ought to be reallocated across sectors It alone 
can assess the overall vulnerability of the national economy to risk from changes in the global 
economy This of course assumes that the state itself is not excessively biased by its own interests 
in public sector production
If free trom such entanglements then the state may tace sectors in which a few oligopolie firms 
operate Such sectors are difficult to restructure due to institutionalized inter dependency between 
the oligopolists and the state in the areas of tax revenue credit allocation and labor utilization 
Conversely sectors with many smaller firms are easier to restructure although tax credit and 
control structures must be deep and flexible to integrate the larger number of actors involved
This argument for state involvement will not be as inclusive for the Japanese case As critics of 
strategic trade theory have suggested there is the potential for failures to arise from state 
involvement in economic development Particularly the state may be captured by special interests 
seeking higher rents or protection from the impact of structural economic changes 13 In such an 
event the optimal national welfare of all producers and consumers is compromised For neo 
classical theory as a whole this suggests that the picture may be more complex that the hope that 
markets alone can and do provide for the optimal mix of production and consumption Rather the 
state may be required to rationalize some sectors of the economy where market failures anse from 
competition between lower level actors While this may provide opportunities for special interests 
to capture the state and achieve suboptimal results such eventualities may have to tolerated Later 
analysis of the Japanese political economy will be used to show how a mixture of neo classical 
markets and strategic trade theory has been used in Japan to realize economic secunty
The second approach is derived from realist theory Although important within international 
relations this theory offers less explanatory power within the study of global political economy 
as it suggests that the relevant actors remain the states 14 For realist theory the international 
global order remains one of anarchy wealth power and security are responsibilities that the states 
must assume Non state actors ultimately depend upon state actors for protection As interests are 
still aggregated on a national level power derived from economic strength is of primary concern 
For this reason Waltz and Greico suggest that states are sensitive to absolute and relative gams 
from trade 15 Thus while the United states may derive tangible benefits from a growing 
prosperous Japanese economy other realist concerns anse as the size of the Japanese economy 
approaches that of ours in relative terms As the current and sole hegemonic power the national 
interests of the United States do not wish to disrupt the economic and political regimes which it 
has invested in In terms of this analysis however realism is unable to offer a sound explanation 
of changes that have occurred both within the Japanese political economy and the global system
Thirdly liberalism offers an explanation that places a lower burden on the state to ensure relative 
economic gains Rather not all international politics are either purely conflictual or perfectly
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harmonious Instead liberal institutionalists start from mixed motive games where elements of 
conflict and cooperation exist 16 As Snidai points out only in a two state interaction do concerns 
over relative gains hinder cooperation 17 Further Powell suggests that security interests and 
political economy are not always perfectly coordinated 18 This permits an explanation in which 
actors below the state specifically at the level of the corporation can assert their own preferences 
within the bounds ol domestic politics
Japanese firms within the highly efficient export sector have increasingly exhibited behavior 
comparable to traditionally strong American and European MNCs Theorists in the 1970s 
suggested that the MNC can have deleterious effects upon its host country 19 However Kudrle 
suggests that MNCs show three faces when engaged in a host country extension of its home 
country interests rivalry and competition with local firms and a source of resources that would 
otherwise not exist 20 Yet as knowledge inputs become increasingly more essential to capital 
accumulation conflict deepens 71 MNCs want to engage in its product innovation within its core 
while local nationalists would like it done locally to maximize local accumulation and long run 
profits 27 The MNC though also desires to tap into local resources to spread out the cost of 
product development
Such an environment of cooperation and conflict over knowledge inputs suggests that a strong 
developmentalist state working closely with local oligopolie industrial groupings can be essential 
for development Japan to a certain degree has utilized just such an institutional arrangement 
However by recasting the roles of the state as a provider of basic infrastructure and direction and 
private interests as the primary dynamic agent of economic production the later developers in East 
Asia have enhanced their chances to develop their economies In so doing they have borrowed 
mixed motive games from liberal theory a role for the state from realist theory and the necessity 
of free markets within which firms possess a certain measure of independence
The Development of Corporate Autonomy
Debate over the relationship between the Japanese government and Japanese industry has occurred 
along a continuum On one side are those who advocate what Friedman terms a Bureaucratic 
Regulation Thesis 23 which propounds that strategic planners have been effective in their efforts to 
guide industrial development On the other are those in favor of the Market Regulation Thesis 
which suggests that although the government may have provided a favorable environment for 
development market forces and strong competition have been the primary engine directing the 
transformation of the economy 24 While neither side denies that both the bureaucracy and industry 
groupings play some role in shaping the economy the central question asks about the direction of 
the relationship Further it seems that as the Japanese economy increases in complexity this 
question can not be asked just once but must be repeated within each sector of the economy
With the opening of Tokugawa Japan by Commodore Perry and the subsequent rise of the Meiji 
oligarchs to power institutions and relationships were formed within the political economy which 
continue to affect the modem day economy As a late developer the Meiji government sought to 
develop as rapidly as possible to ensure the nation s security The nearby image of a weakened 
China divided by the western imperialist powers provided sufficient motivation for the leadership 
The overseas missions to the same western powers however provided the leadership with the 
knowledge and much of the technology with which to proceed to develop the nation However a 
key tool necessary for strategic development was missing
Unlike Korea and Taiwan m the middle of the twentieth century Japan in the late nineteenth 
century did not retain control over its tariff and exchange policy As a condition of the treaty it had 
signed with Commodore Perry a low tariff treaty port regime limited the average tariff rates on 
imports to around 5 percent Not only did this constrain the ability of the state to direct industrial 
policy but encouraged government to acquiesce in the rise of powerful private industrial groups 
and stimulated a more market sensitive approach to international economic competitiveness than
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prevailed in other great powers insulated by colonies or huge continental scale from these broader 
market forces 75 As the previous Tokugawa period had progressed mercantile and financial 
interests had slowly penetrated the elite classes ot samurai warriors and dcnmyo the regional lords 
of the shogun The pre cursors to later Japanese industrial development thus began to organize 
during the Tokugawa and thereafter under a strong but constrained state
The Meiji oligarchs did though attempt a wide range of policies under the slogan shokusan 
kogyo or develop industry and promote enterprise 76 After initial attempts to develop industries 
failed the government sold assets such as textile machinery and steelworks to the emerging 
^aibatsu industry groupings Along with commercial banking institutions the Meiji oligarchs 
supported the vertically and horizontally integrated zaibatsu as the best means to organize 
production and ensure economic security While many heavy industries came under certain forms of 
regulation and received direct subsidies the zaibatsu as a whole and especially the commercial 
banks associated with he zaibatsu were given considerable autonomy Essentially this period of 
independence allowed private industry to ascend a considerable portion of the learning curve for 
competitive free markets Thus when SCAP curtailed the power of the state during the post war 
reconstruction period private industry s prior experience enhanced its ability to pursue industrial 
policies often at odds with government strategy
Of course the period of Japanese militarism critically impacted this relationship between private 
industry and the state Primarily through its use of propaganda and military successes in China the 
military was able to gain control of both the emerging political parties and the powerful zaibatsu 
Unfortunately the lessons learned from the west were grounded in the past For the leadership 
emulation of the other powerful western nations necessitated the adoption of their imperialist 
policies what they failed to see was that the efficiency of this form of political and economic 
control had begun to wane Essentially the other powers were changing the rules of the 
international regime at a time when an emerging Japan was just beginning to learn the old 
rulebook
The post war structure of industrial groupings provided further impediments for a coordinated 
strategic response by the government These groupings known as keiretsu either arose from the 
prewar aibatsu conglomerates financial ties or vertical integration 27 Included within these 
groupings were many firms from a wide range of industrial sectors as well as a main bank and an 
international trading company Relationships were cemented by a system of interlocking stock 
ownership as well as interpersonal management networks
The main banks located within these groupings have provided the basis for much of the 
dynamism found within the productive sectors of the Japanese economy Common practice within 
the keiretsu has been for member firms to seek loans or sell equity to a diverse range of industrial 
and financial firms both within and outside their own groupings 28 However the main bank fulfills 
a vital function by reducing information costs and risk it alone ensures the efficient management 
of a firm and then coordinates syndicated loans from many banks 29 Despite a greater role 
beginning in the early 1980s for equity and internal financing the main banks still provide the 
best in depth institutional information
Outside the immediate keiretsu grouping are many subsidiaries which are dependent upon 
keiretsu control providing a flexible framework around which the firms organize production 
Compared to their U S counterparts large industrial Japanese firms rely quite extensively upon 
subsidiaries or affiliates for a greater share of production specifically 60percent of the Japanese 
workforce engaged m manufacturing can be found in smaller firms while 65percent of the 
American workforce is employed by large firms This flexible arrangement enables the parent 
firm to lower its internalized labor costs investment and risk while maintaining control over 
production Whereas recessionary periods require difficult restructuring in American firms Japanese 
firms instead can shift much of the hardship onto these subsidiaries and enact limited internal
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reorganization This Japanese mode of industrial organization intensifies domestic competition 
both among suppliers and between the large powerful keiretsu
Calder s model explaining the source for Japan s international competitiveness assigns 
responsibility to its unique set of private sector institutions This model assumes two primary axis 
for industrial policy the extent of state intervention and strategic resource allocation (see Figure
1) Over time and across sectors industrial organization has varied although there has been a 
notable shift away from a developmental state towards a corporate led strategic capitalism
The government although noted for its structure of strategic decision making has functioned 
more as a stabilizer than as a proactive agent galvanizing society to deal strategically with 
emerging imperatives 31 Government strategists notably in MITI have shown less agency in 
coercing industry to follow its directives The primary shift has been in the government s declining 
ability to direct credit allocation within the economy although certainly other organizational 
transformations have contributed
Japan s organization of credit allocation divides jurisdiction among many separate agencies 
which usually place the independence of their own agency s agenda above consensus A unique 
aspect of Japanese bureaucracies is that each indoctrinates its staff with highly idiosyncratic 
standard operating procedures this practice further undermines cooperation among government 
bodies The Ministry of Finance (MOF) for one has adopted goals that have come into conflict 
with MITI s Rather than seek the transformation of industry the MOF has assumed a strongly 
regulatory posture more like that of the U S Federal Reserve Board 17 In fact the leadership of the 
Bank of Japan which comes under MOF jurisdiction has been drawn largely from people educated 
in the United States and previously employed within the keiretsu During ex Mitsubishi Bank 
chairman Usami Makato s term as BOJ governor in the 1960s control of credit was further 
diversified to serve private interests with the creation of the Bank of Tokyo to handle foreign 
exchange and the Industrial Bank of Japan (IB J) whose lending would later conflict with other 
agencies This period also saw the rise of many private trading and insurance companies which 
came to control large amounts of capital but were not under BOJ control Instead the BOJ became 
largely a banks bank and removed itself from the control of industrial credit
The pluralistic organization of those agencies m charge of credit allocation and regulation 
contradicted the image of Japan Inc they have been insufficiently coordinated and empowered to 
have more than a supportive role in the economy The complexity of the administrative structure 
of government banks has diminished the capacity of strategists 31 Additionally planners especially 
at MITI have lacked the necessary personnel and political clout Unlike South Korea s Economic 
Planning Board the Japanese government does not possess centralized control over the allocation 
of industrial credit
A crucial source of funds for the purpose of credit allocation is the Federal Investment and Loan 
Program (FILP) This off budget program funnels funds largely from deposits in the postal savings 
system which up until the financial deregulation begun in the early 1980s provided citizens with 
about the only place to put their savings other than their housing Other sources include public 
pension and postal life insurance accounts Viewed as a percentage of the national government s 
general account this program forms a sizable portion of GNP 34 In 1953 FILP was 33 4percent of 
the general account budget By 1991 this figure had risen to 52 3 percent In terms of percentage of
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national income this translates into a general account share of roughly lópercent of GNP and 
8percent share for the FILP investment program Compared to the other OECD nations Japan 
directs a disproportionate share of its resources towards government capital formation 35
Such a large pool of funds for use by the government however has not conferred a 
commensurate amount of control over the formation of industrial policy The number of 
government bodies participating in FILP has increased significantly 16 As the program s 
framework has become more complex centralized control of credit has suffered in light of 
heightened bureaucratic divergence and external political influence A breakdown of the uses of 
these funds suggests that government credit has become captured by the needs of social policy and 
declining economic sectors Objectives such as housing welfare education and public amenities 
took 71 4percent of the funds in 1991 up from 38 2percent in 1953 37 In the same period 
industrial development s share has fallen from 29 1 percent to 3 2 percent The remainder of the 
funds support infrastructure development (18 9 percent) and foreign trade (6 5 percent) The shift 
away from direct industrial development suggests that the government has altered the role it plays 
within the economy to one that increasingly provides for its citizens social needs and 
infrastructure such as transportation and port facilities to benefit industry
Even MITI the premier agency for industrial strategy has been severely constrained A crucial 
event was failure to pass the Draft Law of Special Measures for the Promotion of Designated 
Industries of 1962-1963 38 This law would have provided MITI and the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) with extensive powers to determine firm by firm levels of investment spending limit 
oligopolistic keiretsu rivalry and consolidate the fragmented structure of industry Thus not only 
would the government strategists be able to control sectoral industrial organization but intra 
sectoral as well
The defeat of this law in the Diet attests to the strength of the opposition Within the business 
community most of the commercial banks keiretsu and Keidanren business lobby opposed their 
potential loss of autonomy Certain bureaus within MITI itself captured by heavy industry divided 
the agency Within the lower house of the Diet few politicians saw any political gain in 
empowering the bureaucracy at the expense of important corporate constituents With the defeat of 
this legislation the strategists at MITI could only affect marginal changes within the confines of a 
limited number of industrial sectors
Okimoto perhaps gives MITI more recognition than it deserves With the economy s shift into 
more knowledge intensive sectors such as computers Okimoto suggests that MITI is showing 
restraint by not implementing strict controls such as credit allocation sectoral reorganization etc 
rather Okimoto suggests that strategists have come to understand that innovation at the edge of 
technology requires smaller innovative firms m a chaotic environment to reach the necessary 
breakthroughs 39 However the organizational deficiencies of the government suggests that MITI 
would be incapable of rationalizing industrial organization and credit allocation were it inclined to 
so Previous success m reorganizing the machine tool industry to reduce excessive competition and 
over capacity is not likely to be repeated once the computer industry reaches maturity Instead 
MITI s reluctant strategy has been primarily to foster national research projects that reduce the cost 
of basic research for the large oligopolistic firms engaged in the competitive international sector 
of the economy Such a strategy may act as an efficient substitute for the dynamic arrangement in 
the United States which links industry affiliated research laboratories and universities where much 
basic research is conducted
What appears to be the case is a set of policy responses specific to each stage of the industrial 
life cycle 40 As agencies such as the MOF are primarily regulatory in nature infant industries at 
the edge of technology are perceived as too nsky to receive government credit In fact one of the 
MOF mandates is to insure a safe return on the large pool of postal savings investments it has 
access to Without a developed venture capital market innovation has arisen largely from within 
keiretsu activities More recent strategy among MITI planners has been to establish support for
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research in emerging sectors Most notably a small percentage of funds controlled by MITI has 
sponsored joint research programs in semiconductors computers and biotechnology 41 Yet as was 
the case with the initial development of the vehicle and consumer electronics industries the 
government has disapproved of key industries as wasteful of precious resources
At the middle of the industrial life cycle government involvement declines as the dynamic 
private sector keiretsu strive for autonomy from government intervention in order to optimize 
firm and keiretsu specific goals However sunset industries such as coal mining and oil refining 
actively seek and receive government credit and protection from both the bureaucracy and political 
channels To satisfy the special interests47 associated with declining industries the Japanese 
government restricts the speed which market forces largely embodied by the powerful keiretsu 
industry groupings might reorganize sectors of the economy more quickly than workers and 
localities can adjust
This view of government disengagement trom many emerging sectors as excessively risky and 
more mature stages of the industrial life cycle suggest two possibilities Either the government 
agencies have become enlightened and have adopted the neo classical approach advocated by Jones 
and Hayek or market forces have constrained their ability to control industrial organization I 
suspect the latter is somewhat more true Market trends in the 1980s especially at the 
international level have accelerated this conversion
International Influences
As Japanese firms locked within supportive keiretsu relationships have expanded into overseas 
markets their ability to tap internal sources of funding has markedly increased Up until the late 
1970s internal funding sources were evenly matched by external borrowing However the early 
1980s saw the first Japanese surpluses in its current account and Japanese firms began taking large 
profits 43 Subsequently internal funding rose to over 70 percent while borrowing actually dropped 
below Opercent for a time This was due in part to the increased incidence of zaitech 44 Much like 
American firms with large cash reserves their Japanese counterparts began to actively loan excess 
reserves to other firms Combined with greater use of domestic equity markets and overseas capital 
markets firms have lessened their dependence upon bank and government oversigh t45
The institutional arrangement of strong keiretsu banks able to work with member firms to 
control the flow of credit has typically been a powerful instrument A firm s main bank would 
coordinate syndicated loans from many banks [which] reduced the agency costs of external funds 
thereby mitigating the restrictiveness of the internal funds for investment expenditure decided by 
individual firms 46 The main bank accomplished this by maintaining a high level of oversight 
reducing information costs and nsk for the other lending institutions Equity financing has utilized 
this extant proxy investors benefit from opportunities for nsk sharing yet have not sought the 
power to discipline corporate managers to practice efficient management This contrasts starkly to 
the position of equity investors in the United States whose control of shares can influence firm 
policy or enact a takeover Japanese institutional arrangements have more closely approximated the 
German case interlocking equity stakes in keiretsu member firms and the continued strong 
relationship with a main bank have given Japanese firms a large degree of autonomy from 
government interference and investor demands for profit taking
Further changes in the international political economy have had a significant impact upon Japan 
The nation s high household savings rate combined with rapid productivity growth and 
competitiveness in sectors orientated towards exporting have provided the catalyst for endaka 47 
Calder explains
As the surplus of savings over investment in Japan began to intensify during the 
early 1980s long term interest rates that had been gradually liberalized from the early 
1970s on began to fall in response to market forces Japan s long term prime rate for
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example dipped from 9 5 percent in mid 1980 to 6 4 percent by early 1986 
Government administrative policies were unable to determine the interest rate 
structure especially given the growing integration of international and Japanese 
domestic capital markets By 1985 the decline in long term market interest rates had 
erased the 2 percent differential between the long term pnme rate and the FILP cost of 
funds below which the Japan Development Bank and other public institutions could 
not lend without subsidies Private sector loans thus rivaled the cost of unsubsidized 
government credit for the .first time in history 48
As the government s strategic planners could no longer easily direct industrial credit they 
realized that unbridled competition would destroy government banks ability to lend Thus 
planners have pursued a strategy of subsidizing some lending while dismantling portions of the 
government financial system and deploying the freed resources at more market orientated rates of 
return
Macroeconomic conditions in the United States exasperated the effect of the market upon 
monetary policy specifically US fiscal deficits in the 1980s combined with growth in domestic 
demand spurred the Japanese purchase of dollar denominated securities in order to diversify their 
portfolios 49 As the yen quickly appreciated in 1985 and 1986 and the dollar fell the Bank of Japan 
sought to increase liquidity to avoid an endaka induced recession However the rise of a bubble 
economy and the government s subsequent rapid shift to a tight monetary policy brought about the 
collapse of share prices in 1990 and persistent recession Five years later the economy had just 
begun to achieve significant growth rates when another round of endaka began increasing the 
value of the yen by over 20 percent Such rapid swings in monetary conditions not only brought 
instability to the net outflow of securities investment abroad50 but quickened Japanese industry s 
reorganization on an international scale
The theory of comparative advantage states that each country can produce certain commodities 
products or services more efficiently than other states Cummings suggests that northeast Asia has 
developed a systemic interaction of each country with the others and of the region with the world 
at large 51 Product cycles on a regional and international scale have linked the organization of 
industrial development For example the production in Japan of consumer electronics had been a 
mature industry until the highly skilled but much cheaper labor in other parts of Asia made it 
profitable for Japanese firms to relocate production By 1980 South Korea and Taiwan had both 
surpassed Japan in the number of television sets exported to the United States 52 However profits 
rose for electronics manufacturers as they were able to efficiently produce high valued parts in 
Japan and export them for inclusion m the final assembly by subsidiaries throughout the region 
Organization on such a global scale thus allowed for increased rationalization of production and 
decreased production costs
Most interestingly however has been the excess of foreign direct investment (FDI) in developed 
countries over developing ones 53 This imbalance in investment is partly due to the quantitative 
restrictions on imports arbitrary imposition of anti dumping duties and administrative or legal 
harassment 54 However the sheer size of the markets of developing countries virtually necessitates 
Japanese firms m the export sector to establish production and distribution there 55 With the 
appreciation of the yen skilled American and European workers become cost effective to employ 
in many high value added industries By reorganizing its production activities Japan has 
successfully raised the sophistication and value of the sectors in which it has a comparative 
advantage Such improvement in Japan s international position is contrary to fears that a 
hollowing out similar to that purported to be occurring in the United States
Further Japanese MNCs have had a much smaller presence abroad than their American and 
European counterparts As of 1987 only 3 2percent of production by Japanese firms was done 
overseas 56 However this figure was expected to jump to 8 7percent by 1990 Further estimates 
suggest that FDI will quadruple by 1995 Whether or not these projections will be met given the
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prolonged recession in Japan are in doubt Yet regardless the evidence seems to suggest a 
burgeoning presence by Japanese firms on many fronts
The benefits ot Japanese firms growing global position has not translated into commensurate 
improvements for the Japanese people Much to the chagrin of the government regional planners 
wider market forces have come into conflict with the National Land Development Agency In an 
effort to ease overcrowding along the Tokaido Corridor57 previous plans have sought to disperse 
growth to regional poles 58 Government transfer payments and support for declining industries in 
outlying prefectures eased regional income inequality through the 1970s However the 
organizational changes that have occurred as part of Japanese industry s global rationalization of 
production have reversed these gains
The most significant event has been the transformation of the Greater Tokyo area into a World 
City As Japanese Firms have increased their multinational presence Tokyo has assumed the role 
of a global command center By the 1980s the finance insurance information and real estate 
sectors had taken a key role in the nation s economic activities 59 Most of the nation s corporate 
headquarters also were located m Tokyo by this time As manufacturers relocated heavy industry 
and assembly plants overseas they increasingly turned the Tokaido Corridor into a seedbed for 
manufacturing research and development Such a high concentration allowed for the development 
of symbiotic networks of large firms subcontractors and high tech research facilities which 
compressed the product cycle diversified product development and expanded the range of potential 
business relationships 60
A critical perspective suggests that firms manipulate their growing global control Sessen-Koob 
states that the large size of firms has made it more profitable to internalize transaction and 
circulation costs thereby reducing the barriers to capital circulation and raising capital s ability to 
equalize profit rate The centralization of capital may therefore improve rather than diminish the 
capacity to equalize profits 61 On the other hand
The decentralization of economic activity can then be seen as a tendency that ensures 
the reproduction of structurally differentiated labor supplies in a context of global 
sized firms which by internalizing the functions of the market homogenize their 
space of operation In this sense decentralization becomes a mechanism to prevent the 
generalized increase in the organic composition of capital or the tendency toward 
empowerment of workers in the advanced sectors of capital 62
While states may have the power to regulate certain actions of MNCs operating within its 
borders it certainly can not indefinitely control day to day operations or the long run trends which 
arise out of economic restructuring Thus the growing autonomy of Japanese keiretsu suggests a 
commensurate ability to decide domestic and international norms for the means of production and 
the distribution of wealth
Conclusion
Within its highly efficient export sectors the Japanese economy has become one of corporate led 
strategic capitalism The government having largely lost its power to allocate resources has 
begun to adopt within the economy a supportive role towards innovative sectors of private 
industry Declining industries are given preferential support to ease their reorganization in these 
sectors the Japanese economy more closely approximates a chentized state As a result of their 
success in reorganizing production on a global scale Japanese keiretsu industrial groups and their 
member firms have reduced much of their costs by internalizing portions of the labor and 
commodity markets Profits have provided sufficient internal funding to afford greater independence 
from government credit Through a mixture of cooperation and competition Japanese industry 
both domestically and abroad has brought about a reorganization of industry worldwide
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Chapter 7
The Russian Path to Economic Transformation 
Decision Making and the Role of the State
William E Ferry
The political and economic transformations occurring in East and Central Europe have aroused much 
scholarly debate One of the primary issues on the agenda has been how to most effectively transform 
planned economies into market based ones without causing a popular backlash against reforms The 
literature on these economic transformations points to this dilemma It is obvious given the 
magnitude of restructuring that is needed that the process of reform is going to have negative 
consequences for a significant proportion of the population in these countries People are probably 
aware—at least to some degree—which groups will be hit the hardest by the negative consequences of 
the process Even if this were not the case the veil of ignorance that may have hidden the initial cost 
of reforms disappears soon enough to reveal the winners and losers ot the process Much of the debate 
has centered around two basic components of reforms 1) the mode of decision making m economic 
policy formulation and 2) the role of the state m this process In the case of the former the main 
question that is asked is whether an authoritarian or a democratic regime can most effectively and 
efficiently implement reforms An authoritarian regime may be able to push through reforms at a 
quicker pace but it will likely not have the same level of legitimacy as a democratic or semi 
democratic regime that consults with a wider range of actors before making important decisions For 
the latter component of reforms the debate seems to focus on the question of speed Should a gradual 
pace be taken in an effort to minimize the harmful side effects or should a country aim to take the 
shock therapy approach with the belief that a short period of intense pain is better than a long drawn 
out process7
The Russian government has had to deal with these issues in its efforts to transform the extensive 
planned economic system that was created and developed over a 70 year span The purpose of this paper 
is to make an assessment of the tactics and strategies that the Yeltsin regime has utilized to respond to 
the dilemmas that have been created by economic transformation Since far reaching economic reforms 
were initiated in Russia in late 1991 it seems as if the Yeltsin regime has altered its strategy several 
times It is not unusual for a country to change its policies during economic transformations In fact 
transforming countries seem to follow a somewhat regular path This process starts out with a small 
group of technocrats leading reforms from above with little or no consultation with forces either within 
the government itself or with external sources in society However the nature of reforms usually 
changes dramatically as more senous and extensive changes are necessary and as support starts to wane 
This is a similar path that the Russians appear to have followed up to this point
The approach that is used to explore the Russian case is to analyze the negotiations that have taken 
place throughout the reform period between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Russian 
government concerning Russian progress in meeting the prescribed norms that have been set out by the 
IMF This study focuses on the IMF because it is the primary international organization through 
which western aid along with neoliberal principles are directed toward Russia In addition IMF demands 
provide a relatively stable set of external signals to the Russian government This paper will define the 
impediments that exist in meeting these demands and make an assessment of the solutions that the 
Yeltsin regime has advanced to deal with these impediments I will also explore which strategies the 
Yeltsin regime has used to deal with the IMF and to assure itself of new aid packages There is evidence 
that these negotiations have also resulted in a modification of IMF demands Exploration of this high 
profile engagement of the IMF m the internal affairs of Russia will elucidate the tension and cleavages
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that result from both the economic trans formation process and trom the external monitoring process of 
the IMF itself
In sum the objectives of this research paper are 1) to survey existing models concerning economic 
transformation 2) to test how the Russian economic reform experience fits into this theoretical 
framework by focusing on the interaction between the Russian government and the IMF keeping in 
mind the peculiarities of the Russian case and 3) to investigate possible scenarios for the future in 
light of upcoming parliamentary elections in December 1995 It would also seem appropriate to 
ascertain the effectiveness of the strategies of the Russian government basing the definition of success 
on the ultimate entena of economic growth and progress Although this issue will necessarily be 
addressed due to the topic of the paper it will not be dealt with directly or be one of the main focuses 
The main reason that this paper does not delve into this issue directly is due to the difficulty of 
assessing the process while it is ongoing Identifying the model of Russian reform is less speculative 
and therefore more useful
Theoretical Framework
This study conceptualizes economic reforms along two axes One axis is concerned primarily with the 
mode ot economic policy formulation How are economic policies and strategies created9 What range of 
actors are involved in the process7 What degree of influence do various actors have in the process9 An 
extensive literature has already formed around the politics of economic reforms in developing countries 
As Africa Latin America and Asia have struggled to emerge from destitution and to attain some degree 
of prosperity debates have raged over the best strategy for a successful transformation The discourse 
pertaining to the issue of policy formulation has revolved largely around which regime type is most 
conducive to economic growth—democratic authoritarian or something in between 1 This study will 
refer at times to this literature in discussing the issue of regime type However I will also examine 
how economic transformation in post communist countries and in Russia in particular differ from that 
which has taken place elsewhere
It is also useful to refer to this literature in looking at the role of the state m economic 
transformation This is the second axis that is used to conceptualize economic reforms in this paper In 
the 1970s many developing countries saw the state as a powerful instrument that could actively be 
involved m directing economic growth through the use of distributive and redistributive policies 9 By 
the 1980s and early 1990s however economic crises in these states forced them to reevaluate the role 
of the state and to limit its coercive power m directing the economy 3 In fact there has been an 
amazing ideological convergence during this time period toward neoliberal notions of economic 
development one that sees a minimal role for the state The crises in developing countries the rapid 
development of several East Asian economies and the eventual collapse of communist regimes in East 
and Central Europe have all contributed to this convergence These norms are represented and forwarded 
by international regimes such as the IMF and World Bank These are two of the main organizations 
through which neoliberal principles are prescribed to developing countries
After surveying the various modes of economic policy formulation and roles of the state I will focus 
on the dynamics of the process The nature of economic transformation usually means it is a phased 
process More specifically the initiation phase requires different preconditions than the consolidation 
phase of the adjustment period For example the level of support among the population for economic 
reforms tends to decline as the resulting pain intensifies In addition policies of structural adjustment 
require the involvement and cooperation of a much wider array of actors than policies directed toward 
attaining macroeconomic stabilization
Modes of Economic Policy Formulation
The debate concerning economic policy formulation has centered around the type of regime that enables 
a country to implement economic growth policies in the quickest and most effective manner Does an 
authoritarian regime best enable a country to implement strict and harsh economic policies without
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worrying about a popular backlash which could slow or even halt the process or is a more democratic 
system required in order to bring legitimacy to the government and its policies7 Some of the arguments 
made against democracy are that it fosters consumption over investment and particularist over collective 
interests 4 Moreover since the decision making process is not insulated from popular pressures there is 
the fear that reforms could be interrupted when they start to become painful On the other hand the 
argument against authoritarian rule is that it can be corrupt and self serving and does not necessarily 
lead to reforms in the interests of the country as a whole Przeworski and Limongi s overview ol 
empirical studies brings us no conclusive evidence that one type of regime promotes economic growth 
better than another5
Notice that this study focuses not on regime type per se but on the actual mode of decision making 
that takes place within nascent democratic political systems Although many post communist countries 
are ostensibly democratic the way in which they formulate policies may differ quite dramatically Even 
though democratic structures may have been created in many of these countries democratic norms have 
not been regularized Russia is an example of a country which has passed a new constitution and has 
put in place some democratic institutions and laws but which cannot yet be considered a democratic 
country due to the way it operates This is due in part to the infancy of these political institutions
The modes of decision making used in this study were developed in the literature by Pereira Maravall 
and Przeworski 6 The technocratic/aiithoritarmn mode is the First one we will examine In this 
model policies are dictated from above by a relatively small group of technocrats according to an 
economic blueprint This is one way top down reform with little or no input from people or interest 
groups from below or from within government itself (e g parliament) Reform policies are enacted 
much of the time by decree without consultation or negotiation 7
A second mode of policy making has been labeled mandatism 8 In  this model democracy exists 
mainly in the procedural sense An executive or leadership is elected fairly but policies are still dictated 
from above without negotiation or consultation from outside forces be these forces the opposition 
within the government or forces emanating from outside the government Economic policy in such a 
model is still carried out in largely a technocratic manner This type of policy formulation occurs 
frequently in nascent unconsolidated democracies 9 O Donnell defines regimes that engage in this type 
of policy formulation as delegative democracies 10 According to O Donnell [d]elegative 
democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to 
govern as he or she sees fit constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a 
constitutionally limited term of office The president is taken to be the embodiment of the nation and 
the mam custodian and definer of its interests 11
The parlimentarist mode is a third type of policy making In this model policies are formulated 
by negotiation between opposing groups within the government Either this negotiation is necessary 
if there is no party with a clear majority in the parliament or consultation is initiated by the party in 
the majority There is also the question of whether or not a system is parliamentary or presidential 
Obviously even m a presidential system there is the possibility for consultation with the parliament 
However under such a system the legislative and executive organs are not fused as in a parliamentary 
system Therefore the possibility of conflict between the two branches is greater leading to a more 
unstable democracy and a turbulent reform process
Finally there is the corporatist mode of policy formulation Here consultation is extended 
beyond groups within the government to include interest groups in society (e g employees 
organizations industry lobbies etc ) It has been argued that this is especially important in order to 
sustain reforms after they have been launched
Role of the State
In considering its role in economic transformation a state must occupy itself with two predominant 
issues 1) the role it should play in fostering economic growth and 2) the role it should play in
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protecting various segments in society from the negative consequences of reforms (1 e social safety 
net concerns) The first issue is a familiar one for all countries of the world but especially for those 
that are faced with dire economic conditions When is it necessary to use the coercive power of the state 
to create conditions for and enhance the operation of markets9 What type of industrial policy should the 
state implement9 There are special circumstances for post communist countries in addressing these 
questions These states must first find a way of tearing apart the bond between the state and the 
economy In doing so however the state must also decide how it will deal with those segments of 
society that have vested interests in the old system and also with those that are the most vulnerable to 
the social costs of reforms Thus along with the external pressures that are pushing these countries 
toward neoliberal economic policies and democracy (two objectives that seem to be contradictory at 
times) there are also internal pressures emanating from those groups in society most likely to lose 
from reforms that are calling for continued state intervention m the economy to either cushion the 
painful effects or to retain the status quo
The first scheme that I will examine concerning the role of the state in promoting economic 
transformation is the strict neoliberal approach This approach envisions a minimalist role for the 
state in pushing through IMF style reform since the market is seen as the best most effective 
mechanism for coordinating and generating growth in an economy Those countries that strive to meet 
the orthodox prescriptions of the IMF are faced with a dilemma that Miles Kahler has called the
orthodox paradox 17 The state is to be used as the instrument to promote economic stabilization 
structural adjustment and the overall strength of market forces while at the same time reducing its role 
m the management of the economy Of course even those who posit the market to be the main engine 
of growth admit to some need for state intervention As North states ultimately it is the state that is 
responsible for the efficiency of the property rights structure which causes growth or stagnation or 
economic decline 13 He also points to the paradox that this leads to for those who adopt a neoliberal 
view The existence of a state is essential for economic growth the state however is the source of 
man made economic decline 14 This approach does not necessanly ignore the social costs involved 
with economic adjustment However financial stabilization structural adjustments and other measures 
aimed at achieving a rapid marketization of the economy take priority
A second approach is one in which the state follows a program that calls for strategic targeting of 
state industrial and social policies This could be labeled the strategic or developmental approach 15 
Peter Evans defines such states as those that extract surplus but also provide collective goods 
They foster long term entrepreneurial perspectives among private elites by increasing incentives to 
engage in transformative investments and lowering the risks involved in such investments 16 Some 
have argued that strategic state intervention is needed as a catalyst for countries that are late 
developers 17 The key is to create an environment conducive to growth for competitive industries or 
enterprises while resisting pressure to prop up inefficient sectors of the economy The market is seen as 
a necessary but not sufficient component of economic growth
Regarding social policy a state can also take a targeted approach This approach is geared toward 
creating a social safety net for the most vulnerable in society (e g pensioners) In addition the state is 
seen as an instrument to make the adjustment a smoother process by taking the responsibility for 
setting up retraining centers and providing limited unemployment benefits This approach however 
excludes the option of providing broad based support such as subsidizing certain goods or attempting 
to halt the decline m output and an increase in unemployment by bailing enterprises out
A final approach is called the socio democratic approach 18 or state interventionist approach 
According to this reform plan the state is a key actor in promoting economic growth and protecting 
the social welfare of the people With such an approach transformative strategies are usually decided 
upon in a democratic manner with a wide range of consultation However although an economic 
program aimed primarily at using the state to soften the blow of reform measures is usually associated 
with countries that display some degree of consensual decision making (as the term socio democratic 
implies) this does not necessarily hold true in all cases (e g Mexico) Also what differentiates this 
approach is that there is no set of reform blueprints The main industrial policy is to provide
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enterprises with enough funds to allow them to slowly and less painfully adapt to the emerging market 
environment Therefore the state does not target potentially competitive enterprises alone but extends 
its helping hand to inefficient and stagnate enterprises as well
This financial assistance to noncompetitive state enterprises is literally a part of the social policy 
These funds are directed at minimizing unemployment and social disruption Other social measures 
include broad based support such as minimum wage increases or the continued subsidization of certain 
goods 19
Political Dynamics of the Economic Transformation Process
Scholars have identified different phases that countries pass through in transforming their economies 
The preconditions that enable the initiation of systemic changes are not the same as those that are 
necessary for the consolidation of these reforms Public support the extent and scope of reforms and 
the social costs associated with the process are some of the factors that change over time It is generally 
agreed upon that one of the preconditions for the initiation of far reaching economic transformation is 
an agreement by a majority of the population and by elites that the status quo is no longer a viable 
option For countries in Eastern Europe the status quo—a restructuring of the socialist system—was 
not a viable option by 1989 the general public politicians and technicians agreed on this point A
thick line had to be drawn between the past and the future The society was prepared to draw this 
line 90 However consensus against the status quo cannot necessarily be construed as support for a 
specific set of changes
As John Waterbury explains reforms are likely to be launched by change teams consisting of a 
group of technocrats that are insulated from politics 21 Furthermore when reforms are initiated they 
tend to be less complex (macroeconomic stabilization vs structural changes) require only a small 
number of individuals to implement them and are generally met with more widespread support 72 This 
period is one of extraordinary politics 23 During this period there are increased political economic 
opportunities for the leadership of a country since their political capital is at its highest following the 
collapse of communism and the raised expectations of what market reforms will bring This period of 
extraordinary politics is soon superseded by a period of normal politics m which major issues 
become much more politicized and there are growing disagreements over the course of reforms 24
The problem with consolidating reforms are twofold First the policies carried out tend to hurt 
specific groups immediately Conversely the benefits emanating from the process are as Joan Nelson 
claims usually deferred uncertain and diffused Losers know who they will be gainers are much less 
certain 25 Furthermore losers tend to be situated in groups that are organized and vocal whereas 
potential winners are often neither 26 The fact is that the poorest and most vulnerable segments of 
society are also those that have the least political influence 27 Therefore the incentives for the 
government are to meet the demands of groups that are somewhat better off and are politically more 
active although a certain amount of international and domestic pressure does exist for pro poor 
measures 98 Unfortunately it is much more difficult to significantly buffer urban formal sector 
workers and middle strata from the social costs of adjustment without undercutting the adjustment 
effort itself 99 Therefore once the so called honeymoon is over political leaders must deal with 
growing discontent from various groups that have suffered from reforms without being able to rely on 
commensurate support from those that have benefited
Second as political leaders move from reform policies that are more easily carried out with a small 
group of individuals to more complex institutional and structural changes such as privatization they 
must count on a wider array of people to carry out these changes successfully Moreover as the 
complexity of the changes grows so do their implications for the public It is one thing to liberalize 
pnces and quite another to restructure the entire economy To carry out the latter reformers must rely 
on the cooperation of a much larger segment of society At this stage states must strive to create a 
network of connections with groups in society emphasizing embeddedness Connections to civil
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society become part of the solution rather than part of the problem Failing to address the concerns of 
affected interests in society may become an obstacle in the effort to consolidate reforms 10
This failure could also result in the election of a new leadership depending on what type of regime is 
in place Besides regime type the structure of political institutions should be taken into consideration 
in determining the capacity of the state to carry out reforms successfully and the degree to which 
societal interests are represented 3i These include electoral laws and the party system If a country is a 
democracy and has relatively fair and competitive elections the election cycle can greatly affect the 
strategies and tactics that a particular government uses in designing a reform program Governments 
facing upcoming electoral challenges not surprisingly have generally been reluctant to impose 
unpopular programs Incoming governments by contrast have capitalized on honeymoon periods and 
the disorganization or discrediting of the opposition to launch ambitious new reform initiatives 32 A 
period of elections can often place the leadership of a country m the position of choosing between their 
own myopic interests as opposed to the long term interests of the country as a whole It is insightful 
to examine how a government picks and chooses strategies to deal with outside international pressures 
such as IMF conditionality that call for strict neoliberal monetarist policies while at the same time 
internal forces are lobbying for a more gradual or softer approach
This study will now endeavor to identify the reform model that has emerged in Russia and explain 
why it has emerged as a consequence of these external and internal pressures 33
Initiation of Russian Economic Reforms 
Institutional Anarchy and Economic Vacillation
The political situation in early 1992 was conducive for the initiation of reforms by the Yeltsin regime 
Two months before the August coup in 1991 Yeltsin had become the first president to be elected by 
popular vote in Russia s long history although Russia was still a republic of the Soviet Union at the 
time He undoubtedly gained some additional political capital from his highly visible defiance of the 
August coup Other political institutions that may have countered his relatively powerful position were 
not strong enough to play such a role 34 The conservative elements in other institutions were still 
reeling from the failed coup and its subsequent negative consequences This enabled Yeltsin to form 
within the government his own change team of young technocrats led by the economist Yegor 
Gaidar Most of the members of this new cabinet the youngest m Russian history were economist 
friends of Gaidar who had never served in the government They were devoted to radical reforms and 
proceeded to craft an economic program that was to bring about drastic changes in the first year
One of the first acts of the Russian government was the deregulation of most pnces in January 
1992 35 The Gaidar team was intent on following a program of shock therapy Gaidar announced in 
March the same month he was promoted to first deputy premier that his economic programs 
envisioned the elimination of the budget deficit the reduction of the inflation rate to western levels and 
the shift to a single ruble exchange rate by the end of the year36 In addition Economics Minister 
Andrei Nechaev announced that state investment expenditures would be cut sharply for 1992 37 These 
were indeed bold objectives for a country were industrial output continued to drop along with living 
standards 38 The IMF recognized this and voiced its approval of the Russian economic program It also 
proceeded in June to grant Russia membership in the IMF 39
However the program of shock therapy that the Yeltsin Gaidar team had developed and just started 
to implement was not an outcome of political debate and compromise among the major political actors 
in government and it did not go unchallenged The Gaidar reform measures were enacted in a rather 
authoritarian manner largely bypassing the Russian Parliament and ignoring the chairman of the 
Central Bank Georgn Matiukhin This not only offended members of these institutions but also 
irritated many of Yeltsin s older supporters 40
The Parliament and Central Bank responded to these executive decrees with their own policies and 
were able to pressure the Yeltsin government into making numerous concessions Soon after passing a
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budget for the first quarter of 1992 that projected a deficit of only $115 billion (about 1 percent of 
GNP) the Supreme Soviet persuaded the Russian government to agree to cut the value added tax (VAT) 
by 13 percent (28 percent to 15 percent) to increase pensions and student stipends and to introduce a
physiological subsistence minimum or minimum wage needed purchase basic goods for survival 41 
The lowering of the VAT meant a significant loss of revenues Adding to the revenue problem the 
Yeltsin government also postponed the liberalization of energy prices a commitment that was made to 
the West and to its own petroleum sector 47
As the year progressed the bold objectives that Gaidar had spelled out in his economic plan for the 
country to reach by the end of the year now appeared unattainable Along with the concessions that it 
was pressured into making the Yeltsin government had little if any control over the activities of the 
Central Bank Russia display[ed] the curious phenomenon of a government full of monetarists and a 
central bank full of Keynesians 41 In May and June a new wave of credits was issued to industry with 
the directors of large enterprises calling for even greater injections of credit44 As a result even though 
inflation had been declining (hovering around 10 percent the summer) the loosening of monetary and 
fiscal policies resulted in an inflation rate of 25 percent and a budget deficit of 17 percent by the end of 
the year
A large part ol the blame for the failure of the Gaidar plan can be placed on political circumstances 
At the time the old Soviet era constitution with its numerous liberal amendments was still the law 
of the land Under this document the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People s Deputies 
(parliament) had ample powers which were nonetheless largely nonexistent In addition their were 
minute provisions for any executive Therefore even though Yeltsin was popularly elected in 1991 his 
attempts to run a politically stable and democratic regime under such a document were sure to lead to a 
power struggle As Judith Kullberg has remarked The coexistence of new as yet uninstitutionalized 
rules and structures borrowed from Western models of democracy with old norms of elite behavior has 
contributed to conflict and political instability 45
As Yeltsin was consolidating his power during the first part of the year tensions were growing 
between the Presidency the Parliament and the Central Bank The political situation became more 
entangled as the year progressed The Yeltsin Gaidar team was presented with the dilemma of seeking a 
viable path between demands placed on it by the Parliament Central Bank and industrial lobby on the 
one hand and the IMF and West on the other The former were pushing for a more gradual state 
managed approach including generous credits for enterprises to adjust to the new market environment 
and a delay or outright elimination of some of Gaidar s proposals concerning such issues as 
privatization and the liberalization of energy prices The latter still emphasized the overriding need to 
attain financial stability before the economy could rebound This meant an increase in revenues and a 
decrease in subsidies
The Yeltsin regime used co optation as a way of dealing with the growing internal opposition to its 
economic program Yeltsin invited several representatives of the industrial lobby to take part in his 
government46 In a way he was forced into doing this especially after conservative and centnst 
elements within the Parliament had tned and failed to have him and his reform team removed from 
office at the Sixth Congress of People s Deputies in April Nevertheless the uncertainty of the 
political situation made it difficult for the Yeltsin government to proceed with any coherent set of 
reforms that would satisfy the IMF
This put the IMF in a difficult position one that it has continued to endure time and time again 
Although the Yeltsin regime had not made good on earlier commitments there was the palpable threat 
that reforms might come to a halt without external support and financial assistance Also the Yeltsin 
Gaidar team had achieved some limited successes most notably price liberalization and the start of the 
privatization process 47 Given these factors combined with the geopolitical importance of Russia and 
pressure from several western countries the IMF decided in August 1992 to approve the first tranche 
credit to Russia of $1 billion Michel Camdessus IMF managing director termed the approval a 
damage control exercise aimed at helping the country avoid hyperinflation and sustain reforms 48 No
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extra conditions were attached to this credit line although Camdessus indicated that the next tranche 
would be based on stricter conditions and he encouraged a reduction of the budget deficit to five percent 
of the GDP and of the monthly inflation rate to a single digit by the end of the year Also he expressed 
the willingness of the IMF to be more flexible in judging Russian reform efforts 49 Thus the IMF 
decided that it was best to remain involved with the Russian government to ensure the sustenance of 
reforms and that it would a have future influence on the process
The institutional crisis intensified in 1993 amid questions over newly elected Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin s reform credentials 50 As the struggle between the President and Parliament heated up 
and rumors swept across Moscow Yeltsin was urging the West to respond with aid to ensure the 
survival of democracy and market reforms As he stated at a new conference with French president 
Francois Mitterrand there is a very very serious threat hanging over democracy and reforms I 
believe the western world and western countries did not understand the reality of revanchism We 
cannot wait for Tokyo in June or July It may prove too late 51
The West seemed to heed this warning There were growing signals that the western countries wanted 
to change their aid strategy toward Russia from one based on IMF conditionality to one that would be 
directed through the G 7 countries themselves and based on promoting reforms 57 Aid was to be viewed 
as a precondition for helping Russia achieve certain objectives not as a reward Before his meeting 
with the Russian president in Vancouver in April President Clinton called on the IMF to be more 
flexible in assessing Russia s program of economic reforms 51
It is likely the case that the G 7 and the IMF learned from the previous year that placing strict 
external conditions on western aid to Russia held little promise of bringing the desired results as long 
as the political and institutional crisis continued in that country Moreover demanding an austere 
budget and a low inflation rate before doling out aid would certainly lead to increased unemployment 
and a lower standard of living which could activate social tension and unrest The G 7 generally cited 
IMF conditionality in early 1992 as one of the causes for the rather drastic economic downturn which 
resulted in a slowdown of the reform process
Although the IMF was not about to abandon conditional aid altogether it did set up a new temporary 
facility for providing aid with weaker provisions attached As Camdessus conveyed the old strategy 
that the IMF had worked out with Gaidar at the time of the Munich summit in 1992 was to put on 
hold because of the institutional crisis and the consequent difficulties the Russian Government has had 
implementing such a strategy 54 The new tool that the IMF set up in April 1993 the Systemic 
Transformation Facility (STF) was designed to be a precursor to the full fledged arrangements that 
the organization was trying to achieve 55 This new lending device was adopted especially for the 
Russian case although other countries that were experiencing abrupt negative changes in trade and 
payment arrangements could also take advantage of this facility
The IMF approved a $1 5 billion loan to Russian under the STF in July 1993 The program agreed 
upon called for a reduction of the inflation rate to the low single digit level by the end of the year 
tighter fiscal and monetary policies a budget deficit of 10 percent of the GDP and progress on 
privatization and legal reforms 56 As for the role of the state the IMF acknowledged that restructuring 
required a certain degree of state intervention but warned that it should be limited and targeted 57 Both 
subsidies and social policies should be targeted and not generalized 58
In terms of the political situation Yeltsin seem determined to make 1993 the year he would break 
the institutional logjam As he had done previously he sought a mandate directly from the people by 
convincing the Parliament to agree to an April referendum on economic reforms elections and his 
performance as president He then proceeded to make populist pledges to various segments of society to 
win support before the referendum 59 As a result of his actions combined with the loose credit policies 
that the Central Bank chairman Gerashchenko had been following under the authority of Parliament 
both the budget deficit and the inflation rate grew
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Following his declared victory in the April referendum Yeltsin took actions to usurp the power of 
what he termed the anti reform movement and thus consolidated his own power60 He interpreted the 
results of the referendum as a mandate to proceed with reforms and he immediately took action to 
accelerate the privatization process Meanwhile the Parliament challenged his privatization initiatives 
and voted to increase expenditures in the new budget This set the stage for the September showdown 
when after months of threats from both sides Yeltsin dissolved the Supreme Soviet and Congress of 
People s Deputies and called for parliamentary elections and the adoption of a new constitution in 
December 1993
Without the Parliament to impede his actions Yeltsin expediently pushed through measures to 
liberalize pnces and to unburden some of the strain put on the budget He decreed the liberalization of 
bread pnces increases in rents a higher bank interest rate and cuts in industrial credits as well as legal 
reforms to make Russia more attractive to foreign investors
Unfortunately reformers were unable to compromise with one another and to put together effective 
coalitions for the parliamentary elections Party fragmentation and factionalism have been defining 
factors in Russian politics since 1991 As Kullberg has stated parties have been reduced to the role of 
tools m the intense intra elite power struggle In this role parties become mere vehicles for 
participation in traditional Kremlin court politics rather than institutions which articulate and channel 
mass demands mobilize public support for particular policy agendas and translate electoral victory into 
substantive policy outcomes 61 The inability of reformers to unify coupled with the pain that the 
transformation process had already caused resulted in a strong nationalist and conservative showing in 
the election 62
These elections acted as a catalyst in bringing some degree of stability and normalcy to Russian 
politics The new Russian constitution adopted has created a stronger president and a somewhat more 
limited parliament made up of two chambers instead of one More importantly this document defined 
the division of powers with greater clarity than the increasingly confusing and ambiguous Soviet era 
constitution had done up until then Although the president was provided with increased powers 
Yeltsin found himself facing a newly elected State Duma that was made up of many victorious 
conservatives
Second Period of Economic Reforms 
Political Stability and a Gradual Approach
Following the December elections Yeltsin came to a crossroads in the economic reforms process He 
could either hand the process over to radical reformers as he had done in late 1991 in an attempt to 
speed up and intensify the transformation or he could seek compromise with the newly elected and 
largely conservative parliament In support of the former the Russian government had once again failed 
to deliver on pledges made to the IMF The inflation averaged around 20 percent a month in 1993 
about 12 percentage points higher than agreed upon for the end of the year 63 In addition the state 
continued to prop up unproductive enterprises and was making insufficient progress in other areas As a 
result the IMF was threatening to withhold further credits until a credible reform program was 
forwarded In support of the latter (compromise with the parliament) Yeltsin could no longer attack the 
members of parliament as relics of the old communist system that had been elected undemocratically A 
hostile stance toward the new parliament and an effort to push through radical economic measures were 
likely to succeed only m bringing about gridlock and political instability
Yeltsin interpreted the elections as a vote against radical reforms and for more stability As a 
consequence he decided to build his relationship with the parliament upon consensus and not conflict 
He reached out to Chernomyrdin whose political clout had nsen dramatically to act as a mediator 
among the many sides Furthermore Yeltsin accepted the resignations from radical reformers Gaidar and 
Fedorov from the cabinet and turned to Chernomyrdin to form a new cabinet This left members of the 
strong industrial and agrarian lobbies in charge of many key positions of leadership within the cabinet 
and within parliament 64
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It is not surprising that the IMF was concerned over what had transpired Analoln Chubais in charge 
of privatization was the only liberal deputy prime minister left in the cabinet
The events m January coupled with the increase m the inflation rate convinced the IMF to hesitate in 
doling out the second STF loan of $1 5 billion Amid rumors of a coup and questions over Yeltsin s 
health in March drawn out and difficult negotiations between the IMF and Russian government finally 
resulted in an agreement over a new program for 1994 with final approval coming in April The 
program for 1994 called for a further consolidation of structural reforms a reduction of the rate of 
inflation to seven percent by the end of the year through tighter monetary and fiscal controls a federal 
budget deficit goal of seven percent of the GDP for the year and the elimination of energy export 
quotas 65 The monetary policy included the shift from centralized credit distribution to one directed 
through commercial banks Structural reforms included an expansion in the number of state enterprises 
put on the block for privatization and additional legal and foreign trade reforms to attract western direct 
investment Finally the program stressed the need for the state to enforce hard budget constraints and to 
refrain from extending credits to help enterprises clear their inter enterprise debt66
The strategy the IMF once again followed was to base aid on promises and not necessarily on results 
Although the Russian government was able to cut the budget deficit and lower credit growth in 1993 
and begin again to curtail the inflation rate m 1994 they have continually been unable to meet 
program goals negotiated with the IMF The old Soviet saying we pretend to work and the state 
pretends to pay us could be reworked to fit IMF Russian relations we pretend to reform and the West 
pretends to lend us money 67 In fact bilateral aid from G 7 countries has been much more forthcoming 
than that of the IMF 68 However the limited aid that the IMF has allocated to Russia has acted as a 
catalyst for increased foreign investments and aid from other sources
The Russian government appeared to be working toward meeting the goals set out in the third 
program through May and June The inflation rate had fallen to around four percent by August 
However as the former prime minister Gaidar was eager to point out the government had been lax 
since April in issuing credits to heavy industry agriculture defense sector and to other sectors 69 A 
large percentage of these credits were doled out in July and August for the harvest and to prepare 
northern territories for the upcoming winter 70 Once again the state was also intervening in the 
economy to provide ailing enterprises with funds to muddle through the transformation period The 
effects of these lax policies began to influence the inflation rate in September as it nearly doubled from 
four percent to 7 8 percent At the same time the Russian government was rebuffed in its attempt to 
increase the credits that it had access to The Russian action drew the ire of both third world countries 
and the G 7 which indicated that Russia would have to make a greater commitment to radical reforms 
before such an extension could be made Clearly as the inflation rate continued to climb into the 
double digits toward the end of the year that commitment was questionable at best
Third Period of Economic Reforms Russia at a Crossroads
Inflation continued its upward trend until Black Tuesday m October 1994 when the ruble fell 27 
percent against the dollar in one day 71 This may turn out to be one of the major turning points for 
Russian economic reforms At this point the government had a choice of continuing its gradual 
approach which included generous subsidies across a wide range of sectoral lobbies or to break with 
the past and boldly set out to meet IMF conditions (meaning a more neoliberal approach) The former 
would of course threaten the loss of enormous amounts of much needed foreign aid The latter would 
likely lead to a confrontation with the parliament Parliament has the power to stop the reform effort 
in its tracks But it would then have responsibility for finding a more palatable or incremental 
alternative 72
Thus 1995 began with vital if not entirely new dilemmas facing both the Russian government and 
the IMF The 1995 budget put together at the end of the previous year and approved by the Russian 
Parliament in January 1995 appears to be a serious attempt to break with the gradual approach of the 
past The budget envisions an inflation rate of two percent by the end of the year Furthermore the
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budget deficit is to be reduced through increased revenues and a cut in subsidies and is to be financed in 
a non inflationary manner 71 Although these are positive actions there were many concerns that the 
IMF had in deciding whether to embark on one of the largest programs of its existence As one senior 
IMF otficnl remarked This is probably the biggest decision in the IMF s 50 year history 74 The 
program that was under consideration would funnel approximately $13 billion to Russia including a 
$6 billion currency stabilization fund Not only did this represent a sizable portion ot IMF reserves but 
Russian failure in enacting and reaching the goals set by this economic program could irreparably 
damage the credibility of this international organization One of the main concerns was the poor track 
record that the Russian government had in keeping its pledges especially in regards to the liberalization 
oí oil prices and on macroeconomic stabilization in general
Second the military actions that were started m Chechnya at the end of 1994 have threatened to undo 
any proposed tight budget plan Though consideration of political factors is supposedly not within the 
IMF s domain it is difficult if not impossible to completely separate the economic and political 
realms
Finally the IMF is not convinced that the Russian revenue figures are correct These figures assume 
that there will be a sizable amount of revenue raised from future privatizations and from an improved 
taxation system Moreover the Russian parliament has been attempting to adopt a much higher 
minimum wage that along with promises made to various lobbies have the potential of wrecking the 
budget
The IMF decided in the end that abandoning the Russians now could lead to a shift away from further 
marketization as reformers were warning75 Moreover the Russian government was already counting 
on western aid to help finance almost one third of the projected budget deficit Without such aid the 
deficit would have to be financed in other ways that would surely lead to a higher inflation rate Once 
again the IMF strategy was to lend to the Russia as a precondition to meet certain objectives instead 
as a reward The IMF is however dealing with the uncertainties mentioned above by taking a carrot 
and stick approach in doling out money The credits will be transferred in monthly tranches based on 
strict conditions Furthermore the final agreement was based on the adoption of several decrees 
including one aimed at placing any extra budgetary expenditure decisions under the president s domain 
and another at finally allowing oil prices to reach world levels 76
The program for 1995 lays out the following objectives 77 First it projects an inflation rate of one 
percent by the end of the year based on tight monetary and fiscal policies Second the budget deficit is 
to be nearly halved by December (to about four percent of the GDP) Third the export regime is to be 
liberalized including oil prices Fourth structural reforms are to continue with an acceleration of land 
reforms Finally a targeted social safety net is to be provided to help the most vulnerable and needy 
without exceeding fiscal targets
Scenarios
With parliamentary elections on the horizon what type of economic program will the Russians 
follow7 The first scenario is a relatively strict neoliberal approach adhering closely to the program 
that was negotiated with the IMF Since financial stabilization is seen as the foundation to future 
economic growth the government maintains a tight monetary and fiscal policy bringing inflation 
down to one to two percent by the December elections Privatization continues and the state ceases to 
keep enterprises afloat through subsidies Enterprises must seek credit through commercial banks in 
order to deal with debt This enforcement of hard budget constraints forces enterprises to restructure to 
survive and thus leads to increased unemployment and a further drop in industrial output for 1995 78 A 
targeted social safety net is provided for those most vulnerable to reforms and for those who are 
unemployed
However the social costs from such an approach result in a growing resentment among the losers 
from the process against reformers and others in government who have promoted these policies Since
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the social safety net was designed primarily to target the poor and most vulnerable (groups that are 
typically not that politically active) those segments of society that might not be considered poor but 
have nonetheless suffered greatly from reforms voice their discontent in parliamentary elections by 
electing individuals and parties promising a more gradual and state protected approach that is not 
dictated by the W est79 An even more conservative parliament leads to a shift in economic policy and 
growing conflict with reformers
The second scenario is a gradual state interventionist approach After attempting to meet IMF 
conditions during the early part of the year the government yields to demands from the industrial and 
agrarian lobbies for more credits The IMF refuses to release the remaining portion of the loans that it 
had approved in April The reformers m the government lose credibility and the political clout to keep 
some semblance of the original economic program agreed upon for the year The budget deficit and 
inflation rate quickly reach double digits as loss making enterprises are propped up by the state under 
soft budget constraints Industrial output drops but not as drastically as was projected under the 
original program Unemployment levels increase slightly The economy is literally frozen in 
transition The restructuring that is desperately needed in industry proceeds at a snails pace and recovery 
seems to be a long way off
Of course the actual path of reforms is likely to be somewhere in between these two extreme 
scenarios The parliamentary elections in December will surely lead to some populist measures or 
promises thereof We saw this before the referendum and parliamentary elections that took place in 
1993 One factor that might make a difference this time is the ideological orientation of both the 
population and elites toward economic reforms Has this orientation evolved since the initiation of 
reforms in 19927 One might argue that the collapse of the ruble in October 1994 is one event that had 
a significant effect on elite perceptions concerning at least monetary policies Kahler claims that a 
certain degree of social learning is required by elites interest groups the public and other groups m 
society in order for the consolidation of reforms to be successful 80 If Russia continues on its road to 
institutionalized democracy leaders and all cross sections of society will have to reach some type of 
consensus
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to identify the economic model of reform that has been 
formulated or has developed as a consequence of internal and external pressures m Russia As is evident 
from what has been discussed above the Russian experience does not fall neatly into any of the 
categories outlined m the theoretical part of this paper Since economic reforms were initiated in early 
1992 three rather distinct periods can be identified The first period January 1992 to December 1993 
was marked by institutional anarchy The Gaidar Yeltsin were implementing orthodox measures while 
the old Parliament and Central Bank were enacting heterodox state interventionist policies This crisis 
of authority meant that no coherent economic policy could be formulated
The second period January 1994 to October 1994 marked a shift toward a slightly greater consensus 
among political actors The parliamentary elections and adoption of a new constitution in late 1993 
both contributed to this new situation Yeltsin sought better relations and compromise with the 
Parliament and Central Bank The policies during this period could be defined as state interventionist 
Monetary and fiscal policies were relaxed toward the end of the year and financial stabilization became 
less of a priority taking a back seat to the goal of stabilizing industrial output
The third period October 1994 to present has been defined by what seems to be another shift in 
direction and power back to the center Financial stabilization has once again become one of the top 
priorities as the Russian government has just negotiated another program with the IMF This program 
is much larger than previous ones and sets some stringent conditions
The internal impediments of economic reforms have remained similar throughout all three of these 
periods Lobbies for heavy industry the agriculture and defense sectors have persistently pressured the
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Russian government to provide them with low interest credits and subsidies However this aid has not 
been use to effectively restructure these sectors of the economy as much as to encourage stagnation and 
the status quo The government has not used its resources to invest strategically in those areas of the 
economy such as technology that are or have the potential to be the main agents of economic growth 
in the future Resources have instead been allocated and distributed much more broadly
As for the external prescriptions of the IMF they started out rather stringent but were loosened as the 
organization realized that the political circumstances in Russia prevented any serious attempt to fulfill 
these strict conditions The IMF has continually been faced with a dilemma in dealing with Russia If 
it prescribes too strong of a medicine the political side effects could lead to rejection of reforms 
altogether On the other hand if it weakens the medicine the patient is likely to take a much longer 
period of time to recover and the IMF s credibility could be ruined However given the geopolitical 
importance of Russia and pressure from G 7 countries (especially the US) the IMF seems to have 
taken the second path although it is still acting cautiously in doling out credits in an incremental 
fashion In the end it is difficult to effectively measure the influence that IMF conditionality has had 
on the progression of Russian economic reforms Nonetheless one cannot rule out any influence at all 
based soled on the fact that Russia has yet to have fulfilled any of the programs it has so far negotiated 
with the IMF Influence cannot be measured by simply looking at quantitative outcomes 81
Finally what conclusions can be drawn concerning the two components of economic reforms that are 
used to form the theoretical framework tor this paper First concerning the form of economic policy 
formulation power relations need to be defined to put an end to the institutional crisis that was 
pervasive throughout the early period of reforms in Russia Only after a new constitution was adopted 
and a parliament was democratically elected was political stability within reach and consensus a realistic 
option Before this point economic policy formulation could only be defined as authoritarian albeit by 
several separate political actors Thus it seems that a more consensual form of decision making has 
become a necessary but not sufficient factor for the sustenance and consolidation of reforms Michel 
Camdessus from the IMF has commented that If we have learned something about the failure of the 
reform effort so far in Russia we see the fact that basic minimal consensus was never achieved within 
the Government and between the Government and the Parliament 89
Second the role of the state m this process has been linked to the political situation described above 
During the period of institutional crisis the state was used to promote both neoliberal and state 
interventionist policies simultaneously In certain areas (e g privatization and price liberalization) the 
state has accomplished much in a short period of time However in other areas (e g land reforms 
enterprise restructuring financial stabilization) change has been slower Overall the state has taken a 
more gradual interventionist approach to economic reform although the new budget and IMF program 
in 1995 hold promise that there may soon be a shift in economic policy The state has not invested 
heavily in spheres of the economy that are competitive or promise to be so in the near future Instead 
credits have flowed more toward propping up stagnate state or newly privatized enterprises to both 
placate vested interests and sidestep the negative social costs (e g unemployment) connected with the 
restructuring of large and medium enterprises The state has also been slow to provide a targeted social 
safety net opting instead for broader measures that threaten financial stability It may be the case that 
the immense new IMF aid package coupled with a certain degree of social learning on the part of elites 
interest groups and society in general could lead to a extraordinary shift toward the consolidation of a 
more neoliberal approach to economic reforms
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Appendix
TABLE 1 Russia/IMF Program Agreements and Actual Outcomes Figures tor the Monthly Inflation Rate and 
Annual Budget Deficit 1992-1995
1992 1993 1994 1995
Monthly Inflation Rate3
Agreed 9 0 8 0 1 0 1 0
Actual 25 0 13 0 16 4 6 0b
Annual Budget Deficit
Agreed 5 0 10 0 7 0 5 0
Actual 17 5 10 0 1 1 0 10 0b
a This is the monthly inflation rate tor the end of each year 
b This Figure is an estimate
Sources From the Executive Board IMF Survey 17 August 1992 12 July 1993 2 May 1994 
Russia s Transformation at a Turning Point IMF Survey 17 April 1995 114-16 Economist Intelligence 
Unit 29 June 1994 23 March 1995 Russian Economic Monitor PlanEcon Report 11 nos 7-8 (7 April 
1995)
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FIGURE 1 The January 1992 to May 1995 Monthly Inflation Rate Note that the inflation rate tor January 
1992 was 245 percent The figures tor April and June 1995 are estimates Source Russian Economic 
Monitor PlanEcon Report 11 nos 7-8 (7 April 1995) 12
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Chapter 8
They Might Be Giants 
The U S Film Majors in the Global Market
Brian Michael Goss
When one talks of cinema one talks o f American cinema The influence o f cinema is the 
influence o f American cinema which is the most aggressive and widespread aspect of 
American culture throughout the world For this reason every discussion o f cinema made 
outside the Holly wood must begin with Hollywood
—Glauber Rocha1
People always come here (to Cuba) and start asking about freedom of expression and human 
rights and censorship— Can you make films freely 9 I never hear that when people go to the 
United States or France or England that when the\ arrive the\ start asking about the 
situation in terms o f freedom of expression and human rights I would like to see the defense 
of the transnationals for their destruction of national film cultures which is against human 
rights and freedom o f expression
—Julio Garcia Espinosa2
Introduction
An April 1995 issue of Variety The International Trade Weekly of the film industry reports the 
following figures in its International Box Office section on page 12 The Brady Bunch Movie was 
Australia s highest grossing film in its first week of release reaping $640 million while exhibited on 
114 screens throughout the country The Bradys narrowly outdistanced Dumb and Dumber which 
grossed $628 million in Australia during the same period Dumb and Dumber fared better in the United 
Kingdom grossing $3 841 million to top any film in the U K market The appeal of Dumb and 
Dumber was not however limited to the English speaking world that requires no subtitles to follow 
its sublime discourse In Portuguese speaking Brazil and in Germany Dumb and Dumber also emerged 
as each nation s top grossing film of the previous week in the latter country the film prevailed 
narrowly over Outbreak a Dustin Hoffman vehicle Swedish audiences preferred Outbreak over all 
other cinematic offerings while Japanese audiences lifted the week s box office champion Forrest 
Gump to a four week gross of $20 037 million Canadians joined U S audiences in anointing Bad 
Boys as its box office savior for the week Taken together the figures present a familiar portrait of the 
international film industry as in most weeks in most years the U S film industry s primacy in the 
industrial and western nations is clearly evident
Alongside the smashing success of U S films the previous page of the same issue of Variety notes 
that Sony New York Classics New York re launch of the 40 year old Pather Panchali on a single 
screen scored with close to a $16 000 weekend 3 Awarded Best Human Document at the Cannes 
Festival in 1956 Pather Panchali launched Bengali Satyajit Ray s career as one of the century s 
leading directors 4 It hardly appears fair to compare the market fortunes of Dumb and Dumber a major 
release on its first international run with a re release of a 40 year old neo realist film entirely set in a 
Bengali village However the contrast between Dumb and Dumber and Pather Panchali goes deeper 
than the former s status as popular culture and the latter s comparatively elevated position as an art 
film The relative fortunes of the two films may function as a synecdoche for the economic base of the 
international industry and the United State s place within it A question thus emerges what features of 
the internationalized economic base relegate Pather Panchali to a single screen in a New York art 
theater while Dumb and Dumber commands 368 screens throughout Germany9 The question may be
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construed as a starting point in examining how the U S film industry has achieved its penetration of 
international film markets in the context of the emerging global economy 5
The present investigation stakes out an unusual position within the ongoing debates within 
communications scholarship In March 1995 a leading journal Critical Studies in Mass 
Communications provided a print forum tor a debate between U K political economist Nicholas 
Garnham and U S cultural studies theorist Lawrence Grossberg 6 Garnham s call for a reconciliation 
between communications scholars oriented toward political economy and those oriented toward cultural 
studies was firmly rejected by Grossberg Indeed Grossberg denied that there was ever any wedding of 
the two that now required reconciliation while arguing that Garnham s proposal clearly privileged 
political economy as basic and prior to culture In focusing on both film as an industry and as a 
cultural expenence this investigation undertakes a project for which many scholars within the field do 
not diagnose a need Nonetheless the tension between film as a commodity in international circulation 
and the local cultures that it may efface forms the seam in which this paper inserts itself in theorizing 
the impact of global liberalization
Conflicts have arisen over the commanding position of the U S film industry as evidenced by the 
controversy surrounding the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during 
the autumn and winter of 1993 In this international arena French led Europe (at least temporarily) 
thwarted U S designs on prying open the European market still further for U S corporations The 
French were at once willing to yield to other trade demands (e g concerning agricultural subsidy) but 
were adamant about dampening further liberalization of audiovisual materials For the Europeans the 
stakes were high as Francois Mitterand testified A society which abandons the means of depicting 
itself in this case to the comparative advantage of the United States second leading export industry 
would soon be an enslaved society 7 In a similar vein European Community trade official Lord Leon 
Brittan commented The United States already has 80 percent of the European movie market and that 
market is growing This is not an American industry fighting for survival The European Community 
wants to have its own culture and that seems to me to be reasonable 8 The conflicts over audiovisual 
materials during GATT negotiations brings forth a central problematic of this investigation In 
particular film is at once a form of commerce and a site of free speech and cultural expression In the 
course of this investigation I will therefore attempt to inscribe an appreciation for the revelations of 
cultural studies into a study that otherwise places accent on the political economy of the film industry
The body of the paper beginning by mapping the theoretical positions that have been taken in the 
base/superstructure debate and locate the international film industry within them Next I present a brief 
over view of the historical development of the U S film industry and its leading place in the west 
whereas section IV characterizes the EC film industry followed by an examination of how the EC s 
attempts to preserve its own culture by stanching complete market liberalization I will then briefly 
survey the Indian film industry devoting attention to the federal government s measures to and enhance 
its film industry via protectionism and state subsidy Together these sections support my argument 
that the international film industry is one site at which the present trend toward global liberalization 
may destroy more than it creates where subject cultures are concerned unless global trends are arrested
Film as Industry/Film as Culture
In fashioning an adequate theoretical scaffolding for approaching the international film industry it is 
necessary to sketch out the theoretical approaches to the relation between the economic base and the 
superstructure The base refers to the means of production (l e ownership of industry and financial 
instruments) from which commodities are produced Superstructure encompasses the distribution of 
commodities the political and legal regimes which are intertwined with the economic base and the 
culture and ideological forms associated with a particular configuration of the base While theorists in 
the marxist tradition have posited that there is a relationship between the economic base and the 
superstructure the debate over the character of this relationship has produced neither consensus nor 
predictable consequences In the section of the paper which follows I will first sketch different 
positions in the debate assumed by the Frankfurt School Louis Althusser and Raymond Williams I
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then locate the present investigation within the ongoing debates theorizing what is at stake in 
regarding film s two edged position as a commodity and as an aspect of culture
The Base Superstructure Metaphor
Positioned at one pole in base/superstructure debates are structuralists who have traditionally advanced 
materialist critiques of capitalism In these critiques the economic base is privileged as a primordial 
condition from which superstructure follows At the other pole are post structuralists who dissolve the 
assumed necessary and deterministic connections between base and superstructure In the structuralist 
camp one finds the Frankfurt School theorists whose wariness of commodified popular culture is 
inscribed with their confrontation with the Nazi horror Base oriented reductionists of this type assume 
that the culture generated by capitalism necessarily reproduces the ideologies that enable its 
continuation closing the ruptures in any ideological contradiction as quickly as they are opened to 
demonstrate the futility of confrontation with capitalist relations of production 9 Thus culture both 
mirrors the economic base and reproduces it in a straightforward manner
Theorists who follow in the tradition of Louis Althusser similarly privilege the economic base 
albeit with more nuances than more strongly structuralist Frankfort School 10 On the Althussenan 
view the relationship between base and superstructure is transparent in the case of feudal economic 
relations in which the feudal state is confiscatory with respect to its subjects The leading ideological 
state apparatus in this form of state is the church which lends justification to feudal relations of 
production by emphasizing preparation for the afterlife rather than advocating struggle m the present 
In the case of liberal capitalist states Althusser posits that they produce not one but many ideologies 
and their attendant Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) of which the school is taken as being the 
single most important Heros may even emerge in the liberal capitalist state (e g teachers who resist 
the ideologies of the ISAs in which they are contained) Althusser further contrasts with the Frankfurt 
School in arguing that liberal capitalism does not have a fixed and determined relationship to its 
superstructure Hence contradictions that are generally smoothed over by capitalist ideology may be 
unpacked and exploited for revolutionary purposes (e g Cuba in 1959) While Althusser collapses base 
and superstructure into a complex whole he nonetheless privileges the economic base as deterministic 
of superstructure in the final instance Thus Althusser both departs from and affirms structuralism 
departure is found in his rejection of dialectical materialism and an assumed primordial thesis that 
precedes antithesis Nonetheless Althusser preserves the leading role of the economic base in shaping 
the attendant ideologies that any configuration of the base (capitalist or socialist) necessarily facilitates
In the theorization of Raymond Williams 11 one detects a move away from the base/superstructure 
metaphor that is typical of the Birmingham (U K ) School of Cultural Studies with which Williams is 
associated For Williams marxists who insist on a strict dichotomy between base and superstructure 
have misread the more nuanced conception that Williams locates in Marx s texts On Williams 
reading Marx posited many superstructures not a monolithic and monovocal superstructure and also 
stopped far short of a deterministic link between them An example deployed by Williams will serve to 
illustrate the point that the production of piano within a capitalist factory is the work of the economic 
base is straightforward Furthermore the playing of a piano is clearly an activity that is in the domain 
of culture hence superstructural However Williams intervenes by arguing that Marx himself could 
not locate the distribution of the commodity as either being within either the base or the superstructure 
Williams further complexifies the base/superstructure discourse in positing that both are labile entities 
As both base and superstructure may change dramatically over time the relationship between them can 
vary considerably m strength and there may often be time lags between changes in the economic base 
(e g accelerated internationalization) and attendant shifts in the attendant superstructures (e g 
multiculturahst movements) Shifts are not only gradual but highly contested Consider for example 
the traditionalist outrage and even legal efforts to prosecute that are mobilized against new musical 
forms that rapidly gain an audience (e g rock and roll in the 1950s rap circa 1990) For Williams 
base and superstructure are difficult to tease apart since they permeate and condition each other in
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complex multifaceted ways Williams does not however place the same faith as Althusser does in 
assuming a deterministic role of the base in the final instance
While space does not permit a discussion of the rigorous post structuralist interrogations of the 
base/superstructure metaphor 17 the value of the metaphor should be clear in the context of this 
investigation Film provides a unique site from which to examine the connections between culture as 
an internationalized industry and as a leading dimension of culture since the relations between base and 
superstructure emerge with unusual clarity in the case of international film While these relations may 
not be stitched together as seamlessly as the Frankfort School suggests the global circulation of U S 
film and audiovisual materials places the U S in a commanding position where disseminating visions 
of its preferred liberal escapist and consumenst values are concerned While a toy soldier that is 
produced in South Korea can be assumed to produce little or no need for cultural negotiation to the 
U S child who may play with it the same can not be said so readily for the bigger than life 
narratives encased in a Film
During the 1993 GATT negotiations the EC moved vigorously against further liberalization of the 
film industry The EC may have been partially motivated by the transparency of the connection 
between the base and superstructure in the case of the film industry where economic domination 
translates into cultural effacement When one finds EC film screens predominantly filled with U S 
films then the reflection of the deficiencies in the EC industries economic base are readily apparent 
and may be read directly off of cultural offerings A nation s weakness m the film industry is both 
obvious to a national audience and also comes with cultural consequences attached Nonetheless when 
one discusses culture and identity it is important to avoid couching arguments in essential ist terms I 
now turn to this discussion in further detail below
Film and National Identity
Theories of identity and culture intersect with this investigation in the following manner I do not 
defend protectionist measures by national film industries by insisting that there is an essential and 
primordial Frenchness that is under assault France is itself constituted by numerous identities and 
subjectivities (e g France is marked by class gender and ethnicity) as La Pen an ugly nativist 
movement makes painfully apparent Moreover French films may in certain respects speak to 
audiences throughout the globe Thus I consider exchanges between cultures to be worthwhile— 
provided they occur as equitably and as free of exploitation as is possible Mutually beneficial terms of 
exchange permit self consciously national cinemas in other nations to flourish The condition of 
mutual benefit stands in stark contrast with the present situation in which national cinemas are 
overwhelmed by the highly commercialized U S industry Protectionism and state support of national 
film industries may actually assure cultural diversity such that many cultures may penetrate each other 
rather than being largely effaced as a consequence of permitting anything goes market liberal doctrines 
to run their course
What imperialism once accomplished with force can now be accomplished through market 
liberalization m which comparative advantage in cultural industries may constrain traditional national 
cultures Even crude imperialists made substantial efforts to sculpt the cultural and ideological 
landscape to their specifications (e g by infusing school curricula with versions of the past that 
aggrandize the conquerors) Third world nationalist Frantz Fanon notes that in the Philippines 
Accounts of the years of fierce people s resistance accounts of the atrocities perpetrated by the 
Americans were suppressed Instead the leaders of this resistance were branded as bandits while the early 
collaborators were presented to the people as leaders and heroes Thus succeeding generations forgot 
their people s record of resistance n Given films capacity to be a form of school room for the 
nation it is not surprising that Fidel Castro s regime established a film institute within three months 
of overthrowing the U S sponsored Bautista dictatorship in 1959 14
Theorizing national identity through cinema is crucial for the same reasons that dismantling a 
nation s history is a form of violence cinema can record articulate contest and recirculate versions of
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and tropes about national dilemmas in ways that imported films can not Who for example is better 
positioned to theorize the Cuban Revolution than Cubans themselves as director Sara Gomez does in 
her stunning film One Way or Another (1974) a complex moving and Brechtian presentation of 
attitudes toward the revolution in post revolutionary Cuba715 A him such as Gomez s has the quality 
of being a ground level look at how Cubans negotiated the new privileges and responsibilities of 
socialism from the perspective of a him maker immersed in that same structure of feeling and sensitive 
to the population s nuances and gestures In this vein a Brazilian theorist observes that a nation s 
relationship with its one of its own films is incomparably more lively than with the corresponding 
foreign product a relationship which promotes an intimate relationship of creative participation 16
Similarly Graeme Turner argues that films textuahze along an ideological axis that encapsulates the 
fears anxieties and contradictions of particular cultures at a given time 17 While some films speak 
fluently to audiences across national borders the specificity of a films capacity to hail its subjects 
pivots on being directed to an audience that is immersed in a similar structure of feeling As Turner 
observes in his theorization of the Weimer era Metropolis (Director) Fritz Lang was not the author 
of the discourses of Metropolis his culture was 18 It is this negotiation of cultural meanings for a 
national audience that is undermined by the uninhibited international circulation of U S films that is 
demanded by slavish allegiance to liberalization doctrines Moreover the U S film industry does not 
view its role as being the carrier of value free commodities In the post WWII period for example the 
U S industry regarded itself as the flag bearer of the American way of life abroad including the 
values of market liberalization that permitted the pro U S message to be widely distributed 19
Clearly there is much to be gained in the international circulation of film when it is achieved on 
equitable terms However on the terms dictated by self serving U S film majors subject cultures may 
be at least partially obliterated by liberalization doctrines 20 It is on the basis of these theoretical 
commitments that I oppose liberalization doctrines and in the case of the film industry advocate state 
intervention to protect markets I now turn to characterizing the U S film industry to demonstrate how 
far removed market conditions are from those which would facilitate fair and equitable exchange 
between the U S and its trade partners
The U S Film Industry
The film industry has moved along an unpredictable trajectory since the invention of the cinematograph 
by Louis Lumiere in 1895 The forerunner of cinema internationalized rapidly and by the turn of the 
twentieth century the cinematograph had reached Bombay Shanghai Cairo Alexandria Tokyo New 
York London Manila and Dakar 1 A century later at the cusp of the year 2000 US major studios 
have long dominated the world s film industry Table 1 documents the U S majors dominant position 
in capturing its own indigenous film audience During the period from 1986 to 1988 the majors 
collectively claimed 77 9 to 93 4 percent of the U S audience The figures do not represent a mid 
1980s aberration as the top nine producers commanded similar market shares between 1970 and 1978
TABLE 1 U S Domestic Box Office Shares 1986-1988
Film Major
1988 
# films
1988 
% share
1987 
# films
1987 
% share
1986 
# films
1986 
% share
Buena Vista 18 19 4 15 14 0 12 10 1
Paramount 19 15 2 17 19 7 19 22 2
20th C Fox 14 11 6 15 08 7 21 08 1
Warner 31 1 1 2 21 12 5 21 01 0
MGM/UA 21 10 3 14 04 2 15 04 4
Universal 20 09 8 18 07 2 16 08 5
Orion 20 06 6 15 10 5 14 07 0
Tn Star 17 05 8 17 06 2 18 07 1
Columbia 19 03 5 12 04 5 17 09 5
TOTAL 179 93 4 144 87 5 153 77 9
Source N Gamham Capitalism and Communication (London Sage Publications 1990) p 207
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during which time their shires ranged from 77 9 to 95 3 percent of the audience 77 The magnitude of 
the majors dominance is startling given that they do not release the majority of films within the 
United States 71 Rather the majors parlay the advantages conferred by larger production budgets and 
higher advertising and promotional expenditure into market success
In the film industry capturing the U S audience represents more than protecting one s home market 
and more is at stake than pride Of any audience m the world the U S audience represents perhaps the 
most profitable to attract Thus success in capturing the U S audience endows U S majors with an 
enormous advantage in penetrating foreign markets In particular the cost of capital intensive films can 
be more easily amortized over the U S audience than over say Swiss film audiences Profit margins 
on subsequent international distribution then become greater as the cost of production may already have 
been absorbed leaving only costs of distribution 74
The U S industry emerged as global hegemon in the 1920s when the U S constituted 60 percent of 
the world s cinema audience while also claiming 75-80 percent of Europe s audience 75 The logic of 
international market penetration was clearly articulated in 1930 when audio was beginning to be 
introduced into theaters As noted at the time in Harvard Business Review In the motion picture 
industry perhaps more than m any other there is no factor so important as wide distribution Hence 
the natural tendency in the industry is to obtain world wide distribution for all pictures produced 76 
Given the histone importance of capturing the U S audience for the industry Garnham posits that 
even if a European firm purchased one of the majors it would still be compelled to largely orient itself 
to the U S market in order to be internationally competitive 27 Thus protectionism co production and 
cartels have been the typical prescnption for Europeans to maintain its film industries 78
Table 2 dramatizes the strength of the U S film industry and its saturation of EC film markets A 
typical case is Spain in 1984 where 70 percent of film revenue was collected on U S films while 21 
percent was generated by indigenous productions While France Portugal Spain and the U K export 
significant portions of their cinema beyond Europe this is partly facilitated by language and colonialist 
ties that these four nations have beyond Europe (ì e France with Francophone Africa Portugal with 
Angola Spain with Latin America and the U K with Australia New Zealand and the United States 79 
The U K  is the only European nation with anything more than sporadic penetration of the North 
American market as it exploits its linguistic and cultural commonalities with the U S and Canada 
Lionheart s distribution is specifically geared toward the U S market10 Nonetheless U K market 
penetration in the U S is slight despite the relatively favorable conditions for their English language 
offerings The degree of difficulty the EC has encountered in penetrating U S markets can be attributed 
to the ghettoization of most foreign films to the art theater circuit and the U S population s 
preference for its own brand of commercially oriented entertainment For Lange & Renauld^1 the EC s 
difficulties have less to do with legal protectionism any trace of which is hard to find than with 
structural considerations as suggested above
TABLE 2 Ratios of Market Share of Nationally Produced Films and U S Films in EC Nations
State
1984
Nation/U S 
Share o f Revenue
1985
Nation/U S 
Share o f Revenue
1986
Nation/U S 
Share o f Revenue
Belgium 2/40 1/61 1/42
Denmark 20/70 18/70 24/73
France 49/37 45/43 44/43
FRG 17/66 23/59 21/48
Greece 25/63 13/76 26/na
Italy 33/52 31/53 32/51
Netherlands 15/60 4/74 14/79
Portugal 1/48 2/48 1/56
Spain 21/70 16/53 14/60
Switzerland 2/58 5/61 4/62
UnitedKingdom 15/80 15/80 15/87
Source A Lange & J L Renaud The Future o f the European Audio Visual Industry (Manchester European 
Institute tor the Media 1990) p 85
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Political Economy ot U S Film Majors
U S film majors are also integrated within larger corporate empires that display striking degrees of 
vertical integration and synergy across divisions From early in its history the U S film industry 
presented a tendency toward conglomeration During the 1960s however the majors experienced 
financial crisis due to an over emphasis on expensive productions and erosion of its audience due to 
television In response to crises the majors began program production for the networks while further 
enhancing revenue by selling exhibition rights of films to the television industry MGM for example 
dealt CBS 51 films for $53 million in the autumn of 1966 32 The subsequent increase in value of the 
majors film libraries occasioned takeovers by larger multinational corporations (MNCs) eager to 
diversify their own portfolios and take advantage of the revenue boom occasioned by the majors newly 
fostered connections with television In one transaction of this type Gulf+Western purchased 
Paramount and added the studio to its Leisure Time Division Although this division also included 
Madison Square Garden racetracks book and music publishing leisure accounted for only 22 percent 
of G+W s revenue in 1978 thus providing a sense of the scale of Paramount s parent MNC 33 Since 
the 1960s the tendency for MNCs to configurate into larger more highly synergized corporations has 
intensified with the corresponding decline in anti trust enforcement34 Entry costs into the film market 
have also been raised by the precipitous increase m expenditure for advertisement in the film industry 
first evident in the mid 1970s 33
Despite the different patterns of ownership evident in the economic base cinema attendance remains 
the primary instrument of revenue collection for the majors Money from video and cable has enabled 
us to face up to inflation in the costs of production and to continue to make ambitious and expensive 
films notes the President of Paramount He nonetheless characterizes the film as the flagship around 
which its other associated markets revolve [T]he cinema remains the most important means of 
showing films the one in which we concentrate all our marketing investment because it determines 
the success of the other markets 36 Nonetheless the majors are also able to commit levels of 
investment into film accessories (e g novelizations The Making of books soundtracks tee shirts 
toys comic books etc ) that can not be matched by either third world or independent producers 37
The majors tendency to be absorbed into large MNCs is partially understandable given that film 
requires high levels of initial investment relative to the cost of the cinema ticket that consumers pay 
Moreover demand for particular films is highly elastic across seasons geographical regions and 
different films During the early 1970s for example MGM generated 40-50 percent of its revenues in 
the U S during Christmas Easter and the summer months while one third of its revenue was collected 
in nine urban markets 38 Moreover less than ten percent of films that are released will be hits while 
one third break even 39 Costs of production and distribution for the majority of films that are 
commercial failures are covered by the relatively infrequent hits As industry banker A H Howe 
observes No sane banker can make loans for the production of a picture where the sole source of 
payment is revenue from that picture given the risk associated with any one film 40 Nonetheless 
The whole history of the growth of the film industry in the United States has been marked by the 
various forms of support given by banks to the companies in Hollywood 41 The majors were able to 
generate this financial support in part by covering risks to the extent possible producing numerous 
films engaging in high degrees of promotion and synergizing with the film s related accessories all 
curb risk Thus the majors position m the industry presents clear structural advantages over the 
independent producers within the U S market as independents may not have more than revenue from 
that picture to attract initial investment
The Role of Distribution
As Armes notes Power in the film industry resides in the distribution company which as a 
purely financial organization can be located anywhere in the world it is an intermediary stage not 
bound geographically to either the studios where the films are distributed and produced or the cinemas 
where they are exhibited 49 With U S independents the majors control over the distribution apparatus 
presents clear advantages over the independents who often depend on distribution by a major While
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$100 million was invested to produce 300 U S independent Films in 1976 the independents secured 10 
to 15 percent of the box office revenue 41 By the mid 1980s 30 percent ot U S films were produced by 
majors while they also distributed 50 percent Distribution terms of independent films are highly 
favorable to the majors as fees typically skim at least 30 percent off the box office gross the 
arrangement effectively covers the distributor s risks while the film production company faces the 
rigors of market discipline and consumer preference Major distributors may even turn profits on films 
that lose money for the producers given the majors guaranteed percentage of the gross 44
In summary the U S majors present considerable advantages over the indigenous independent 
competitors These advantages are conferred by access to finance corporate synergies across divisions 
and control of the distribution apparatus After having secured the U S audience the majors are then in 
a commanding position to penetrate EC markets as discussed in further detail in the following section
The EC Film Industry
During the 1980s the European Community s audiovisual environment was impacted by both 
endogenous and exogenous pressures to liberalize Audiovisual industries in Europe had traditionally 
been operated on a public service model with considerable state support particularly for broadcast media 
such as the U K s highly regarded BBC (supported by fees rather than by advertising) Even through 
the mid 1980s state intervention in European audiovisual markets was significant Throughout the EC 
m 1985 film accounted for 14 percent of audiovisual revenues 45 far less than the 36 percent accounted 
for by telvsision fees 46 The United States by contrast had long committed itself to placing production 
of audiovisual materials into private hands While the FCC treated the airwaves as an ostensibly public 
entity to be allocated to public minded corporations that are subject to periodic relicensing the 
regulatory agency also privileged commercial interests and facilitated the formation of broadcast 
oligopolies 47
During the 1980s however liberalization reached the European continent European media giants 
(e g Germany s Bertelsmann) became major international Figures by commanding large 
internationalized and synergized corporations The liberalization evident in U S media industries 
required reciprocal moves on Europe s part to provide markets for U S corporations which were in the 
process of becoming larger and more tightly integrated as a consequence of liberalized anti trust 
enforcement Even Europeans generally oriented toward liberalization doctrines expressed concern for 
the future of European culture and its audiovisual industries in the face of U S competition 48 
Technological developments during the 1980s also irrevocably altered the media landscape and included 
satellite and fiber optic transmission alongside the market penetration of cable subscription and VCRs 
Between liberalization and new technologies Lange & Renuad posit that the situation may be fatal to 
European cinema 49 Specifically [t]he trend towards the creation of competition privatization and the 
introduction of the commercial spirit into the public service will certainly have a profound effect not 
only on the way in which the audiovisual system works but also on its place in society as a whole 
We are witnessing the commercialization of the public sector private law is tending to take the place 
of public law contracts are replacing legislation and the viewer as consumer is replacing the viewer as 
citizen 50
In the effort to compete with the U S and treat cinema as another mass produced commodity the EC 
has marked disadvantages at the outset Despite a heritage of celebrated film auteurs the EC market is 
culturally and linguistically fragmented with at least 21 official languages spoken and English the most 
widely understood 51 Heterogeneity occasions both artistic complications (e g devising script getting 
cast to speak same language) and further costs for dubbing and subtitling Furthermore U S audiences 
tend to be radically intolerant of subtitles and dubbing which dampen possibilities of EC market 
penetration into the United States A further disadvantage for EC film may be its failure to stream 
line where intellectualism is concerned European films have traditionally placed more emphasis on 
modest budgets and autuership and have been less oriented toward mass spectacle directed toward the 
largest possible audience (and perhaps toward the lowest common denominator) The European 
industries have also traditionally garnered less financial resources from banks than their U S
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TABLE 3 Cinema Tickets Sold by Nation 1980 1986 (in millions)
State 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Austria 17 7 na 18 1 17 9 16 1 17 0 17 7
Belgium 21 6 20 1 19 7 21 4 19 0 17 9 17 7
Cyprus na na na na na 0 2 na
Denmark 15 7 16 2 14 3 13 7 12 2 11 2 1 1 3
Finland 9 1 na 9 0 9 0 7 6 6 7 6 3
France 174 8 189 0 201 9 198 8 190 8 172 2 163 4
FRG 144 0 141 3 125 0 112 4 112 1 104 2 105 2
Greece 42 9 40 5 35 3 35 0 22 0 23 0 22 0
Ireland na na na na 14 0 1 1 6 1 1 0
Iceland na na na 2 0 na 1 4 1 2
Italy 241 0 215 0 195 0 162 0 131 6 123 0 124 8
Luxembourg na na na 1 0 0 6 na 0 7
Netherlands 28 0 26 7 22 0 21 6 17 4 15 3 14 9
Nor 17 5 na na 14 8 12 8 na 11 1
Portugal 30 7 30 5 27 3 24 3 18 8 18 9 18 5
Spain 176 0 173 0 156 0 141 0 1 18 6 101 0 87 0
Sweden 24 0 22 1 na 18 8 17 2 14 0 14 7
Switzerland 20 9 20 4 20 1 19 7 17 9 16 4 16 3
United Kingdom 101 0 86 0 64 0 65 7 58 6 70 2 72 6
United States 1021 na 1 170 1173 1 199 1060 1017
EC Total (estimates) 994 0 953 0 876 0 811 0 715 5 675 5 649 6
Source A Lange & J L Renaud The Future o f the European Audio Visual Industn (Manchester European 
Institute for the Media 1990) p 84
counterparts as the European industry has not covered its risks as well as U S monopolist 
capitalism 52 Other modes of amortizing film costs by exhibition outside of cinemas are also more 
limited within the EC for example cable accounted for only 2 5 percent of EC audiovisual revenue m 
1985 51
The U S has witnessed shameless cheerleading for its own media and the love directed toward it by 
Europeans 54 Despite the spasms of self congratulation within the U S European cinema audiences 
declined by 35 percent from 1980 to 1986 while the size of the U S audience was stable during the 
same period 55 Table 3 documents the decline in European cinema attendance which is particularly 
marked in Italy Spain and the Netherlands but which is consistent across the EC The cause of the 
precipitous and rapid decline in European cinema appears to be overdetermined by multiple causes 
Julio Garcia Espinosa a Cuban film theorist and founder of Instituto Cuban del Arte e Industria 
Cinematografíeos provides the first clue about what features of U S film may turn away the EC film 
audience Scorning Hollywood s lack of diversity and frightening uniformity Espinosa posits that 
They keep giving us the same adventure movie the same melodrama the same action picture they re 
just made better with budgets and technology like never before 56 ^
Second alongside the flood of Hollywood films many of which are of dubious cultural value 
Europeans have also witnessed a precipitous decline in the number of EC films made during the 1980s 
Table 4 presents a detailed comparison of EC and U S film production from 1970 to 1987 Notice that 
while the EC produced 823 films in 1970 the figure declined to 423 by 1987 Between 1980 and 1986 
the EC produced 24 percent fewer films while U S production increased 60 percent by 1986 the U S 
outproduced all EC film industries combined Thus there is a co occurrence of international 
liberalization increased U S production and declines in both EC film production and viewership The 
rise of European cable broadcast increased ticket prices aged exhibition houses and the perception of 
diminished EC film quality also appear to have played a part in the declining size of cinema 
audiences t'7
Prospects for the Future
The European film industry is in an unenviable position where maintaining itself as an industry and 
cultural resource is concerned Lange & Renauld indicate the industries death knell may be
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TABLE 4 Production of Feature Films 1970-1986
State 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987
Austria 7 6 7 1 1 na
Belgium 4 9 6 7 12
Cyprus 0 0 0 1 na
Denmark 20 19 13 12 na
Finland na na na 15 na
France 1 10 138 189 151 133
FRG 113 73 43 65 *70
Greece 88 38 25 38 18
Ireland 5 2 0 2 na
Iceland na na na na na
Italy 235 198 163 89 116
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 4 16 7 16 na
Nor 1 1 12 10 10 na
Portugal 8 16 1 1 9 na
Spain 105 98 1 14 75 70
Sweden 22 23 22 12 24
Switzerland 5 30 na 15 na
United Kingdom 86 69 29 58 51
United States 443 425 321 330 578
EC Total 823 747 645 666 494
Source A Lange & J L Renaud The Future of the European Audio Visual Industry (Manchester European 
Institute for the Media 1990) p 86
imminent while the EC has formulated several strategies with which to confront the crisis of its film 
industry Echoing the sentiments of the president of Paramount the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe recommended that cinema be the privileged venue for exhibiting films as cinemas 
alone are capable of exhibiting films to the best advantage 58 Videocassette is characterized as next 
most desirable mode of exhibition with television regarded as the least desirable Following the film- 
video-television hierarchy the ministers recommended that film should not be exhibited on EC 
television between Friday and Sunday evenings The restriction was designed in order to relieve cinemas 
of competition during their biggest drawing period As if to illustrate the difficulties of cooperation 
across large numbers of states EC members Germany Denmark and U K objected to the restrictions 
on television movies
Another strategy implemented by Daniel Toscan du Planner at Gaumant has been to coopt some 
features of the U S model (big budget mass appeal films synergized markets) while also maintaining a 
stable of autuer oriented films While Planner s strategy was only partially successful it did succeed in 
spawning imitation within Europe 59 Co production between EC nations has also been pursued 
although obstacles are evident in for example facilitating cooperation among banks producers 
distributors and in standardizing accounting practices Whereas the United States FCC has centralized 
authority and has long been sympathetic to promoting the interests of business there is no equivalent 
agency in the EC 60 Thus attempts among Europeans to cartelize have yet to blunt penetration by the 
U S industry 61 Conversely the U K film industry has pursued a strategy of co production with the 
United States most vigorously 62 During the 1980s the children of cross Atlantic corporate marriages 
included Ghandi (a Goldcrest-Columbia co production directed by Richard Attenborough) and The 
Killing Field (Goldcrest-Wamer directed by Roland Joffee) However the commercial failure of a 
Hugh Hudson project Revolution dampened enthusiasm for co productions a problem exacerbated by 
changes in U K tax laws that were unfavorable to foreign actors 61 While co productions have tended 
toward being big budget extravaganzas some medium budget films have done well in the United States 
(e g Room with a View M\ Beautiful Laundrette )64
Similarly EC attempts to revitalize the film industry by producing films for television have yielded 
mixed results German directors have balked at having their work sanitized for the medium of television 
while directors throughout the EC object to the artistic license which is taken by television when
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exhibiting their films 6S On the other hand the United Kingdom s commercial station Channel 4 has 
facilitated the rise ol a new wave of directors Aside trom Luxembourg and to some extent Germany 
the EC film industries investment in television remains modest Given the difficulties that have been 
encountered by the EC film industries conferences and festivals (e g Cannes) become important fora 
m which Europeans can built support for their work Nonetheless conferences and festivals present no 
panacea for the Europeans in competition with the U S film behemoth Despite the U S film 
industry s striking advantages and its successes in penetrating EC markets the industry has maintained 
a combative bare knuckles stance toward pursuing full market liberalization as discussed below
U S Responses to EC Moves for Self Preservation
Guback discusses the EC s Television Directive ( TV Without Frontiers ) that was issued October 3 
1989 and the hysterical response it engendered in some quarters 66 An EC consultant and U S 
academic Guback notes that TV Without Frontiers presents guidelines for European television that 
are mainly concerned with proposing strategies by which to deploy the EC s considerable artistic 
talents m the liberalized market environment The report is itself highly liberalized in its vision of 
trade although still short of U S demands of complete command of EC television While the directive 
advises stations to broadcast programming the majority of which is EC produced guidelines are waved 
for new stations which may benefit initially from cheap U S imports Moreover the directive s call 
for a majority of EC produced programming on television actually sanctions a steep increase in U S 
market penetration of EC television over the 1988 levels That is the United States commanded 32 
percent of EC screen time in 1988 and could thus increase its market penetration up to 49 9 percent and 
remain within the TV Without Frontiers guidelines Screams of Fortress Europe over the directive 
were nonetheless heard in Congress where one representative fashioned embarrassingly crude 
diatribes against Europeans in response to their alleged shot across the bow of U S exporters 67 Jack 
Valenti of the Motion Export Association of America (MPEAA) was predictably quick to rush to the 
scene and denounce insidious EC protectionism while bluntly characterizing audiovisual materials as 
a commodity not culture When the director of this U S export agency views the wares he peddles as a 
mere product that fills screen time EC resistance to complete market penetration becomes very 
understandable As noted by Guback other figures in the U S audiovisual industries were able to 
recognize the liberality of TV Without Frontiers
U S (television) programs lead the world by far m their transportability and even manage to 
dominate schedules in numerous countries as Jacka & Cunningham have observed 68 It should be 
noted nonetheless that U S programs are rarely the most popular programs where viewers have a 
reasonable menu of locally produced material from which to choose as local production is laden with 
the idioms accents and concerns with which its audience is most familiar U S style programming 
has however achieved considerable international penetration via the U S inspired formats that are 
cheaply produced 69
Conflicts Surrounding GATT
After the 1989 Television Directive the EC continued its attempts to save its industry from 
complete subjugation most notably during the final phases of the Uruguay Round of GATT in 1993 
I think we have a bit of a crises on our hands EC trade official Sir Leon Brittan remarked in 
December as the deadline drew near for President Clinton to submit the GATT agreement to Congress 
as unamended fast track legislation The crises referred to by Bnttan concerned European insistence that 
a cultural exemption be granted for the audiovisual industries in a GATT agreement that otherwise 
liberalized trade in industries previously undisturbed by the supranational agreement (e g 
agriculture)70 As the calendar wound down on GATT negotiations France Europe s leading film 
industry was confronted with theaters in which nearly 60 percent of the films exhibited were of U S 
origin Similarly almost half of French television programming was of U S origin Throughout 
Europe the United States commanded 80 percent of the EC market conversely European films had 
garnered only 2 percent of the U S film market where it is largely limited to the urban and college
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town art theater circuit As ot 1985 EC products also commanded a mere one percent of the U S video 
market71 There is invisible protectionism m the United States Films circulate throughout the world 
but not in the United States noted Unifrance president Daniel Toscan de Planner72
The U S industry had considerable interests at stake in the outcome of the audiovisual passages of 
the Uruguay Round of GATT Audiovisual commodities represent one of the United States principle 
domains ot comparative advantage ranking second among U S export industries behind aerospace 
technologies (which are heavily state supported and largely military in orientation71) As noted by 
Weinraub74 audiovisual products (i e tilm television videocassette) generated $18 million in revenue 
lor U S firms in the early 1990s almost hall of this sum (l e $8 million) was generated from 
international markets of which more than half was secured in Europe Thus approximately 20-25 
percent of the total revenue of U S audiovisual firms were reaped in markets across the Atlantic Ocean 
As of April 1993 the audiovisual industries in the U S employed 414 700 workers as this 
employment sector grew 6 3 percent over 1992 The Motion Picture Association also estimates that 
new jobs created in the audiovisual industries generate further jobs in related industries in a 2 3 ratio 75 
Since the U S film industry is largely located in the electoral vote laden state of California political 
pressure exerted on an administration by this industry may be particularly acute
During the GATT negotiations Jack Valenti asserted the United States right to penetrate every 
screen across the globe come what may The negotiation has nothing to do with culture unless 
European soap operas and game shows are the equivalent of Moliere 76 Notwithstanding Valenti s 
radical dichotomization of culture from its commodity forms and his crude anti intellectual dismissal 
of European concerns there was much at stake for Europe s culture and its domestic markets for 
audiovisual material EC artists recognized the gravity of the situation as leading European directors 
also responded angrily in Hollywood trade journals to Martin Scorsese and Steven Speilberg s 
championing of trade liberalization We are desperately defending the tiny margin of freedom left to us 
We are trying to protect European cinema against its complete annihilation by the turn of the twenty 
First century 77
United States industry complaints during the GATT negotiations were bizarre in certain respects In 
particular the U S industry angered over the 11 percent tax applied to cinema tickets in France 
revenue which subsequently provides partial subsidy to the nation s film industry and its joint 
productions with other European nations In 1992 the revenues thusly collected totalled the equivalent 
of $350 million According to Meyer 78 these revenues helped promote the choice valorized by U S 
trade officials by directly assisting French Film along with Italian and German co productions with 
France Since most of the Films exhibited in France are U S productions the tax revenue thusly 
generated is mostly extracted from tickets to U S productions In other words the U S industry 
complained strenuously that its products were subsidizing the French industry without pausing to 
consider that liberalization made it the case that much of the tax revenue was generated by exhibiting 
U S films The French government rejected U S demands to a share of the tax revenue 79 an action 
that was defended by Meyer 80 although his defense is couched in terms of concerns for U S tourists 
France is not alone in fearing for the survival of its national culture American visitors who prize 
the vitalizing diversity of Europe should be the First to grant that the Film surcharge is not just about 
jobs in California
After the Clinton administration engaged in unconvincing bluffs toward abandoning GATT over the 
EC s cultural exemption for audiovisual materials 81 the U S negotiating team approved GATT a 
move Clinton hailed it as a historic victory in which the stakes are immense 87 The U S film 
industry generally praised the agreement in public despite bitterness over its failure to achieve full 
liberalization This is a great victory and beautiful victory for Europe and French culture commented 
French Communications Minister Alain Cangnon while former Culture Minister Jack Lang rejoined 
It s a victory for art and artists over the commercialization of culture 83 Thus ticket taxes in support 
of French production and EC co production will remain m place along with restrictions on the 
proportion of U S produced programs broadcast on EC television Given that European Film industries 
outside ot France are in an advanced state of decay and the possibility of subsequent U S trade war on
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other fronts optimism in Europe was qualified and tempered We won satisfaction today commented 
French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe But we will have to be vigilant tomorrow The United States 
will return to the charge 84
India Case Study in State Intervention
While the EC struggles to blunt near complete U S penetration of its cinemas halfway around the 
globe one of the victims ot western exploitation has established a film industry that is in robust health 
Despite being located in one of the world s poorer nations the Indian film industry has thrived By 
1975 more than half of the world s hlms originated in Asia and about one quarter were Indian 8^  In 
many respects the success of Indian him does not appear to pivot on state intervention as much as on 
the crucial preservation of a national Film industry that speaks to the many subcultures embedded 
within it Furthermore the Indian him industry has succeeded despite linguistic diversity that is at least 
as great as that of Europe 86 Indian cinema is distinctive for its bigger than life sets locations stars 
fights songs dances and melodramatic storytelling techniques Films have been so central to Indian 
culture that him music and songs pervade various ceremonies from birth to death and even political 
gatherings reports Manjunath Pendukar an Indian positioned in the U S academy There is no 
country like India where the film industry has had such a hold over its public according to scholar 
Erik Barnouw 87 a commitment to film which predates the nation s independence from the United 
Kingdom 88 The success of Indian Film may only be matched by the intensity of the disparagement it 
has occasioned in the West The New York Times indicted India s as the worst films in the world 89 
while scholar Jack C Ellis scorned India s purely escapist fare 90 Nonetheless even commercial 
Indian Films have occasioned praise91 and the nation has also brought forth the towering figure of 
Satyajit Ray who is often cited as one of the world s greatest directors 92 What can not be doubted is 
that while the EC film industries fight for survival India s film industry is in good health with 13 183 
theaters and Rs 6 3 billion in after tax revenues in 1987 Indian cinema was the only major national 
cinema to develop under imperialist occupation and maintained its strength in a nation noted for its 
grinding poverty it may therefore present some lessons for an EC that has not parlayed its far greater 
wealth into a healthier film industries
In its structure the Indian film industry presents some of the features of Hollywood The studio and 
star systems various cinematic techniques and many Hollywood plots have been adopted and 
adapted 91 In addition to its commercial features the Indian government has also taken a leading role in 
fostering the development of cinema from the autuer s socially conscious films94 to locally oriented 
cinema Government support for film may be a legacy of a grant conferred by the West Benagli state 
onto Ray so that he could complete Pather Panchah 95 Binford locates a paradox in the Indian 
governments attempts to sponsor New Cinema and its autuer oriented film in India While locally 
onented film presents traditional Indian song and dances Indian New Cinema has focused on 
distinctively Indian concerns while appropriating some features of western film making 96
State support for Indian film extends beyond facilitating New Cinema Through the National Film 
Development Corporation (NFDC) the federal government is involved in financing distributing and 
promoting Indian films both domestically and m international markets NFDC s powers and activities 
have over the years grown considerably They include nearly all the important activities of 
filmmaking at home and abroad NFDC s screening subtitling duplicating and other facilities which 
have been added in the last ten years are impressive 97 Low interest loans and subsidies to the Indian 
private sector have also assisted in the construction of 82 new cinemas in 15 different states with a 
seating capacity of 65 801 The NFDC has been involved in a diverse range of activities that include 
the provision of protection for Indian film furnishing subsidies for constructing theaters and granting 
awards to meritorious films The government corporation has also attempted to augment the thriving 
commercial industry and cultivate higher quality productions by holding national script writing 
competitions and then financing the winners more than 200 films and documentaries have been fully 
or partially financed in this manner Production for Doordarshan the national television network is also 
underway 98
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Table 5 presents a sketch of Indian films international penetration in 1988 Indian cinema penetrates 
numerous international markets notably those of the Middle East where many Indians work In 1988 
India exported 179 films to the Middle East grossing Rs 24 349 million in revenues in 1988 Africa 
other parts of Asia and the former Soviet Union have also constituted a substantial international market 
for Indian film The NFDC also imports 50-60 films per year most of which are screened mainly in art 
cinema houses The United States MPEAA exports films to Indian markets but financial restrictions 
imposed by New Dehli have protected its markets more effectively than the EC has In particular the 
MPEAA functions under an operating agreement with the NFDC The agreement limits the quantity of 
exports into a nation that generally has been characterized by foreign exchange shortages and as of the 
late 1980s capped annual import of U S films to India at 100 titles The NFDC has imposed further 
financial restrictions on the MPEAA that constrain use of non repatriated revenues from U S imports 
and which also assures revenue for the Indian state by applying further fees to imported films 99 
Furthermore all videocassette imported into India before August 1 1988 are subject to being sold and 
distributed by the NFDC In effect this move gives the Indian government corporation control of 
Hollywood film libraries when they are distributed within the massive Indian market U S majors have 
also reported losses of $10-15 million due to video piracy in the Indian subcontinent
In support of locally oriented cinema local governments have provided low interest loans and 
subsidies and cash rewards for films considered to be meritorious In this vein Pendukar100 reports that 
in Karnataka a southern state which offered the best support scheme in 1985 provided a Rs 300 000 
subsidy if shooting for color art films was done within the state In state films were further advantaged 
by a 50 percent reduction in the entertainment tax on cinema tickets a move which helped facilitate a 
240 percent increase in film production in Karnatka between 1967 and 1984 The state s investments in 
sponsoring a local film industry appeared to have paid off handsomely for the purpose of raising state 
revenue between 1977 and 1984 Karnatka reported Rs 1 471 billion in entertainment tax revenue 
alongside Rs 40 47 million m subsidy (i e investment constitutes 2 7 percent of return)
EC states may have much to learn from India where national cinema has developed despite widespread 
poverty and culturally diverse conditions In particular India s use of state subsidy and protections have 
departed from liberalization dogmas while providing enabling conditions for the continuance failed of a 
thriving film industry What Indian markets have not provided (ì e socially conscious New Cinema)
TABLE 5 Indian Films Exported by Market 1988
State(s) Number o f Films Revenue (mill Rs)
Arabian Gulf 179 24 349
USSR 18 9 811
Indonesia 41 9 484
Sn Lanka 30 2 588
Burma 17 2 463
United Kingdom/Ireland 67 2 286
Morocco 36 2 031
Jordan 28 1 814
Fiji Islands 29 1 785
Singapore 27 1 642
Mauritius 61 1 632
Sudan 31 1 288
Tanzania 28 1 281
Maldives 27 I 214
Kenya 22 I 086
Malaysia 33 808
West Indies 13 590
South/Latin America 1 2 524
Gambia l 1 536
Nigeria 10 451
Liberia 10 331
Source M Pendukar India in J Lent ed The Asian Film Industry (Austin Tex University 
of Texas Press 1990) p 240
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have been cultivated by the use of state resources that further the diversity of Indian cinema
Conclusion
In this study film has been considered first as a dimension of national culture and second as a 
commodity that is captured within a regime of international circulation which has largely been 
dominated by the U S majors The majors present striking market advantages over their competitors— 
advantages which have been conferred by their size and position within larger and synergized MNCs— 
such as the capacity to cover market risks to the extent possible access to a large and affluent U S 
film audience which is accustomed to highly commercial entertainment and the strength of the majors 
distribution apparatus
The EC film industries have by contrast been overwhelmed by Hollywood due in part to their 
inability to reciprocally penetrate the U S market even in an ostensibly liberalized environment 
Moreover the EC film industries have suffered from difficulties in smoothing over linguistic cultural 
and commercial differences among its own nations thus complicating efforts to consolidate economies 
of scale from which the EC could benefit The EC has also been caught within the contradiction of 
film being at once a commodity and an aspect of culture As discussed earlier the EC has attempted to 
protect its own audiovisual industries via cultural exemptions during the GATT negotiations 
Nonetheless the EC has taken considerable steps toward market liberalization as if audiovisual 
materials are strictly commodities and not culturally valanced This strategy of simultaneously abiding 
by market liberalization doctrines and then frantically attempting to construct some protection may 
present a prescription for disaster for the EC India by contrast has far more effectively constructed 
partially liberalized audiovisual markets on terms more congenial to the continued development of its 
own industries thereby offering its national audience ample local and national entertainment that is 
augmented by imports
Within the U S industry considerable stress is placed on film as a commodity from this follows 
the U S industry s transparently self serving insistence on liberalization dogmas that permit the U S 
industry to circulate its wares throughout the world largely without hindrance In this case the cultural 
consequences of the U S majors activities can be summarized by Cuba s Garcia Espinosa whose 
comments on U S MNCs also opened this study Garcia Espinosa states that Since freedom of 
expression and rights are always being spoken of when it serves U S state and corporate interests to 
do so I would mention the public s right to cinematic information In most Latin American countries 
the only thing people can see is American cinema There is no guaranteed right to see films from all 
over the world—but that should be a sacred right It should be a fundamental tenant of freedom of 
expression 101 Garcia Espinosa s judgement about the global activities of the U S film industry 
appears to be appropriate on the evidence presented in this investigation Furthermore he injects 
himself into the base/superstructure debate by elevating the film s place as an aspect of culture 
inverting the U S industry s emphasis on exploiting its advantages in the economic base without a 
thought toward the cultural consequences engendered in such exploitation I m completely convinced 
that capitalism is incapable of reconciling economic interests and art There is indeed little indication 
that the U S film industry even pretends to do so In this investigation I have called for mutually 
beneficial exchange between cultures The call may also be construed in Garcia Espinosa s words as an 
effort to transcend the dichotomy between high art and popular art which for me is like reconciling 
entertainment and thought 102—reconciliation which should pivot on local concerns and not be taken 
as a captive to liberalization dogmas
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Chapter 9
Latin American Economies and Foreign Capital A Survey
Jose Ambal Insfran P
This paper presents a historical perspective of the economic situation of Latin America and the effects 
of foreign capital in growth and development In addition political elements that have economic 
implications will be considered Four critical questions will be answered hoping that they can 
highlight some aspects for further research in this area a) Can foreign capital potentially contribute to 
the growth and development of the Latin American countries7 b) Has foreign capital really contributed 
to the improvement of the standard of living of the masses7 And if not was there any contribution at 
all7 c) What is the net result7 d) Should foreign capital be promoted7 and if yes how7
Social reality is a very complex subject A better understanding of it will require a combination of 
elements from economics sociology history to politics and other social sciences In this paper social 
reality will be generally addressed from the viewpoint of economics while elements of other sciences 
will be borrowed to have a better perception of Latin Americans feelings towards foreign capital The 
economic effects of foreign capital are considered as well as how important it has been in the growth 
of regional economies
Latin America is a vast region rich in contrast and variety Therefore a simple generalization is not 
easy I will try to trace common patterns and trends of the countries individual experiences which will 
help us understand the complex effects of foreign capital in these economies
In general during colonial times foreign capital exploited the natural resources of the colony This 
exploitation left nothing for the development of human capital and the improvement of the living 
conditions of the masses except for a small privileged group Independence from Europe and its 
aftermath opened the international financial market to the new republics and allowed them to participate 
without restrictions in international trade Almost all of these new republics issued bonds in the 
international bond market But after a few decades most of these bonds defaulted generating a capital 
flight from the region So before being able to organize their economies the Latin American countries 
faced the problem of external debt1 Only by the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the 
1900s did large amounts of external capital flowed into the region helping to establish the primary 
export led growth model In this way foreign capital contributed to growth although income 
distribution worsened
After the Great Depression and until the 1960s the Latin American countries started to apply the 
Import Substitution Strategy As a result many republics had a tremendous increase in their growth 
rate and in the transformation of the economy The most successful story being Brazil Dunng this 
period foreign capital had a central role because it came with the technology and the know how that 
allowed the transformation Nonetheless regional imbalances urbanization and income distribution 
remained as problems At the same time because exports were not favored the bottleneck of the 
strategy continued to be the deficit in the balance of payments
In the seventies and eighties the environment in the region changed from one with easy and abundant 
money to a one of crisis and with extreme constraints in the external sector This crisis was caused by 
the excessive indebtedness of Latin American countries and other external and internal factors DurineO
the eighties capital flows to the region were interrupted and Latin America became a net capital 
exporter Latin American economies stagnated and many economists called the eighties the lost 
decade Dunng this period foreign capital only had a passive activity The investments made overcame 
the depreciation of the capital already invested Only in the 1990s did the flows become positive again
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after employing many creative ways to solve the debt problem Paradoxically these flows created 
problems appreciating m real terms the local currencies and managing the macroeconomic policies 
Only those countries that could attract foreign direct investments had less problems
In sum foreign capital has had a changing role in the history of Latin America It is not only a 
source of external funds it is also an aggregate of technological managenal and organizational 
capacity where the investor and the host country share the investment risks Nonetheless 
multinational corporations with their immense economic and political power can create instabilities in 
the policies and many times can induce policy measures that are in contrast with the interest of the 
countries Moreover an adequate mix of good government right market incentives and clear stable 
rules of the game foreign capital can make a positive contribution to the growth and development of 
Latin American countries
Historical Background
Foreign capital with investments for exploitation and colonization is part of the history of Latin 
America from the very beginning of colonial times The expedition of Columbus that led to the 
discovery of the New World was financed as a venture capital with resources from the Spanish Crown 
This expedition can be considered as the starting point of the investments in the region
During colonial times Spain imposed upon its colonies its own patrimonial and hierarchical 
structure of organization where the Church had the prominent role of converting heathen masses to 
the true religion In addition the Church provided services as a transmitter of both education and 
control to the administrative organization in the colonies The early discovery of precious metals led 
the Spanish Crown to be more interested in maximizing the revenue from the mines than in promoting 
the development of infrastructure and human capital Investments were very low and mines were 
exploited by using very labor intensive old technology Mercantilism2 was the doctrine guiding the 
organization and administration of the colonies The colonial society was organized m such a way that 
the higher positions were restricted to the peninsulares so that the white people born in the colonies 
Creoles were excluded of the leading positions 1 and the possibility of economic progress was not 
based on a meritocratic system 4
In the 1600s Spam began to loose the power it once had m the late fifteenth and the sixteenth 
centuries leading to profound social and economic transformations in the colonies The Creoles started 
to assume active roles in key sector of the economy such as mining and trading Especially important 
was their increasing land ownership in fact the rural ranches became virtually autonomous rural 
communities governed by their owners The role of the Creoles in politics in the early eighteenth 
century was reduced to political posts at the local levels such as town councils or audiencias Upper 
level positions were still reserved to peninsulares With the emergence of France and Great Britain as 
leading powers Spain s control over the trade was eroded After 1778 with the Decree of Free Trade5 
its power to monitor trade was minimal
In general since colonial times and until the late nineteenth century the economic environment was 
dominated by cycles with booms of commodity exports followed by stagnation without benefits for 
development6 We can say that foreign capital in the eighteenth century was not an element to promote 
development because the investments were made only to exploit natural resources and maximize 
benefits for the Crown
In Portuguese America there was no Indian civilization comparable to the Aztecs and the Incas The 
largest group was the Guaranies who lived along the coast from what is now Venezuela into southern 
Brazil and Paraguay This group and other smaller ones were semi nomadic Therefore the Portuguese 
did not face a highly organized and settled indigenous organization Since initially no precious metals 
were found Brazil was not very important for Portugal The administrative organization was very 
simple and monarchical control was too much looser than m Spanish America The first important
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economic activity was export of brazil wood followed by agriculture especially cultivation of sugar 
cane
Compared to Spanish America there was a scarcity of mineral and human capital in Brazil Portugal 
had to use different means to persuade people to occupy its possessions in the New World Large 
extensions of land were assigned to military men or to hand picked personal favorites Effective power 
at the local level rested on land owners and town councils Even the church was weak compared to the 
rest of America In the late sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century landowners developed a 
lucrative sugar industry in Northeast Brazil Since the technology used was labor intensive it required 
abundant labor Initially Brazil relied upon Indians but later on slaves were imported from Africa 
During this sugar boom Brazil was the largest sugar producer in the world Investments made were not 
specially important because the technology was primitive using slave based labor
By mid century the British and the Dutch brought new technology for sugar production to the 
Caribbean This made Caribbean countries the world s preeminent sugar cane producer This period did 
not have implications on long term development In the 1690s gold was found in Minas Gerais 
causing a lot of people to move into the South Central Brazil The mining activities reached their peak 
in 1750 But the low technological expertise contributed to the end of the mining activities near the 
end of century From the viewpoint of investments in human capital this gold boom had negative 
impact since Portugal imposed serious mercantilist controls The printing press and universities were 
prohibited as a strategy to make Brazil as dependent as possible 7 So like in Spanish America foreign 
capital in Portuguese America did not constitute a factor for development
Independence and Its Economic Consequences
Many Latin Amencan countries acquired independence in the first decades of the nineteenth century this 
in turn implied many economic changes The First important element was the abolition of external trade 
monopoly and the opportunity for free trade Also the new republics had the opportunity to raise 
capital in the international capital market with the British investors responding promptly to this need 
Most Latin American countries issued bonds in the London Stock Exchange The new governments had 
to deal with foreign debt even before they could to reorganize their economies But because of lack of 
managerial skill dishonesty high interest rates and unproductive investments most of these bonds 
defaulted by the end of the 1820s A large number of these old loans after conversion and adjustment 
remained outstanding for almost a century 8
The previous situation generated a capital flight with serious consequences for capital accumulation 
and future prospects of growth This problem was aggravated for the destruction of the economies 
caused by civil wars that preceded the independence The fiscal deficit increased because of the lack of 
skilled administrators and the increase in the public expenditures Along with the investments in bonds 
from the new republics foreign capital also invested in trade of African slaves 9 In sum independence 
brought the advantages of access to the international financial system and free trade but internal 
conditions drained these benefits 10
1850-1914
During the years of the mid eighteenth century export of primary products was the engine of growth in 
most countries Wheat and nitrates came from Chile tobacco from Colombia hides salted beef wool 
from Argentina guano from Peru sugar from Cuba coffee from Brazil and cocoa from Venezuela On 
the other hand the region was importing manufactures from Europe Latin America failed to make its 
industry truly competitive because of the hierarchical elite perpetuated an agrarian oriented economy
A considerable increase in the capital flows from Europe to Latin America took place in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century However the primary export oriented organization of the economies 
continued This organization was a result of Britain s imposition and perhaps because of some 
comparative advantage in the production of primary products Nonetheless the determining factor was
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England s political power in the region The wave ot inventions in Europe (steamships refrigeration 
barbed wire fencing etc ) and the region s position in the world trade facilitated a large flow of 
investments and later the transference to Europe ot their proceeds
The principal investors were Great Britain France Germany and the United States British 
investments went from £85 million in 1870 to about £750 million in 1914 with the latter the 
investments in Argentina and Brazil representing 60 percent of the total Railroads government bonds 
banking and shipping accounted for 80 percent of the total in 1914 It is estimated in $8 5 billion the 
total investment in Latin America with England accounting for 43 5 percent 11 These implied that key 
sectors of Latin American economies were dominated by foreign capital It made Latin American 
countries dependent upon foreigners in decisions and achieving prosperity Foreign capital did not 
help to increase the living standard of the masses Moreover it has intensified the dualistic economies 
(mining and plantations) and did not become part of local capital Also it did not contribute to training 
domestic labor in fact foreign corporations only hired native unskilled workers and skilled people that 
came from Europe
Export-Import Growth and the Great Depression
After World War I the primary export model continued although there were important changes in the 
financial relationship between Latin America and Europe Currency convertibility was suspended in the 
belligerent countries and European Banks called in their loans creating a domestic financial crisis 
Indeed capital inflows were drastically reduced and Europe s exports dropped This created shortages 
with imported manufactured goods and induced some industrialization with domestic production of 
substitutes 17
The first decades of the twentieth century saw a transference of the economic hegemony from Great 
Britain to the United States For example the ratio of U S /U K investments rose from 4 5 percent in 
1913 to 51 1 percent at the end of 1929 n Much of the investment from United States was represented 
by governmental bonds corporate bonds and private equity Most of Latin American countries entered 
into the U S capital market with the exception of Ecuador Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Paraguay 
and Venezuela Although part of the capital borrowed by governments was used to finance productive 
public goods another part was also used in inefficient ways that did not increase the productive capacity 
of the economies Foreign firms were not objects of special regimes and royalties and taxes remained 
low 14
The collapse m the economies of industrialized nations during the Great Depression and the 
subsequent drop in pnces of pnmary goods affected every Latin Amencan country Some countnes 
suffered a drop of 40 percent or more m the volume of their exports The purchasing power of exports 
in 1932 was on average 57 percent below the one of 1928 This latter average along with the 
unchanged debt service schedule of payments determined a sharp decline m imports As a result there 
were deficits in the balance of payments and in the public budget given that the governments relied 
heavily on revenues from the external sector 15 This situation created internal and external imbalances 
that forced governments to adopt stabilization policies As a way to respond to the global economic 
crisis during this period and until early 1960s the Import Substitution Strategy (ISI) dominated the 
economic panorama in Latin America especially in the larger countnes
Import Substitution Strategy16
This strategy was implemented through industrialization with the goals of achieving greater economic 
independence and providing jobs to workers The ideas of Raul Prebisch and his followers a gave 
theoretical basis for ISI In addition the states supported the industry with protectionism and 
complementary investments
World War II also helped promote mdustnahzation with the increasing demand for food and raw 
materials and the impossibility to import manufactured goods Foreign investments from the United
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States achieved levels not seen since 1920s especially in war strategic materials Brazilian textile 
exports were increasing rapidly during the war at one point represented 20 percent ol the total 
Exports 17 Argentina exported nearly 20 percent of its manufacturing production m 1943 Another 
important element that helped the industrialization process was the inter American cooperation both 
between Latin American countries and the United States At the end of war financial aid from the 
United States turned to reconstruction of Europe and flows to Latin America decreased As export 
volumes increased at modest rates Latin American governments followed inward looking models18 
favored by the Economic Commission tor Latin America (ECLA)
In the 1950s industry was or was to become the leading sector in Brazil Argentina Chile Mexico 
Colombia and Uruguay Governmental policies included protection of internal markets incentives for 
investment m industry and the establishment of Development Banks Also state owned enterprises 
were set up to sustain the industrialization program
The legislation to attract multinational corporations was revised as means to consolidate large scale 
investments in new sophisticated industrial enterprises Multinational corporations came to Latin 
America attracted by protected domestic markets They brought their technology marketing and 
management skills and new capital In this way they helped to ease the balance of payments 
problems gave employment and training to the labor force and contributed to generate a whole 
gamma of complementary industries Although there were conflicts between the multinational 
corporations and the Latin American governments that created negative feelings People in the 
government argued that foreign companies engaged in practices against the interests of the host 
country An example of that is the transfer of prices19 to minimize the tax burden Also in some cases 
as in the automobile industry in Brazil they gave new life to second hand machinery that was totally 
depreciated Another critique to multinational corporations is that they use their economic and political 
power to impose regulations that contribute to instability
ISI resulted in high rates of GDP growth as well as changes in the composition of the GDP In the 
case of Brazil the average yearly real growth rate in the period 1947-1962 was 6 percent and in the 
most intensive industrialization period 1952-1962 the average yearly real growth rate of the product 
was 7 8 percent 90 But to achieve this success Latin American had to pay an expensive price 
Compared with similar industries in developed countries industry was both inefficient and high costs 
Also since the goal was to substitute imports in general exports did not get enough attention Thus 
they lacked of dynamism in this period The latter and the increasing need for imports of intermediate 
capital goods generated continuous deficits in the balance of payments Consequently the scarcity of 
foreign exchange gave a ceiling to ISI strategy and to growth of the economy generating a 
bottleneck
Foreign capital helped ISI Multinational corporations brought new capital and in smaller 
proportions multilateral agencies and the United States provided funds Even though the GDP grew and 
there was a change in its structure the region continued being dependent on the external sector In the 
same way critical problems of the region were not solved such as regional imbalances and 
unemployment Moreover it generated social problems because of the increasing urbanization of the 
population and the worsening of the income distribution
The 1960s and the Official Financial Aid
At the beginning of the 1960s Latin American countries had completed the first stage of 
industrialization and the larger countries had become semi industrialized But in general industrial 
production was inefficient so they only produced for the domestic market Therefore manufactured 
goods could not compete in the international market and the bottleneck of the foreign exchange was 
still present In general to make production more efficient it is necessary to have economies of scale 
which in turn requires the presence of large markets Although Latin American domestic markets are 
generally small As a way to cope with this problem in 1959 the ECLA proposed the development of 
a Latin American Common Market 1 This approach was accepted as valid and larger countries expected
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to solve their problems with regional integration But by the end ol the decade the leaders of the 
republics changed their minds
Following Bulner-Thomas the development strategy followed by some nations in the region was 
called Export Promotion 77 which complements the ISI with some policy measures to make exports 
possible so that they would have the best of both worlds protected local markets and export to the rest 
of the world Initially export promotion seemed to be successful Moreover the proportion of 
manufactured goods in exports increased dramatically from 1960 to 1970 for example m Brazil it went 
from 2 2 percent to 15 4 percent in Argentina from 4 1 percent to 13 95 and in Mexico from 16 
percent to 32 5 percent This helped to stabilize the export proceeds since the pnces of manufactured 
goods are less volatile than those of the primary goods But the strategy did not accomplish an export 
led growth Some major policy problems included the management of the real exchange rate and 
conflicts between short term and long term policies 73
Regarding capital flows to the region the change in the foreign policy of the United States and the 
increase in official aid were very important for the capital flows towards the region 74 Alliance for 
Progress (AP) was created in 1961 and capital inflows were linked to social and economic reforms 75 
Its motivation was unashamedly political and was a way to avoid communism influence in the 
region 76
Goals of the AP were economic growth structural change and democracy Moreover in most of the 
cases structural changes and democracy were preconditions for the economic aid In this period official 
aid especially from the U S and multilateral agencies increased its importance However in the 
sixties Latin America was a net a exporter The total amount of capital outflows (profits and interests) 
was $18 1 billion and the inflows were $17 5 billion (net loans direct investment and donations) The 
situation worsens if we consider the outflows with other accounts such as private donations Net 
outflows were $4 7 billion 77 and payments of profits and interests represented on average 15 3 percent 
of exports
By 1961-1969 flows between the United States and Latin America suggested that the aid had 
financed capital outflows In other words this net transference from subsidiaries to parent companies 
in the case of the multinational corporations was possible with new governmental loans Indeed 
without that governmental capital the deficit in the total balance of payments in the region would have 
been immense The value of the total financial aid28 from 1961-69 was $10 28 billion and the net 
inflow29 to the region was $4 8 billion In turn the private capital net inflow during the same period 
was $5 7 billion 30
The sixties are characterized by an attempt to solve the problem of imbalances in the balance of 
payments created by ISI An export promotion approach was selected Regarding the relationship of the 
region with the developed countries and especially with the United States this period represented an 
increase in the official financial aid as a result of the change of the international political conditions 
The needs and the predisposition of the Latin American governments to comply with the requirements 
of AP determined the amount and composition of the help Another result of the official financial aid is 
that it has compensated the private capital outflows of the region 31
Nonetheless the engine of growth in Latin America during the period 1960-1969 was the domestic 
capital both private and public Although only nine percent of the Gross Investment32 was from 
external sources but this part of the gross investment can be viewed as a catalyst because of its 
influence in modernization of industries that made them capable of participating in the international 
market33
Easy Money in the Seventies and Debt Crisis
In the 1970s and the early 1980s the world financial scenery changed dramatically It marked clear 
changes in foreign capital flows They were influenced by the oil shocks and the increase of eurodollar
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deposits especially those from the member countries of the Ore tni/ation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC)
As a result of changes in the world situation the strategies followed by the different countries were 
varied Some countries (Argentina Chile Uruguay) followed an approach that promoted a market 
oriented and less protected economy They expected to align their domestic relative prices with those of 
the rest of the world so that it would promote production of tradable goods14 (1 e exports will be 
incentivated) These programs were implemented by military regimes and political repression was a 
very important element in their implementation Chile was the first to establish this model after the 
overthrow of the socialist Salvador Allende by General Augusto Pinochet on September 11 1973 The 
military government started a process of re valorization of foreign investments with the agreement of 
compensatory payments to the expropriated multinational corporations 15 and the establishment of a 
new legislation for foreign investments 16 Uruguay also started a liberalization program at the end of 
1973 and Argentina followed in 1976 All three countries were struggling with balance of payments 
and inflationary pressures They had a high level of desintermedntion given their environment of 
financial repression
The experience of these economies fits into the large debate of order of economic liberalization 
where positions go from a total liberalization (the current account and the capital account in the balance 
of payments) to a gradual approach with the initial liberalization of the goods market (the current 
account of the balance of payments) And once industries are consolidated then there is the 
liberalization of financial markets (capital account in the balance of payments)17
To solve the deficit of the balance of payments it is necessary to increase exports One of the most 
important measures was an initial large devaluation of the nominal exchange rate to achieve a higher 
real exchange rate After that countries followed a crawling peg system To promote imports tariff 
reductions and the abolishment of non tariff barriers were implemented As a result in these countries 
the exports rose rapidly and the openness of their economies increased This system favored the tradable 
goods in the economy but made it difficult to control the inflationary pressures due to its inertia Also 
inflation was complicated by what Werner Baer has called fight for shares and other authors have 
called the class struggle
In addition the capital account in the balance of payments was liberalized 18 The consequences were 
disastrous the real exchange rate appreciated imports rose and the deficit in the balance of payments 
increased which initially was financed by international borrowings Other results were partial 
deindustrialization19 and moral hazard behavior40 by the domestic financial institutions As a result of 
the oil shock in 1973 Brazil opted for a growth policy that resulted in substantial structural changes 
in the economy in a resurgence of inflation and in a rapid expansion of the country s international 
debt 41
On the other hand the countries with a weaker industrial base continued using a primary export led 
growth strategy with ISI continuing as a secondary activity The countries that followed this strategy 
were Bolivia Ecuador Paraguay Venezuela the Central America nations Panama and Cuba The 
boom of the primary products price in the 1970s generated an impressive improvement in the 
situation of exports the value of exports jumped and the purchasing power of the exports 
soared 42 On the other hand they did not increase their share of the world exports
In the case of Paraguay the construction of two gigantic hydroelectric dams in the Parana River— 
Itaipu on the Brazilian border and Yacyreta on the Argentine border—was a very important factor for 
growth along with good prices for primary products The GDP rose in the seventies by 8 7 percent per 
year Although many of the countries in this group enjoyed respectable rates of growth in the seventies 
and the beginning of the eighties none of them could solve the structural problem of deficit in its 
balance of payments During this period they showed good macroeconomic indicators based on short 
term favorable conditions The deficits were financed with the increase of external loans
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Looking at tendencies of capital flows to the region in the 1970s we can see a very large increase in 
the total amount of net inflows Capital inflows averaged $11 3 billion in the period 1971-1978 
against only $2 1 billion in 1961-1970 Also it is important to note that the composition of flows 
changed dramatically with the private flows dominating the scene Private capitals that were on average 
49 85 percent of the total in the period 1961-1970 in 1971-1978 represented on average 79 39 
percent and in 1978 were 92 7 percent In the same way the proportion of loans from multilateral 
private banks jumped to 61 06 percent of the private flows in 1978 while it was only 10 41 percent 
during the 1960s Causing direct investment to decreased Also the current account deficit in the 
balance of payments rose sharply but it was compensated for the capital account 45 Also the excess of 
external funds generated appreciation of the real exchange rate in many countries
The reasons for the increase in private financing to Latin America were the expansion of euro­
currency markets with the increase of deposits of the members of OPEC regulation Q 44 and other 
regulations in the Banking System of the United States Private banks given their excessive liquidity 
were offering loans at very low interest rates45 (many times at rates that were negative in real terms) 
without analyzing the creditworthiness of the borrowers (Latin American countries) Also borrowed 
funds were used to delay adjustments in the economies required by internal and external imbalances In 
addition the dishonesty or lack of ability of public officials to manage funds
The total external debt of Latin America was $314 4 billion in 1982 while in 1970 it was $20 8 
billion (i e an increase of more than 1500 percent in 12 years or 25 4 percent per year) Another 
important indicator of the magnitude of the external debt was the ratio of service payments (interest and 
amortization) to exports that jumped from 17 6 percent to 59 percent 46 All these reasons and many 
others generated a situation that was impossible to sustain in the long run Countries in the region 
were living beyond their production capacity They were inflating a balloon that finally exploded in 
1982 when Mexico declared it impossible to serve its international obligations a sharp decline in the 
flow of capital to the region Consequently the easy money ended and the crisis began
Debt Renegotiation Adjustment and Reactivation
With the debt crisis positive capital flows to the region stopped and turned negative All the 
economies were affected even those in a good debt situation because foreign lenders changed their 
expectations about the future of the region and refused to make new loans For Latin American 
countries this implied a change in growth strategy and in policies to apply
By the end of 1982 the world macroeconomic conditions were viewed as extremely negative and 
most analysts thought that this was more a temporary liquidity problem than a solvency problem 
Depressed growth conditions low price of primary products the high interest rates and overvaluation 
of the dollar among others were expected to be overcome shortly To defeat the situation it was 
thought that it would be necessary to reschedule the debt service supply new capital inflows to the 
regions and make reforms in the market direction in such a way that in the medium run the countries 
would recover and would be able to repay the liabilities All this would be helped by the expected 
recovery of the world economy which would be growing strongly in the short run
The above description of the crisis was a shared understanding of what happened with the debt 
problem and how it should be faced Although the facts have shown that the situation was much more 
difficult and the solutions were not that easy Given the negative capital flows to the region that were 
reflected on the Overall Balance of Payments for Developing Countries of the Western Hemisphere 
which on average had deficits of $1 9 billion per year in the period 1982-1989 and in 1982 the deficit 
was $19 2 billion 47 the economies were forced to adjustments with export promotion as a cornerstone 
of the programs The picture was further aggravated by the capital flights which in many cases were 
unrecorded 48 The capital flight in 1983 from Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico and Venezuela was 
estimated $12 1 billion 49
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Governments begin to address tht problem of how to mike their economies more efficient and 
competitive so they pursued fiscal reforms privatization and generally a turn to the market as an 
allocator of resources At the sime time foreign capital was seen as a very important element to 
provide technology especially encouraging foreign direct investment Indeed foreign investment 
legislation was modified in many countries although the debt problem remained trough the first half 
of the 1980s and the expected new capital flows never arrived
Multilateral agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the World Bank (WB) and the 
Interamencan Development Bank (IDB) had a very important role in the crisis Agreements with IMF 
proved to be particularly important to restore the economies although IMF programs were very 
restrictive and very costly especially for poor people Many programs could not be completed because 
the countries were not able to satisfy the requirements given domestic political pressures
As a result of these initial disappointing results it has been recognized that success in the debt 
renegotiation depended upon adjustment programs and upon a reduction of service and nominal amount 
of the debt In other words a cooperative strategy is required among lenders multilateral agencies and 
indebted countries By success it is meant long term external viability and sustained growth of the 
countries
In line with this cooperative strategy in 1985 the U S Treasury Secretary James Baker proposed a 
$30 billion increase in new loans to fifteen of the most indebted countnts with two thirds of the funds 
provided by private banks and the rest by multilateral financial institutions Later two more countries 
were added to the list and neither of the fund s suppliers effectively delivered the resources so the 
initiative collapsed
With the failure of strategies many countries were not able to comply with their liabilities despite 
the rescheduling At the same time a secondary market for the debt instruments appeared Most of the 
countries debts were exchanged below par The value of the Peruvian debt in August 1990 was around 
five percent of its nominal value the Argentinean debt was about 13 percent in April 1990 only the 
Chilean debt was over 50 percent during the whole period Also other mechanisms were used to take 
advantage of the low prices in the secondary market such as Debt equity Swaps Debt for Nature Swap 
Buybacks and others
All these procedures had been used by countries in the region For example debt equity swaps were 
extensively used by Chile Argentina and Mexico especially with their privatization program Many 
governments opposed this mechanism arguing that many of the investments would have taken place 
anyway so that only result was to lower investment costs for the private sector Another argument 
was if the resources were used to buy firms already working then the result would be a mere property 
transference with an increase of the monetary base which would create inflationary pressures Also at 
times nationalistic arguments were used although this method could have created a favorable climate 
for investments in the country
Debt for Nature had been set up in Bolivia Costa Rica Ecuador and Paraguay but so far it only 
accounts for a very small part of the total debt Another system similar to Buybacks is the one used 
during 1990-1991 by Paraguay to payback its external public debt to Brazil This method that can be 
called Debt Exchange was implemented m the following way Paraguay buys Brazilian debt at a 
discount (at that time it was at 25 or 30 percent of its value) in the secondary market and then 
exchanges this debt one by one with the Paraguayan debt So as a result both countries have reduced 
their external obligations and Paraguay pays its debt at market price In this case it seems that most 
of the benefits were for Paraguay but maybe this was the only way to pay the obligations at this time 
Also the deal took place at an opportune political moment since Brazil was renegociating its own debt 
with the Paris Club In this way Brazil showed a positive predisposition with another indebted country 
and can then later ask for a good agreement for itself
In the same way of trying to take advantage of the discounted price of the debt in 1989 the Plan 
Brady appeared named after Nicholas Brady the U S Treasury Secretary It asked private banks to
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forgive partially thur obligations to debtor countries in exchange for some guarantee of repayment that 
was financed by the IMF and World Bank The countries were to take measures to facilitate private 
investments It gave relief to some countries such as Mexico Costa Rica Uruguay and Venezuela 
As a consequence confidence in the macroeconomic policies was regained and the flight capital was 
repatriated in the countries
The 1990s and Capital Flows Restoration
During the early 1990s with the restoration of the confidence the flows of foreign capital into Latin 
America jumped to levels not witnessed for over a decade This can be explained by structural reforms 
in the Latin American countries a drop in the interest rate in some developed economies the increasing 
popularity in developed countries of emergent markets as a mean of getting higher returns flows 
associated with the privatization and repatriation of capital However the majority of this capital went 
to Argentina Chile Colombia Mexico and Venezuela ^  In the case of many other smaller economies 
in the region large flows were received (relative to the size of their economies) that generated serious 
problems of appreciation of the local currency and sometimes an increase in the deficit quasi fiscal 
and/or inflation
The external flows allowed the financm0 large deficits in the current account as in the case of 
Argentina and Mexico On the other hand Chile and Colombia increased their international reserves 
The real exchange rate in Argentina and Mexico appreciated at levels equals to those of the 1970s and 
continued falling in 1992 Argentina has passed a Convertibility Law providing a full foreign exchange 
backing to its monetary base This measure helped to fight inflation but the cumulative real 
appreciation of Argentina s currency from 1989 to 1992 is 67 percent which hurts exporters In 
Mexico the exchange rate played an active role against inflation after the economic Solidarity PactS1
In the case of Paraguay the capital flows also created problems in the management of the 
macroeconomic policy during 1990-1992 generating appreciation of the real exchange rate But this 
was compensated for by the incredible appreciation suffered by Argentina which is one of its most 
important commercial partners Paraguay also entered in the process of economic liberalization with 
both current account and capital account being almost simultaneously liberalized As a result of the 
complications of the increase in capital inflows and to avoid an excessive appreciation of the Guarani 
international reserves have grown dramatically and the monetary base expanded In 1990 the inflation 
went up to 44 1 percent one of the highest on Paraguayan history However in 1991 it dropped again 
to 11 8 percent
For Chile and Colombia the increase in international reserves expanded the monetary base at levels 
that generated inflationary pressures Also capital flows generated problems for exports with the fall 
of real exchange rates Both countries had a policy of devaluation to defend the real exchange rate Chile 
had a band of fluctuation of the exchange rate based upon a basket of currencies This band was 
widened with the increase in external flows In Colombia there is also a band but it is not based upon 
a basket of currencies In both countries the capitals were absorbed without an excessive appreciation of 
the local currency presenting moderate inflation rates
One serious problem whenever there is a continual process of appreciation of the local currency is 
the reallocation of resources from tradable to non tradable goods which goes against the policy of 
liberalization and export led growth A situation that should be considered is how stable is the flow of 
the nineties Many economists argue that most of these flows are speculative they are capitales 
golondrina (swallow capital) and that they will leave the countries with any rumor or change in the 
expectations so that they recommend to taking measures to avoid the excessive consumption of 
imported goods and to make the flows more stable This scenario seems to apply to the case of 
Argentina Colombia Paraguay Uruguay and other countries with a lot of speculative capital 
Although for those countries that are receiving more stable flows such as the direct foreign 
investment this is not a problem
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Foreign Capital and Its Implications lor Growth and Development
In each ol the previous sections the trends and tendencies ol the Latin American economies and the 
influence of forei0n capital in growth and development were described A synopsis of benefits and costs 
of foreign capital will be given below In synthesis the focus will be on Direct Foreign Investments 
(DFI) which is different from the external borrowing and the portfolio investment although all are 
parts of the foreign capital
Generally foreign capital can complement domestic savings in order to increase investments in the 
economies so that productive capacity can grow faster Then it could be possible to enjoy the benefits 
of higher levels of consumption earlier Nonetheless it is not free of complications and costs that 
should be analyzed and minimized as much as possible
Direct foreign investment has the characteristic of generally having long term interest in direct 
management and control of projects or firms In contrast the portfolio investment has a shorter 
duration 57 and characteristically has no control of projects Direct foreign investment is more than 
external funds it is a whole package of resources such as technology commercialization and capacity 
of organization In addition foreign investors only send profits if the business was successful (1 e 
they share the risk of the country and reduce the pressure in the exchange market during periods of 
crisis) This is in contrast to credit received from foreign banks whose interest rates are inversely 
correlated to the terms of exchange of the developing countries that do not produce oil At the same 
time profits of foreign investment have a positive correlation with the growth of host countries ^  A 
further element that should be considered is that multinational corporations (MNC) train the local labor 
force and provide an added tax source In addition the MNC have a multiplier effect on the local 
suppliers of inputs and help to diversify exports
In terms of negative aspects we can quote DFI varies over time and reinforces the economic cycles 
the rates of return are higher than the interest rate of the external borrowing 54 Furthermore there are 
desestabilizing forces from external sources 55 In terms of in political and economic aspects there are 
the following factors the loss of autonomy in making economic decisions that can create problems for 
the nationalism the MNC application of technology that is capital intensive in a country with high 
unemployment the excessive payments for patents and Research & Development (R&D) and the 
MNC s distortion of the population s consumption pattern Also it has been argued that host countries 
have failed to benefit from foreign capital especially when they are invested in the exploitation of 
primary goods or raw material for exports The reasons for this failure are Foreign Capital removes 
secondary effects of investments it diverts the countries from investments m industrial technological 
areas that can offer greater possibilities in the future and foreign investment in raw material has 
resulted in a decline in the terms of trade 56
The presence of the MNC in Latin America is not exclusively an economic fact it has also political 
connotations This elements are the yearly value of sales for many multinational corporations is larger 
than the GDP for some Latin American countries the large political influence of the United States in 
the region and MNC use political pressures and lobbying to achieve their goals Generally these goals 
do not consider the needs of the host countries and they maximize the objective function of the global 
corporation Additionally bribery dishonesty and corruption are always present m the spectrum All 
these elements and many others have made it very difficult for the smaller countries and even the 
larger ones in Latin America to find an appropriate way to overcome these negative aspects
This survey has analyzed positive and negative contributions of the foreign investments and it is 
now time to weigh these opposing viewpoints to answer the four questions posed at the beginning of 
this paper
1) Can foreign capital potentially contribute to the growth and development o f Latin 
American countries ? The answer is YES it can The evidence was shown above when 
positives aspects of foreign investments were described
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2) Has foreign capital ieall\ contributed to the improvement o f the living standard of 
the masses 9 And if not was there an\ contribution at a ll9 Here the answer is IT 
DEPENDS on the period of time that you want to consider In colonial times the answer 
was NO because most of the investments were made under the mercantilist doctrine with 
the idea of exploiting the colonies After the period of independence and before World War 
II there was some industrialization and especially investments in primary goods for 
export This helped to modernize many sectors of the economies and increased the GDP 
per capita although the income distribution problem was not solved
After this period of industrialization and until the present the improvement in 
technology and training of the labor force was increasing This statement does not imply 
that everything was perfect but the contribution of technology and training was 
important Overall without these two components the modernization of the current 
industries would not have been possible
3) What is the net result9 The net result is POSITIVE because generally all the direct and 
indirect benefits of the projects with foreign investments are larger than the profits that 
the capitalist would send to its country This is generally true for the case of Direct 
Foreign Investment For the Foreign Portfolio Investment the connection is not very 
straightforward and many considerations should be made In the case of the External 
Loans the results depend on the profitability of the investment which is generally 
managed by local people Therefore the result generally can not be blamed on 
foreigners
d) Should foreign capital be promoted and if yes how9 The answer is YES with 
STABILITY in the Macroeconomic and Social conditions At the same time some 
precautions need to be taken to minimize the negative effects and maximize the positive 
ones Particular attention should be paid to political influences of large MNC that can 
make it difficult to obtain stable macroeconomic conditions To increase the bargaining 
power of Latin American countries economic integration in the region should be 
considered Foreign capital should complement internal savings and help promote 
growth and development What Felipe Gonzalez the Spanish Primer Minister said 
applies here Given our lack of technology we cannot expect to have Spanish 
industries with the latest technology These industries will be property of foreigners or 
they simply will not exist 57
Foreign Capital should be attracted to a country with a set of stable conditions the macroeconomic 
environment should be predictable (control of inflation low budget deficit and clear and stable rules of 
the game must be clear and stable) and the political environment should be safe and free of major 
social disturbances The incentives for the investments should be correctly placed and the market should 
be the allocator of resources in the economy
Concerning the portfolio foreign investments the arguments above expressed are also valid As the 
emerging markets are growing some Latin American countries are counted among the most 
important The Portfolio Foreign Investment could be an additional source to increase the liquidity and 
solvency of these markets These investments should be promoted in the developed countries as a 
source of diversification and higher returns With the stability of the economies risks for the foreign 
investor would be reduced
Conclusion
Foreign capital has been part of Latin American economies since the Columbus first expedition to the 
New World The effects of foreign capital on growth and development have changed over time and
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the results range from total exploitation and expropriations to sharing of the benefits between the 
recipient country and the foreigner investor The real costs and benefits of foreign capital however 
depend upon the specific circumstances of each recipient country although it could be beneficial for 
both parties In other words benefits depend fundamentally on internal policies
Problems such as low level of savings low productivity low income illiteracy unequal distribution 
of income regional problems land reform etc cannot be expected to be solved or addressed by the 
private foreign capital Although with a good government the right market incentives and the right 
policies the foreign capital can make an important contribution in many areas Ultimately foreign 
capital can contribute substantially in order to complement the internal formation of capital acting as a 
provider of technology and know how that would hopefully accelerate growth and development of 
Latin American economies
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Chapter 10
The Transition from a Controlled to a Market Economy 
The Case of the Russian Electricity Sector
Andrei Kuxenko
Introduction
In Russia there exists a huge and complex electricity sector which is one of the few branches of this 
country s economy that managed to remain relatively stable despite the upheavals induced by the 
process oí transition to a free market Traditionally power engineering was one of the most advanced 
industries in the Soviet Union Under the conditions of a command economy that was designed to 
satisfy the basic needs of the society it enjoyed a privileged position because adequate electricity 
supply was considered as an essential requirement for an industrialized and developed socialist society 
Many Soviet authors regarded electric power modern engineering and chemical industry as branches 
forming the basis of social and technological progress The crucial role of electrification was expressed 
by Lenin s famous equation Communism is equal to Soviet power plus electrification of the whole 
country Because of its strategic importance the Soviet Union emphasized the creation ot a strong 
electric power industry the development and administration of which was often determined by 
ideological and sociopolitical aims
Today again specific attention must be paid to the electric industry Its successful restructuring is 
vital to sustained reform and development of Russia s economy Policy makers face the challenging 
task of introducing new market based mechanisms into this key infrastructure sector in the process of 
economic transition from a controlled to a market economy while at the same time ensuring its 
reliable functioning under the current difficult economic conditions
In this article I argue that in its transition period to a market economy the Russian electricity sector 
has undergone a considerable process of reorganization which is oriented toward two major issues 
First the realization of guidelines of economic transition in the electricity sector and second the 
mastering of designing competition policies for network based industries characterized by natural 
monopolies The efforts to create a wholesale market for power the privatization process and the 
introduction of an appropriate regulatory regime and antimonopoly statutes illustrate the current 
development in the electricity sector In this respect to a certain extent experiences in organizing this 
industry in developed market economies such as in England and Wales the United States and 
Denmark are used The reform of the Russian electricity sector however is confronted with a whole 
string of serious problems and influences that endanger successful implementation of market relations 
and competitive elements into this industry The existing impediments of its development are related to 
the political and economic problems of the country the undeveloped institutional framework necessary 
for creating a market oriented economy the influence of governmental and administrative management 
on this sector and the actual state and special features of the Russian electric power industry
To point out the prospects for and the barriers to the restructuring process of the electric power 
industry I begin with a brief discussion of the politico economic environment Because particular 
importance in the considerations concerning the introduction of a competitive power market must be 
given to the supply side I will present some basic facts about the Russian power industry in the 
second part The major efforts of reorganizing the electricity sector since 1992 will be emphasized in 
the following part The reorganization privatization and regulation of the electric power industry as 
well as the new price mechanism for power create the foundation of a Russian power market At the
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end of the article I outline potential strategies lor introducing competition policies into the Russian 
power industry
Economic and Energy Policy
The Holding Company Model
In 1992 alter the abolition of GOSPLAN (the central state planning committee) and the five year plan 
after the introduction of contractual freedom and after the termination of state loreign trade and foreign 
currency monopoly the Gaidar government initiated a new period of the transitional process through 
the liberalization of prices and the start of the privatization process of state owned enterprises 
However the absence of a complex and workable plan for the economic transition the influence of 
competing interest groups on the policy making process and the special interests of a huge 
administrative apparatus slowed down the introduction of market conditions Even if President Yeltsin 
and the Chernomyrdin government recently expressed their will to continue the reform efforts the 
actual policy repeatedly avoided necessary measures ol an economic transition or rather interrupted 
them after a few steps
Those market oriented reform measures deal with the creation of a reliable institutional framework 
which means introducing a functioning price mechanism organizing markets breaking up or 
weakening monopolies lowering protection making the state solvent and supporting a social policy 
which protects at least those whose subsistence is threatened by reforms None of these issues is 
sufficiently addressed in the current Russian economic policy and the vacillate approach to economic 
reforms can be blamed for many aspects of the present difficult situation of the Russian economy 
which can be seen in the 40 percent decline of industrial production over the last three years a 45 
percent decline of investments in 1992 and an estimated decline of investments of over 10 percent in 
1994 and by an inflation rate of approximately 500 percent in 1994 1 However because market 
oriented reforms inevitably impose substantial social costs on the society and bring about a temporary 
period of economic deterioration the question is what form and pace of economic reform—radical or 
gradual—will be chosen
To all appearances Russia is relying on a gradual style of market oriented economic reforms One 
obvious evidence supporting this view is the realized dualistic structure of the Russian economy 
Besides a private sector comprised mainly of commerce and services there remains a strong state 
sector The government s policy in this respect follows a so called holding company model In this 
approach state owned government controlled firms and enterprises m certain industrial sectors are 
grouped into one holding company which is directly or indirectly supervised by the ministry 
responsible for this industrial sector In some cases these holding companies are huge monopolistic 
creations which in effect represent a whole branch of industry This for example applies for the 
electricity sector and the gas industry
In general the present economic and energy policy is characterized by vague conception and weak 
coordination This state of affairs endangers the necessary market onented restructuring of sensitive 
industrial sectors like the electric power industry That is why the creation of a reliable institutional 
framework is an essential requirement for further reforms in the entire energy sector and in the electric 
power industry
The Energy Policy
The major objectives of energy policy are a cheap and stable power supply and harmony between the 
energy political and general politico economic objectives of the society 2 For Russia this means that 
the particular energy political aims should correspond to the guidelines of the general transitional 
process to a market economy Simultaneously special incentives must be given to guarantee a
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sufficient power supply which is currently hampered by a high share of outdated existing equipment 
and by a severely curtailed number of new power pi mts being brought on line
At the moment it is not possible to claim that the Russian energy policy is dealing with the above 
mentioned objectives sufficiently The Concept of Energy Policy of the Russian Federation under New 
Economic Conditions which was approved in September 1992 by the Russian government is 
distorted by economic principles characteristic of a controlled economy—for instance centralized 
assignments concerning production input output power prices for certain consumer groups allocation 
of fuels and investments to build new generation and transmission facilities—and heavily influenced 
by special interests like those of the administrative apparatus In order to maintain its power and retain 
control over the reform and production process the strategy of the administrative apparatus is to permit 
only a magnitude of market relations and private property which does not jeopardize its dominant 
position in this sector The corresponding scenario proposed by the energy policy concept envisions the 
creation of controlled energy markets characterized by moderate centralization with market mechanisms 
playing an auxiliary role
Furthermore the energy policy attaches great importance to energy saving and to the so called gas 
intermission The gas intermission marks a longer transitional stage beginning in the 1970s when 
the use of gas in thermal power plants was supported to ensure a stable electricity supply until the full 
employment of the nuclear power industry would be reali/ed Besides the setbacks in the nuclear power 
sector present economic conditions lead to an extension of the gas intermission Now it serves as the 
basis for the rehabilitation and modernization of the whole energy sector—maybe even of the whole 
economy
Nevertheless the core of the new strategy in the energy sector is energy saving The unused energy 
saving potential of the Russian economy is estimated at roughly 500 to 600 million tones standard 
coal equivalents per year 1 Several suggestions and concepts have been worked out to give incentives 
for energy saving to all involved parties That includes price incentives in energy consumption credits 
to preferred conditions for energy saving equipment federal and regional fonds to promote energy 
consumers who try to use energy saving technique and alternative energy sources The given 
incentives however will have no effects if the general economic mechanism is not functioning 
because of the absence of an appropriate institutional framework and especially of a workable price 
system
Basic Characteristics of the Russian Electricity Sector 
Electricity Supply and Demand
The Russian economy can rely on a considerable electric power potential which is mainly based on 
domestic fuel technique and technology Russia possesses one of the biggest potentials of fuel and 
energy resources m the world On its territory which occupies nearly 10 percent of the surface of the 
earth reside about 45 percent of the worldwide discovered natural gas six percent of the oil and 23 
percent of the coal4
The Russian electric power industry generates about 63 percent of the power of the former Soviet 
Union In 1992 the installed generating capacity of Russian power plants was 212 Gigawatt (GW) and 
the net generation was about 1 008 5 billion kilowatt hours s Out of the 728 power plants 618 are 
thermoelectric power plants 9 are nuclear power plants and 101 are hydroelectric power plants (see 
Figure 1)
At the beginning of the decade energy inputs for providing electricity in the former USSR consisted 
of 26 percent coal 13 percent oil 33 percent natural gas 15 percent hydroenergy and 13 percent 
uranium 6 However in Russia the share of natural gas and oil appears to be much higher because the 
significant coal deposits in the Ukraine are mainly used for the generation of domestic power In 56
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FIGURE 1 The structure ot installed generating capacity and net generating in 1992 Source 
Berliner Kratt-Bewag and A G Licht eds Die Elektroenergiewirtschaft und die Wirtschaftsreform 
in Rußland (Berlin Iniormationsmatenal 1993)
percent of the thermal power plants natural gas is used as a primary fuel 7 At least from an ecological 
standpoint this is a favorable fuel structure On the other hand the efficiency of the thermoelectric 
power plants lies considerably below the standard of advanced industrial countries According to 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) statistics the net efficiency of coal 
fired power plants is only 24 9 percent whereas the net efficiency of oil fired and gas fired power plants 
is about 21 percent 8
A distinguishing feature of the Russian electric power industry is its complex character Besides the 
operating infrastructure it includes a huge sector of specialized maintenance construction installation 
and mechanical engineering enterprises as well as several specialized research and project institutes 
This complex structure combined with state ownership and centralized planning and control in the 
opinion of leading Russian energy experts were responsible lor the successful formation and 
functioning of the electricity sector Today the main task is to maintain the system performance 
However the disruption of production ties resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union the 
imbalance in price policies on fuels and other major economic difficulties led to an unstable fuel 
supply to operate power plants backlogs in building new power plants (which caused an increase of 
outdated and inefficient electric power equipment) a reduction of reserve capacity and with it to 
unstable power supply The reserve capacity amounts to merely four to six percent of the highest 
annual load 9 in contrast to 20 to 25 percent reserve capacity which in Western countries is considered 
as necessary 10 Moreover whereas in the first half of the 1980s in Russia annually 6 000 Megawatt 
(MW) new generation capacity was brought on steam by 1991-1992 it was only 1 380 MW In 1993
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TABLE 1 The Electric Power Balance ot the Formtr Soviet Economy (in billion kilowatt hour) 
__________________Consume o f Electric Power
Generated
Year
Electric
Power Industn Agriculture Transportation
Other
Sectors
Transportation
Losses Export
1980 1293 9 772 9 1 10 9 102 8 181 3 106 9 19 1
1985 1554 1 893 5 145 7 120 1 222 2 133 7 28 9
1986 1598 9 922 3 152 1 128 0 230 2 137 3 29 0
1987 1664 9 957 1 160 4 131 3 239 5 142 0 34 6
1988 1705 1 980 7 166 8 132 8 245 9 139 9 38 0
1989 1721 7 978 6 173 2 136 5 253 8 141 6 38 0
1990 1725 7 968 3 189 0 134 2 258 1 140 3 35 8
1991a -1068 2 622 0 103 4 96 7 150 l b 84 0 47 Ie
a For the Russian Federation
b 95 6 billion kilowatt hour—municipal economy 54 5 billion kilowatt hour—facilities tor 
telecommunication culture health and commerce 
c Outside ot the Russian Federation
Source Center ot Informing the Public about the Nucleir Power Industry ed Energetika Ziffn t Fakt\ 
(Moscow 1993) p 123
new power plants with 3 000 MW were introduced while at least 8 000 to 9 000 MW of new power 
were required to ensure a reliable electricity supply 11 Because of declining construction and installation 
work there is a serious threat that a large part of the special enterprises in the Russian electric power 
equipment sector will break up
The demand structure for power makes the dominance of the industrial sector especially that ot heavy 
industry evident (see Table 1) Related to all successor states of the USSR heavy industry has a share 
of 42 percent of electricity sales Considering the fact that a large part of the former Soviet light 
industry and agriculture is located in other republics the share of the heavy industry in Russia is still 
higher The remaining industry consumes 28 percent and households and small consumers use up 22 
percent of the generated power 12
The production in the electricity industry fell by four percent in 1992 and by 5 3 percent in 1993 n 
One would assume that the production slum in this and in the other sectors should have brought a 
sharp decline in power demand This in fact did not happen largely because of the failed attempts to 
save energy
There exist several scenarios for the development of the electricity demand in the future Most of 
them assume a subsequent steady growth up to 1 135 to 1 180 billion kilowatt hour in 2000 and 1 360 
to 1 490 billion kilowatt hour in 2010 14 Consequently the electricity generation after restoring the 
level of 1990 generation by 1996-1998 will also grow substantially primarily due to thermal power 
plants In this respect Russian energy policy makers have in mind the situation in China where a 
sharp increase in power demand because of the growing economy cannot be satisfied due to the poor 
conditions of the power sector
The Nuclear Power Industry
A special part in the Russian economy is played by the nuclear power industry And as it appears from 
the gas intermission concept this importance will continue in the future as well As a part of the 
Soviet Military Industrial Complex a mist of secrecy always hung over that sector for a long time and 
even today for instance the budget of this sector is not explicitly published Because of the 
communist technical optimism the absence of expressed opposition and substitution competition and 
because of the political and military aims of the Soviet Union the nuclear power industry had almost
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ideal conditions tor a strong development Until now this branch is economically uncoupled trom the 
power companies and subordinated to the Ministry ot Nuclear Energy Industry (MINATOM) The 
owner and commercial as well as production coordinator of the nine operating nuclear power plants and 
the belonging construction and maintenance enterprises is ROSENERGOATOM a 100 percent state 
owned holding company
The lingering aftereffects of the nuclear disaster near Chernobyl and the desire of several regions for 
more economic and political independence are responsible for the negative attitude of the public and of 
local administrations concerning the attempt to build new nuclear power plants or to finish those which 
are under construction Nevertheless the strategy up to the year 2010 points to an intensive 
development of the nuclear power industry Besides modernization and satety enhancing in existing 
power plants there are plans to install new capacity through the use of a new reactor generation and 
small low power atomic power plants 15 However even if the increasing power consumption in the 
future the declining speed of development ot the coal industry higher costs of oil gas and coal 
exploitation and ecological advantages support this plan serious obstacles remain So for instance 
the absence of funds and investments the poor conditions of the nuclear equipment sector the negative 
public opinion and the possible shortage of highly qualified staff make this goal questionable 
Additionally the existing concept for the development of the nuclear power industry does not suggest a 
new economic mechanism management structure or property relationship to deal with the complicated 
situation in this industry This shows the attempt ot the administrative apparatus to maintain the 
monopolized and centralized character ot this branch To what extent the existence of 
ROSENERGOATOM and other commercial structure like for example ERCO a finance company for 
the realization of projects in the nuclear power sector which are not financed by the Federal budget 
anymore will lead to practical solutions of these problems remains open
The Unified Power Grid
Russia s electricity sector includes an enormous unified power grid which connects more than 70 
energy systems (regional power companies) and ensures the power supply of a territory extending from 
the Far East to the Western borders ot European Russia and from the Ice Sea to the border of Georgia 
(see Figure 2) The national grid is a highly automated system which allows to realize the advantages 
of the parallel operation ot energy systems under the conditions of an operative distribution of power 16 
It is technically controlled by the Central Electricity Dispatch (CED) m Moscow which coordinates 
the work of dozens of regional grids
In the hierarchy the CED is followed by six regional electricity dispatches Regional electricity 
dispatch (REDs) which coordinate the activities of the regional energy systems located on their 
territory The regional energy systems are responsible for the cooperation of the power plants and 
network enterprises within their boundaries (see Figure 3)
In Russia prevails the opinion that the unified power grid is an inalienable precondition for a reliable 
functioning and a successful development of the electricity sector Consequently the switch to market 
relations must not threaten its existence Furthermore it was very important after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union to withstand efforts to carve the national grid up and to divide it among the sovereign 
regions and republics That would have placed in jeopardy the power supply system because only 20 
regional energy systems produced a power surplus whereas all the other energy systems needed top 
ups 17 Common sense prevailed and the core of the former unified grid of the USSR has been retained 
At the same time substantial economic dependencies made it necessary to reorganize the former Soviet 
power grid on the basis of cooperation between the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
countries For example the energy systems in Ukraine Belorussia Kazakhstan Georgia and Armenia 
currently cannot generate sufficient energy to meet domestic requirements 18 Therefore bilateral treaties 
were signed to establish the conditions for parallel operation of national grids so that each country 
would provide its own power supplier buying additional power from neighboring states when 
necessary While the Electric Power Council of the CIS is in charge of organizing the
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Territorial Eners>\ Associations Important Regional Energ\ S\stcms
I TEA North-West 1 Ltnenergo
II TEA Center 2 Mosenergo
III TEA North-Caucasus 3 Tatarenergo
IV TEA Middle Volga 4 Tjumenenergo
V TEA Ural 5 Kusbasenergo
VI
VII
TEA Siberia 
TEA Far East
6 Yakutskenergo
FIGURE 2 Territorial Energy Associations (TEA) based on regional electricity dispatches 
and important regional energy systems
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FIGURE 3 The Russian Unified Power Grid RED (Regional electricity dispatch) Source A F Dyakov 
Reform der Leitung der Stromwirtschaft VGB Kraftwerkstechnik 2 (1994a)
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cooperation the CED in Moscow collaborates with electricity dispatches of individual CIS countries to 
guarantee constant technological control of the national grid Despite these efforts for many pressing 
problems like for example the huge debts of other CIS nations to Russia for power supply still has 
to be found a solution 19
International Cooperation
On the basis of economic cooperation between the Communist economies (COMECON) nations the 
former unified grid of the USSR was included into the integrated power system of the socialist 
European countries whose central electricity dispatch is located m Prague The Soviet Union then 
exported large amounts of electricity through this system The collapse of COMECON caused a 
massive decline of power export However even if many Middle and Eastern European countries want 
to integrate into the Power network of Western European Countries (UCPTE) there exist serious plans 
to revive power export via Ukraine to these countries Furthermore Finland has been buying electricity 
in Russia for many years In the future this cooperation will expand Russian electricity is also 
exported to Mongolia
In addition for several years there existed projects of direct electricity exchange between Russia and 
Western countries which could be realized through direct high voltage lines linking certain Russian 
power plants with Western power compamts Even the creation of a synchronous network from Spain 
to Vladivostok or the construction of a direct transmission line between Russia and the U S over the 
Bering Strait is conceivable Of course whether such projects are technically possible and economically 
useful is still to be studied For a coordinated operation of Russia s national grid and the Western 
UCPTE (and/or NORDEL the Power network of Scandinavian Countries) improvements especially in 
reserve capacity and frequency maintaining m the Russian grid are necessary
The Russian electric power industry needs to carry out a major overhaul of thermal power stations 
located in the European part of the country Altogether it faces an estimated long term demand for about 
50 000 MW of new generating capacity 70 The significant lack of Financial recourses and the enormous 
need for all manner of equipment and technology makes various kinds of cooperation with Western 
partners necessary This could be direct investments or credits which could be repaid by transfer of 
electricity to the West However the lack of security for foreign investments and the general difficult 
economic climate complicate these efforts Hopefully the fulfillment of the obligations specified in the 
European Energy Charter Treaty signed in November 1994 in Lisbon will lead to an appropriate 
environment for foreign investments in Russia
Nevertheless one has to keep in mind that Russia plans to retain the complex character of its electric 
power industry This will include protection of the domestic electric power equipment sector from 
foreign competition In general Russians maintain a negative attitude against foreign dominance in the 
electric power industry as was the case in the pre 1917 Russia 71
Creating the Foundations of a Russian Power Market 
The Necessity to Reorganize
At the beginning of the 1990s the existing organizational and management structure of the Russian 
electric power sector was not prepared for the introduction of market relationships This especially 
refers to the property structure to the relationship between central and regional electric power 
authorities and to the price formation for power Under the Soviet Union s centralized system of 
planning and distribution of income it was not a particular problem that only 20 out of 70 regional 
energy systems had a surplus of power whereas the rest needed top ups The abolition of the planned 
economy however caused the substantial problem that energy systems with a surplus of energy 
imposed high electricity prices on those with a power deficit77 The surplus energy systems tried to 
shift their higher costs of using inefficient generation facilities increasing social security payments to
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FIGURE 4 The management structure ot the Russian electric power industry before the formation of joint 
stock companies and the privatization process Source A F Dyakov Reform der Leitung der 
Stromwirtschaft VGB Kraftwukstechnik 2 (1994a) p 89
their own workers and new local taxes on electricity onto importing energy systems This in the eyes 
of Russian policy makers led to unnecessary and undesired polarization of electricity prices between the 
regions Furthermore the existing organizational and price structure did not give incentives tor cost 
cutting and efficiency increasing measures The surplus energy systems also partially refused to pay the 
customary money to centralized funds preventing the proper functioning of the centralized investment 
mechanism Those facts led to the opinion that the negative tendencies inherent in the evolving 
situation have been the result of a growing and inappropriate decentralization of economic decision 
making (see Figure 4)
It was claimed that this structure did not correspond to the special features of the electric power sector 
and to the present economic conditions in Russia which is why the threat of unstable electricity 
supply and other negative effects on the national economy arose Therefore the privatization process 
has been used to form a new organizational and financial structure in the electric power industry which 
had to fulfill the task of pushing back monopolistic behavior of regional energy systems with energy 
surplus to create conditions tor lower electricity prices and to develop basic elements for competition 
in this sector In this respect the realized centralization serves as a remedy rather than as a goal
The New Structure and its Competitive Implications
The development of the Russian electric power industry has been determined by a senes of special 
presidential decrees which emphasized the importance of the electncity sector and the special approach 
to reorganize it The first decree was issued in 1992 to define the structural changes and the 
pnvatization process in the electric power industry Accordingly the existing energy systems were 
transformed into 72 joint stock companies acting as power generators and distributors Most of the 
energy enterprises in the territory of the energy systems (power plants network enterprises etc ) became 
subsidiaries of the new regional power companies However all thermal power plants with 1 000 MW 
or greater generating capacity and hydroelectric power plants with capacity of 300 MW or more—51 
large power plants altogether—and the transmission lines at 330 kilovolt or above were separated from 
the surplus amalgamations These large power plants and high voltage transmission lines together 
with at least 49 percent of the common stock capital of every regional power company were handed 
over to the state owned Russian Joint Stock Company for Power & Electrification known as Rossn 
State owned Russian joint stock company for power and electrification (RAO EES Rossn) which was 
founded December 31 1992 In addition the electncity dispatches the substations and the research and 
project institutes became entities of the new holding company The traditional integration of the
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FIGURE 5 The composition ot the common stock capital of RAO EES Rossn Source Derived from Berliner 
Kratt-Bewag and A G Licht eds Die Elektroenergiewirtschaft und die Wirtschaftsreform in Rußland 
(Berlin Informationsmaterial 1993)
electric power and energy equipment industries has been guaranteed for at least the next three years by 
uniform management and fiduciary administration of the equipment sector through the RAO EES 
Rossn (see Figure 5)
The Ministry of Fuels and Energy MINTOPENERGO in the new structure has the task of 
supervising activities of the RAO EES Rossn coordinating the interplay between RAO and other 
energy sectors and working on general issues concerning the electric power sector such as drafting 
bills working out prognoses and scenarios for the lurther development of the sector ensuring the 
governmental influence within the scope of existing bills (see Figure 6)
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FIGURE 6 The management structure ot the Russian electric power industry after the formation of joint stock 
companies and the privatization process Source A F Dyakov Reform der Leitung der Stromwirtschatt 
VGB Kraftwerkstechnik 2 (1994a) p 92
Figure 6 also points out the relationship between RAO EES Rossii and the nuclear energy industry 
All nuclear power plants and all maintenance and construction enterprises belonging to this branch were 
handed over to the trust ROSENERGOATOM which is 100 percent state owned and under the 
supervision of MINATOM
What elements of competition does the new structure contain9 The first important observation that 
can be made is that the high voltage transmission lines were separated from the generating facilities and 
handed over to RAO EES Rossii as a uniform grid Because the separated grid is a natural monopoly 
under strong regulatory supervision and in the hands with a single owner one condition for the creation 
of a potential power market has already been met Such a network company has to grant every 
electricity supplier—regional power companies separated power plants nuclear power plants—free 
access to the transmission lines It will have no right to discriminate a potential user of the grid for 
instance through arbitrary fixing of the fee for using the grid
The foundation of the 72 joint stock companies on the basis of the regional energy systems and the 
creation of the subsidiaries of RAO EES Rossii on the basis of the 51 separated power plants are also 
important steps toward development of power markets Every power company now has the opportunity
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to choose between generating power with their own facilities or buying power on the wholesale 
market supplied by the separated power plants of the RAO EES Rossn and by the surplus capacity of 
other regional power companies In the future other customers like for instance large industrial 
enterprises will also get the opportunity to buy power directly from the wholesale market On the 
other hand large industrial enterprises as well as some communities have already started to build their 
own power plants to become independent from the regional power companies To a certain degree the 
threat of loosing customers can be an incentive for the power companies to provide a cheap and stable 
power supply in order to keep or win back important customers
Another competitive element is that the RAO power plants have free access to transmission lines 
They have an incentive to provide a reliable and efficient power supply because they want to be a 
participant in the wholesale market With further progress in the implementation of market relations 
the separated power plants should be transformed into independent power producers
An advantage of the new structure specific to the power industry in Russia is that the contractual 
relationship between the generating facilities of RAO EES Rossn and the regional power companies 
make investments easier because every single player can now establish investment funds without 
having to contribute to centralized funds 21 Nevertheless it is necessary to point out that in the current 
structure the former state monopoly has been simply replaced by a state owned trust what reproduces 
the structure of the former Ministry of Electrification of the USSR MINENERGO The difference is 
that in a planned economy all relevant data are determined so that monopolistic behavior is not 
possible whereas the present monopolistic firm—the RAO EES Rossn—will have strong incentives 
to ensure a guaranteed monopoly rent The semi competitive elements in this context are little more 
than a kind of socialist competition between separate units of a huge centralized and monopolistic 
economic creation which is an attempt to improve its profitability but not to condemn monopolistic 
behavior The reorganized power industry is designed in accordance to the Russian energy policy to 
provide a solution for dealing with actual economic and potential power supply problems However 
even if policy makers currently do not trust market solutions for these problems the new structure at 
least retains basic elements for a potential Russian power market
Privatization
The aim of privatization in Russia is to create a socially oriented market economy stabilize Russia s 
finances and attract foreign investments Institutions of the electric power industry can be privatized 
only by a decision of the Russian president or government A presidential decree from 1992 states that 
not less than 50 percent of the stocks of RAO EES Rossn should remain state property for at least 
three years The State Committee for Privatization the administrator of state property has to transfer 
30 percent of these voting shares proportionally to the consumption of electric power to the 
republics regions autonomous regions and counties of the Russian Federation as well as to the cities 
of Moscow and St Petersburg so that they will be able to influence the management of the electricity 
holding company and play an active role m developing the national grid 74 The sale or any other kind of 
disposal of the state owned share of the electricity sector is only possible through a legislative action of 
the Russian president or government
Another 20 percent of the RAO stocks were sold by June 30 1994 to Russian citizen for 
privatization checks—the so called vouchers—that were given to every citizen m 1992 Approximately 
140 000 shareholders invested 5 5 million vouchers into RAO EES Rossn A certain portion of RAO 
stocks has been reserved for foreign investors
Before however the public auction of RAO stocks took place the participation of electric industry 
employees in the privatization process was ensured The workers of the regional power companies had 
the opportunity to choose among two variants of privatizing their firm (see Figure 5) The electricity 
dispatches high voltage transmission lines and research and project institutes are completely the 
property of the RAO EES Rossn Employees of these institutions which did not have the right to 
privatize were allowed to buy shares of the RAO EES Rossn There were also mechanisms ot
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receiving corresponding shares for employees of the separated large power plants and in the electric 
power equipment sector The goals of this privatizing procedure were to make a contribution to the 
social security of the employees and to overcome a certain psychological barrier to the introduction of 
capitalism The employees were used to socialist ownership under which the powerful energy system 
had been created and of which they were proud Now they must accept alien ownership of their 
company and the significant influence of new owners for instance concerning the use of profit
For the present the privatization process can be described as formal because for at least the next three 
years the majority of stock will remain with the government so that the privatization constitutes the 
choice of a specific form of managing the defined public scope of duty The bodies responsible for this 
scope of duty became independent in the form of joint stock companies The main objective of this 
measure is to relieve the national budget Furthermore it serves as a source of public income and 
capital for investments because the dividend that is paid on state owned stocks will be used for 
investments into this sector The further development of a competitive market for power requires a far 
reaching freeing from governmental influence on the electric power industry through share holding For 
this the creation of adequate capital markets and the development of an appropriate regulatory 
mechanism is a prerequisite
Pnce Formation for Electricity
In a market economy a workable price mechanism plays an essential role which is why it is necessary 
to take a look at the price forming mechanism for power After the abolition of central planning the 
financing of the electricity sector from budgetary funds declined drastically That s why the needs for 
investments couldn t be satisfied Moreover the increasing running costs were unrelated to the existing 
official price list for electricity For this reason price regulation was chosen in 1991 In the beginning 
the American pattern of price formation for power was used Even if this system did a good job with 
the restructuring of the power industry a new system of price formation was needed
The main point of the developed price mechanism is that there is one wholesale price for power from 
the grid of RAO EES Rossn so that importing power companies in any region of Russia pay the 
same price for the power they buy from RAO Additionally every user of the grid has to pay a 
participation fee the amount of which depends upon the quantity of provided or received electric 
power 26 This system ensures that deficit regional power companies are not dependent on power supply 
from those with a power surplus so that they will have to pay lower power prices compared to the 
situation before the reorganization Thus the expressed goal of pushing back the strong position of 
surplus regional energy companies can be reached At the same time wholesale wheeling without an 
additional transmission fee is guaranteed Only a participation fee which depends on the quantity not 
on the distance of the power exchange will be charged
This system of transmission pricing is a first step into the direction of introducing a power spot 
market In the course of developing normative and methodical foundations for such a spot market and 
improving the technological state of the electricity sector (for example equipping power suppliers and 
consumers with electric meters) it will be possible to switch from the system of determined prices to a 
kind of clearing system on the basis of offered delivery prices similar to the pool model practiced in 
England and Wales since 1990 However there are a lot of serious problems to solve and obstacles to 
overcome before such a system can be realized One problem which jeopardizes the workability of the 
current pricing system and of the electric power industry itself is connected with huge mutual payment 
refusals among state owned or state controlled enterprises 77 Under these conditions the current most 
important task is to ensure stable electricity supply with any available remedy The electric power 
industry at the moment definitely is one of the few areas which have avoided the complete collapse of 
the Russian economy This responsibility results in a cautious approach to any change
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Electricity Regulation
As stated earlier one reason for the present economic problems are the half hearted efforts to create a 
market economy Yet in Russia the difficult economic situation is often considered a negative outcome 
of the introduction of market forming elements In this opinion many of these elements are 
inappropriate under the specific circumstances of the country The failure of the market to master the 
economic transition in a way considered by Russian policy makers as appropriate therefore makes it 
necessary to keep methods and elements of a controlled economy as they were used during the period of 
planned economy This attitude towards economic reforms also applies to the electricity sector For this 
reason the notion of the term regulation in Russia so far does not typically imply laws independent 
regulatory agencies and different kinds of regulations governing affairs such as prices profits 
allocation of costs financial transactions organizational and financial structures health safety and 
environmental impacts Regulation rather is considered a method of direct governmental control 
including central given assignments concerning input output and prices centralized allocation of fuel 
and centralized decisions whether to build new generation facilities 28
The electric power sector clearly crystallizes the Russian variant of the transition to market 
relations through strong governmental influence and management methods of a controlled economy it 
is intended to establish the basis of market relationships in this sector With the gradual increase of 
market conditions the governmental influence will diminish Simultaneously the terminus economic 
regulation will get its true meaning in the sense of influencing the behavior of economic subjects 
through market specific measures with the aim of correcting or avoiding market failure
The way in which wholesale and retail rate regulation was organized expresses the attempt of the 
Russian government to introduce an appropriate regulatory mechanism The Russian Federal Energy 
Commission approves wholesale power prices (prices for power from the RAO grid) the transmission 
network participation fee and the prices for power that is delivered from the separated large power 
plants to the grid or provided off grid directly to importing power companies 29 The rates charged to 
customers and appropriate profit levels for the regional power companies are approved by Regional 
Energy Commissions which were created following the Danish model 10
It is evident that this regulatory approach to a certain degree is copied from established market 
economies Even if this were to promote a faster recovery and renewal of the power industry the same 
discussions about economies of regulation will evolve as we face them today in other industrialized 
countries with a highly regulated electric industry The point is that under a regulated regime the 
electric industry seeks to be organized as an area which is exempt from any kind of competition that 
power prices in general tend to be too high and that the market division of consumers according to the 
range and quantity of electric power use leads to successful price discrimination in the interests of the 
electricity supplier Therefore in Russia it would be meaningful to impose regulation on the electricity 
sector only to an extent that is considered efficient and that also will not constitute serious barriers to 
the future objective of introducing a competitive power market
Designing Competition Policies for the Russian Electricity Sector 
About Competition in the Electric Power Industry
In a market economy competition should be the dominant social process leading to economic 
decisions Competition should be replaced by other economic mechanisms only where it does not exist 
where it cannot be implemented through economic policy or where competition cannot produce useful 
economic results in a market environment The existence for example of natural monopolies which 
generally arise out of situations where supply by one firm leads to the lowest costs is viewed as a 
reason to exempt an industry from competition The provision of electric power has been considered to 
have natural monopoly characteristics However energy policy makers are beginning to realize that 
power generation (and power marketing) could be organized in a competitive way whereas electricity
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transmission remains a natural monopoly This is the starting point of the current discussion about the 
introduction of various types ot competition into the wholesale and even retail market for power
In Russia in the course ol the drive for a power market reflections on the design of competition 
policies for the electricity sector become important too Major conditions for a competitive 
environment in this industry would include liberalization of power plant and transmission line 
construction termination of closed supply areas of the regional power companies access of third 
parties to transmission and distribution networks and so called unbundling that is the separation of 
costing and accountancy of generating transmitting distributing and trading units As a result 
power wheeling would become possible Comprehensive competition could be achieved if 
additionally the networks were removed from the vertically integrated companies a uniform operator of 
transmission lines and power plant employment were established and a spot market for power were 
created ^  Given these changes a certain type of a competitive pool system could evolve
However in the discussion about the creation of markets—especially power markets—and 
introduction of real competition one has to keep in mind that markets do not function out of nothing 
They are institutions that depend on other institutions Furthermore competition also requires a 
sufficient supply with the corresponding commodity Therefore the design of competition policies for 
electric power markets is only feasible in the context of the creation of an appropriate institutional 
framework and a sufficient power supply At the present neither reliable institutions are established nor 
an adequate power supply is guaranteed so that the following remarks represent rather a perspective 
outlook
The Generation Pool Wheeling System
Before the reorganization of the Russian electricity sector when the transmission lines and large 
power plants where still included in regional energy systems the unified grid represented a 
conglomerate of cooperative power generation pools that ensured a cost effective supply of power in 
certain transmission areas through integrated network and power plant employment The CED level 
could be described as a kind of a super cooperative generation pool As a result of the restructuring 
when the high voltage transmission lines and the 51 power plants with an installed capacity of about 
96 000 MW were separated from regional energy systems to form the RAO EES Rossn most of the 
regional power companies became substantial power purchasers themselves Like the separated large 
power plants the regional power companies which retain 80 900 MW have free access to the RAO 
grid This national grid structure controlled by the CED constitutes a power generation pool In such 
an environment the relationship between generating facilities (removed power plants surplus power 
companies) transmission (separated transmission lines) and consumers (power companies) is not 
based on closed supply areas Under these conditions the addition of individual negotiated power 
delivery contracts between these parties—so called wheeling contracts—would create a generation pool 
wheeling system 11 For Russia the creation of this system is quite possible in the medium term It 
allows evolutionary changes in the electricity sector such that for a transitional period traditional 
attitudes and management methods can be kept The statute of RAO EES Rossn which stresses the 
creation of a market for power on the basis of a system of contractual arrangements 14 indicates the 
possibility of introducing such a generation pool wheeling system The new price structure points also 
into this direction by emphasizing a general participation fee instead of individualized transmission fees 
for the use of grid transmission lines In fact if other requirements as for instance the necessity to 
work out guidelines for wheeling contracts and to grant RAO power plants and regional power 
companies full economic independence from the electricity holding company are fulfilled the 
generation pool wheeling system seems most suitable to the current strategy for the electricity sector
The Unified Pool System
In the future further steps m the direction of more comprehensive competition in this sector would be 
conceivable A variant of a pure pool model like the existing spot market in England and Wales but
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applied to the specific features and conditions of the Russian electric power industry could be realized 
Such an orientation which is already being discussed in Russia requires further fundamental 
adaptations including the need for normative standards and technical improvements in the electricity 
sector economic independence of generating facilities and free access to the pool tor electricity dealers 
and power consumers which means a separation of network operation and power trading It is necessary 
to establish the transmission network as an independent unit which as a natural monopoly will remain 
under a strong regulatory supervision That means the transition grid is owned and maintained by a 
separate regulated company unaffiliated with any power generator or distributor The grid company 
provides the assets that physically interconnect generation and distribution but does not control the 
dispatch of generation on the grid This is the responsibility of the central dispatch/spot market 
operator who dispatches the system based on energy buy/sell offers from individual power distributors 
(consumers) and generators provides transmission services (including those needed to maintain the 
systems performance) determines market clearing energy prices for each hour (or half hourly) and 
settles spot transactions In concrete terms the function of RAO EES Rossn which retains the 
electricity dispatches would be limited to dispatching the national grid and operating the spot market 
The regional power companies then will be treed from holding company control as well as the large 
power plants and all other units currently included in RAO EES Rossn —such as construction and 
installation firms research and project institutes
Before implementing these significant changes a fundamental question concerning the structure of a 
possible pool system must be settled How many pools should there be7 The size of the country 
regional differences in features of the electric power industry and furthermore the partially existing 
capacity restrictions in the transmission network makes it necessary to set up several power pools 
These could be created as so called point markets—pools with uniform power prices regardless of what 
point the power is taken from—on the basis of the REDs The founded pools which control the 
dispatch and operate the spot market in the corresponding regions (see Figure 2 and 3) would be acting 
under the aegis of a super power pool coordinated by the CED The emerging unified pool system 
would guarantee the existence of the integrated electricity network and does justice to regional 
differences as well as to the dimensions of the power sector Of course this proposal would require a 
comprehensive analysis coherent with the general economic development and specific features of the 
Russian energy sector
Conclusion
The prospects for considerable changes in the Russian electric industry and the major banners to these 
changes as emphasized in this paper are summarized in Table 2
Presently in Russia the prevailing understanding of the economic transition is reflected in a dual 
national economy in which important sectors—the electric power sector included—remain submitted to 
state control These sectors are subject to strong governmental influence and management methods 
characteristic for a controlled economy which is considered necessary to overcome the present difficult 
economic state of the country Further progress in economic reforms and improvements of the 
economic situation will allow a gradual implementation of market relations into these sectors and the 
removal of governmental and administrative control In this context the creation of a controlled power 
market based on moderate centralization of economic decision making with market mechanisms playing 
a supplementary role is regarded as an appropriate approach to deal with the reorganization of the 
electric power industry It is claimed that this scenario will guarantee a stable and secure electricity 
supply in the course of the transition to a market oriented economy
The realization of this energy strategy is reflected by the design and gradual introduction of a 
Russian type wholesale market for power which in effect is a huge centralized and monopolistic 
creation represented by the state owned joint stock company RAO EES Rossn Certainly the new 
structure bears some competitive implementations and elements which in the current context 
however are little more than a kind of socialist competition between separate units of these 
monopolistic firm Nonetheless those elements of competition as well as the privatization of the
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TABLE 2 Prospects ot the Russian Electricity Sector ind Impediments to its Development
Economic Polit\
Energy Polic\
Power Supph and Demand
International Cooperation
Russian Power Market
Competition Policies
____________ Prospects___________
Promise ot market oriented 
economic reforms 
Dual economy approach relying on 
the holding company model 
Controlled energy markets 
characterized by moderate 
centralization with market 
mechanisms playing an auxiliary 
role
Emphasizing the use ot natural gas 
and energy saving measures
•Subsequent steady growth of 
electricity demand 
•Retain complex character ot the 
electricity sector 
Retain parallel operation ot 
national grids ot the CIS countries 
Reviving export to Middle and 
Eastern European countries 
Power export to Western European 
countries
•major investment opportunities 
(tor example in comprehensive 
renewal of the power plant park and 
in electricity stocks)
European Energy Charter Treaty 
Participants unified grid 
(transmission) separated power 
producer (generation) regional 
energy companies (generation and 
distribution)
Privatization and cost based power 
pricing
•Electricity regulation and 
antimonopoly policies
•Generation pool wheeling system 
•Unified pool system
___________ Impediments__________
•Vague conception and weak 
coordination ot economic policies 
•Undeveloped institutional 
framework
Use ot economic principles 
characteristic tor a controlled 
economy
•Special interests especially ot the 
administrative apparatus 
•No comprehensive and logical 
concept to improve power supply 
•Potentially unstable power supply 
because ot outdated and inefficient 
equipment and tuel shortage
Substantial debts ot other CIS 
countries to Russia tor power 
supply
•Permanently changing decrees and 
instructions
•Lack ot security for foreign 
investments
•Artificially low power prices 
•Huge mutual payment refusals no 
system ot debt indexation
•Monopoly power ot the RAO EES 
Rossn
•Regulatory authorities vulnerable to 
political pressure 
Strong governmental influence 
based on non economic 
considerations
•Energy enterprises burdened with 
the duty to supply comprehensive 
social services to their workers and 
communes
•No appropriate and reliable 
institutional framework 
•Potentially unstable power supply
electricity sector the new price structure for power and the regulatory mechanism are first signs of a 
development toward a real power market in Russia The creation of such a market and the design of 
corresponding competition policies depend on further substantial reform efforts leading to an 
appropriate institutional framework Furthermore measures must be taken to provide a reliable power 
supply considered necessary for competitive power markets
In the course of this development two types of power markets with different degrees of competitive 
market coordination have a chance to be realized in the Russian electricity sector the generation pool 
wheeling system and the unified pool system The generation pool wheeling system where the 
relationship between the market players is determined by individual negotiated power delivery contracts 
allows more evolutionary changes toward competition in this industry In contrast the unified pool 
system based on the pure pool model which is intended to be a price determination mechanism derived
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from competitive short term powtr buy/sell otters ot market participants would be a step toward 
extensive competition in the power m trket However considering all the aspects of the development ot 
the Russian electricity sector presented in this paper the process of creating competitive power markets 
is a long and onerous one The so tar in the course ot the economic transition realized changes in this 
industry are only the beginning ind imply that there will be a Russian variant ot a market oriented 
electricity sector
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Power, Hegemony and the United States in the 21st Century 
The Presidential Theory of Hegemony
Sean C Matheson
In the surrender ceremony following the American victory at Yorktown the British band played the 
tune The World Turned Upside Down an inglorious song that surely captured the mood of many an 
observer Designed as an insult this tune can now be called prophetic for the American victory set in 
motion forces that certainly turned the relationship on end Just over 150 years after the battle at 
Yorktown the Anglo American relationship was reversed with the Americans assuming the preeminent 
position in world politics and the British having been largely relegated to the role of squire to the 
American knight However the essence of the world system remained intact all that changed was the 
leadership of it
With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union the United States is in the 
position to validate that song and turn the world order itself on end In this paper I will attempt to 
show how the United States rather than facing an erosion of its power is actually poised to solidify its 
hegemonic role in international politics I will argue that this twenty first century hegemony will be of 
a different sort than the world has so far experienced and will show why by looking first at the changed 
international environment in which the U S will operate Next I will explain how traditional notions 
of hegemony are incompatible with this new world order Since this incompatibility could be indicative 
either of a multipolar world or of the need to redefine hegemony I will show that the world is truly 
unipolar Having shown that the international order requires a new conception of hegemony and that the 
US is in the position to fulfill this conception I will then redefine hegemony for the twenty first 
century 1
The International Environment
Without a doubt the greatest transformation in the international environment has been the changing 
nature of power As Nye succinctly puts it Power is becoming less fungible less coercive and less 
tangible 7 More specifically the twenty first century international environment is (and is likely to 
continue to be) characterized by a decreased concern for traditional geopolitical power increased concern 
for economic and technological strength and a general diffusion of influence among a myriad of actors 
The net result of this is that power will still matter of course but will matter in different ways and for 
different reasons
First the traditional basis for geopolitical power is declining in international relevance Military 
power will still be important in the next century but not to the degree that it has been in the past 
This is a result of three factors First the cost of using force has priced itself out of the realm of 
possibility for many countries As Vietnam Afghanistan and Somalia have shown even the 
wealthiest most militarily powerful of states can be humbled by guerrilla forces with only a fraction of 
the larger state s resources Quite simply it is harder for the initiators of the use of force to win today
Second the extreme cost of modern weaponry especially aircraft can not help but make leaders 
hesitant to use it As Egypt and Syria have shown it does not take long to throw away multibilhon 
dollar arsenals When those multibilhon dollar arsenals are depleted and the goal they were used for is 
not obtained the domestic pressures to curtail future uses of force will inevitably grow This is not to 
say that generals and admirals will be unable to Find opportunities and justifications for the use of their
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toys but that they and their civilian masters (if any) will have to consider seriously the loss of most of 
those toys
Beyond these two hard costs however is a factor that is less tangible but possibly more 
important—the use of force has lost much of its legitimacy in the world A country contemplating the 
use of force today must go beyond mere calculations of its expected direct losses and gains to 
assessments of costs to its international reputation and standing If this trend continues then 
conventional military forces may approach a degree of unusabihty and hence irrelevance that nuclear 
weapons have achieved I will return to this concern for legitimacy later
For now and the foreseeable future however force and the ability to resort to it successfully still 
matter All that has changed is that the costs relative to the benefits have increased dramatically 
reducing the utility of forceful measures
As military capacity has become a less fungible aspect of power economic capacity and 
technological innovation have moved in to fill the vacuum Saying that economics matters more in the 
late twentieth century and will matter yet more in the twenty first century borders on the banal yet 
requires brief mention as well Of course the wealthier one is the more able one is to afford new 
weapons and/or lots of them Spending just one percent of GDP on its military Japan has the third 
highest military expenditures in the world In a world in which states are increasingly secure from 
external threats to their sovereignty though economics take on a more important role—it becomes the 
principal agent of influence
Among the wealthiest countries in the world (the OECD countries) none has any plausible tear of 
military invasion or of war amongst themselves For these states the security dilemma has been solved 
(even if temporarily) Hence pressures tor economic growth have taken center stage Even the CIA is 
devoting increasing resources to economic and industrial espionage—and is targeting traditional 
American allies 1
With this increased concern for economic growth states have important cards to play against (or 
with) each other Trade balances exchange levels trade accords and a host of other international 
economic arenas have become especially influential in international relations It is certainly arguable 
that even at the height of Soviet American tensions in the early 1980s Japanese imports were of more 
concern to Americans and had more impact on their lives than did the prospects of a third world war
There is a good deal of rationality behind those American fears though While a third world war 
would be immensely destructive it was still far less likely than the chances that an autoworker in 
Detroit would lose his job or that Americans would be driven out of the consumer electronics industry 
Beyond this Japan attained considerable power m the United States principally because of the 
American dependence on Japanese investors to pay the huge American budget deficit4 In short while 
two huge oceans protected the United States from penetration by states whose power was based on 
traditional geopolitical factors the modem world economy has no such barriers and the U S has been 
more thoroughly penetrated
As we will see in the third section though while the U S does not have the utterly effective passive 
defense of two oceans to protect it it is far from vulnerable The increasing importance of economics 
as a source of power actually benefits the United States as other countries are more vulnerable than it
Finally the world has also seen a great dispersion in power resources While one could describe 
example after example and cause after cause of this dispersion I will focus on the two most important 
Probably the most cited example of this dispersion is the rise in the number and strength of 
multinational corporations General Motors Exxon Mitsubishi and a host of other companies have 
annual sales that exceed the GDP of most of the countries of the world With economic power having 
become more important m the world these MNCs automatically wield significant influence
However the power of these corporations should not be overstated While they are certainly 
important players in the drama of world politics and have contributed to the general dispersion of
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power even the strongest of them must recognize the greater power of states First states maintain a 
monopoly on the use of force and MNCs can no longer rely on their home country to bail them out 
of a tough spot by deploying the marines Second companies are susceptible to lawsuits brought 
against them in areas in which they do business and their officers can be fined jailed or worse Third 
states can occasionally nationalize the assets of these MNCs an action for which these companies have 
less recourse than a hundred years ago
Finally there is a limit to the autonomy of these MNCs The independence of MNCs from states 
with regard to their competitiveness and productivity has been exaggerated as Porter found in an 
exhaustive look at international markets the mam competitors in an industry or industry segment tend 
to come from the same country or be grouped in a small number of countries 5 The state in which they 
are based thus makes a substantial impact in their performance 6 The men and women who run the 
MNCs are also citizens of a particular country and in time of crisis they will look to their home 
capital for advice or instructions In effect when push comes to shove GM is an American MNC just 
as Mitsubishi is a Japanese one Multinational corporations have power and their proliferation and 
increase in resources have given them more power but the effect of all this tends to be overstated
A far more important cause of the dispersion of politics is the rise in power of regional powers 
relative to the world powers this relates closely to the decline of geopolitical power as a source of 
world power States such as India Brazil and even Iraq are much more powerful today as a result of 
two factors First many of them are armed to the teeth and many of these weapons are those of mass 
destruction and of the means to deliver them Even conventional weapons stocks are sufficient to give 
deter great power intervention though Of the world powers only the U S has the ability to engage 
these countries and it is questionable if even it could defeat some of them (especially if there was little 
time to build up ground forces or there was no ability to use the American air fleets) Since they have 
dramatically increased the cost of an attack against them these states have concomitantly increased their 
power relative to other countries while also lessening the importance of this type of power While this 
seems contradictory one can look at nuclear weapons as a clarifying analogy Nuclear weapons give 
countries power especially relative to other nuclear armed countries However if everyone had nuclear 
arms their utility as a means of power (ì e getting someone to do what you want) would be 
nonexistent (unless what you want is to deter such a threat against you)
Second the economic competition between the major powers is so intense that poorer countries have 
an important source of leverage in dealing with each other and with the major powers Arms sales are 
the clearest (though not the only) example the prospect of a major sale will cause arms manufacturers 
and their home governments to offer everything short of eternal salvation (and in some cases even that) 
to close the deal
The combination of increased military capabilities by regional powers and the great demand for new 
markets has spurred a great dispersion of power away from the core countries While there are limits to 
this dispersion the important net effect is that it is harder for the major powers to exercise influence in 
the traditional ways This changed nature of power manifested in the decline of traditional geopolitical 
power its supplanting by economic power and a general dispersion of power among a host of rising 
states and transnational actors has changed the dynamics of the entire international system As a result 
we must explore the definitions of hegemony that were derived from this older system to see if they are 
still relevant in the twenty first century
Conceptualizations of Hegemony
While pornography may be hard to define but knowable when one sees it hegemony is just the 
opposite Definitions of hegemony abound but as we will see problems in those definitions make 
hegemony difficult to detect The most common conceptualization of hegemony exemplified by Waltz 
Bull and Schroeder equates it with empire 7 The logic behind this definition is simple and beguiling 
if a certain state has markedly more power then the other states and power is the ability to get others 
to do what one wants then that most powerful of states will compel others to do what it wants much
Sean C Matheson/7?
as an emperor would be able to command his lar flung subjects Indeed Hedley Bull equates hegemony 
so clearly with control that he argues that balance of power politics is primarily concerned with 
preventing the rise of a hegemon 8 The de facto test for hegemony then boils down to an examination 
ot whether or not a state has been successful in getting others to do its wishes If such control exists 
hegemony exists if it is absent so too is a hegemon
Such a test is certainly Herculean and is unlikely to be passed in the modern international 
environment As we have seen the changed nature of power and the dispersion of power in general have 
made such extensive control impossible Therefore the twin assumptions that underlie the hegemony 
as empire strain of thought that power is control and that control is omnipresent are no longer 
accurate (if they ever were)
A second common conceptualization of hegemony posits it in a Saint Christopher like role bravely 
bearing the costs of supporting the liberal world economic order even as the costs of such action 
increasingly drag it under Robert Gilpin s hegemonic stability theory is the best example of this 
conceptualization 9 Gilpin contends that a liberal international system needs a clear leader if it is to 
overcome the problems of free ndership in rule enforcement 10 In other words there must be a hegemon 
for a liberal economic order to develop to be sustained Unfortunately for the hegemon the costs of 
maintaining the system fall squarely on its shoulders and the other states in the system benefit from 
the free ride they get In the end one hegemon drowns and is replaced (one hopes') by another usually 
after a hegemonic war 11
While Gilpin s thesis that international regimes depend upon the existence of a hegemon has been 
effectively rebutted by Keohane12 among others it does identify a common problem for hegemons—the 
costs of leadership are very high As all hegemons or world powers have risen to their position by 
climbing on the tombstones of their predecessors they are acutely aware of this liability and take steps 
to reduce the costs of leadership This can be done by practicing mercantilist policies retrenching or 
by expanding (thus giving a country more room to retreat )—but all of these actions result in other 
countries losing faith in the hegemon s leadership The legitimacy the hegemon needs is squandered in 
attempts to preserve its position and the end result is the same n
Both these types of definitions however share a common similarity—they posit a hegemon who 
exercises active control in the international environment Even Keohane while acknowledging that 
countries can set up regimes to promote their interests seems reluctant to part with this active 
conceptualization 14 Furthermore hegemonic stability theory and Keohane s regime based theory focus 
exclusively on economics short changing crucial political matters that a hegemon must address These 
definitions of hegemony then are incompatible with a world that while more concerned with 
economics is still concerned with geopolitical power and that has witnessed a general dispersion of 
power away from the central states This leads us to two possible conclusions either the world has so 
changed that hegemony is impossible or that hegemony has changed and these definitions are 
anachronistic In the next section I will address these possibilities
The Case for Umpolanty
If the changed nature of world politics means hegemony is impossible then this debate over the nature 
of the world environment is moot the parameters under which actors in such a power distribution 
behave are well established by the historical record and contemporary theory However the belief that 
the world is currently multipolar is borne more out of theoretical default than empirical observation To 
Waltz Keohane and a host of prominent international relations theorists if the world is not bipolar it 
must be multipolar (largely because they base the identification ot a unipolar world off of those 
anachronistic definitions of hegemony) Even Nye while recognizing the clear transformation of the 
nature of power reasons to the wrong conclusion
But is the world unipolar and how can we tell? To answer this we must know how to measure 
power Kenneth Waltz argues that the polar configuration of a system is identifiable by scoring and
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comparing countries on the size of their population and territory resource endowment military 
strength economic capability political stability and competence 15 A host of other power indices 
using varying components of power exist as well 16 While I contend that my argument will be 
supported by which ever method or index one chooses to use I will base my position on just one 
Having clearly identified the changed nature of power in the post Cold War environment Joseph Nye 
provides the most conceptually sound yet accessible definition He argues that we can identify a 
country s power (and it follows the distribution of power) by looking at what he calls hard and soft 
power resources 17
Hard power resources include such traditional factors as natural resources military and economic 
strength and technological competitiveness They bestow the ability to get others to do what one 
wants Soft or co optive power is composed more of intangible factors like cultural attractiveness 
participation international regimes and shared values It is the ability to get others to want what one 
wants 18 To be a hegemon I will say that a country must place well in both types of power for a 
bipolar world two countries must place must rate approximately the same and for a multipolar world 
three or more countries must rate approximately the same
In territory and population traditional geopolitical bases for power the United States ranks fourth 
and third respectively 19 Significantly the countries that outrank it in population are much poorer and 
have less educated citizens their large populations have proven to be more of a power liability than 
asset Resource endowment is difficult to measure so I will conservatively say that the U S has more 
than all its major potential rivals (Japan Germany and China) save possibly for Russia
The military power of the United States is clearly unmatched but bears a little elaboration The 
United States has the largest and most secure nuclear arsenal (even if such an asset is largely useless) it 
alone retains the capacity to project large scale forces globally its technological edge in weaponry and 
its training advantage in manpower are unmatched In the vital areas of warfare in the next century such 
as cruise missiles and precision guided weapons the U S advantage is considered not only to be 
unmatchable but growing 70 The United States is simply in a class of its own militarily
Furthermore while the costs of using military force have increased the United States has certainly 
improved its position relative to the world No other country or group of countries seems able to better 
bear the increased costs of military action Furthermore only the United States seems capable of 
footing the extreme costs of developing high tech weaponry (any doubters need only look at the 
tortured European experience with the Eurofighter) In effect the increased cost of military action has 
priced most countries out of the market for world power
However it is also in a class of its own economically While being the most maligned of the United 
States attributes it is ultimately the greatest source of American power and presents the basis for 
continued American hegemony Of course the American share of world output has declined 
dramatically from its 1950 peak but as Nye and others have pointed ou t71 this is a decline from an 
unreal position Despite this relative decline dire forecasts such as Paul Kennedy s22 are utterly 
unwarranted The U S retains the world s largest economy and adjusted for internal purchasing power 
the highest per capita GDP of any industrial power Its productivity the essence of competitiveness 71 
is the world s highest and is expanding at a rate higher than both Germany and Japan 74 While the 
world s largest importer at $605 billion it is also the world s largest exporter at $462 billion ($100 
billion more than Japan) Since 1970 the value of its exports of manufactured goods has risen twelve 
fold more than any other commodity and manufacturing retains the same share of GNP as it did in 
1950 75
United States technological security also seems intact Of the eight types of high technology exports 
that the CIA reports the U S retains its preeminence in half and since 1980 has improved its position 
in two (see Table 1)
Politically the United States has unmatched global influence (though it is probably at a disadvantage 
to regional powers in certain areas) President Bush s diplomacy in crafting and maintaining the anti
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TABLE 1 High Technology Exports and World Share Values
Industn 1980 Rank (World Share) 1990 Rank ( World Share)
Microelectronics 1 (18 3%) 1 (27 5%)
Computers 1 (38 6%) 1 (24 2%)
Telecommunications 3 (10 9%) 2 (15 9%)
Aerospace 1 (47 6%) 1 (50 3%)
Machine Tools/Robotics 2 (14 1%) 3 (13 1%)
Scientific/Precision Eqp 1 (28 3%) 1 (27 4%)
Medicine/Biologicals 5 (11 4%) 2 (13 5%)
Organic Chemicals 2 (13 9%) 2 (14 9%)
Source Central Intelligence Agency Handbook o f Economic Statistics (Washington D C Government 
Printing Office 1994)
Iraq coalition in 1990-1991 is possibly the most obvious yet deserved example ol this clout96 This 
influence is also apparent in the central U S role in all major international conferences treaties and 
organizations Its weighted vote gives it significant power in the dtcisions ot tht World Bank as does 
its Security Council veto Admittedly these ire obvious examples oMJ S political influence and are 
based on agreements reached at a time ol much greater American relative power The important point 
though is that in the organizations that have the most clout in the modern world the United States 
has substantial clout as well
Beyond these traditional components of power Nye argues and I concur that the US has a great 
amount ol soft power resources as well The most important ol these is the degree of legitimacy that 
the U S enjoys
The most fundamental base for American legitimacy is its liberal democratic system As Fukuyama 
argues only such a system has a claim to universal validity its other rivals have discredited 
themselves 27 The rising number ot liberal democratic regimes shows the universal appeal ot the values 
that are the system s characteristics Huntington argues that the U S concern for its ideals in the 
practice ol its foreign policy is responsible for much of this growth noting that
any increase in the power of or influence of the United States in world affairs generally 
results—not inevitably but far more often than not—in the promotion of liberty and 
human rights in the world The expansion of American power is not synonymous with 
the expansion of liberty but a significant correlation exists between the rise and fall of 
American power in the world and the rise and fall of liberty and democracy in the world 98
Of course the causal direction of this correlation is contestable but either way the U S benefits If 
its power increases as democratization spreads then the events of the past fifty years (and even the last 
decade) bode well for its future power If it truly is responsible for much of the growth of liberal 
democratic regimes then its influence is incontestably substantiated In either case though the U S 
benefits from this universal validity because the depth ol potential opposition to it is truncated 99 and 
the existence of commonly shared values increases the proclivity of nations to cooperate 10 thus 
reducing the need to exercise power
These values have been largely applied in practice further legitimizing American power For 
instance after the Gulf War the U S reassembled its forces and simply left Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
only those personnel and equipment that the always cautious Saudi s requested were left behind The 
idea that the U S can come to a country s aid and not try to colonize it or democratize it or otherwise 
interfere in its internal politics certainly decreases fear ot U S power (except by those who that power 
is targeted against) While this is only a cursory examination of the perceived legitimacy of U S 
power it hopefully serves as a partially persuasive case for the global (though admittedly not universal) 
acceptance of American leadership 11
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Of course one must look not only at American power but at that of its purported rivals as well The 
biggest disappointment is Europe While once touted (principally by advocates of Europe 1992 ) as 
the United States of Europt the continent has witnessed the near collapse of all segments of its power 
Militarily the end of the Cold War has witnessed an erosion of its military resources to the point that 
it retains only minimal capacity for extra European projection More importantly the Bosnian fiasco 
and reluctance to extent security guarantees (1 e NATO membership) eastward have shown that no 
common military will exists Economically the continent seems unable to compete in the 
international market without significant barriers to foreign agricultural commodities steel textiles and 
high technology goods 17 Politically no sense of Europe has really taken hold and no common 
foreign policy is anywhere near taking shape Each state still pursues its own foreign policy In short 
it remains more accurate to look at European countries individually and in doing so one automatically 
rules out a challenge to the United States (Germany is nowhere near the United States economically its 
best claim to great power status)
Japan s economy is its sole basis for rivalry and while powerful it is not enough to merit pole 
status Economic power does not translate automatically into power in the other critical realms Indeed 
Japan s strength is ultimately vulnerable if anything its export driven economy has become export 
dependent something of which Japanese trade officials are acutely aware M
Two future challengers Russia and China may eventually rise to a position in which they can 
challenge the United States Judging by history and current developments the prospects for the former 
are bleak China however has the capacity to present an eventual challenge considering its current 
status as an international pariah and the underdeveloped (though improving) status of its rural areas 
though this may not take the form of a serious challenge for another fifty years or more
Based on an assessment of its own power and that of its most frequently mentioned rivals the U S 
is clearly unmatched in power resources However the U S does not behave as theorists of hegemony 
would expect It certainly does not control the world in an imperial manner In just the last year the 
U S has been stymied in its efforts m Bosnia Herzegovina prevented by France from expanding 
sanctions against Libya and ignored by China despite threats of punitive trade actions if the country did 
not improve its human rights record Nor is the U S much of a Saint Christopher It has shucked its 
load by ending the convertibility of dollars into gold in 1973 by maintaining large budget deficits and 
by refusing to act unilaterally to end the Bosnian arms embargo despite a clear capacity to do so All 
along it has also taken steps that would conceivably hurt its hegemonic standing—it did not protect its 
world dominant industries from foreign competition allows huge trade balances to exist unchecked and 
buys much of the critical components for its high tech arsenal from foreign companies In short the 
U S has not acted as many theorists would expect a hegemon to act
Using Nye s definition of a pole leads us to conclude that the world is truly unipolar not multipolar 
and that this situation is likely to remain so for quite sometime But we have also seen that the United 
States is not acting as our traditional theones of hegemony would predict This presents us with a 
theoretical dilemma If the world is unipolar but the pole does not act in ways that are consonant with 
theoretical predictions of hegemonic behavior then either the hegemon is acting poorly or our theories 
are wrong Since we have already determined that our traditional theories of hegemony are incompatible 
with the modern international system it is not a wide leap to believe that their predictions of 
hegemonic behavior are also incompatible Guilt for the incongruity of American behavior with 
existing hegemonic theories lies thus with the theories not with the actors In the next section I will 
provide restitution
Presidential Theory of Hegemony
I
In the next century hegemony will be based on a triad of attributes geopolitical power the liberal 
state and international legitimacy ,5 Geopolitical power will be important because the last refuge of an 
international scoundrel will always be violence For a country to lead it must be able to respond to 
calls for help whether these calls be to stop an invading army or to provide humanitarian relief
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International trade must be protected terrorists punished and attacks with weapons of mass destruction 
deterred Furthermore the dispersion ot military power toward regional powers means that any 
international capacity tor intervention in an area against the wishes ot these countries must be based off 
one or more world powers military capabilities
A hegemon must be able to provide transport logistics intelligence combat support etc After all 
as of now the United Nations does not own any military equipment itself the planes trucks ships and 
tanks have to come from somewhere That somewhere will be states with the capacity for global 
projection and if a world power can not provide these resources it can hardly be said to be a world 
power Again geopolitical power will not play the role it once did but neither has that role been 
eliminated
The liberal state (defined as politically and economically liberal that is democratic and capitalistic) 
will serve as a basis for hegemony for three reasons First it serves as a governor on the hegemon s 
tendency for intervention Liberal (1 e capitalistic) democracies tend to develop deep aversions to war 
and imperialism as these endeavors are costly diversions from the more important tasks of 
production 36 Wars or more appropriately the human casualties that accompany them are especially 
unpopular and the longer and messier the conflict the less domestic support they will enjoy As 
foreign interventions are more likely to resemble the Somalia debacle and less the quick clean Gult 
War interventions will be less frequent The timidity of the European response to the war in Bosnia 
exemplifies this concern The net result is that the less a country is seen as meddling the greater the 
acceptance of its leadership role
Second and relatedly the liberal state reassures others of a state s proclivity to war for the simple 
reason that other states are aware of the inherent limitations on action that a liberal system imposes 
The combination of shared values and/or institutions serves as an ameliorating influence on disputes 
between democracies and autocratic regimes are by now aware of the difficulty that democracies often 
have in rallying public support for military efforts or costly economic measures (such as seemingly 
never ending embargoes that result in starving children on television screens) There are certainly limits 
to this reassurance but the basic effect is that the uncertainty states have about the possible actions 
another may take is reduced with states realizing they have less to fear from liberal states than from 
authoritarian ones
Third the liberal state has also proven to be the best engine for economic growth As economic and 
technical ability are much more important a country must be able to remain competitive and powerful 
in these areas 37 Decline here will certainly spell decline in one s overall position a point that I believe 
few if any readers will question
The final basis of power in the next century will be the legitimacy a state enjoys Legitimacy is 
important because it reduces the transaction costs of using power When one s position and power are 
viewed as legitimate there will be less opposition to that power and position Furthermore coercive 
forms of power can be replaced by co optive measures facilitating the overall use and preservation of 
power The result is power on the cheap to borrow a phrase
This legitimacy must inevitably reside in commonly held values such as the liberal state 
nonintervention except when the need to do so is critical and open international markets Shared values 
are the most obvious source of legitimacy they serve as the basis for international regimes 38 reduce 
uncertainty and ameliorate conflict39
Having already addressed the value and legitimacy of the liberal state I will focus on two other 
sources of legitimacy in the next century Nonintervention is important because it respects what Bull 
calls the constitutive principle of the current international system sovereignty 40 By breaking this 
most important of shared values by frequent intervention in the domestic disputes of other states a 
hegemon will create grave fears among other states that it is abusing its power—after all might not 
the hegemon intervene in its affairs next7
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Furthermore intervention is costly—it drains the hegemon s resources This imperial overstretch as 
Kennedy labels it has brought down even the greatest oí world powers in the past 41 Thus 
nonintervention is critical in maintaining legitimacy and one s resources
There is an important caveat to this stipulation though A perceived failure to intervene in a 
situation that clearly affects one s interests or that is an egregious affront to important international 
values will reduce the hegemon s legitimacy and resources as well The fiasco in Bosnia and the chaos 
of the latter part of the Somalia operation have certainly hurt the world s image of Europe and the 
United States while the Haitian Rwandan Kuwaiti and initial Somali interventions helped Good 
foreign policy is knowing which situations truly meet this criteria Regardless it is crucial to 
remember that hegemony involves more than just economic leadership
The final component of hegemonic legitimacy is support for open international markets As the 
benefits of open international markets have been established by a number of authors 491 will simply 
say that the hegemon must avoid taking any economically nationalist steps except as part of a greater 
effort to open world markets (such as taking retaliatory steps against countries violating this principle) 
The value of these markets is so great both to civilization41 and to individual countries44 that 
anticompetitive policies on the part of the hegemon will create great opposition to the hegemon and a 
strong desire to find alternative means of maintaining the system 4<î The liberal state helps in this 
process of keeping markets open as it produces domestic groups with strong commercial md 
ideological interests in free trade
These three components of power in the next century require that we view the twenty first century 
American hegemony with a new analogy that is consonant with the changes in power we identified in 
the first section Rather than looking to emperors or saints I suggest we look at the American 
presidency itself The similarities are compelling
Basis and extent of power
Of the three branches of government the Presidency46 currently enjoys the most power 
just as the United States currently enjoys more power than any of its rivals 
Despite having greater power as any scholar of the American presidency will attest the 
American President can only lead he can certainly not control I contend that hegemony 
has been and will be based on such a distinction (leadership rather than control)
Since neither can dictate their will their power resides in their perceived legitimacy 
aided by their popularity this is because both must rely on persuasion as their ultimate 
source of influence 47
The Presidency is more capable of leadership than the other branches 48 Similarly the 
U S can provide leadership on global issues and many regional issues more capably 
and more efficiently than any other country or group of countries As long as the 
President and hegemon are perceived to be fulfilling their responsibilities and not 
abusing or mismanaging their position other loci of power will largely defer to their 
lead
Neither was predestined for leadership Congress provided must leadership in the U S 
until the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson In the international 
arena multipolar arrangements were the norm until after World War II and the Cold 
War
Neither is guaranteed permanent leadership though their mutual environments and 
resource bases make them unlikely to be replaced anytime soon 
While economic concerns can make or break both a hegemon and a President their 
leadership must be exercised in other areas Looking at the power and success of 
Presidents and hegemons solely from an economic perspective ignores much of what 
their position requires Since hegemons and Presidents do more than just manage the 
economy they should not be judged solely on their economic management
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Challengers to their position
If either tails to lead a power vacuum results This can lead to 1) chaos and paralysis 
or 2) a new leader emerging
As long as the gaps in leadership are not chronic and egregious the President and the 
U S will retain their positions Continued shortcomings will erode their base of 
legitimacy to the point that new actors will replace them 
Challengers must possess the same power resources as the President/hegemon 
Challengers to American hegemony for instance must have strong geopolitical 
resources a liberal state and widely accepted legitimacy
Limitations on their leadership
Neither can provide leadership in all areas as attempts to do so will overextend their 
resources and gravely deplete them The President can only focus on certain issues and 
must defer to Congress or the Courts in other areas Similarly the U S can not take 
the lead in every area or issue and must at times allow regional powers or other world 
powers to take charge
Both must focus and provide leadership on those issues that are most important to their 
constituents this is the responsibility of leadership
Neither need expend resources unilaterally costs can be distributed to other actors This 
can be done to increase efficiency provide greater solvency to a problem preserve 
resources and even mitigate blame
Issues that are not of prime concern to the country or world can be deferred to others 
As above this can be done to increase efficiency provide greater solvency to a 
problem preserve resources and to enhance legitimacy by letting those with a strong 
concern over an issue to handle it themselves
Both the American President and the American hegemon must be acutely aware of the 
importance of moral positioning This is an important source of legitimacy and hence 
their overall power By righteousness the throne endures 49
These analogies and tenets of the Presidential Theory of Hegemony are admittedly underdeveloped 
but that task must wait for another paper They hopefully serve as a clarifying basis for understanding 
the changed international environment and the requirements for influence and leadership in it
Conclusion
When children starve in Somalia Bosnians and Kuwaitis plead for help to resist invading armies and 
Rwandans and Haitians look for help to stabilize their countries the direction they look is toward 
Washington In many international crises and some would even say most if the U S does not lead no 
one else will This is a clear indication of the recognized American leadership role or phrased 
differently of American hegemony This hegemony has been frequently overlooked by scholars because 
traditional conceptualizations of hegemony have proven to be theoretical blinders With a clear linking 
of the uniqueness of the American position with the changed nature of the international environment 
and with a recasting of the definition of hegemony to be compatible with the changed nature of power 
the American position is revealed With the end of the Cold War the world has been turned upside 
down Now all that remains is for our theories of power and hegemony to be so inverted a process that 
this paper hopes to have facilitated
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Chapter 12
Systemic Factors Influencing India’s Economic Liberalization Program
Dinshaw Mistry
In June 1991 the Indian government undertook to liberalize India s economy in return for structural 
adjustment loans from the IMF and World Bank that would enable India to overcome an economic 
crisis India s economic liberalization program has continued well after macroeconomic stabilization 
was achieved and India is now undertaking a comprehensive economic restructuring program aimed at 
making the transition from a state planned to a market driven economy Commenting on India s 
economic liberalization program John Waterbury states that in India there has been no fiscal 
balance of payments or external debt crisis of magnitude sufficient to drive through a process of 
economic restructuring 1 As such while the economic crisis of 1991 was important for the initiation 
of India s economic reform program other factors also appear to be responsible for the Indian 
government s decision to opt for economic restructuring In this respect I note that India s move 
toward privatizing the economy was undertaken at a time when many nations were undertaking similar 
liberalization policies Edward Kolodziej observes that particularly after the collapse of the Soviet 
experiment the economic policies of most states are now oriented toward incorporation of national 
economic systems into world product and factor markets and that the failure of the Soviet model may 
have left the developing world with little alternative other than to adapt to the economic model of the 
Westcentric states The harsh lesson of self defeating protectionism learned by the Western states 
during the mterwar period are now being applied on a world scale after a lag of a half century 9
In this essay I examine the factors responsible for India s economic restructuring program In 
general explanations for India s economic reforms may be found at three levels of analysis—the 
individual level (related to the ideological biases of the country s leaders) the domestic level 
(concerning factors such as macroeconomic conditions and domestic politics) and the international 
level (involving the effects of changes in the international economic and political environment) My 
emphasis in this essay is on the international level of analysis and on the geo political and systemic 
factors that have influenced India s economic reform program I first examine why India opted for a 
socialist economic policy one that emphasized state planning and a protected economy in the period 
before 1991 by analyzing factors such as the international appeal of socialism and the effects of the 
Cold War in causing strong India-Soviet ties and weak India-U S relations I then review India s 
economic performance under socialist economic policies and examine the scope of the economic 
reform program that began in 1991 Finally I examine factors that in the 1980s and early 1990s 
contributed to the adoption and continuation of economic reforms
These factors relate to increased uncertainty about the future continuation of strong India-Russia 
relations and improvements in India—U S relations in the post Cold War environment new directions 
in India s defense and foreign policy greater foreign investment in India and a process of social 
learning about economic restructuring that has occurred in India My conclusions are that economic 
reforms in India were initiated largely because of endogenous domestic factors but exogenous factors 
were also instrumental in facilitating the transition toward a market economy In the absence of 
changes in the international political and economic environment a wide ranging economic 
restructuring program may not have been adopted in India
The Socialist Economic Policy 1947-1991
From 1947 to 1991 India relied on an economic policy that emphasized central planning Under this 
policy some areas of production were reserved to the government wages and prices were controlled
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government permits were required to build factories and tariffs and quotas were used to control 
exports 1 Excessive regulation under the socialist system had its drawbacks because it made 
bureaucratic approval rather than market efficiency the criterion of survival tor economic units 4 The 
ideological biases of India s leaders and locally prevailing economic conditions caused India to adopt 
the state controlled approach to its economic policy Educated at Harrow and Cambodge India s first 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was greatly influenced by the principles of Fabian socialism 5
During Nehru s 1927 visit to Moscow he developed admiration for the Soviet method of planned 
economic development The Soviet model held promise because the U S S R had like India (and other 
Third World nations) been an economically underdeveloped largely agricultural society but had 
successfully progressed to become an industrial powerhouse under Stalin s rule during the 1920s and 
1930s the Soviet system had proven its ability to undertake large scale production during the Second 
World War 6 The fact that large scale industrialization was achieved m less than two decades in the 
Soviet Union while it took many generations to achieve through the free market approach of Western 
Europe and the United States was even more appealing for Third World leaders I also note that from a 
political perspective Moscow was not seen as a threat by India s leaders and Moscow had no prior 
history of colonial domination Furthermore the Soviet Union stressed in its foreign policy aspects 
such as anti colonialism and support for the independence of African and Asian nations the same 
policies that India favored 7 As such India s leaders did not have to fear about becoming subject to 
Soviet control by following a Moscow type economic policy
While some Indian decisionmakers also saw a role for foreign investment in India s economic 
development their views were tinged with memories of a colonial past and foreign investment was 
seen as a gradual erosion of hard fought and hard won sovereignty 8 Given that India s leaders 
regarded capitalism as synonymous with imperialism and that the Soviet model was more appealing 
the Indian leadership embarked on a policy of central planning to be implemented through five year 
economic plans India s policymakers sought to achieve three major goals—growth equity and self 
reliance—through the socialist model Economic growth through a planned process of development 
was intended to automatically eliminate poverty and remove reliance on imports and thus also help 
achieve self sufficiency In reality however targeted growth rates were not achieved (economic 
growth averaged only 3-4 percent annually much less than growth in many other developing 
countries) and increased production did not always trickle down to the poor As a result since the late 
1960s policymakers paid increasing attention to equity this emphasis on the distributive aspect of 
social justice and away from pure growth began in 1969 and peaked in 1971 The logic for seeking 
self sufficiency is easily understood by the fact that given India s history of being subject to colonial 
rule its leaders having achieved political independence also sought economic independence from the 
West which could be achieved through self sufficiency in major sectors of the economy The political 
motivations for seeking self sufficiency were prominent at times of crisis such as at independence 
during periods of food scarcity and during international conflicts 9
Three important ideological and geo political factors contributed to the continuation of the socialist 
policy in India until 1991—the global popularity of socialism Soviet supports for India and the poor 
state of India-U S relations Until the late 1980s most Second and Third World nations emphasized 
state planning socialism was not a discredited ideology and it faced no real legitimacy crisis Very 
few developing nations actually chose to opt for a market driven economy In both the East and the 
West academics and scholars proposed arguments such as the dependency school that added 
supporting theoretical foundations to the importance of economic planning 10 A number of economists 
from the West were also associated with India s five year plans 11
The Soviet Union through its economic aid programs provided both macroeconomic support to 
India s economy as well as ideological support for India s socialist economic policy Beginning in 
1955 the Soviets had the capability to assert their influence abroad through economic aid programs 
thus backing up Khrushchev s assertion that newly independent nations would get Soviet assistance 
and technical aid to rid them of foreign monopoly capital p From the Indian perspective the Soviet 
Union s approach to foreign aid was more appealing compared to the U S approach for a number of
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reasons n First Moscow appeared to be sensitive to India s goals of achieving self reliance by 
assisting the Indian public sector in building up infrastructure and heavy industry 14 the United States 
because of ideological reasons was reluctant to invest in heavy industry 15
A second reason India found the Soviet s approach to aid more appealing is that the repayment 
arrangements for Soviet aid were extremely favorable to India While the terms of repayment of Soviet 
loans (generally involving a 2 5 percent interest rate with the principal repayable over a twelve year 
period) were about the same as those tor Western loans 16 India could make repayments to the Soviet 
Union either in rupees or through exports—these arrangements had the symbolic value of not depleting 
India s foreign exchange reserves On balance Soviet economic aid to India had limited 
macroeconomic value it accounted for only about five to six percent of foreign aid to India in the 
period 1947-1975 yet Soviet assistance was extremely beneficial since it relieved some troublesome 
bottlenecks in India s economy by facilitating public ownership of key industries that were seen as 
important for achieving the goals of growth and self sufficiency 17
The Soviet Union also provided considerable political and military assistance to India because it 
benefited from close ties with India For example the Soviets supported India against a de facto U S -  
Pakistan-China alliance during India s 1971 war with Pakistan India could also count on the Soviet 
veto to prevent any resolutions detrimental to India (particularly on Kashmir) from being passed in the 
U N Security Council Moscow found India to be a useful counterweight to China and a valuable 
intermediary in the Third World 18 The repayment arrangements for Soviet military sales (low interest 
rates repayable through exports or in rupees) relieved India of the need to make foreign exchange 
depleting arms purchases from the West Despite a temporary deterioration in Soviet India relations in 
the late 1960s 19 India continued to rely on Soviet military equipment because with India s economy 
showing no signs of growth and with mounting bills for imports such as food grams fertilizers and oil 
depleting India s foreign exchange reserves India had nowhere else to go for defense purchases 70 The 
generous terms of Soviet military aid were simply too attractive for India to forego
The Soviet Union further assisted India by setting up faetones that allowed for the indigenous 
production of tanks and planes thus supporting India s goals of achieving self reliance While India 
diversified its arms imports beginning in the late 1970s (for example by purchasing the Jaguar from 
England submarines from West Germany and Mirage 2000s from France—the Jaguars and 
submarines were also manufactured under license in Indian factories) the U S S R remained India s 
main military supplier71 and at the end of the Cold War accounted for 70 percent of India s defense 
imports 22 By extending political support to India assisting India s goals of self sufficiency and 
through arms sales that conserved foreign exchange the Soviet Union helped avert possible economic 
problems that may have occurred if India were to purchase arms at higher costs on the international 
market in this manner by (unintentionally) helping prevent economic crises that would have caused 
moves away from the socialist system the Soviet Union facilitated a continuation of the socialist 
economic policy in India
The generally poor state of India-U S diplomatic relations from the 1950s through the 1980s 
contributed to India s continuing pursuit of a socialist economic policy In the 1950s the U S was 
unwilling to strengthen relations with India because of India s Soviet style economic policy In this 
respect Sumit Ganguly notes that Nehru s policy of forging a path of economic development that 
avoided the repression of Communist systems and the inequities of capitalism was challenged by the 
U S because the U S ideologically favored the free market approach and also saw that an open Indian 
economy held prospects for U S investment 71 Political considerations were also critical in 
contributing to the lack of stronger India-U S diplomatic relations—Cold War politics and India s 
non aligned but pro Soviet policies contributed to poor India-U S relations in the period 1950-1980 I 
note that while India-U S diplomatic military and polntcal relations were not strong in the 1950s and 
1960s 74 this did not prevent the U S from granting large amounts of economic aid to India In the 
period 1947-1975 India received a total of $30 billion in foreign aid—79 percent in loans 14 percent 
in commodity assistance and 7 percent in grants This aid came mainly from the United States (45 
percent) and the World Bank to which the U S was a major contributor (16 percent) other
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contributors of foreign ud to India were Great Britain (9 percent) West Germany (8 percent) the 
Soviet Union (5 4 ptreent) and Jap in (3 percent)
Under the PL 480 program the U S provided $5 billion worth of food aid to India and at the 
program s height in the 1960s about one fourth of the U S wheat crop went to India 75 Until the 
1970s the U S accounted for almost half of all foreign aid to India In the 1970s the India-U S 
diplomatic relationship deteriorated greatly 76 and during this decade U S aid accounted for only about 
5 percent of India s foreign aid even friendly U S cooperation with India was seen in India as 
intrusive 77 Given the poor state of India-U S relations India s policy makers would have been 
unenthusiastic about pursuing a free market economic policy that had ideologically pro U S 
overtones also they would have been quite reluctant to allow U S firms entry into India s market on a 
large scale The Indian economic policy of imposing restrictions on the activities of multinationals and 
the nationalization of several foreign firms created a climate that U S investors found inconducive for 
investment As such I note that the poor state of India-U S diplomatic relations discouraged foreign 
investment and contributed to the continuation of socialist economic policies in India
India s Economic Performance 
in the Period 1947-1991
The annual growth rates of GDP for India s economy averaged 3 6 percent in the 1950s 3 1 percent in 
the 1960s 3 6 percent in the 1970s and 5 5 percent in the 1980s Compared to an annual growth rate of 
less than one percent in the decades before India s independence India s economic performance after 
independence shows a great improvement However compared with the economic growth rates in 
other developing countries India s economic performance was not that impressive For example 
average annual economic growth rates for other nations were as follows China 5 4 percent South 
Korea 7 2 percent Taiwan 9 1 percent Thailand 6 8 percent Indonesia 5 5 percent and Malaysia 6 
percent 78
India s economic policymakers aimed at achieving growth and self sufficiency through increased 
industrialization yet the annual rate of growth for the manufacturing sector was not very high 
declining from an average of 7 4 percent tor the period before 1966 to 4 3 percent between 1967-1981 
the average annual growth rates for the industrial sector as a whole were 7 5 percent from 1959 65 and 
5 5 percent between 1966 81 India s share of world trade declined from 1-1 5 percent in the 1950s 
and early 1960s to 0 5 percent by 1974 and has remained at that level since then I should note that 
while economic growth rates were not very high certain improvements were made in infrastructure 
and human resource development For example the percentage of the population living below the 
poverty line decreased from 50 percent m 1972-1973 to 37 percent in 1983-1984 and to about 30 
percent by 1988 29 India also made significant improvements in areas such as supplying basic utilities 
(water and electricity) to the vast majority of its villages and in increasing education and literacy rates 
though I should note that compared to the progress made by other developing nations these 
improvements may not appear that impressive
The question arises as to why despite having a large resource base and domestic market a large pool 
of skilled technical and scientific manpower a relative stable political system an experienced 
bureaucracy and a high savings rate of about 20 percent (India s domestic savings rate increased from 
approximately 10 percent of GDP in the 1950s to slightly over 20 percent by the early 1970s) 
economic growth rates were not high in India A number of explanations have been put forward for 
India s slow economic growth involving factors such as drag from the large agricultural sector an 
inappropriate investment strategy and an inefficient bureaucracy 70 The agricultural sector makes up 
almost 50 percent of GDP and slow growth of agricultural incomes limited the demand for and thus 
constrained investment in many capital goods This was because the agriculture sector generated the 
demand for output in the industrial sector through its requirement for machinery such as water pumps 
and tractors Public investment (which consists of 40 percent to 50 percent of total investment) was not 
sufficient in either the agricultural sector (in areas such as irrigation flood control land consolidation 
R & D) or in the development of infrastructure (in sectors such as power fuel and transport where the
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state had a virtual monopoly) Underinvestment in infrastructure contributed to slow growth in the 
agricultural sector as well as to poor performances in the industrial sector ^
Inefficient management in public sector enterprises and the vested interests of India s elites who 
were able to dominate the process of resource allocation also contributed to poor economic 
performances under a socialist state controlled economy Rao explains that the dominant elites in 
India consisted of three classes—the agricultural rich the industrialists and the professional 
bureaucrats each attempted to extract economic rents from the state The agricultural rich sought to 
maintain or increase farm price supports low input prices and easy credit terms meant for poor 
farmers Private sector industrialists lobbied for similar subsidies for industry Civil service officials 
took advantage of their official pnveleges by extracting bureaucratic rents ^  In general state control of 
the economy led to increased levels of inefficiency in many areas the government s support of ailing 
industries resulted in further pressures on the economy M and contributed to poor overall economic 
growth rates
The Economic Reform Program 1991-1995
In the 1980s India partially liberalized its trade industrial and financial policies ^  A new economic 
policy initiated in 1980 and consolidated in 1985 involved the limited deregulation of industry 
decontrol of prices lessening of import restrictions and tax reductions 1,6 Several officials serving in the 
government s of Indira Gandhi (1980-1984) and Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989) had been former 
employees of the IMF and World Bank They favored removing bureaucratic controls over the 
economy Yet economic reforms were not implemented to any great extent because of resistance 
generated by India s entrenched business houses and public labor unions As such fundamental 
structural problems in India s economy were only very partially addressed tariffs continued to be high 
constraints in the form of licenses and bureaucratic approvals made investment cumbersome and the 
government had to maintain subsidies for several sectors of the economy As a result the fiscal deficit 
which was about 4 percent of GDP in the mid 1970s increased to an average of about 6 3 percent in 
the early 1980s and to eight percent by the late 1980s
Two political economic shocks beginning in mid 1990 added to the problems of a high fiscal 
deficit and resulted in an economic crisis in India First as a result of the Persian Gulf war India s oil 
import bill rose and remittances from Indians living in the region fell 17 Second the fall of two 
coalition governments within a period of a few months undermined investor confidence in India 
resulting m a withdrawal of deposits and a drying of medium and long term credit By the time a new 
government took office following elections in June 1991 India s foreign exchange reserves had 
declined to $1 2 billion an amount sufficient to pay for barely two weeks worth of imports By mid 
1991 India had a debt service ratio of about 30 percent a $7 5 billion domestic fiscal deficit and a $80 
billion foreign debt With foreign exchange reserves low and facing the humiliation of having to 
default on debt payments India had to sell 90 tons of gold from its national reserves to maintain 
liquidity
The economic crisis allowed the newly elected Congress party s government to reverse socialist 
economic policies without having to publicly repudiate the party s political icon Nehru I should note 
that India s new Prime Minister Narasimha Rao represented the old guard of the Congress party he 
held ministerial positions in previous Congress governments that had followed socialist policies and as 
such did not represent a new generation of leadership However Narasimha Rao fully recognized the 
need for economic reform and gave technocrats such as the Finance Minister Manmohan Singh (a 
former World Bank economist) who advocated a market driven economy a free hand These 
technocrats were shielded from domestic opposition because the Congress party and its allies had a 
small majority m the Parliament and no opposition party was strong enough to form a coalition that 
would enable it to overthrow the Congress government
The initial macroeconomic stabilization measures undertaken by the government involved a 20 
percent currency devaluation and a set of measures to reduce the fiscal deficit These measures made
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their way into the 1991 — 1992 and 1992—1993 budget without much difficulty The economic reform 
program was rewarded by foreign governments who granted India bilateral loans and by the IMF and 
World Bank who granted India a $500 million structural adjustment loan as well as a $1 7 billion SDR 
stand by arrangement By 1993 with macroeconomic stabilization having been achieved and with the 
economic crisis having passed opponents of economic reforms had the potential to regroup and turn 
back the liberalization program yet there has been no reversal of the reforms Instead many further 
steps have been taken to consolidate the economic liberalization process First large scale dismantling 
of the industrial licensing system has taken place Second restrictions on foreign investment have 
decreased so that foreign investors can own up to 51 percent of equity (up from the previous level of 
40 percent) without requiring government approval Third the Indian currency has been made fully 
convertible on trade accounts and the government has also announced its intentions to make the rupee 
convertible on capital transfer accounts Fourth tariffs have been lowered The maximum tariff was 
lowered from 150 percent to 65 percent and tariffs on capital goods and machinery were lowered to 
about 30 percent—though high by international standards these levels represent great reductions 
compared to the previously high tariffs Fifth domestic and foreign companies have been allowed into 
sectors such as power telecommunications transportation banking and internal air transportation 
areas where the government previously had a virtual monopoly
As a result of the economic reform program India s economy has improved considerably The GDP 
growth rate which was 1 2 percent during the year of the economic crisis 1990 91 rose to about four 
percent tor the years 1991-1992 and 1992-1993 and to about 5 percent for 1993-1994 and 1994- 
1995 a level of growth comparable to the economic growth rates in the mid 1980s Other economic 
indicators also reflect improvements made by the economy India s industrial sector grew at an annual 
rate of one to two percent between 1991-1993 but industrial growth increased to 5 5 percent in 1993 — 
1994 Inflation declined from a peak of 17 percent in August 1991 to seven percent by mid 1993 but 
then again increased to slightly over 10 percent by April 1994 inflation remained at nine to ten percent 
since then India s exports which grew only tour percent in 1991-1992 have increased at an annual 
rate of about 20 percent since then India s foreign exchange reserves which stood at $1 2 billion in 
1991 were $21 billion in early 1995 India s trade deficit was $2 03 billion in 1994 1995 compared to 
$1 billion in 1993-1994 and $3 3 billion in 1992 93 The fiscal deficit was reduced from 8 4 percent of 
GDP in 1990-1991 to 5 6 percent in 1992 1993 rose to 7 3 percent in 1993-1994 and came down to 
6 0 percent for 1994-1995
It should be noted that while India s economic performance in the year 1994-1995 has been 
impressive many further steps need to be taken to increase GDP growth rates to six to seven percent 
rates that would make India more attractive to investors and help consolidate economic growth In the 
first four years of its reform program (1991-1995) India s government approved $9 6 billion m 
foreign investment projects of which $2 billion worth of investment had actually flowed into India by 
March 1995 Many of the planned projects have been delayed partly because of bureaucratic controls 
I also note that while the amount of investment attracted by India in the period 1991-1995 is many 
times more than that in the 1980s it is still only a small fraction of India s investment requirements 
Analysts have estimated that investment worth about $80 billion is needed ($30 billion for the power 
sector $12 billion for telecommunications and $40 billion for roads) for infrastructure development 
that would make India globally competitive 40 Another point to note is that since India s economy has 
significantly liberalized in the mid 1990s the impressive economic performance achieved during the 
early 1990s is likely to be sustained for many more years This is in contrast to the situation in the 
1980s where moderately high growth rates were a temporary phenomena that could not be sustained 
due to state controls on the economy—thus India s economic liberalization program seems to be 
producing the desired macroeconomic results
Analyzing the Factors Responsible for Economic Reforms
I have noted that economic reforms in India have not been limited and aimed merely at addressing the 
economic crisis that arose in 1991 but have been much deeper in scope and are intended to move
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India toward a market economy In this section I review a number of factors that laid the foundations 
for economic reforms—improving Indn-U S relations uncertainty about the continuation of Soviet 
aid to India following the collapse of the Soviet Union and an almost universal repudiation of the 
socialist ideology—as well as factors that have facilitated the consolidation and continuation of 
reforms—increased U S investment in India and a process of social learning about economic 
liberalization
Improvements in India-U S Relations in the 1980s
In the 1980s the India-U S diplomatic relationship improved despite high levels of U S assistance to 
India s main adversary Pakistan which received a $3 2 billion economic and military aid package 
from the United States following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Improvements in India-U S 
relations coincided with a thaw in U S —Soviet relations as well as with India s first moves toward 
economic liberalization which began in 1980 and were continued by Rajiv Gandhi who took office as 
Prime Minister in 1985 United States policymakers saw an opportunity to improve relations with 
Rajiv Gandhi who was noted for his desire to take India into the computer age 41 As such the mixed 
U S motives of commercial interests as well as a larger geopolitical interest facilitated improvements 
in India-U S political and economic relations 47 Between 1982 and 1990 India-U S trade and U S 
investments in India increased considerably especially in high technology areas 47 In turn economic 
interaction has also led to increasing levels of political cooperation and a lessening of confrontation in 
India-U S relations during the late 1980s and early 1990s 44 Also contributing to the increase in 
bilateral economic exchanges is the fact that U S views of India have been affected by a growing 
industrial lobby that sees business opportunities in India and by the influence on Congress and the 
State Department of lobbyists such as U S residents of Indian origin (there are approximately one 
million U S residents of Indian origin) Ingenerai the fact that U S firms had increased investments 
in India as a result of the partial liberalization during the 1980s was an indication that further 
investments would be made once large scale economic reform was undertaken The strengthening of 
India-U S relations contributed to creating an atmosphere conducive for the launching of economic 
reforms in 1991 because with improving bilateral relations the Indian government had fewer 
ideological biases against allowing the entry of U S multinationals into India
Uncertainty Surrounding the Continuation of Strong India-Russia Ties
During the 1980s India s arms imports increased considerably For the period 1985-1989 they were 
estimated to be $10 billion 4<i and the figure was $17 5 billion for the 1980s 46 Most though not all of 
the expenditures were for Soviet equipment Since the Russian debt was payable in exports and not in 
hard currency the high defense debt would not normally have been a cause of concern for India 
However given the political turmoil occurring m Russia India s policymakers remained uncertain 
about whether or not the favorable terms of exchange with Russia would continue Also India faced 
problems obtaining spare parts for its Soviet purchased miltary hardware and there was no guarantee 
that Soviet spare parts would be easily available at short notice which would be particularly important 
in times of a crisis 47 Gorbachev was more willing than his predecessors to confront India s leaders on 
controversial subjects such as nuclear proliferation and the economic effects of high spending 48 
Gorbachev s desire to improve the Soviet economy under the perestroika program meant that 
arrangements such as barter trade with India were unlikely to continue Indian policymakers perceived 
that India would eventually have to trade with the Soviets in hard currency 49 As such from the early 
part of Gorbachev s term of office there were doubts about continuation of the generous Soviet terms 
of trade with India Later as events in the Soviet Union became even more unpredictable with the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union the uncertainty only increased Whereas in previous decades India 
had traditionally relied on the U S S R  for defense imports on concessional terms during periods of 
economic constraint Moscow s ability to deliver any such support was not assured during the late 
1980s and early 1990s The fact that India could not count on the Soviets to assist them either to 
recover from the economic crisis of 1991 or more generally in the long term through continued support
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for India s socialist economy could have influenced the Indian government s decision to undertake 
economic restructuring as a solution to India s economic problems
A Changing Regional and International Environment
I have noted that socialism was not a globally discredited ideology until the late 1980s Yet once the 
socialist experiment was proven to be a failure in the Soviet Union it was less likely to be followed by 
developing nations so India s economic crisis opened the eyes of the government to the follies of 
socialist policies and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and Russia made the drawbacks of 
socialism even more compellingly evident—as such by 1991 a policy shift toward a market economy 
was not merely desirable but absolutely essential 51 The success of nations such as South Korea 
Taiwan Singapore Hong Kong Malaysia and Thailand who eschewed economic autarky and import 
substitution policies and pursued export led growth and tied themselves to foreign markets and capital 
with links to multinationals provided a model to follow for the developing countries 57
India s trade with East and Southeast Asia had considerably increased through the 1980s growing 
by about 160 percent 57 Increasing contacts with this region had an effect in influencing India s 
decision to move toward free markets In this respect India s Finance Minister Manmohan Singh 
pointed out that to emulate the progress made by other Asian states India must abandon the socialist 
model it followed since 1947 and drop its hostility to Western ways S4 In the early 1990s India also 
saw the potential for increased trade opportunities with South Africa and Israel nations with which 
India previously had no official diplomatic relations Though the volume of trade with these nations is 
still small ,5 the potential for expansion of trade is large for example India and South Africa are 
considering forming an Indian Ocean free trade zone with other nations As such I note that world 
wide repudiation of socialism and the changing international political and economic environment 
which offered India the potential for increased trade (that would lend a considerable degree of support 
for India s economic liberalization) contributed to India s decision to move toward a market driven 
economy
Stable India-U S Relations and Increased Foreign Investment in the 1990s
India-U S relations having improved in the 1980s continued to remain stable in the 1990s I should 
note that India-U S diplomatic relations are not strong enough to facilitate (nor in the near future are 
they likely to further strengthen to levels that would facilitate) the creation of an India-U S political or 
military alliance Yet in the 1990s India and the U S appear to have more mutually common interests 
in the international political arena—for example both nations sent peace keeping forces to Somalia 
and India and the U S have jointly sponsored drafts of a treaty banning the production of nuclear 
fissile material Improvements in India-U S political relations have also coincided with higher levels 
of trade and commercial activities
Over one third of $9 6 billion foreign investment attracted by India in the period 1991-1995 was 
from U S proposals and about 9 percent was from Britain Stable India-U S relations have played a 
role in India s decision to allow the entry into India of U S firms Iflndia-U S relations had 
deteriorated in the 1990s then however great the need for foreign investment (which was crucial to the 
economic restructuring program) India would have remained reluctant to allow U S multinationals 
into India Yet given the fact that India-U S relations had improved throughout the 1980s political 
factors (such as bilateral differences on the NPT) have had no retarding effect on India s seeking 
foreign investment (a large component of which is U S investment) and U S firms have been more 
willing to enter India S6 The U S has during the past decade been and is likely to continue to be 
India s leading trade partner 57 The increase in foreign investment from and trade with the U S 
contributes to a better economic performance and thus lends support for a continuation of economic 
reforms in India
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Social Learning Faulititing Continued Reform
Economie reforms in India have led to a proeess of soeial learning and greater aeceptance of the 
economie liberalization proeess During the first phase of eeonomie liberalization only a few 
bureaucrats favored the economie restructuring program the socialist model still held considerable 
appeal in political circles in the civil service and among the public Yet after the first few years of 
reforms the transnational ideas of economic liberalization have now found increasing acceptance and 
this helps sustain the economic reforms In this respect a number of points are worth noting First a 
large majority of India s popul Uion support economic reforms but also note that government spending 
on social welfare programs tor the poor should be continued ^  As such the government still maintains 
large social welfare programs tor example it raised food subsidies from $1 3 billion in its 1994-1995 
budget to $1 7 billion in the 1995-1996 budget
Second given that the principle of liberalization is now widely accepted it has become a definite 
political virtue Previously economic reforms (generally directed by the World Bank) had to be 
undertaken by stealth in the hope that they would not be noticed and politicized to the detriment of the 
government Now reforms are introduced in a very public way and every time the government runs 
into political trouble it reacts by announcing more economic liberalization rather than drawing back S9 
Third a number of groups still oppose reforms partly in response to this opposition the 1994-1995 
budget allows the fiscal deficit to continue plans to further privatize the public sector h ive been put on 
hold because of an outcry from trade and labor unions 60
In short I note that unlike the reforms of the 1980s that were turned back because of domestic 
opposition India s current economic restructuring program has continued for much of the Congress 
government s five year (1991-1996) term of office The reforms have not been turned back largely 
because of the process of social learning that led to greater public acceptance of the principles of 
liberalization In the past few months however with elections approaching there has been increasing 
politicization of some issues This has caused the government to adopt a more populist budget for the 
year 1995-1996 and thus slowed the pace of reforms
Changes in India s Defense and Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era
After rising consistently for five years in the period 1984-1989 from 9 9 percent of total government 
expenditure to 10 3 percent India s defense budgets were cut in the next four years the defense budget 
came down from 4 percent of GDP in 1986 to 2 44 percent of GDP by 1993-1994 61 The high defense 
expenditures of the 1980s contributed to large government fiscal deficits 60 and have also had an 
adverse effect on India s balance of payments—in a 1993 report the head of India s Reserve Bank 
attributed the balance of payments crisis partly to arms imports during the late 1980s As such one of 
the important goals for India s policymakers in the 1990s has been to cut military expenditures In 
general changes in military doctrine and cuts in force structures and recruitment appear inevitable 
given the budget cuts 64
Political factors have helped facilitate the reduction in military expenditures complementing the 
budgetary pressures that force decreases in military spending India s confrontational relationship with 
its main adversary Pakistan continues largely as a result of the unresolved dispute over Kashmir The 
continuation of this dispute would normally cause New Delhi to maintain high defense expenditures 
Yet new directions in India s foreign policy have facilitated a reduction in military expenditures 
Improvements in U S -India diplomatic relations (manifest through moves toward increasing military 
collaboration such as India s interest in purchasing and license producing aircraft engines from the 
United States and small scale India-U S military exercises) and decreasing hostility in India-China 
relations (brought about by a bilateral troop reductions agreement and a common understanding on 
amounting to a de facto settlement of the India-China border dispute) allow for cuts m India s military 
budget Improved India-U S and India-China relations also make the U S and China less likely to 
support Pakistan against India thus a smaller military force that is necessary for dealing only with 
Pakistan is adequate for India s political leaders I also note that at the time of India s economic
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reforms in the early 1990s there had been considerable uncertainty about India s ability to obtain 
Russian political support at the U N and Russian military aid at the same concessional terms of 
previous decades and this forced New Delhi to look for new economic and military partners—the hard 
realities of economy and security had some influence in driving India toward the West 65
I should note that once the situation in Russia stabilized India-Russia relations seem to have 
returned to their previous strong levels Russia does offer India a security guarantee that was implicit in 
the India-Russia friendship treaty during the 1970s and 1980s but India-Russia economic and 
diplomatic relations continue to be strong For example bilateral negotiations at the highest level 
between President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Rao resulted in an agreement allowing India to repay its 
$10 billion debt to Russia through barter arrangements involving annual repayments of about $900 
million 66 India s new foreign policy built upon favorable relations with both the U S and Russia is 
facilitated by the absence of U S -Russia hostilities in the post Cold War environment As such I note 
that political and economic factors have contributed to decreasing military expenditures and the shift 
in emphasis away from increasing military might and toward building a stronger economy further 
facilitates the economic reform process in India India s government has accepted that military strength 
is not the way toward enhancing India s power internationally—rather technological advancement and 
a stronger economy is the way to increasing the nation s power and prestige
Conclusion
In this paper I have concentrated largely on the international level of analysis in searching for 
explanations for India s economic reform program the domestic and individual levels of analysis have 
not been examined in any great depth My analysis shows that systemic factors played an important 
role in India s economic liberalization program I have noted that India s economic restructuring 
program was undertaken at the same time that economic liberalization was taking place in many other 
nations and thus India s economic liberalization could be considered as being simply a part of the 
broader global movement toward tree markets I further note that certain factors that influenced India s 
economic liberalization policy—India s changing relationship with the former U S S R  and the 
improvement of relations with the U S in the 1980s—may have influenced the move toward markets 
in other countries that had close ties with the former U S S R  such as the East European nations 
Vietnam and Mongolia Finally I note that factors applicable specifically to India (such as the 
economic crisis of 1991) also contributed to India s economic liberalization program Thus a 
combination of wider systemic factors as well as endogenous and exogenous factors applicable 
specifically to India seem to be responsible for India s economic reform program
At this point it is useful to analyze a process of transition somewhat similar to the global movement 
toward free markets that has taken place concerning the political systems of nations Samuel 
Huntington observes that in the past century waves of democratization have occurred whereby a 
number of nations simultaneously changed their political systems from non democratic to 
democratic 67 Reverse waves or transitions from democratic to authoritarian regimes have also 
occurred The third wave of democratization began in Southern Europe in 1974-1975 and eventually 
encompassed over thirty nations in Latin America Asia Eastern Europe and Africa Commenting on 
these transitions occurring in nations on different continents during the same time period Fukuyama 
notes that while real differences exist between these cases there was remarkable consistency in the 
democratic transitions what permitted regime changes was the voluntary decision on the part of the 
old regime to give up power in favor of democratically elected governments While this willing retreat 
from power was always provoked by some immediate crisis it was ultimately made possible by a 
growing belief that democracy was the only legitimate source of authority in the modem world 68
Fukuyama s observation that transitions from one type of political or economic system to another are 
ultimately based upon some universal ideological belief is challenged by Kegley who in examining 
the causes for the end of the Cold War states that as important as the external environment may be as 
a source for a country s policy change this perception can easily lead neorealist and neoliberal 
structural analysts to exaggerate the potency of systemic influences The source of change ultimately
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resides in how lenders view their external environment and their nation s interest in it 69 Kegley 
reduces but does not discount the importance of broader systemic factors in contributing to changes in 
a country s domestic policies
My conclusions about the process of economic reforms occurring in India incorporate aspects of 
both Fukuyama s and Kegley s analyses about transitions taking place in the economic and political 
systems of nations I have noted that the economic reform process in India was not merely a response 
to the economic crisis of 1991 changes in the international environment were also responsible for the 
move toward free markets If the international environment had not changed in the 1980s and if the 
Soviet Union continued to exist and to provide generous amounts of aid to India then despite the 
economic crisis of 1991 India may not have opted for economic restructuring The disintegration of 
the Soviet Union caused uncertainty in India about future access to Soviet aid and India had 
apparently little option but to turn to a market driven economy (a step required in order to receive 
economic assistance from the World Bank and IMF) as a solution to its economic problems The fact 
that socialism was becoming increasingly discredited globally made the move to the Westcentric 
economic model much more acceptable tor India s leadership
Also implicit in India s move toward a more liberal Westcentric economic policy was a desire to 
improve economic and political tics with the United States 70 In the 1980s India-U S relations 
improved and this coincided with improvements in U S -Soviet relations as well as with India s first 
tentative attempts at economic liberalization In the 1990s India—U S relations further improved 
India s economic restructuring program also took place in the 1990s Finally I note that in the 1990s 
given the changes occurring in the international environment India s leadership recognized that a freer 
economy more solidly linked to world trade and more capable technologically was more important 
than being a military power 71 making India s leaders more willing to cut defense expenditures a step 
necessary for the success of the economic reform program
To conclude I note that a combination of many factors are responsible for India s transition toward a 
market driven economy Changes in the international environment such as the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union occunng mid 1980s created conditions that necessitated a move toward economic 
restructuring Other systemic changes such as the global movement toward capitalism and 
improvements in India-U S relations tended to support and facilitate India s move toward a market 
oriented economy India s economic crisis of 1991 was primarily responsible for the initiation of 
economic reforms Increased foreign investment in India in the 1990s strengthened the economy and 
contributed to a continuation of the economic reforms Finally the evolving international ideological 
currents in favor of capitalism and away from socialism supported a process of social learning leading 
to broader acceptance of the economic reforms and influenced the decision by India s policymakers to 
concentrate on strengthening the economy at the expense of increasing military expenditures—these 
two factors further facilitated the continuation of a comprehensive economic restructuring program in 
India
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Chapter 13
Infrastructure and Industry Development
Dara Szyliowicz
Introduction
Industry formation and growth is a critical process in the modern world It takes place on a variety of 
levels—the state the sector the firm and the individual It is central to a nation s economic well beine 
and the general public s welfare As a result countries seek to promote growth usually industrial to 
ensure their own economic advance Firms within an industry are eager to promote their sector in hopes 
that it will help their company Industry growth often means increased sales more jobs increased 
earnings and overall economic development Individuals champion it because it means higher salaries 
and policy makers advocate it in hopes that unemployment rates will decrease and overall economic 
development will follow Despite the importance of this topic however relatively little is known 
about these processes
The factors that make for industry emergence and growth remain an understudied topic Discussion 
often centers around industry creation in terms of the roles of individuals as industry innovators or a 
technology that pushes an industry As a result of this technological bias industry studies have often 
focused on the effect a major technology has in pushing an industry Thus scholars use product cycles 
as a way to talk about industries equating an industry with a given technology or group of 
technologies According to the traditional paradigm industries usually form around a particular product 
or group of related products are easily identifiable and recognized by both participants and outsiders
Much of the work done by economists sociologists and organization theorists assume that industries 
are the result of competitive market processes Perhaps it is most important to realize that industries 
are not fixed entities rather they are created grow and continually change But what are the underlying 
factors that allow for industry emergence7 Clearly infrastructure is a critical part of this process 
However the available literature is limited This paper proposes to begin to rectify some of these 
limitations by explicitly addressing the relationship between industries and infrastructure This is a 
topic of distinct importance for theoretically it advances the study and understanding of industries and of 
how industries function The empirical implications are clear—the more known about this topic the 
more we will know about how and why certain industries form and succeed This has important 
ramifications for a variety of actors policy makers are interested in this topic to ensure economic 
development industry leaders want to ensure continued growth of their field entrepreneurs want to 
know how to ensure the success of a new enterprise as do related actors such as bankers stock brokers 
etc
This paper will explore two main bodies of literature the work on industry emergence and the 
literature that explicitly deals with infrastructure The importance of infrastructure in the process of 
industry emergence will be argued and then new ways of looking at infrastructure will be presented
Existing Literature
Industry Emergence
Industry emergence has long been the domain of economists The basic industrial economics model 
suggests an industry emerges around a specific product or technology This view contends that formal 
markets arise as a response to competitive forces transactions are distinct and all parties are
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anonymous Supply and demand conditions dictate what firms and industries succeed Neoclassical 
theorists assume that there is no differential access to the market and that entry and exit are easy for 
participants 1 This vantage point relies heavily on Schumpeterian assumptions that there is a best 
technology or product that cets selected due to a demand in the market place It assumes that the need 
for a particular product drives the formation of a given industry 7 Formally therefore an industry is 
defined in terms of the cross elasticities of demand
Recent work in sociology and political science has provided a different perspective it stresses the 
importance of institutions It argues that industries are not the result of a given demand for a product 
but that their growth is a process a process embedded in institutional and normative arrangements 
These scholars point out that the view of looking at markets as self regulating mechanisms does not 
accurately reflect the empirical realities Neither markets nor industries arise due to reasons of 
efficiency rather they are the results of particular institutional and cultural factors which shape this 
particular mode of exchange 1 They argue that action is embedded in larger contexts 4 The proposition 
that industry emergence is not just due to a given demand gives rise to an important questions—what 
exactly are the forces that are shaping these factors7 This question will be addressed throughout the 
paper using the idea of infrastructure as a central important component that shapes industry emergence 
and the eventual form industries take
This paper advances the idea that the neoclassical economic notion of industry formation is flawed as 
it does not take into account the already existing resources institutions and networks that impact upon 
these formations The present view suffers from many shortcomings First it ignores the preexisting 
conditions that allow for and shape an industry Presently industries are taken for granted 
uncontested spaces that spring up in response to a new technological or product innovation Industries 
we suggest are not just the natural result of Smith s invisible hand but the result of visible and 
carefully modulated interactions between organizations and their environment
Secondly the neoclassical view fails to take into account the larger institutional and political 
frameworks that these industries are embedded in Far from being uncontested this paper suggests that 
industry formation is a highly contested political process that allows for the industry growth and is 
greatly dependent upon the notion of infrastructure—existing social political and technical networks 
that constrain and shape the eventual outcome Industries do not just emerge due to reasons of 
efficiency or the creation of a new and superior technology but are created in part due to the existing 
social structure that facilitates a particular type of industry creation 5
The work being done on the social construction of industries is interesting and important because it 
recognizes that industries are not created from a technological imperative but rather are embedded in 
larger social historical and political context By understanding this context we will have a clearer view 
of how industries are formed and why some industries succeed while others fail even those with 
seemingly similar attributes More specifically the contributions of research on the role of 
infrastructure in industry emergence are clear 1) it will explicitly draw attention to institutional 
environments that industries are embedded in and 2) it will recognize the role that these environments 
play m industry emergence
The Role o f Infrastructure
Unfortunately not a great deal has been written on the subject of infrastructure Most of the literature 
views it in terms of common sensical public policy terms—infrastructure is seen as large projects 
such as transportation (roads railroads airports) communications networks (telephone lines computer 
networks) education systems etc that are deemed necessary for a modern society to function
As mentioned previously an underexplored factor in industry emergence is infrastructure When this 
topic is discussed infrastructure is cavalierly presented as an explanation for the success or failure of an 
industry Much of the work on infrastructure and industry emergence has focused how the lack of 
infrastructure has prevented growth of a particular industry especially in developing countries These
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countrits are in a catch 22 situation without infrastructure they cannot create viable industries 
however being underdeveloped they do not possess the resources to create one especially tor high 
technology industries which these countries need so badly For example biotechnology has been 
suggested as an answer to many ot the agricultural problems facing developing nations 6 However the 
biotech industry remains centered in the advanced countries while creation of an indigenous capability 
of this technology has remained limited world wide there has not been a global boom in the 
biotechnology industry
By having an indigenous capability these countries would not be dependent on imports from the first 
world Also they mieht be able to create solutions to problems that are unique to their region Authors 
have argued the reason for a constrained world wide biotechnology industry is a lack of infrastructure in 
the host country 7 For example in Nigeria a survey of scientist agricultural experts and policy makers 
indicated that the greatest problem creating a truly Nigerian biotech industry was infrastructural 
deficiencies Nor is this finding limited to one particular industry or third world countries in a study 
on the Greek military industry the overall ineffectiveness of this sector was attributed to the general 
weakness ot the domestic industrial infrastructure 8
Clearly infrastructure plays a crucial role in industry emergence and as a result a country s potential 
development Infrastructure does not just affect the presence or absence of an industry in a given 
country but since new industries provide employment and revenue it directly influences the quality of 
life of the citizens ot that country and the overall economy Thus it stands to reason that the more 
knowledgeable scholars are about this topic the more they will know about industry emergence and 
success or failure
The literature for the discussion of infrastructure and industry emergence can be situated in three 
distinct traditions 1) the literature dealing with technological innovation 2) the work done by 
transaction costs economists and 3) institutional approaches
Tecnological Innovation The main body of work that has explicitly addressed the question of 
infrastructure has done so in terms of technological innovation—how it works to inhibit or facilitate 
the creation and formation of a given technology or industry 9 This literature dealing with infrastructure 
and innovation can be divided into several categories
The first views new technologies as a complete break with the past each successive technology is 
absolutely different from any technology that has come before it For example Schumpeter and his 
followers focused their attention on gales of creative destruction arguing that new technologies cause 
upheaval and a dramatic break from past arrangements and structures 10
More recently scholars concerned with this area has focused on cognitive capabilities They posit 
that technologies are not just created sui generis but are actually the accumulation of basic scientific 
knowledge and other technological changes that allows for a particular breakthrough— conceptual 
trajectories 11 The concern of researchers here is the cognitive knowledge base not the resources and 
social arrangements that make these innovations possible p
The work on technological innovation overlaps in several areas Perhaps most important for the 
purposes of this discussion are the studies that assess technological change in terms of social structure 
Authors agree that innovations may represent a radical departure from the past however most views of 
innovation still sees change as occurring within the existing social framework Although dealing with 
a variety of technologies and actors these approaches all focus on the impacts to the innovation 
processes Innovation as the result of certain structural arrangements is the focus of much of the current 
work on technology n
These authors concentrate their research efforts on the social networks and relationships that allow for 
innovation Although concerned with the effects of social structures individual actors play key roles in 
developing and creating an infrastructure 14 Infrastructure m the language of innovation becomes 
reducible to an input in the innovation process Van de Ven and Garud for example argue that there is
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a social system framework that can be used to understand how actors create the infrastructure to 
support the development of new technologies According to this particular approach infrastructure is 
made up of three distinct yet interconnected parts institutional arrangements resource endowments and 
proprietary functions Crudely these three categories can be identified as the state financial, structures 
and supply and distribution networks Van de Ven and Garud suggest that each of these areas are 
necessary and equally important parts of the infrastructure This line of work is extremely important as 
it is the first attempt to address infrastructure and suggest ways to systematically test these ideas 15 One 
example looks at the role infrastructure played in the creation of one specific technology the cochlear 
implant This work illuminates the need to look at industry formation and the process of innovation in 
context It also demonstrates the necessity of looking at preexisting relationships when examining 
these phenomena
These preexisting relationships are important in many ways not only m terms of innovation For 
example the existence of infrastructure is also used to explain why competitors or imitators those that 
come second to market have the advantage 16 The conclusion is that second to market companies profit 
from the innovation because there are basic building blocks in place The building blocks are 
specifically identified as regimes of appropriability the dominant primarily design paradigm and 
complementary assets 17 These building blocks can be regarded as what other authors have labeled 
infrastructure the necessary components for technological change to occur
This literature provides insights into the nature of infrastructure as well as a basis for future work m 
the field It identifies and recognizes the importance of existing social institutions and material 
resources that allow for innovation to occur It also sensitive to the structural nature of innovation and 
recognizes that one of the results of this disruption is the emergence of novel infrastructural 
arrangements that are needed to support the new technologies
Although this concern with social structure (whether it be as building blocks or infrastructure) 
represents an important conceptual breakthrough it possesses certain shortcomings The central focus 
in this literature is not really upon infrastructure but the technology or the process of innovation In 
these works infrastructure is just a framework that allows these technologies to be produced 
Moreover it fails to outline how this development occurs Additionally it ignores how infrastructure 
changes or adjusts to support the innovation process or the new technology In short this literature 
often treats the material and social as completely divorced from one another but is this the case7 There 
is no attempt to blend or integrate the various components for example why are resources not seen as 
embedded within the institutional framework7 Most of these authors focus primarily on the material 
nature of infrastructure (such as the hardware needed to build the technology) but what about the parts 
that cannot be characterized as tangible assets7 Perhaps the most overarching question is whether realist 
approach appropriate for this type of research7
Transactional Costs Scholars doing work on transaction costs provide a second paradigm They focus 
on costs of transacting this represents a major change in the field of economics 18 They point out that 
firm behavior is not just the result of market forces but also involve institutional arrangements and 
business relationships 19 Thus they begin to introduce a behavioral component into the relationship 
between organizations and markets Williamson suggests for example that hierarchical arrangements 
are at times more efficient than markets 20 Although efficiency considerations can not always explain 
the actions of firms it is a proper explanation when the variable of cost of transacting is added into the 
efficiency calculation Thus he argues that due to asset specificity and small numbers bargaining both 
of which increase the costs of transacting firms become committed to certain courses of action and 
particular relationships with other firms 71 No longer is there an assumption of no switching costs for 
an organization or that organizational action is motivated primarily by price mechanisms
However such arguments still assume a functional individual basis for action Organizational action 
is based on bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior by individuals Due to uncertainty in the 
environment and small numbers problems people find it more useful to organize into hierarchies 
Although these arguments provide an enhanced view of organizations from a traditionally economic
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viewpoint they fail to explain how efficiency is defined or value is infused into the price mechanism 
process Societal forces such as institutions norms and procedures are not addressed the traditional 
version of transaction costs and are just subsumed under the general rubric of the costs of transacting
The State The work on the state is also relevant The state is a seminal actor m industry emergence 
and growth It directly influences development through laws and financial concessions as well as 
providing funding for certain industry sectors Some industries are the direct result of state intervention 
(e g the aerospace industry) and others are supported through various mechanisms (e g grants and 
sales) to the state Moreover the state indirectly influences economic development especially industrial 
policy though institutional arrangements rules and regulations such as property rights These 
relations which are maintained by the state are seminal determinants to the manner in which an industry 
is created and provide a structure to the creation of any industry Hence the work on property rights is 
directly relevant to industrial development as they are an integral part of infrastructure Property rights 
are at the nexus of much of the arguments on infrastructure both in terms of a transaction costs 
approach and an institutional viewpoint
Property Rights Individual property rights are central to any market77 According to North poorly 
defined property rights (due to elites self interest) result in inefficiencies which reduces economic 
growth 7 The original arrangement is then sabotaged by groups who seek to use the political process 
to safeguard their terms of exchange Property rights are treated in a vacuum in this argument as an 
impediment to efficient markets North elaborates on the context by focusing on the importance of 
institutions and institutional change these he states allow for market processes to occur 74 The 
argument is that the interaction between organizations and institutions allow for economic 
performance Thus institutions and institutional arrangements provide stability for relations as well as 
constraints and opportunities Other scholars have demonstrated the large extent to which institutions 
influence these property arrangements and therefore dominate much of the discussion on 
infrastructure 75
Institutional Analyses Another body of literature comes from sociology and organization theory This 
literature has its roots in Marx and Weber who argued that there were certain fundamental institutional 
preconditions that allow for the rise of a given social system According to these theorists it was these 
preconditions that enabled and shaped the modern state In Weber s case he stated that certain 
requirements were necessary for the creation of capitalism 26 Marx used thresholds in the process of 
technological change to formulate an evolutionary theory of change 77 In Marxian terms infrastructure 
might be linked to his idea of superstructure the sum total of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society the real foundation on which rises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which corresponds definite forms of social consciousness 78
One of the many assumptions of this school of thought is that social order is the result of a long 
process of interpretation of action and eventual acceptance of a shared definition of social reality 79 
Institutionalization is the mechanism by which social processes obligation or actualities take a rule 
like form 10 and become taken for granted 11 Perhaps the most central point of these types of arguments 
is the assumption that the existence of organizations or industries can not be explained by instrumental 
rationality but rather are the result of social legitimation processes
Stinchcombe in his study discovered that organizations founded at the same time had similar 
structures 17 The conclusion of this finding was that history matters or at least timing does The 
organizational literature has interpreted this to mean that an organization is a product of its 
environment of the time Much of the work on industries is based on the notion that an industry is 
imprinted at its founding These arguments maintain that there are initial founding pressures and 
constraints that fundamentally affect organizations and shape them for the span of their existence ^
Much of the work done m recent years by sociologists and organization theorists has been to explore 
the taken for granted assumptions about societal action The idea that an infrastructure made up of 
technical institutional cultural and historical factors would influence industry creation may be viewed 
as an outgrowth of this work New industries are not just simply the result of a technological
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innovation or ntw products that individuals decide to sell this paper posits that it is a much more 
complex process Institutions both form il and intorniai allow for certain arrangements to exist In the 
language of this discussion they might be viewed as part of an infrastructure
If the above findings are taken seriously then they should be applied to industry formation as well 
By doing work in this area it will fill an important gap in the literature presently what little research 
that has been done in this area evades many of these issues Usually the focus of these studies is to 
addresses the outcomes of an infrastructure (i e industries) and not on the context that provides and 
allows for these events to occur
New Perspectives
All of these bodies of literature suggest that industry formation is closely linked to the nature of 
available infrastructure Although innovation and change are part of the picture they are certainly not 
the whole story In the following section I attempt to delineate more precisely the elements of 
infrastructure b 1) introducing the concept of public good and 2) by considering the functions that 
infrastructure performs
It is appropriate to begin by addressing i problem that was alluded to during the discussion of earlier 
approaches to infrastructure the notion that these relationships are highly institutionalized and 
embedded In contrast to the depiction of institutional arrangements as an equal part of the infrastructure 
picture I argue that all material and structural resources are highly institutionalized and embedded in 
their institutional context As a result what resources are utilized and available is highly dependent 
upon the character of both the general and the specific infrastructures The institutionalized nature of the 
environment is at odds with a traditional efficiency paradigm therefore this approach does not see 
resources used as taken for granted or the result of efficiency concerns but rather as very dependent on 
the nature and type of infrastructure present at the time of emergence and later growth Thus 
environments have important ramifications for industry emergence and growth
There seems to be no consensus on identifying what constitutes infrastructure However rather than 
concentrate on the traits or characteristics that make up infrastructure what exactly is meant by 
infrastructure9 This paper proposes several possible ways of approaching the problem
One way of looking at infrastructure is to see it as an arrangement that is necessary to promote 
innovation However this definition seems very limiting infrastructure promotes much more than just 
innovation Perhaps a richer approach would be to look at it as a much more amorphous symbolic 
concept I argue that the innovations that get chosen or selected out to use evolutionary terms are 
based on this framework It is the infrastructure (or access to) that determines the degree of success that 
an industry achieves This is especially true at the beginning of an industry Additionally this paper 
attempts to advance three main theoretical points in its discussion of infrastructure that will be 
discussed more fully that 1) infrastructure has both a general and specific nature 2) industries are 
imprinted from this infrastructure and 3) infrastructure changes and evolves over time
General and Specific Infrastructure
Consider the possibility that infrastructure takes two fundamental forms—general and specific The 
former may be defined as the common resource elements that are accessible to all strata of society and 
are not dependent on a particular sector or industry These are pure public goods Everyone need not 
utilize the good but each individual must have access to it This generalized infrastructure incorporates 
the material notions that are traditionally associated with the word infrastructure Examples are those 
elements that are generally identified as infrastructure—education systems telecommunication 
networks and transportation systems Moreover the underlying tax systems private property 
arrangements etc all are part of the general infrastructure Much of this generalized infrastructure is 
provided by or structured by state intervention
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In addition each industry requires a specific infrastructure Industry specific infrastructure might be 
thought of as a semi public good This is a specific type of institutional arrangements resource 
allocations and organizational networks Examples are trade associations specialized technologies and 
specific patterns of interaction such as conferences and industry meetings Social theorists suggest that 
as society develops it is accompanied by structural differentiation If industry formation is viewed as 
being analagous certain propositions emerge
Proposition I As the industry becomes more mature and well developed there will be a 
corresponding increase in the number and types of these semi public goods
The specific infrastructure also includes some private goods These are organizational and individual 
goods and assets They include all goods and services that the organization or an individual explicitly 
owns or provides Examples are the organizations themselves their assets including patents and their 
human resource capabilities Access to these goods can only occur with explicit organizational 
permission and are acknowledged as organizational assets
Obviously these categories are mixed and will vary from society to society because of the different 
roles that states play in shaping markets Therefore i capitalist or free enterprise society will possess a 
mix of public semi public and private goods whereas a more socialist society or less free market 
society will have more public goods than private goods ^  Accordingly I suggest
Proposition 2 The more free the market system the more dramatic the delineation 
between types of infrastructure
This argument posits that both the specific and generalized infrastructure change over time however at 
different rates and in different ways
Proposition 3a Changes in generalized infrastructure are determined more by shifts in 
macroeconomic political and regulatory patterns than by firm level factors
whereas
Proposition 3b Changes in industry specific infrastructure are influenced more by the 
nature of the technology relations between firms and between the industry and the wider 
community than by state level factors
Functions of Infrastructure
Another way to provide specificity to this very amorphous notion of infrastructure might be to explore 
the dimensions of infrastructure and identify their functions This functional approach considers areas 
such as information dissemination communication networks and distribution of outcomes For 
example universities are an important element of infrastructure because they provide knowledge and 
skills carry out research disseminate knowledge transfers ideas and socialize individuals and groups 
Thus these organizations also provide a skilled labor force often specifically trained in a specific 
technology (l e biotechnology) as well as the technologies themselves
Similiarly highways roads telecommunication and transportation (the aspects that one traditionally 
associates with infrastructure) facilitate interaction between organizations and individuals
The underlying structures of society are also an important part of infrastructure Examples of this 
underlying structure are the legal system property rights tax codes and patents as well as the political 
regime type 16 These are seen as important elements that are necessary to spur industry and economic 
development So what do these basic blocks of infrastructure provide to organizations9 They provide 
a well laid out understanding of the distribution of outcomes These outcomes are based on a rational
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legal system they ire constant ovtr time and well understood by the participants in the system It 
would not be enough that a distribution of outcomes had been established but also there existed a 
manner in which to enforce them Thus there is agreement among individuals on basic rules of the 
game and on the consequences of ignoring these rules Their importance is evidenced by the reluctance 
of organizations to enter in to the Chinese market as they have no guarantees that leases property 
rights or intellectual property agreements will be honored or enforced
A useful analogy to clarity this discussion sees infrastructure as electricity and industry as trying to 
plug itself in to as many outlets as possible The more outlets it can gain access to the greater the 
strength of its charge and the greater the charge the stronger the industry will be Therefore
Proposition 4 The greater the number and strength of linkages between an industry and 
structure the more rapidly an industry will form
The same considerations apply at the level of the firm However just because the resources exist or 
are part of the infrastructure does not mean that they are usable for a specific firm One of the most 
important factors in terms of infrastructure is not necessarily the existence of resources but rather the 
ability of a firm or organization to mobilize a given set of resources The ability to mobilize resources 
to acquire and activate them towards a given productive end is a formidable challenge to any 
organization Just the existence of the resources in the environment guarantees nothing For example 
banks might be considered part of the general infrastructure They provide money for a wide variety of 
projects but if a firm is unable to obtain a loan it becomes irrelevant The organization must either 
find other sources for that given resource (such as networks) or do without it (which depending on the 
resource may not be an option)
One might argue that one of the functions that the specific infrastructure serves is m providing 
access making it easier to mobilize certain resources For instance a trade associations may facilitate 
the making of linkages or get involved in certain industrial networks And as the industry may become 
more structured and more legitimate the banks maybe more willing to provide loans A high degree 
of interaction between a given industry and the infrastructure may also change the mobilization process 
For example banks may become used to working in a specific area become familiar with its particular 
needs and therefore more likely to provide monetary and other resources and services to organizations 
from this sector Accordingly
Proposition 5 The ability to mobilize resources is one of the most important parts of the 
orgamzation/infrastructure interaction Industry specific infrastructure makes the 
mobilization of resources easier
If we can suggest a general infrastructure it is not surprising that we would see similarities across 
organization or industries at a given time As was noted earlier organization are imprinted at the time 
of their founding Perhaps we could argue that what an organization is imprinted with is information 
from the infrastructure that exists at the time Or is it imprinted with the best way of dealing with a 
given infrastructure We would like to extend this argument and suggest that perhaps the organizational 
structure that was selected was the one best suited for dealing with the infrastructure
Proposition 6 Being able to successfully access the infrastructure of the time that 
determined the subsequent survival of an organization
Proposition 6a As a general infrastructure changes and evolves so must the 
organizational form
Infrastructiii e and Indus tn  Development '>07
Mapping the Infrastructure
This discussion still leaves us with the primary question ot how to conceptualize this framework7 And 
perhaps more importantly how do we know it exists7 We would like to draw the analogy between 
infrastructure and a large plot of land made up of very rough uneven terrain Infrastructure would be the 
land and the components that make it up would be represented on it Thus this analogy would show 
the inchoate nature of infrastructure The topographical map that one might use when looking at the 
territory would not be fixed over time but would have to be continually updated as resources were 
depleted and replenished actors changed and power relations shifted
An industry would be seen as the buildings or structures of varying shapes and sizes built on the 
property These buildings would be built with different types of foundations and on uneven terrain 
Using this framework the conceptualization would not be of bulldozers which raze the land but rather 
of unusual and different structures that adapt to this uneven land utilizing its potentials and 
compensating for its deficiencies The topographical map would not just have elevations ground 
formations it would also have latitude and longitude These lines would indicate different areas on the 
infrastructure map Just as things will only grow in certain areas the same might hold true for the rise 
of certain industries
The location number of buildings as well as the shape and sizes of these building will identify not 
only the boundaries ot the industry and relationships between the members but also the connections 
between the industry and the infrastructure
Proposition 7 The more of these buildings that an industry has—that is the greater the 
number of connections along a variety of dimensions that an industry engages in with the 
infrastructure—the more successful it is likely to be
Furthermore we might be able to see certain industries clumped on certain types of terrains whereas 
others would be spread out across a variety of territories The lines of latitude and longitude would not 
be arbitrary but might serve as indicators in the different areas of infrastructure
In strategic management much is made of Michael Porter s value chain a concept that is meant to 
give clarity to complex issues The value chain attempts to identify those factors and activities within 
an organization which give value to products or services Perhaps the longitude and latitude lines might 
be representative of the value grid of the infrastructure those activities in the infrastructure that frame 
ideas provide boundaries and give value to the industry
The elaboration of such an approach can provides several important contnbutions to our 
understanding of infrastructure First it discusses what exactly are the results from the infrastructure 
industry relationship More simply what are the outcome variables from the infrastructure—industry 
linkage I think there are several results and to use the map analogy perhaps one outcome is the 
topographical map itself It allows us to delineate the nature and shape of infrastructures for specific 
industries Second infrastructure seems to provide a framework a paradigm of how to interpret the 
events and realities of the world It provides the grounding for the cognitive and material reality It 
makes some forms on the map possible and others unthinkable Third the map also provides others 
those not directly involved in the industry a guide to the industry and a way to understand it
Conclusion
This paper has argued that infrastructure plays a critical role in industry development a topic that has 
not been treated adequately in the literature Important aspects remain understudied because the focus of 
infrastructure studies to date has been upon technological innovation or public policy In this paper I 
have attempted to suggest several novel approaches that might provide additional insights into the 
nature of infrastructure its components and its relationship to industry formation
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Clearly this is only an exploratory ettort Much work remains to be done both theoretically and 
empirically betöre we are provided with an adequate understanding ot this important topic The 
propositions suggested above represent the first step in what will become an ongoing research project 
They should be operationalized and tested empirically and additional ones developed Hopefully this 
effort will contribute to our understanding ot industry development and will be of interest to scholars 
and policy makers in a range ot areas
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Chapter 14
Free Market Ideologies Adam Smith and the Neo Austrians
Catalina Vizcarra
Since the collapse oí Soviet communism increasing numbers of politicians and economists are 
extolling the virtues ot the free market Ironically they often advocate quite different policy 
prescriptions especially with respect to the nature and content of the institutional iramework in which 
markets operate (i e property rights) These distinctions exist partly due to the fact that the notions 
related to the market are subject to various interpretations Efficiency in particular the very criterion 
for evaluating the success of the market is essentially normative Once we accept this iact it is a 
short step to conclude that the arguments in favor of tree markets are essentially ideological rather than 
scientific positions
Recognizing the ideological nature of the free market is particularly important today because it is 
now often claimed to be the only possible mechanism capable ot achieving sustained welfare In this 
context we discuss the arguments for tree markets of Adam Smith and the Neo Austrians who 
together comprise the strongest intellectual defense of free markets The laissez faire prescriptions of 
both Smith and the Austrians are philosophically based on the notion ot negative liberty—freedom 
from coercion especially from the state In Smith s case this criterion is not absolute but rather it is 
occasionally superseded by some social considerations For Smith the wealth of the nation social 
welfare is simply the aggregation of individuals production of commodities Consequently his 
notion of efficiency is confined to the productive sphere—to the productive powers of labor In 
contrast the Austrians maintain highly individualistic and subjective concepts of efficiency and wealth 
which are entirely founded on the concept of negative liberty As a result there are no social standards 
that justify government intervention
The differences between Smith and the Neo Austrians are particularly striking especially considering 
that they belong to the same philosophical tradition Indeed Hayek considers that true 
individualism—as represented by himself and Smith is essentially a social theory based on the 
individual as the unit of analysis and the belief in a spontaneous (harmonious9) order For Hayek this 
philosophical tradition also includes a set of policy maxims derived from the theoretical approach 
However despite the claims of Hayek Smith s conclusions for society undoubtedly differ from his 
own The subsequent analysis elucidates the differences in theory and policy of Smith and Hayek 
especially with respect to wealth efficiency and the role of coercion Without question Smith s 
invisible hand suggests both the method and main results of his analysis and therefore is the natural 
place to begin
Adam Smith s Invidible Hand
Smith s argument in favor of the market in the Wealth of Nations addressed the most important 
problem that concerned English political philosophy since Hobbes the limits of coercion 1 Hobbes 
proposed that the only method of escape from the social chaos which resulted from man s selfishness 
was a Leviathan a state with absolute powers that became in his model the actual founder of civil 
society 7 Locke was apparently the first to respond to Hobbes challenge He claimed that a natural— 
divine order was the actual support of civil society He was opposed to Hobbes characterization of 
human nature and believed that mankind was essentially virtuous Society evolved naturally and the 
state was only required as a guarantor of this natural order
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Locke s argument for coercion rested on the existence of scarcity To be more precise in his model 
property rights were constantly threatened due to the problem of scarcity In order to solve this 
dilemma the state should intervene to defend property rights Nonetheless for Locke scarcity was 
analytically intractable Indeed the notion of surplus value was still to be developed precisely by 
Smith one hundred years later Under Locke s view as with most of Adam Smith s predecessors 
wealth was viewed as a zero sum game Scarcity combined with the mercantilist notion that wealth 
was only to be accumulated and not produced inevitably led to the existence of outsiders—marginalized 
elements of society struggling for subsistence Indeed in Locke s model the limits of coercion— 
administration of justice protection of property rights—were well developed the remaining problem 
was how to legitimize a system that endemically produced outsiders The works of Adam Smith can be 
viewed as an attempt to fill this vacuum with an ideology that pronounced the existence of a 
felicitous natural order ^
Smith s Harmonious View of Society
Human society when we contemplate it in a certain abstract and philosophical light 
appears like a great an immense machine whose regular and harmonious movements 
produce a thousand agreeable effects 4
Smith s metaphor of the invisible hand claims that selfish behavior within the economic sphere 
leads to public welfare Selfishness is mainly understood as the driving mechanism of human economic 
behavior Coercion is the mam restriction on its positive effects but in general this natural tendency 
leads automatically to growth In fact Smith s argument entails Locke s notion of negative liberty s 
m the sense that the suppression of coercion is the guarantor of his natural order
Most scholars would agree with the view that the invisible hand supports Smith s harmonious 
vision of society 6 This interpretation implies that Smith s argument in favor of markets claimed to 
solve the problems of welfare order and legitimacy simultaneously His natural order is the very 
basis of welfare and legitimacy resulted from the fact that his model underestimates the potential 
magnitude of the problem of outsiders However some interesting insights have been developed that 
suggest that Smith s argument does not necessarily entail harmony One of them is due to Rashid 7 
whose view rests upon Smith s development of the labor theory of value (a theory that essentially 
implies a trade off between wages and profits —and rent) Indeed Smith was the first to develop the 
labor theory of value and his influence on Marx has been acknowledged by many Marxists 8 There is 
no doubt that this is a theory of exploitation However scholars disagree in the interpretation of 
Smith s view due to the inconsistencies in his development of theories of prices and value
In his discussion of prices Smith considers that profits are in general a function of the 
accumulation of capital Natural wages on the other hand are generally determined by the level of 
subsistence and respond normally to the demand and supply of labor This is the view that prevails in 
his explanation Profits and wages are determined in the exchange sphere and as a consequence there is 
no trade off between them Rashid argues that it is not as a theory of prices that labor values are 
important 9 The point that Rashid wants to make is that despite the inconsistencies between labor 
values and prices theory the labor theory of value that Smith develops necessarily leads to an 
exploitation theory—m a metaphysical sense But if Rashid is correct why did Marx spend so many 
pages to prove that his notions of natural prices and market prices were consistent with his labor theory 
of value7 Why did Marx s most successful critic E Bohm Bawerk focus his analysis on the 
inconsistencies between his first volume of Capital—where he develops his theory of value—and his 
third volume in which he treats prices7 What we want to stress in any event is that Smith 
consistently maintains the theory of labor value only for a primitive stage of society
In that early and rude state of society which precedes both the accumulation of stock and 
the appropriation of land the proportion between the quantities of labour necessary for
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acquiring different objects seems to be the only eireumstinee which can afford any rule for 
exchanging them for one another 10
In his analysis of the capitalist system his theory of prices prevails which implies that there is no 
trade off between wages and profits Moreover Smith s theory of economic growth contains no conflict 
or trade off between profits and wages Wages are increasing and the rate of profit is decreasing but for 
totally different reasons In particular the rate of profit decreases due to the increasing competition 
until it gets to a rate that only permits the reproduction of the system—the stationary state 11 In 
conclusion it is difficult to sustain a theory of exploitation
There are other objections to interpretations of Smith s social analysis as an harmonious one 19 
Particularly interesting are those related to the role of defense and the conditions of labor under the 
advanced stage of society With respect to the former point as we discuss in the next section there is 
no argument in favor of defense in Smith s natural order Defense is necessary only because this 
system of natural liberty has been subverted under the mercantilist system Trade establishes bonds of 
friendship between neighbors The possibility of a extended order of human cooperation is open under 
capitalism
The latter point relattd to the condition of the labor force in the advanced stage of society is more 
difficult His recognition of the alienation of labor under capitalism casts doubts upon interpretations of 
his view as optimistic Nevertheless the subsistence of the working class is guaranteed in his model 
On the one hand the natural price of labor assures the subsistence of the laborer and his dependents 
On the other his theory of population implies full employment The possible existence of 
marginalized elements of society is therefore eliminated
The Invisible Hand and Efficiency
Modern interpretations of Smith s invisible hand tend to obscure the peculiarities of his vision of 
markets and efficiency For example Rashid n following Wesley Mitchell s arguments argues that the 
invisible hand is based on three axioms
1 Individuals desire to maximize wealth
2 Individuals know better than governments how to maximize their own wealth and
3 National wealth is the sum of individual wealth
We have two mam concerns with this interpretation On the one hand Smith s invisible hand is 
always confined in the Wealth of Nations to the productive sphere—to the supply side of the market 
Smith is focused on the entrepreneur in particular on the allocation of capital 14 Thus an 
interpretation of his argument as one that conceives of individuals as consumers and producers is a 
neoclassically inspired misreading of Smith 15 Moreover Smith s notion of wealth is totally objective 
He defines wealth as the physical production of commodities 16 which implies that there is no place for 
any maximization of subjective wealth Consumers m other words do not maximize wealth as they do 
in the neoclassical and the Neo Austrian approach In fact this objective notion of wealth becomes an 
implicit boundary developed on individual rationality in the Wealth of Nations Smith imposed 
implicitly a particular normative goal on individuals and society maximization of physical 
production In this sense many exceptions to the principle of free markets can be found in his work 
(i e his rejection of profligacy) 17
Analyzing further Smith s argument for free markets we should mention that his interest in the 
productive sphere leads him to emphasize the size of the market as the main channel through which 
efficient outcomes are achieved Efficiency in this context is mainly the result of division of labor and 
productivity It is confined to the productive sphere the greater division of labor the greater efficiency 
in the system The chain that Smith develops starts from the dimension or size of the market that 
presumably should promote more competition In turn competition provides incentives for
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entrepreneurs to improve production techniques (i e division of hbor economies of scale) It is only 
through these ictions that they may achieve further accumulation ot capital and that wealth could be 
maximized This mechanistic view which considers no gaps between savings and investment— 
accumulation of capital is by definition investment under the classical approach is the core of his 
argument in favor of free markets
Smith on the State
Smith s advocacy of the market mechanism as embodied in his discussion of the invisible hand is 
not however unequivocal In The Wealth of Nations Smith specifically defends coercion in three 
areas administration of justice defence and the provision of some public services and public goods 
Administration oj justice in Smith s view is the main support of society 18 For Smith the 
administration of justice essentially supports naturally developed property rights an institution that he 
considers indispensable for the functioning and support of his natural order
The definition of justice m Smith is intimately linked with his defense of negative liberty He 
states in The Wealth of Nations that the principle of the administration of justice should be that of 
protecting as far as possible every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every 
other member of it 12 However his notion of justice is more clearly developed in his Theory of 
Moral Sentiments in which it becomes obvious that Smith s main interest is commutative justice 
Commutative justice is essentially defined in negative terms the abstention from infliction of injury 
to the person or property and reputation of others 70 Smith seems therefore not to have much use for 
any notion of distributive justice On the other hand some interpretations of Smith contend that he 
maintains at least some notion of social justice that may override the natural liberty of the 
individual 71 For example Viner22 mentions the case for protection of slaves against violence by their 
masters which Smith supports not only because it would promote productivity of labor but because it 
is in accord with common humanity In any case he recognizes that Smith invokes this type ot 
argument only sparingly
Later Smith describes how the operational administration ot justice—or protection of individuals 
from the harms of others is based on the defense of property rights First he assumts that vices like 
malice and resentment or all vices that can harm an individual in his person or reputation—not in his 
property—are not common in society As a consequence men may live together in society with some 
tolerable degree of security though there is no civil magistrate to protect them from the injustice of 
those passions 2^  For Smith the real problem that calls for administration of justice—as is the case in 
Locke s model—is the threat to property rights where there is no property or at least none that 
exceeds the value of two or three days labour civil government is not so necessary But the affluence 
of the rich excites the indignation of the poor who are often both driven by want and prompted by 
envy to invade his possessions It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of 
that valuable property which is acquired by the labour ot many years or perhaps of many successive 
generations can sleep a single night m security 74 In his model the defense of property rights 
develops naturally in the stage of society in which property becomes significant It is in the age of 
shepherds in the second period of society that the inequality of fortune first begins to take place and 
introduces among men a degree of authority and subordination which could not possibly exist before It 
thereby introduces some degree of that civil government which is indispensably necessary for its own 
preservation and it seems to do this naturally and even independent of the consideration of that 
necessity 75
Before discussing Smith s argument tor defense we should mention that the notion of property 
rights discussed above basically refers to commodities Nevertheless he also argues in defense of 
patents and copyrights which in his view give incentives for innovative activities that might have 
great returns for society In this case his argument mainly refers to the maximization of wealth 76 
Finally administration of Justice should also be regarded as enforcement of contracts which the defense 
of property rights suggests—a contract might perfectly well be understood as a result of bargaining 
over property rights
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With respect to the role of defense we argue that it should be considered is a practical function of 
government although there is some ambiguity in Smith s treatment of the issue When Smith refers 
to his natural order it is clear that Commerce ought naturally to be among nations as among 
individuals a bond of union and friendship But since each nation has been made to look with an 
invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades and to consider their gain as 
its own loss —which is nothing but the principle of mercantilism defence is necessary 27 In other 
words if the natural order would not have been subverted there would not be an argument in favor of 
defence At least there would not be such an argument under capitalism although it might still hold 
for previous stages of society 78
A final point related to Smith s argument for defense is the curious fact that he supports the art of 
war as the noblest of all arts 79 He contends that the state should teach the art of war to the people
Even though the martial spirit of the people were of no use towards the defence of the 
society yet to prevent that sort of mental mutilation deformity and wretchedness which 
cowardice necessarily involves in it from spreading themselves through the great body of 
the people would still deserve the most serious attention of government30
This argument is linked with the last role Smith assigns to government which is the support of 
som & public institutions and public goods Winch 11 correctly links Smith s view of education with 
Hutcheson s proposals on the issue For the latter the legislator should promote true principles of 
virtue among the people Smith definitely also sustains a notion of the good citizen that should be 
promoted by the State His support of public education is essentially oriented towards the lower 
classes which should be prepared for industry and war Moreover the final goal of this public service 
is to promote happier and healthier men in mind and body It is interesting to note finally that the 
necessity of public education is a consequence of progress
In the progress of the division of labour the man whose whole life is spent in 
performing a few simple operations of which the effects too are perhaps always the 
same or very nearly the same has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise 
his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur He 
naturally loses therefore the habit of such exertion and generally becomes as stupid and 
ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become in every improved and 
civilized society this is the state into which the labouring poor that is the great body of 
the people must necessarily fall unless government takes some pains to prevent i t 17
The provision of public goods can easily be linked to the modern notion of market failure In fact 
Smith justifies intervention for cases in which those publiek works which though they may be in the 
highest degree advantageous to a great society are however of such a nature that the profit could 
never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals and which it therefore 
cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain ^
Smith condones government intervention due to the benefits these public goods can provide to society 
As we will see later this argument is in contrast with Hayek s who does not admit any social criteria 
to justify intervention
There are many other cases in which the maximization of society s welfare supersedes Smith s 
defense of natural liberty Examples include his argument for a maximum interest rate 14 certain kinds 
of monopoly 15 etc There is little doubt that the role of the State for Smith goes beyond what we 
would expect from a proponent of laissez faire It certainly differs ostensibly from the neoclassical and 
Austrian view In any event Smith s view of coercion is flexible enough to permit two different levels 
of justification First some government activities would be a direct result of natural tendencies in 
society as is the case of defence and administration of justice Secondly the case for intervention 
related to Public Institutions and Public Works is mainly a result of constructive reason ^  where two
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mam normative entern supersede natural liberty the maximization of physical production—or 
wealth—and the promotion of the good citizen
Smith s Followers Hayek and the NeoAustnans
An important distinction between the classical school and the Neo Austrians is that the former founded 
by Smith was characterized by a total emphasis on the productive sphere In contrast the Austrians 
beginning with Menger in the late nineteenth century focused on the demand side and on the 
individual Indeed in their view the distinction between demand and supply is misleading Economics 
or in Hayek s terminology Catallaxy is focused totally on individual choices
Austria Markets
The best way to introduce Neo Austrians argument in favor of free markets is to quote M Rothbard
First it should be evident from our analysis of the free market and government 
intervention throughout this work that any argument for the free market rests on a far 
deeper and more complex doctrine We can not enter here into the many ethical and 
philosophical arguments for freedom Secondly the hissez faire or free market 
doctrine asserts that everyone should have the right to be free to pursue his own 
interest as he deems best37
The more complex doctrine he refers to in this passage is nothing but the simple notion of 
negative liberty Most Austrians explicitly defend negative liberty in their work In contrast with 
Smith they do not develop normative criteria that supersede this argument at least explicitly or 
unambiguously The morality of their defense of freedom rests on the fact that they impose no 
normative criteria on the individual or society The individuals in their model are free to choose and to 
satisfy their own preferences no social criteria that supersede individuals can override this natural 
liberty However what lies behind this defense of negative liberty7 It certainly presupposes a specific 
notion of coercion which is explicated by Hayek
Earlier in our discussion we provisionally defined freedom as the absence of coercion But 
coercion is nearly as troublesome a concept as liberty itself Coercion occurs when 
one man s actions are made to serve another man s will not for his own but for the 
other s purpose Though the coerced still chooses the alternatives are determined for 
him by the coercer so that he will choose what the coercer wants 38
Note that Hayek defines liberty as the freedom from coercion of others Paradoxically this 
definition is broad enough to include his own concept of competition which is central to his defense of 
free markets
Competition is after all always a process in which a small number makes it necessary 
for larger numbers to do what they do not like be it to work harder to change 
habits If in a society in which the spirit of enterprise has not yet spread the 
majority has power to prohibit whatever it dislikes it is most unlikely that it will allow 
competition to arise 39
He also relates his view of competition with the rational actor And it is therefore in general not 
rationality which is required to make competition work but competition or traditions which allow 
competition which will produce rational behaviour 40 Hayek s own observations illustrate that his 
concept of negative liberty is not empty of content but rather it presupposes the coercive creation 
of rational actors through the market mechanism
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The presuppositions tntmled in the Austrians argument cast doubt upon its alleged morality A 
careful reading of Hayek s work leads to the conclusion that his advocacy of free markets actually rests 
on a defense of the spontaneous order created by the competitive market process In other words 
coercion is not desirable when it interferes with this spontaneous order (1 e coercion is rejected when 
collective action disrupts competition or when the state subverts the price mechanism) However 
Hayek does not condemn coercion when it is imposed by the economic laws of the market In his 
analysis negative liberty effectively serves as a pretext to defend capitalism for its own sake and is 
not authentic freedom of choice
The Market Mechanism and Efficiency
The market mechanism that Austrians have addressed extensively since Hayek is the price system 
Their model is based on individuals each with her own objective function—utility function that the 
model assumes is rationally maximized The price mechanism is as discussed in Individualism and 
Economic Order 41 central for efficiency Its role is mainly the transmission of information
The importance they attribute to the price mechanism is understandable if we consider their concept 
of efficiency For the Austrians there is no concept of social efficiency but only individual 
efficiency Individual behavior is efficient if it is consistent with attaining the purposes and goals 
sought In this sense their understanding of efficiency is essentially different from the Smithian 
notion A simple example can illustrate this point suppose an individual wishes to spend an entire 
hour washing a car which he can do in fifteen minutes If he ends up taking only fifteen minutes in 
spite of the fact that he wished to be an entire hour washing the car then we would say that he acted 
inefficiently In order to say that he is acting inefficiently it is necessary to assume that he did not 
change his mind during the process and that his methods were inconsistent with his goals 42
This concept of efficiency is also in contrast with the neoclassical approach in many senses 
Neoclassical work mainly with the concept of Pareto Optimality which establishes that m perfectly 
efficient markets all economic transactions in society are such that no one is made better off at the 
expense of another This notion is perfectly consistent with the ideas of social cost social benefit and 
social efficiency developed by the neoclassical school Indeed the main arguments for intervention 
under the scope of the neoclassical—i e monopoly externalities are supported by the notion of 
social efficiency In contrast Hayek and the Austrians reject concepts of efficiency that supersedes 
individual criteria This implies that they do not accept m general the neoclassical notion of market 
failure There is no social criteria that can justify government intervention
Coercion
Rothbard one of the most radical Austrians concedes no argument for the role of coercion In his view 
the political sphere is subsumed by the economic sphere which comprises the whole of society
no State or similar agency contrary to the market is needed to define or allocate property 
rights This can and will be done by the use of reason and through market processes 
themselves any other allocation or definition would be completely arbitrary and contrary 
to the principles of the free society ^
In contrast with Rothbard Hayek seems to be a fairly mild proponent of free markets The role of 
government is as he defines it indispensable to sustain social order
The effective limitation of power is the most important problem of social order 
Government is indispensable for the formation of such an order only to protect all against 
coercion and violence from other44
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But where should the limits of coercion be drawn7 Wc will discuss below how Hayek s preferred 
role of the State is minimal it should only provide the institutional conditions for tree markets to 
work The government as he develops it in Law Legislation and Liberty has the basic 
responsibilities for defense and administration of justice However Hayek also supports coercion for a 
tew public goods and public services such as education
His case for administration o f justice focuses on the defense of property rights The Austrians view 
of Property Rights is particularly interesting and it is worth comparing with the neo classical view 
The Austrians in general support perfectly well defined property rights Well defined property rights 
are crucial in order to reduce uncertainty which certainly implies that the price mechanism will reflect 
more accurately the individual s preferences As one Austrian economist has put it
A property rights system lays down the rules it defines the freedoms and restrictions 
according to which we evaluate alternatives and make choices but as such it is 
conceptually distinct from alternatives among which we choose 45
In contrast most neoclassical view property rights as variable They believe these rights should 
be granted—normally by the state to those who value them the most The neoclassical school s goal 
is to maximize social efficiency—a criterion never present tor Neo Austrians—this is the reason why 
the rights are assigned in a case by case basis to the party who has the most to gain 46
A final comment we want to make on this issue refers to suggestions—see in particular Rothbard 47 
that property rights should entail the whole universe of rights even human rights 48 Indeed as 
mentioned before the goal is to remove the political sphere from the whole of society In any event 
despite the hilarity of this proposition a relevant questions remains What should be the content of 
property rights7 Furthermore how private should property rights be7 The discussion of this questions 
are left for further research with the exception of the following point Free markets may be interpreted 
in various ways even if we just focus on the main institutional framework within which they 
supposedly operate
Market Failure7
The Neo Austrians view the notion of market failure as particularly misleading This concept certainly 
implies that the market is a mean to desired ends There is no view more antithetical to the Austrians 
Hayek put it in these terms
Competition is thus like experimentation on science just and foremost a discovery 
procedure As is true of the results of scientific experimentation we can judge the 
value of the results only by the conditions under which it was conducted not by the 
results It therefore cannot be said of competition any more than of any other sort of 
experimentation that it leads to a maximization of any measurable results It merely leads 
under favourable conditions to the use of more skill and knowledge that any other known 
procedure We can never say by what aggregate amount the net benefits available to 
the people have increased 49
Market failure for the neoclassical school essentially refers to the cases of monopoly externalities 
and public goods Smith considered monopoly an essential problem because it led to a reduction of the 
size of the market and thereby affected efficiency In particular he disliked it because of its effects on 
consumers For Hayek on the contrary monopoly would be rarely regarded as a market failure He 
suggests that It is not monopoly but only the prevention of competition (and all prevention of 
competition whether it leads to monopoly or not) which is morally wrong 50 He explains further his 
argument
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There exists no more argument in justice or a moral case against such a monopolist 
making a monopoly profit than there is against anyone who decides that he will work no 
more than he finds worth his while In certain circumstances it is true that even the 
power over prices etc may confer upon a monopolist the power of influencing the 
market behaviour of others in a manner which protects him against unwelcome 
competition We shall see that in such cases there is indeed a strong argument for 
preventing him from doing We know how to induce such individuals organizations to 
serve their fellows better than anyone else can do But we have no means of always 
making them serve the public as well as they could Sl
In other words Hayek s point is that monopoly per se is not harmful Moreover it could be the 
result of a competitive process as long as its prices are sufficiently competitive to deter entrants The 
monopolist must be at least as efficient as any potential competitor and if the competitive process is 
not distorted there is no moral argument against it He supports intervention against monopoly only 
in cases in which it affects the competitive process This view is consistent with his reluctance to 
apply any social criteria that supersede individuals choices The neoclassical school on the contrary 
considers monopoly harmful due to the net social losses it generates
Finally Hayek considers that the government should only provide a few select public goods 
However his argument supporting provision of these goods rests not on considerations related to the 
increment of social wealth but on a sort of exchange each agreeing to contribute to a common 
pool according to the same uniform principles on the understanding that his wishes with regard to the 
services to be financed from that pool will be satisfied in proportion to his contributions 59
There are very few cases besides the ones mentioned above for which intervention is supported 
Interestingly however Hayek condones the use of constructive reason to support institutions that 
have evolved naturally —those that are integral parts of the spontaneous order
Conclusion
The arguments for free markets of Adam Smith and the Austrians have different normative bases 
Moreover they are founded on conflicting notions of efficiency and wealth As a result the policy 
maxims they propose differ substantially The analysis of Smith s invisible hand leads to the 
conclusion that his natural order maintains social harmony through the maximization of wealth The 
maximization of physical production is the main normative goal he imposes on society and actually is 
one of his main arguments in favor of coercion In his model the state s coercive powers developed 
naturally in the defense of property rights and constructive reason is used to support coercion in 
other areas such as promoting the formation of the good citizen
In contrast the Austrian view is totally founded on negative liberty For the Austrians wealth is a 
subjective notion that entails a highly individualistic concept of efficiency The role of the state is 
limited to little more than the definition and enforcement of property rights and coercion is rarely 
justified by social considerations that supersede individual entena Hayek endorses constructive reason 
only when it supports spontaneously developed institutions—those that allow free markets to operate
Further research should address the relation between markets and society In particular it would be 
interesting to contrast Hayek s notions of progress and evolution with Smith s view For Hayek 
competition is the driving force behind evolution and progress In fact Smith s pervasive interest in 
society might exceed Hayek s simplified characterization The distinctions between Smith and Hayek 
illustrate how difficult if not impossible it is to maintain any objective standard m the science of 
economics
Contrary to the claims of positivism all social analyses are inspired by ideologies The case for free 
markets is just another subjective interpretation of society Undeniably there is abundant evidence from
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experience that markets have enhanced wealth and innovation Nevertheless to make the leap to a total 
advocacy of laissez faire is not only without regard for history but also delusive
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